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This thesis argues that copyright law, in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States, has become predominantly focused on creating and maintaining and creating 
new and pre-existing legal interests for economic exploitation. The early eighteenth 
century aims of copyright law, as put forward by the legislatures, courts, and 
academics, were not predicated solely on the protection of owners interests. Instead, 
upon exploration, copyright has moved away from its original objectives such as the 
dissemination of information and the improvement of learning, and instead has 
created an environment of exclusive control to procure increased profits in the digital 
age. This is considered to be inappropriate in the digital era as content recipients now 
have an increased capacity to creatively re-use digital content in the production of 
unique and innovative works. 
The result of these developments has been the creation of an environment of panoptic 
surveillance and digital licencing that is discouraging creativity based on proprietary 
rights. This has meant that potential creators and recipients obtain needless licenses, 
clearances, and permissions under an impulse to avoid the litigation process for either 
copyright infringement or contractual breaches to avoid legal liability. Ultimately, there 
has been an emphasis on the control of works, as opposed to creativity, where digital 
technology and the application of copyright thereof is being utilised by copyright 
owners, who can avoid the due process of law under the current law. Indeed, the 
protection of right holder interests can reasonably be said to be analogous to 
encouraging creativity, but it is suggested that in the digital environment this 
assumption is perpetuating current business models at the expense of user freedom 
and creativity.   
This thesis argues that copyright has been fundamental to creating the current system 
due to the way it operates in the digital world. To do so, the thesis considers how the 
internet created new forms of dissemination that were extremely difficult to control with 
the law and how these same factors represented an economic and ideological 
challenge to the music industry. To this end, the thesis analyses the role of capitalism 
and proprietary rights in the development of the current system. This includes how 
copyright law has influenced the development of the current streaming business model 
using digital contracts via licencing. The extent to which licenses are now serving to 
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increase the control that copyright holders can exert over their works and the potential 
for contract to restrict re-use is also considered.    
The thesis, therefore, suggests that these issues would be reduced if there was a more 
cost-efficient copyright regime that could increase individual access to the material. 
This also includes using specific legislation to counteract the issue of contracts in the 
digital marketplace. To achieve this, the thesis outlines reform proposals which 
embody the foundational underpinnings behind the creation and existence of copyright 
like the dissemination of information. This could be achieved through driving down 
prices which are predicted to create a more financially accessible system. The 
proposals will also recommend the outlawing of agreements which prevent the 
application, or otherwise obscure the enforcement, of legitimate copyright limitations. 
This will be done to the effect that the reforms are still applicable under the agreement.  
However, this will not affect individual contractual enforceability, except where the 
terms of the agreement act to otherwise prevent the enforceability of the reforms. As 
a result, the reforms recognise the underlying principle that copyright is fundamentally 
a property right. Ultimately, the aim is to lessen the overt focus upon economic 
exploitation and enhance the transferability of digital assets by freeing up some of the 
constraints through creating more financially accessible works and limiting the impact 
of contracts. 
In so doing, the thesis proposes a ‘capping’ system that places a ‘cap’ on what can be 
charged for a work. The basic tenet of this system is:  
(The size of the work) = (The maximum price it can be market for until (x) 
number of copies/amount are/is sold in accordance with the figure imposed by 
the capping system). 
Under the proposed system, rightsholders and distributors will have to declare the 
accuracy of their numbers under a formal system of registration. Then, once the 
qualifying (number/amount/duration) of (works) have been sold/licensed in 
accordance with the rules imposed by the guidelines provided: the work can be 
sold/licensed at a rate chosen by the owner. If there is a conflict where, for example, 
a work is otherwise contended to be outside of the regulation of the proposed 
framework, for whatever reason, it will be for an administrative body to adjudicate on 
such issues.  
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This system aims to reduce costs overall within copyright which could increase the 
number of works available due to increased financial accessibility, including the 
prevention of any undermining by contract. The current copyright systems, based 
around economic exploitation and proprietary-based exclusivity, have become too 
influenced by these factors. Recognising this, the proposed system adopts elements 
from all the factors that have contributed to the creation of the current system. The 
revised system seeks to lessen the focus on the exploitation of copyrighted goods, by 
regulating the sale, and re-use, of works. Therefore, the proposals aim to provide a 
framework that could reduce prices overall and will have an effect beyond 
enforcement. This will be done by working with capitalism to provide a practical basis 
towards dealing with the issues raised in the thesis to procure more accepted change. 
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1.1 The problem.  
“The State is involved in the recording industry by first assigning monopoly 
rights to recorded content through copyrights. By establishing the ownership of 
music through copyrighting, constructed as a form of intellectual property, the 
State creates the means through which value can be produced from the 
production of music. From sheet music to digital files, copyright is what enables 
the capitalist production of music...To the extent the State creates and protects 
property rights, the State is in support of capitalism.”1  
This thesis is study of how UK and US copyright law in the music industry has become 
so heavily focused upon maintaining a balance between the interests of right holders 
of content and those of content recipients, and how this has resulted in an a restriction 
of creativity2 beyond the confines of copyright law itself in the digital age. The balance 
has been disturbed significantly by the way copyright law governs digital assets where 
limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners like the exhaustion3 and first 
 
1 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015), at 43-44.  
2 See this chapter at 1.5.  
3 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 s.18(3)(a); C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg SA v. Cassina 
SpA, Case [2008] ECR I-2731(ECJ); A. Ohly, Economic Rights, in E. Derclaye, Research Handbook 
on the Future of EU Copyright Law (ed.) (2009), 237-8; Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015]; Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene 
Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019. 
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sale4 doctrines are often rendered inapplicable under contract.5 This has resulted in 
an increased amount of imperative control6 that right holders can exert, which is the 
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given 
group of persons. This is because many copyright owners, through changes in 
markets and technologies,7 have been able to nullify the legal rights that copyright law 
gives to users, by purporting to bind consumers to overreaching digital licenses.8  
The implications of this have meant that although an act may be carried out without 
infringing copyright, there can be a breach of contract, even though there may be no 
infringement of copyright9 in both the UK10 and the US.11 The usage of contracts has 
meant the proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it12 is 
being eroded in the sphere of digital licenses in copyright.13 In the digital copyright 
sector, the common form of such a legal relationship is now in the form of a ‘click wrap’ 
license which typically takes the form of a page of text to which a user must signal 
 
4 17 USC §109(a); This principle was reaffirmed in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730 (1989) (commissioning party owned the sculpture but not copyright; artist permitted access 
to sculpture in order to access his copyright); Pope v Curl (1741) 2 Atk 341, 26 ER 608; Cooper v 
Stephens [1895] 1 Ch 567; The principle is often traced back to the US Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
5 See chapter 4.  
6 Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation The Free Press, (1947), pp.152-53.  
7 Lindsay, D., ‘The law and economics of copyright, contract and mass market licenses’ Research 
Paper prepared for the Centre for Copyright Studies Ltd, [2002], p.3.  
8 See Perzanowski, A. and Schultz, J., The End of Ownership (Cambridge, MA 2016), 15-101; M.J. 
Radin, Boilerplate (Princeton 2013), 33-51, 168-76; see e.g. L. Hyde, Common as Air: Revolution, 
Art, and Ownership (New York 2010), 66-68 – Taken from Litman, J., ‘What we don’t see when we 
see copyright as property’ Cambridge Law Journal [2018], 77(3), 536-558. 
9 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th 
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; See also, chapter 4 at 4.5    
10  Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988, s.28(1). 
11 17 U.S.C. 1976 §.109(d). 
12 Friedman, M The Relation between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom’ in Capitalism and  
   Freedom (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962) at 13.  
13 See chapter 4 at 4.3.2. 
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agreement in order to use or access the content.14 Yet, ‘private property’ and ‘freedom 
of contract’ are not to be seen as adequate answers to regulating copyright because 
their meaning is often ambiguous. Problems begin when we ask what ought to be the 
contents of property rights, what contracts should be enforceable, and how contracts 
should be interpreted or, rather, what standard forms of contract should be read into 
the informal agreements of everyday transactions.15 
Changes in markets and technologies disrupt existing legal regimes.16 The emergence 
of MP3 files caused the major record labels to change their production and distribution 
methods as their standard business models were altered.17 File-sharing had the 
potential to procure mass “disintermediation” (removal of the middle-man) in the 
copyright system. This altered the normal physical means of distribution for major 
record labels.18 The response by the music industry was the establishment of a system 
panoptic surveillance19 to procure compliance within the digital music industry using 
copyright law.20 The term surveillance can be deconstructed in its etymological parts 
 
14  Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, [2008], chapter 5 at 5.2.3.2; Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass 
v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 
934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
15 Friedrich, H., Individualism and Economic Order (H Regnery & Co, Chicago, 1972) at 113. 
16 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  Part I, IV.  
17 See chapter 2 at 2.2; See also, chapter 3 at 3.6, and chapter 4; To see the historical impact of 
technological revolutions on the recorded industry, see Peter Tschmuck, Creativity and innovation in 
the Music Industry (Springer Pub, 2012) at 9–196; On the way in which digital technology impacted 
the music industry and how the record labels reacted to such change, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The 
Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  at 1-70.  
18 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015), at 6-20, 107; Nicholas G and Inglis F. Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the 
Economics of Information. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990).  
19  See chapter 2 at 2.3 and 2.5.  
20 Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d and MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct 2764 (US Supreme Court, 2005); Arnold, R. ‘Content 
Copyrights and Signal Copyrights: The Case for a Rational Scheme of protection’ [2011] 1 QMJIP 
272; See also, chapter 4 at 4.3 and 4.7. 
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‘sur’ (from above), and ‘veillance’ (to watch).21 This was to “staunch the flow from the 
internet artery”22 from the “digital revolution”23 where right holders were equipped by 
copyright law with “enough weapons” to win a number of “battles” against both file 
sharing platforms and end-users throughout the 2000s.24  
This thesis argues that contracts laid the foundation for the ‘streaming’ model under 
‘signal’ copyrights.25 Streaming refers to any media content – live or recorded – 
delivered to computers and mobile devices via the internet and played back in real 
time. Podcasts, webcasts, movies, TV shows and music videos are common forms of 
streaming content.26 The significance of this business model is such that in 2017, it 
was estimated that 70% of digital music sales globally and 38% of global music sales, 
were accessed via the streaming model,27 with streaming predicted to double music 
industry revenues to $104bn by 2030.28 
The fundamental basis behind both subscription and download services is that music 
listeners will no longer own the music; rather, they will rent it.29 As soon as a user fails 
 
21 Galič, M., Timan, T. & Koops, B. Bentham, ‘Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance 
Theories from the Panopticon to Participation’ [2017] Philos. Technol. 30, 9–37.   
22 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press  
2004) at 51-2. 
23 Menell, P, S. ‘The American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright for the 
Internet Age’ 61 J. [2014] Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 235.  
24 Malevanny, N., Online Music Distribution – How much Exclusivity is Needed?: A Study of 
International, European, German and U.S. Copyright Systems and Their Objectives, (Springer-
Verlag, 2019) at 2. 
25  See chapter 3 at 3.5; On ‘streaming’ see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), 
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 26-
141.  
26 <https://www.verizon.com/info/definitions/streaming/> accessed: 21/04/2018).  
27  IFPI, Global Music Report 2018 at 11, <https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2018.pdf> (note that 
these statistics are based on estimation only and may be subject to change) accessed: 22/12/2019; 
See also chapter 4 at 4.6.    
28 ,<http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/music-in-the-air.html> accessed: 19/8/2017.  
29    For the UK, see Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 
1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; In the US, see, 
Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 F.3d 
1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v 
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to pay the fee (or cancels the subscription), and the computer or device that stores the 
music is connected to the internet, the files then cease to work because the use of that 
subscription is contingent on a fee.30 The imposition of digital agreements has meant 
that rightsholders can govern beyond the physical context31 as they are intangible32 
and are sold subject to license.33 This has enabled copyright owners to minimize any 
subsequent distributions that may have been carried out by ‘users’ (by users, this 
means primarily the individual consumers who wish to utilize copyright-protected 
material). The result is that now, certain acts now require the consent of copyright 
owners, with copyright law now acting to increase the influence of these contractual 
terms.34 As technology is enabling ever greater communication of content, it is 
 
Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., Cal., Jan 20, 2015); Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
30  Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 
2015) at 120-124.  
31 See chapter 4 at 4.4, 4.5, 4.7.   
32 In the UK, see Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 
1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; In the US, see, 
Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 F.3d 
1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v 
Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., Cal., Jan 20, 2015); Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
33 In the UK see CDPA 1988 s.28(1); In the US, see 17 U.S.C. §109(d); For more information, see 
chapter 4 at 4.5.  
34 See chapter 4 at 4.5, 4.7.   
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increasingly difficult to create balance35 in a copyright system in a society that is 
increasingly virtualized36 and where digital contracts have become the norm.37  
This thesis posits that increasing access to information should be the focus of any 
reform. The inherent focus on economic exploitation38 and proprietary rights39 in the 
current copyright system has created a legal environment that operates to increase 
costs to re-use works and this restricts creativity.40 The ‘capping’ system the thesis 
proposes differs from the imposition of any negative rights. Instead, it aims to 
encourage creativity by creating cheaper works, and processes, overall, across the 
 
35  FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429-08 [2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, Grand Chamber), Painer, 
Case C-145/10 [2012] ECDR (6) 89 (ECJ), [132], [134]; Deckmyn, Case C 201/13, EU:C:2014:458), 
[27]; England & Wales Cricket Board v. Tixdaq [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch), [73]; In the US, when 
measuring whether an act is fair use, the court looks at four factors in particular to determine 
whether a usage is ‘fair’ in order to maintain a balance between authors and users. These are: The 
nature if the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion taken - Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); The purpose and character of the use (the transformative 
factor) - Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D. N.Y. 2008); The 
effect upon the potential market - Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).   
36 Balkin, J., ‘Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds’ 90 Virginia 
Law Review [2004] 2043; Lastowka, G, & Hunter, D., ‘The Laws of the Virtual Worlds’ 92 California 
Law Review [2004] 1; Moringiello, J.M, ‘‘What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law’’ 62 Florida 
Law Review [2010] 159.  
37 See chapter 4 at 4.2.  
38 Copyright is treated as a form of personal property right that can be exploited in a number of ways, 
most importantly by assignment or license – CDPA 1988 ss.1 and 90(1); Griffin notes that the 
development of copyright has been predominantly centred around the capitalist principles of 
economic rights - Griffin, J., A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property 
Quarterly. 
39 See chapter 2 at 3.2 
40 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [14] & [25]; Bryant, C. and Heeley, R., ‘The Kraftwerk case - does a two-second 
sample infringe copyright?’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(4), 125-128; In the US, see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 200) Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs 
Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th 
Cir. 2016); See also, Bartlett, C., ‘Bridgeport Music's Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Big Chill on 
the Music Industry’ 15 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. [2005] 301. 
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copyright spectrum41 as competition is seen as a behavioural process. 42 These 
measures are not designed or implemented in a way that alienates consumers and 
undermines work in education and extending the appeal of legitimate markets.43  
The capping system offered by this thesis operates on the basis that: 
“(The size of the work)44 = (The maximum price45 it can be market for until (x) 
number of copies/amount are/is sold in accordance with the figure imposed by 
the capping system)”46 
Rightholders and distributors will have to declare the accuracy of their own numbers 
under a formal system of registration.47 Then, once the qualifying 
(number/amount/duration) of (works) have been sold/licensed in accordance with the 
rules imposed by the guidelines provided: the work can be sold/licensed at a rate 
chosen by the owner. For simplicity, the analysis focuses on copyright protection for 
 
41 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3 and 5.5.3(a).  
42 McNulty, P. ‘A Note on the History of Perfect Competition’ (1967) 75 J Political Economy 395, who 
mentions the influence of other writers in the seventeenth century; McNulty, P., ‘Economic Theory 
and the Meaning of Competition’ (1968) 82 Quarterly J Economics 639. 
43 Hargreaves, I., ‘Digital opportunity: A review of Intellectual property and growth’ (2011) at 8.45. 
44 ‘Size’ is not defined explicitly here because it is considered to be a quantitative matter that should 
be outlined by the statutory proposals which should be considered within the wider context of the 
culture economy. In addition, such an analysis is deemed to be a matter for governmental 
consideration based on the fact that to provide a comprehensive analysis of potential prices and 
sizes is argued to be beyond the scope of this thesis, as this is designed to provide a framework for 
more detailed reform within the copyright sector to be developed. 
45 For purposes here, no specific number of items (or) duration is provided, neither are specific prices 
because the framework provided is intended to offer a basic outline without any specific numbers. 
Instead, it is designed to provide a model in which accurate numbers can be inserted into, and 
implemented into law by way of a fully-fledged extensive economic analysis. In addition, it is 
suggested that such an analysis is deemed to be beyond the scope of this thesis and so to provide 
specifics pertaining to numbers beyond the scope of this piece.     
46 The proposals are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to other forms of expression – Landes W., and 
Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal Studies 325  
47 For more information, see this chapter at 5.7.3.3(a). 
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(items) and other written works, but it should be noted that the proposals are 
applicable, “mutatis mutandis, to other forms of expression as well.”48 
The ‘capped’ aspect of the proposals works by applying what are known as ‘price 
controls’ to the current copyright system, which is the ability to set maximum and 
minimum prices.49 The reforms would set a ‘maximum price’ that could be charged in 
relation to works sold and re-used, and the price of works cannot go above a certain 
level until a certain amount have been sold/re-used.50 The aim overall, is to reduce 
prices below the market equilibrium price, and this could reduce prices overall across 
the copyright system even after the ‘capped’ phase.51  
It will be argued that contracts also present a challenge to the proposed system. Both 
s.28(1)52 and §.109(d)53 can mean that copyright protects works in the case of a 
copyright violation, can also create further rights under contract that are particular to 
the terms of that agreement. This creates what can be fairly deemed to be a ‘two-tier’ 
system of protection.54 This thesis suggests that such items can be used to contract 
out of the proposed system in same way as they are used to invalidate copyright 
defences.  
Professor Ian Hargreaves would seemingly agree, where he proposed a 
recommendation in his 2011 review, when talking about limits to copyright. He 
recommended that: 
“the Government should legislate to ensure that...copyright exceptions are 
protected from override by contract.”55 
 
48 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
49<https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/621/economics/price-controls-advantages-and-
disadvantages/> accessed: 19/02/2019; On re-use, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b).  
50 There is a reason why ‘quantity’ here is used over a ‘time’ based approach – for more information, 
see chapter 5 chapter at 5.3.1. 
51 See also, part 5.5 in this chapter generally, and specifically, 5.5.3(a). 
52 CDPA 1988.  
53 17 U.S.C. 
54 See chapter 4 at 4.5.  
55 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011) at p.8; See 
also, chapter 4 at 4.8, chapter 5 at 5.4.  
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Contracts need specific consideration in order to ensure that the reforms are not 
undermined by contract,56 which includes making sure that they apply to situations 
where works are re-used.57 It will be argued that the proposals could be considered a 
‘special case’ in accordance with the Berne Convention58 and TRIPS,59 as well as 
other international provisions.60 The Berne Convention61 states, in relation to the 
reproduction right, under Article 9(2) that: 
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”62 
The proposed system aims to provide a set of rules which do not significantly limit any 
of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright. Instead, they seek to provide a system 
of remuneration for rightsholders that does not conflict with the normal exploitation of 
a work as the restrictions apply for a limited period. The temporary nature of the 
system is unlikely to unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author as 
 
56 See chapter 5 at 5.4; Jacobsen v Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008); 
Care has to be taken with this case, since the license is one that provides a condition of use which 
might otherwise result in copyright infringement. The broader case which extended copyright 
protection to an area where it was previously denied was in ProCD, Inc. v ZeidenBerg, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Circuit, 1996). 
57 See chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b). 
58 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised in 
Paris  on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S, Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [The 1979 amended 
version does not appear on UNTS or ILM, but the 1971 Paris version is available at 1161 UNTS 30 
(1971)]; On the Berne Convention generally, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, 
(eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 
23-04.  
59Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, 15th December 1993, 33 ILM 81 (1994).  
60 Malevanny, N., Online Music Distribution – How much Exclusivity is Needed?: A Study of 
International, European, German and U.S. Copyright Systems and Their Objectives, (Springer-
Verlag 2019) at chapter 3.  
61 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) 1886 (Berne, 
September 9, 1886).  
62 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Article 9(2).  
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the limitations are not permanent, so there is a chance for them to recoup any 
perceived lost funds. As there is no reduction in the legal rights of the author other 
than their ability to exploit their works for a limited time, it is likely that the measures 
will comply with article 9(2) and could be deemed a ‘special case’.  
It will be asserted that this will increase in the amount of information that is 
disseminated. This is because the drive-down in prices pertaining to creation, and re-
use, which could also see costs reduced at the point of sale post-reform due to the 
reduction in production costs for rightsholders. This also includes limiting the effects 
of Article 17.63 In some situations a creative re-use may involve several works, such 
as with a piece of music combining together numerous samples at once. This thesis 
argues that the reforms would apply in the same manner, but would be adapted in 
accordance with the current approach in a manner that works alongside the 
compulsory licensing scheme.64 
 
1.2 Why use the capping approach and not licensing?65 
“One of the core purposes of copyright law is to remunerate right holders for 
use of their works... the emergence of sound recordings allowed performances 
of music without the consent of right holders... Legislators all over the world 
reacted differently. Some simply prohibited such forms of private use (e.g., 
USA, UK), while others (Germany or France as front runners), realizing that 
they could never effectively control private behaviour, legalized it and 
established at the same time a compensation (levy) system, under which 
copying devices and blank media were charged with fees, respectively, and 
collecting societies were involved to distribute the revenues among the right 
 
63 Directive 2019/790; For more information, see the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3.1.1(b) and chapter 
3 at 3.5.1.4.  
64 See chapter 5 at 5.4.2, 5.4.2.3; Kung-Chung L., and Reto M.H., Remuneration of Copyright 
Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) 
at 71-83, 85-100.  
65 See chapter 5 at 5.4.2.3  
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holders...and the compensation system had one strong argument on its side: 
creators (the original right holders) could be compensated.”66  
The rise in direct licencing has lessened the role of copyright exceptions and levies.67 
In the UK, there are few non-voluntary licenses because international standards that 
the UK has obligated itself to are resistant to such items.68 This also includes the fact 
that the exploitation of rights is generally the copyright owners privilege.69 In the US, 
the restrained scope of the licenses proves to be a consistent difficulty. For instance, 
§115 is often regarded as being ill-equipped at dealing with the licencing needs of the 
21st Century and places artificial limits on the free marketplace.70   
Moreover, so-called extended collective license systems (ECL systems) are also 
considered to be ill-suited here. ECL systems are primarily aimed at including the 
rights from non-represented right holders (so-called “outsiders”), to procure a 
complete repertoire for the user. In doing so, ECL systems improve collective rights 
management (CRM). Yet, being a form of “blanket paying mechanism” the CRM and, 
in particular, ECL systems have worked quite well in the past.71  
 
66 Kung-Chung L., and Reto M.H., Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New 
Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) at v.  
67 Kretschmer, M., ‘Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies 
in Europe’ [2011] Intellectual Property Office, Newport (22 out of the then 27 Member states had 
these schemes); For background, see B, Hugenholtz, The Story of the tape Recorder and the 
History of Copyright Levies in B. Sherman and L. Wiseman, Copyright and the Challenge of the New 
(eds., 2012) chapter 7; Karapapa, S., Private Copying (Routledge 2012); See also, Microsoft Mobile 
Sales International Oy, Case C-110/15, EU:C:2016:326, [AG23] (AG Wahl) (noting that the increase 
in direct licensing of consumers and the diminishing importance of the private copying exception and 
levy); Case C-572/14 Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer 
Urheberrechte GmbH v Amazon [2016].  
68 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 28-06.  
69 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791, 7811 [AG-56].  
70 Statement on Music Licencing Reform of Marybeth Peters before the Subcommittee on Intellectual 
property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 12th, 
(2005).  
71 Kung-Chung L., and Reto M.H., Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New 
Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) at 86 and 4.4.2.  
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However, whether this could work efficiently under modern technological conditions 
such as online markets is questionable.72 This also includes potential issues regarding 
the ECL compatibility with EU and International Law73 such as the Berne Convention 
“three-step test”74 which applies to all “limitations and exceptions.”75 Thus, licenses 
are considered to be inappropriate in any copyright reform as they are often viewed 
with suspicion in copyright law,76 as well as being difficult on an administrative 
basis.77 This also includes being perceived as operating against the free market 
philosophical underpinnings inherent within copyright78 amongst other things.79  
The proposals will manoeuvre around such issues because they are not permanent 
meaning that any issues of how they are perceived will only be for a limited time.80 It 
will be argued that this minimises any potential interruption of the free market as the 
proposals are temporary, but can also have an effect on the cost of works overall in 
the copyright sector post-reform.81 This is posited to present minimal disruption to 
 
72 Ibid.  
73 Kung-Chung L. and Reto, M. H, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New 
Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) at 5.2. 
74 See the discussion in chapter 5 at 5.3.2. 
75 Article 13, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); Article 8, 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT); There is debate as to whether the ECL model would be a limitation 
or an exemption - Trumpke, F., ‘The Extended Collective License – A Matter of Exclusivity?’ [2012], 
NIR 2012, 264-294; Article 5 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society.   
76 Ginsburg, ‘Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information’ 90 [1990] 
Col. Law Review 1865 at 1872. 
77 See further Scrutton, The Law of Copyright (1883), at 14. 
78 Ginsburg, ‘Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information’ 90 [1990] 
Col. Law Review 1865 at 1924. 
79 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 28-08.  
80 To see why a ‘quantity-based’ approach is used  as opposed to a ‘time-based’ approach, see 
chapter 5 at 5.3.1.  
81 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a). 
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copyright holders monopolies,82 but could also create a cheaper, more efficient, and 
subsequently, more accessible copyright market overall.83   
The thesis will argue that the greater emphasis on direct licencing amongst consumers 
that has diminished the importance of things such as the private copying exception,84 
further supports the decision to move away from licencing as a basis of any reform 
strategy. This conclusion is considered to be more likely in light of Reprobel,85 and 
Article 16 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market.86 Also, the legal 
use of copyright works outside of a country on the basis of a national ECL model is 
not possible due to the principle of territoriality.87 This is particularly important for this 
thesis as creative content is increasingly distributed in non-physical formats across 
national borders through different networks and devices, whereby it is questionable 
whether the national models of ECL systems may have a future at all.88 Yet, it is also 
 
82 For more information on how these reforms will comply with the various international conventions 
and obligations of both the US and the UK, see this chapter at 5.3.2.  
83 For more information on the benefits that the reforms could have on the copyright market, see 
chapter 5 at 5.5 
84 Case C-110/15, Microsoft Mobile Sales International Oy, EU:C:2016:326, [AG23] (AG Wahl) (noting 
the increase in direct licencing of consumers is diminishing the importance of the private copying 
exception).  
85 Case C-572/13 Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v. Reprobel SCRL, EU:C:2015:750 (ECJ), at [48] 
(Presumably, publishers and other licensees or assignees can claim such compensation in 
accordance with any contractual agreement made with the author (or right holder).  
86 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC - Originally, it was listed as Article 12 (now Article 16) which specified that (a member 
state may specify that a transfer of a license to a publisher confers on the latter a ‘sufficient legal 
basis’ to be entitled to a share of compensation); See also the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3.1.1.   
87  On the issue of ‘territoriality’ and the associated copyright implications, see Polčák R., ‘Territoriality 
of Copyright Law’ (2020) - in: Szczepanik P, Zahrádka P, Macek J., and Stepan P. Digital 
Peripheries (eds. Springer Series in Media Industries. Springer, Cham).  
88 As far as Europe is concerned this development has also been identified by the European 
Commission, which clearly strives to facilitate cross-border use of works by promoting transnational 
or pan-European licensing; European Commission (2015), A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe, COM - Kung-Chung L., and Reto M.H., ‘Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory 
Challenges of New Business Models,’ (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) at 97-8.  
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acknowledged that the ECL method could operate within a territorial-based framework 
in a manner that is combined with reciprocal agreements between national CMOs; or 
by introducing a country of origin or transmission rule,89 whereby ECL systems may 
work on a national basis.90 Ultimately, however, it is not unfair to suggest that licencing 
methods, like the ECL approach, will be unsuitable in digital online markets. 
1.3 How this approach could increase access to information and 
encourage the re-use of content.  
The thesis argues that the proposals could result in a reduction in production costs 
which may see a potential increase in the level of information that is disseminated. 
This is based on the notion that a drive-down in fees relating to creation, and re-use, 
could see costs reduced overall at the post-reform stage due to the reduced production 
costs for copyright owners.91 This also includes limiting the effects of Article 17.92 
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that competition produces the best outcomes 
for society as competitive markets keep prices lowered, and this results in other 
qualitative and quantitative benefits flowing to consumers as a result.93  
Yet, this approach is not free of criticism,94 as it is primarily driven by empirical 
observation, the stance is premised on theoretical constructs, often with restrictive 
 
89  Under a “country of transmission rule” a user would only have to obtain a license from the country 
where the copyrighted work was made available, since the relevant act would be interpreted as 
taking place in the country of origin resp. transmission. A similar rule was introduced for satellite 
distribution in Europe (Article 1 Paragraph 2(b) Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 
on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to 
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission) – Taken from M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright 
Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017)  
at 98; L. Guibault (2015) and (2014); J. Axhamn / L. Guibault (2011), 60. 
90 M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New Business Models 
(Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) at 98.  
91 See chapter 5 at 5.5, 5.5.3, and 5.5.3(a).  
92 Directive 2019/790; For more information, see the discussion in chapter 3 at 3.5.1.4.  
93 Jones, A. and Sufrin, B. EU Competition Law (6th ed, Oxford University Press, 2016), at 86.  
94 R.J. van den Bergh and P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective (Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia/Hart Publishing, 2001), at 16, who 
emphasize the great divergences among economic schools since classical theory. However, 
competition economics has been nourished by these interactions between movements, schools, and 
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methods that are otherwise far removed from reality. However, in copyright, the cost 
of expression to authors of copyrighted works increases as copyright protection 
increases. Ultimately, this means that there is less material an author can borrow from 
other copyright holders without infringing their copyrights, whereby the cost of creating 
that work will be higher.95  
Moreover, if a later author is free to borrow material from an earlier one, the later 
author’s cost of expression is reduced; and, from an ex-ante viewpoint, every author 
is both an earlier author96 from whom a later author might want to borrow material and 
the later author himself. In the former position, he desires maximum copyright 
protection for works he creates; in the latter, he prefers minimum protection for works 
created previously.97  
This thesis suggests that a similar result could be achieved by limiting the cost that 
can be charged for a work (which also applies to re-use) without reducing copyright 
protection. This is due to the predicted reduction in production costs that could be 
induced by the proposals because natural prices are determined by the cost of 
production, and this is often irrespective of demand.98 This is based on the hypothesis 
that potential authors and publishers under this system will have lower rates to recoup 
when considering the price to charge for a work when it gets to market.99 This can be 
 
doctrines so that today it is relatively stable and reliable, at least in those applications with a longer 
history. 
95 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. 
96 Jaszi, P. ‘On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity’ Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal 10, no. 2 [1992]: 293-320. 
97 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
98 Smith, A., His Life, Thought, and Legacy (Eds. Ryan Patrick Hanley, Princeton University Press, 
2016) at 242 - (It should also be noted that this is, of course, not the entire story of economic 
growth, but nonetheless one essential element according to Smith); See also, this chapter at 
5.5).3(a).  
99 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
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indirectly achieved by the anticipated direct reduction in both licenses and production 
costs under the reforms.100  
It is predicted that this could induce socially efficient incentives to create new works101 
that result from the above self-interested bargaining, and also, the tendency of 
capitalists to consistently look for new ways to accumulate profit under the notion of 
self-interest.102 This also does not rule out the potentiality that the money acquired 
could also be used to secure compensation for authors indirectly, through the setting 
up of establishments designed to assist those in need of financial assistance under 
this approach.103 However, it is acknowledged that such arguments are 
quintessentially predictive in this economic system, but there is little alternative to this 
approach the economy of the entire earth which we can call “world economy” – cannot 
be absolutely determined, but only relatively so.104  
The thesis contends that the reforms could make works more financially accessible 
across the copyright spectrum as competition is regarded as a behavioural process.105 
This means that easier accessibility may lessen the restrictive aspects of the current 
system as lower prices could mean less unlicensed or infringing activities based on 
the fact that compliance would be more financially feasible, making works cheaper for 
creators and consumers.106 This is important as every author is both an earlier 
 
100 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
101 The funds could be used to pay for social and cultural establishments – Case C-521/11 
Amazon.com, EU:C:2013:515, [49]; See also, chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(a).  
102 See chapter 3 generally.  
103 Case C-462/09 Thuiskopie [2011] ECR I-5331, [29], [39]; Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 944.    
104 Steiner, R., ‘World Economy: The formation of a science of world economics’ Rudolf Steiner Press 
(1977), at 180.  
105  McNulty, P., ‘A Note on the History of Perfect Competition’ [1967] 75 J Political Economy 395, 
who mentions the influence of other writers in the seventeenth century; McNulty, P., ‘Economic 
Theory and the Meaning of Competition’ (1968) 82 Quarterly J Economics 639; Gruter, M., ‘Law and 
the Mind’, Londone: Sage, (1991), p.62 in De Soto, H., ‘The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism 
triumphs in the West and failed everywhere else’ Black Swan Publishing, (2001), pp.185-6; Litman, 
J., Digital Copyright (Promethus books, 2001). 
106 It is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. Poort and J. 
Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam [2018], 
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author107 from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the later author 
himself, and this means all parties to the copyright system could benefit from this 
approach in a system where everyone is a necessary co-creator to an extent.108   
Hargreaves would support this, stipulating that it is important to ensure that “measures 
are not designed or implemented in a way that alienates consumers and undermines 
work in education and extending the appeal of legitimate markets.”109 The reduction 
of costs in copyright is essential because in Reformation Publishing v Cruiseco110  it 
was held that a general starting point for a reasonable license fee for 1 year for 2 
songs is £155,000.111 
1.4 How this temporary approach could increase the ‘quality’ of works and 
further encourage creativity under capitalism112  
 
p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the communication to the 
public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]; See also, chapter 5 at 5.2. 
107 Jaszi, P., ‘On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity’ Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal 10, no. 2 (1992), 293-320. 
108 Bueys, J., ‘Not just a few are called, but everyone’ [1972], in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood 
(eds), Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford: Blackwell, [1999], pp. 
889-92 – Taken from: Reckwitz, A., The Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of 
the New (Polity press, 2017) at 72.   
109 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011), at 8.45.  
110 Reformation Publishing Company Limited v Cruiseco Limited and anor [2018] EWHC 2761 (Ch) – 
(a large part of the judgment looked at what type of damages would be appropriate and the recent 
cases of One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris - Garnier [2018] UKSC 20, and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd v Stinger Compania de Inversion SA [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1308 and concluded the term “Wrotham Park damages” to cover all the types of remedy should 
no longer be used. 
111 A large part of the judgment looked at what type of damages would be appropriate and the recent 
cases of One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris - Garnier [2018] UKSC 20, and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd v Stinger Compania de Inversion SA [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1308 and concluded the term “Wrotham Park damages” to cover all the types of remedy should 
no longer be used. 
112 For the purpose of understanding, the term ‘quality’ refers to ‘good-quality’ works, which is works 
of a high/superior standard in comparison to other pieces of a similar nature -  he standard of 
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The temporary nature of the reforms could push quality to the top of rightsholders 
agendas.113 This is because economic exploitation is contended to be their main 
motivation114 in a society that operates like a “workshop” which is “organised for the 
production of wealth” under capitalism.115 For understanding, it is argued that the 
quality of the work will directly affect an author’s ability to charge his rate. This is 
because under the current system they need to surpass the number of works required 
to be sold/licensed before they can gain pricing freedom.116  
Capitalism is an economic system to which there has been no workable alternative 
offered117 and the approach of the reforms is designed to provide what is predicted to 
be an indirect ‘incentivising’ mechanism that uses the profit-making mentality 
perpetuated by capitalism to encourage the creation of high-quality works.118 
Theoretically, the longer a work stays within the confines of the caps, the longer it will 
take for an owner to charge their rates.119 This fact could create a scenario where 
 
something as measured against other things of a similar kind; the degree of excellence of 
something. 
113 See chapter 5 at 5.5.2.  
114 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly; See also, chapter 3 at 3.2.    
115 Marx, K., Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (Trans. By T.B. Bottomore, 
McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1956), p.91; On capitalism, and the way it has affected the copyright 
system as a whole, see chapter 2 generally.  
116 This refers to the ability of authors to no longer be limited by the pricing limits imposed by the cap 
117 Harari, Y.H., Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow Penguin (Random House, 2015); For an 
opposing view, see Woolfgang, Streeck, How will capitalism end? (Verso Books, 2016) - (Wolfgang 
Streeck argues that we are witnessing a long and painful period of cumulative decay: of intensifying 
frictions, of fragility and uncertainty, and of a steady succession of normal accidents); Alternatives to 
capitalism have also been offered - Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin 
Publishing, 2016); Bregman, R., Utopia for Realists: And How We Can Get There, (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2017).  
118 See chapter 3; More specifically, see 3.2; See also, Steiner, R., The Threefold Social Order 
(Anthroposophic Press, 1966), chapter III.   
119 Predictive theoretical approaches are contended to be the only option in a reform system that has 
not been used before - Steiner, R., World Economy: The formation of a science of world economics 
(Rudolf Steiner Press, 1977) p.180. 
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rightsholders will attempt to focus on the quality of the works to bypass the pricing 
limitations.  
This is contended to cause creators to focus on the quality of the works produced 
under the limited prices they can charge to bypass these limits by creating high quality 
works with a corresponding level of demand that will enable them to do so in the 
quickest timeframe. Therefore, the temporary nature of these reforms remains a 
central element to their proposed success because owners could look to bypass the 
limits imposed and the production of high-quality works is contended to help achieve 
this. Ultimately, it is hypothesised that these factors will ensure that quality works 
remain a forefront consideration for those subject to the capping proposals in a 
capitalist society driven by profit accumulation.120  
The current evolution has created a copyright system that is discouraging creativity 
based on exclusive control to procure increased profits in the digital age. This is due 
to an inherent focus on economic exploitation121 and optimal exploitability122 in the 
music industry123 that is being further extended by a combination of contract and 
copyright.124 It is expected that the current approach will continue in capitalist 
society125 if the factors which have influenced the development of the current 
system126 are not considered when formulating reform here. 
 
120 See chapter 3 at 3.2.  
121 See chapter 3 at 3.2-3.2.1.  
122 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
123 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [14] and [25]; Bryant, C. and Heeley, R., ‘The Kraftwerk case - does a two-second 
sample infringe copyright?’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(4), 125-128; In the US, see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 200 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 
507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Bartlett, C., ‘Bridgeport Music's Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Big Chill on the Music Industry’ 
15 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 301 (2005).  
124 See chapter 4.  
125 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
126 See chapter 4 at 4.3.  
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This brings us to the central basis and fundamental questions of the thesis:  
- How did advancements in digital technology enable the creation of a system of 
panoptic surveillance and what role did the copyright legal process play in the ability 
of the music industry to adapt to these changes? (Chapter 2) 
- To what extent has capitalism and property influenced the development of the 
current system and how was the current streaming model for digital music built on 
the exclusive rights of communication and public performance? (Chapter 3) 
- How have digital contractual agreements increased copyright holder control 
unilaterally and restricted creativity, and if so, to what extent could these 
agreements be used to undermine the enforceability of the capping proposals? 
(Chapter 4)  
- How would the proposed capping system be implemented? (Chapter 5) 
It is argued that the current copyright system has become too focused on economic 
exploitation to the point where it is now acting to restrict creativity via a combination of 
copyright and contract127 under capitalism.128 To this end, the high costs associated 
with re-using works,129 and the costs associated with litigating a copyright claim,130 are 
suggested to justify a degree of questioning as to whether reduced prices within 
copyright could help alleviate the issues associated with the current system as 
 
127 See chapter 4 generally.  
128 See chapter 3 generally.   
129 See chapter 4 at 4.7 generally;  
130 See chapter 2 at 2.3 and 2.6 generally; See also chapter 4 at 4.7 generally; See also, Posner, 
R.A., Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p.393;  For example, in Bridgeport 
Music v. Dimension Films Inc. 410 F.3d 792 at 801 (6th Cir. 2005) per Guy J it was stated that users 
should “get a license or do not sample”; Gowers Review [2006] p.67; For more information, see the 
discussion in chapter 4 generally, and in particular, parts 4.5, 4.6, respectively; See also, Case C- 
476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 
December (2018); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 
2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016). Reformation Publishing 
Company Limited v Cruiseco Limited and anor [2018] EWHC 2761 (Ch).  
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opposed to limiting copyright protection.131 This is because copyright, in providing 
exclusive rights over acts such as reproduction and dissemination, also provides limits 
on such rights via doctrines such as exhaustion132 and first sale133 under contract.134  
However, many have argued that an increase in direct licencing has diminished the 
role of copyright exceptions and levies through contract in the digital age.135 This is 
because the fundamental nature of digital technology removes the applicability of 
these copyright limitations away.136 This allows copyright owners to exert control over 
their assets once they are transferred to customers under licence through the terms 
of these agreements. These agreements receive legislative under items like the E-
 
131 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 at 333; See also, chapter 5 at 5.3.1 and 5.5.3(a).  
132 CDPA 1988 s.18(3)(a); Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg SA v. Cassina SpA,  [2008] ECR I-
2731(ECJ); A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of 
EU Copyright Law [2009], 237-8; Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp 
[2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright 
[2015]; Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom 
Kabinet Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019. 
133 17 USC §109(a); This principle was reaffirmed in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
490 U.S. 730 (1989) (commissioning party owned the sculpture but not copyright; artist permitted 
access to sculpture in order to access his copyright); Pope v Curl (1741) 2 Atk 341, 26 ER 608; 
Cooper v Stephens [1895] 1 Ch 567; The principle is often traced back to the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  
134 See chapter 4 at 4.4 generally.  
135 Kretschmer, M., ‘Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies 
in Europe’ [2011] (22 out of the then 27 Member states had such schemes); Karapapa, S., ‘Private 
Copying’ (Routledge 2012); For background, see B, Hugenholtz, ‘The Story of the tape Recorder 
and the History of Copyright Levies’, in B. Sherman and L. Wiseman, Copyright and the Challenge 
of the New (eds. 2012, ch.7); See also, Case C-110/15 Microsoft Mobile Sales International Oy, 
EU:C:2016:326, [AG23] (AG Wahl) (noting that the increase in direct licensing of consumers and the 
diminishing importance of the private copying exception and levy); Case C-572/14 Austro-Mechana 
Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte GmbH v Amazon [2016].  
136 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.4.  
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Commerce Directive Art.9(1),137 and also both s.28(1)138 and §109(d)139 that assist the 
enforceability contractual terms140 in the copyright system.141 This is because although 
an activity may fall within one of the permitted acts142 does not preclude the fact that it 
does not contravene some other legal right (like contract).143 The thesis argues that 
this creates a ‘two-tier’ system of protection and exploitation for owners144 that has 
served to decrease dissemination and increase costs.145  
Notwithstanding this, it is acknowledged that digital rights management (DRM) is also 
a method that can assist copyright owners in controlling access to digital works and 
limiting potential transfers.146 This includes being used to track and limit uses147 as did 
 
137 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss.50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c); For 




138 CDPA 1988; See chapter 4 at 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively.  
139 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1976) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does not apply to a 
person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as someone who as 
obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee; See chapter 4 at 4.5.  
140 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.7.   
141 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; See chapter 4 at 4.4 and 4.5.  
142 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), chapter 7, part 3.  
143 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 9-20.  
144 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5. 
145 See chapter 3 at See also, chapter 4 at 4.5, 4.7.   
146  McKenzie, E., Note, A Book by Any Other Name: E-books and the First Sale Doctrine, 12 Chi. 
Kent. Journal of Intellectual Property, 57, 63 in Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The 
First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015).  
147 See Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, Am. Libr. Ass’n,  
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/digitalrights [http://perma.cc/D88E-HLHD] accessed: 
21/02/2019.   
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the music industry when selling songs online via iTunes,148 in an attempt at curbing 
illegal file-sharing.149 However, this will not be considered here as the top music 
companies have predominantly abandoned the use of DRM150 with the iTunes Store 
selling all music DRM-free.151  
Therefore, this thesis suggests that any proposed reform system outside of directly 
reducing copyright law in either scope or duration,152 should instead, seek to reduce 
costs across copyright in relation to sale and re-use for a limited period.153 It is 
hypothesised that the capping approach could transcend to reduced production fees 
and a correlative reduction in the overall cost of works generally.154 The reforms also 
consider the ability of digital contracts to otherwise restrict the current system.155 The 
only direct change to copyright law is the proposed introduction of a legislative 
provision that is designed to help solve the issue of rightsholders ‘contracting’ out of 
copyright law.156  
The thesis posits that these items could increase both the amount of information 
disseminated and the level of creative activity in relation to works by providing 
considerably greater certainty for the purchasers and re-users of copyright content 
that can be said to be lacking in the current system.157 Moreover, this may extend to 
an additional reduction in both infringements, and threats of, infringement 
 
148 Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ 
Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015)  at 181. 
149 See McKenzie, E., ‘A Book by Any Other Name: E-books and the First Sale Doctrine’ 12 Chi. Kent. 
Journal of Intellectual Property, at 62 in Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First 
Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . 
150 See chapter 4 at 4.1.  
151 Lettice, J., ‘Apple iTunes Store Goes ‘100% DRM-Free’ – Allegedly’ (2009) Register.  
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/06/macworld_itunes/> accessed: 21/02/2018.  
152 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. 
153 See chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b).  
154 See chapter 5 at 5.5 and 5.5.3(a).  
155 See chapter 5 at 5.4; On contracts specifically, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c).  
156 See chapter 4 at 4.8; See also, chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c). 
157 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [26]; For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5.1. 
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proceedings, as a whole158 by working with capitalism159 to provide incentives to 
creators.160  
Ultimately, the reforms could increase the accessibility of information by reducing 
production costs within copyright, and this may alleviate the issues within the current 
system by encouraging creativity and compliance with copyright through lowering 
costs overall in copyright. It is argued that this could help move the law closer to the 
early eighteenth century aims like the ‘improvement of learning’ under the Statute of 
Anne 1709161 by considering both right holders and recipients.162 This approach is 
considered to be particularly important because copyright law, as per the historic 
judgement handed down by Lord Mansfield, in Sayre v Moore: 
“must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;; the one, that 
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, 
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and 
labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded.”163 
1.5 Terminology and Perspective. 
 
158 Danaher and Telang, ‘Website Blocking Revisited’ (18 April 2016),  
SSRN, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795> accessed 30 June 2019 
(assesses how the aftermath of the November 2014 website blocks, there was a 6% increase in 
subscriptions to legitimate sources such as Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on 
legitimate ad-revenue supported sources such as BBC and Channel 5’s streaming sites. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. 
Poort and J. Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of 
Amsterdam [2018], p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the 
communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]. 
159 See chapter 3 at 3.2 and chapter 5 at 5.5.3.  
160 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011) at p.8; See 
also, chapter 5 at 5.3 and 5.5.   
161 “An act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or  
Purchasers of Such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned”- Statute of Anne 1709. See: 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html> accessed: 13/10/2014. 
162 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3.  
163 Per Lord Mansfield in Sayre v Moore [1785] at 362.  
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Consistent reference is made to property rights throughout this thesis, with a focus on 
intellectual property. Intellectual property rights are granted by the State and are 
limited both in term and scope. The thesis focuses on UK and US law, as these are 
most developed regarding legal argument, and consequently permit a greater level of 
analysis. EU law has been identified where relevant when discussing UK law. It is 
important to note that in the US, copyright law is quintessentially Federal. For the sake 
of clarity, the thesis specifies when cases are from the Supreme Court, Appeals courts 
and State courts. Yet, decisions may be different between courts of the same level, 
and this is highlighted at different points. 
The fundamental focus of the thesis, copyright law, is usually granted for a period of 
the life of the author plus 70 years.164 The rights include the right of reproduction and 
distribution, and these are exclusive rights which are negative by nature165 and require 
the owner’s permission.166 Yet, as a result of digital technology contracts can prevent 
the application of copyright limitations like those provided for under Article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.167 For example, in 
 
164 For the UK, CDPA 1988 s.12(2) (as amended by the EC Council Directive 93/98 EC harmonizing 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights); Alternatively, in the US, see Title 17, 
chapter 3, §302(a).  
165 In the UK, CDPA 1988 ss.16, 17; VG Wort v. Kyocera Document Solutions Deutschland GmbH, 
Joined Cases C-457/11, C-458/11, C-459/11, and 460/11, EU:C:2013:34, [AG33] (AG Sharpston, 
referring to reproduction as the ‘fundamental’ right); In the US, see 17 USC §106; Under US law, 
‘copies’ are material objects that are to which a work is foxed – Paha Pubs., Inc. v. Enmark Gas 
Corp,, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1076 (N.D.Tex 1992); J. Litman, Digital Copyright (2001), 180 ff (proposing 
instead a general right to control commercial exploitation); For digital media, electronic files are 
considered to be comprehended within this definition despite the lack of physicality – London-Sire 
Records v. Does, 542 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass.2008); Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, 
(eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), 
chapter 7, part 3; See also, chapter 4. 
166 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [43]; Capitol 
Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
167 This is otherwise known as the “Three-Step Test under the Berne Convention, Article 9, and this is 
discussed specifically in chapter 5 at 5.3.2; Note, there is a requirement that these limitations do not 
do not prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightsholders - Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 5(5); Marrakesh 
Dir, Art. 3(1) (‘applied’); Rel. Rights Dir., Art. 10 (‘applied’); Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in 
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the US, this includes the defence ‘fair use’ in the US which is codified under §.107 of 
the 1976 Act.168 In the UK, such limitations are categorized as ‘permitted acts’ which 
are listed under Chapter III of Part 1 of the 1988 Act.169 Moreover, these limits on the 
exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright owners are somewhat diminished due to their 
‘extraordinary precision and rigidity’170 despite two reviews of their implementation.171 
The European Court of Justice has also indicated a preference for a ‘narrow’ 
interpretation of copyright exceptions.172 This illustrates the high level of protection 
favoured in this area regarding the reproduction and distribution of articles.173  
 
the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593, Art. 6(applying Art 5(5) to proposed new mandatory 
exceptions). 
168  Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §.107; On Fair Use, see Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. 
Citizens for   Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957 (D. N.H., 1978); Italian Book Corp., v. American 
Broadcasting Co., 458 F.Supp. 65 (S.D. N.Y., 1978); These can be compared with the contrasting 
cases of BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Capitol Records Inc. v. Alaujan, 
(2009) WL 5873136 (D. Mass., 7/27/09).  
169 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988; See also, Info. Soc., Dir., Art. 5; The traditional approach 
of the UK courts: Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer [2000] 4 All ER 239 (CA), 257 
(Chadwick LJ); See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20. On defences under 
European law and the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC and the public interest defence see 
Chapters’ 21 and 24 respectively.    
170 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1988] FSR 43, 48; Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK 
Television Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 605; See also, Fraser Woodward v BBC [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch), 
[2005] EMLR 22.  
171 A. Gowers, ‘Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (2006), ch.4, 39, [3.26]; Ian Hargreaves., 
‘Digital opportunity: A review of intellectual property and growth’ (2011), 3, 8.    
172 Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int. v. Dansk Dagblades Forening, [2009] ECR I-6569 (ECJ) (‘Infopaq I’), 
[57];  Case C-145/10 Painer, [2012] ECDR (6) 89 (ECJ), [109]; Case C-138/16 AKM v Zurs.net 
Betriebs GmbH, EU:C:2017:218, [27]-[38] (ECJ); Case C-265/16, VCAST v RTI SpA, 
EU:C:2017:913, [32].  
173 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [47], [48], [49]; 
See also, the judgments in C-306/05, SGAE, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 36; Peek & Cloppenburg, 
EU:C:2008:232, paragraph 37; and Football Association Premier League and Others, 
EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 186); (see, by analogy, judgment in Football Association Premier 
League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, paragraphs 107 to 109). 
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These agreements are suggested to be the result of an evolution of copyright to ensure 
that the music industry could remain profitable in the digital age by reorganising the 
legal framework following the advent of the internet174 and file-sharing.175 The 
significance of the contractual approach is that it minimises the amount that can be 
distributed (maximising scarcity). In turn, this is contended to serve the purpose of 
intensifying the avenues of exploitation due to the limitations induced by contract under 
a relatively new business model.176 This has led to concerns about whether being 
copyright is being used as a means of “censorship, a restraint on creativity, and a way 
of restricting the supply of music, and so on.”177 This has meant that online music has 
become an expanding market, soon to overtake conventional music sales in physical 
stores.178 This is also considered to be a reason why streaming by services such as 
Spotify and Deezer are overtaking downloaded music formats like iTunes which has 
seen a decline in the imitation offline shop “download-to-own” model.179  
These agreements can be said to have received legislative approval under items such 
as the E-Commerce Directive Art.9(1),180 (SI 2002 No.2013);181 and also, both 
 
174 See chapter 2 at 2.2.1 and chapter 3 at 3.4; See also, Castells, M., ‘The Rise of the Network 
Society’ (Volume 1 of The Information Age, 1996).   
175 See chapter 2.  
176 See chapter 4 at 4.6.  
177 Frith, S. and Marshall, L., Music and Copyright (2nd edn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
2004) at 5. 
178 Andres Wiebe, Right Clearance for Online Music: Legal and Practical Problems from the 
Perspective of a Content Provider and Alternative Models (Medien und Recht Publishing, 2014) at 1.  
179 <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jan/05/film-and-tv-streaming-and-downloads-overtake-
dvd-sales-for-first-time-netflix-amazon-uk> accessed: 21/08/2019.  
180 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c).  
181 The Directive was originally implemented by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 (“the 2002 Regulations”), which amongst other things implemented the Country of Origin 






s.28(1)182 and §109(d)183 that assist the enforceability of contractual terms184 in the 
copyright system.185 In the UK, the only statutory provision which governs the 
relationship between contracts and copyright is to be found in the Fair Dealing 
Chapter.186 The Fair Dealing provisions are statutory sections which detail various 
‘permitted acts’ of infringement, and according to s.28(1) of the Copyright, Designs, 
and Patents Act 1988:  
“..[the provisions] relate only to the question of infringement of copyright and do 
not affect any other right or obligation restricting the doing of any of the specified 
acts.”187 
According to this subsection, owners can assert rights under contract and get their 
private interests upheld by way of a separate agreement. This means that even though 
an act can be carried out without infringing copyright, this does not prevent rights being 
asserted under an agreement stipulating the contrary and create a breach of 
contract.188 In the US, 17 U.S.C. §.109(d) is operates similarly to that of s.28(1) in the 
UK. Specifically, §109(d) enables the direct omission of licenced works statutorily from 
the regulation of the first sale doctrine, suggesting that the doctrine does not apply to 
a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as a 
licensee.189 
 
182 CDPA 1988; See also chapter 4 at 4.5.  
183 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1976) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does not apply to a 
person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as someone who as 
obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee; See also chapter 4 at 4.5.   
184 See chapter 4 at 4.7.1  
185 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; See also, chapter 4 at 4.4 and 4.5 
respectively. 
186 See CDPA1988, Chapter III.  
187  CDPA 1988, s.28; Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the 
future’ [2011] European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1.  
188 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20.   
189 17 U.S.C. 1976 §.109(d); See chapter 4 at 4.5.   
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The thesis argues that the contractual practices that have developed in the digital 
music industry are submitted to be a deliberately intensified exploitation of an already 
existing market monopoly that is restricting creativity.190 The purpose of this was to 
create a new investment outlet by retaining control over subsequent distributions via 
contract. The reason being is because capitalism perpetually strives to create an 
environment in its image and requisite to its own needs at a particular point in time.191 
This is done by adapting copyright law in the digital age: a product of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization in capitalist society.192 What this means is that what is presented 
as progress in the music industry, via the new formats it offers up, like iTunes and 
Spotify, remains a disguise for consistent sameness, simply a different way to secure 
music sales.193 
Creativity is referred to in several places within this thesis. Creativity has, however, 
been subject to many differing interpretations. Creativity is expressed here as the 
ability of individuals/recipients to use the internet and other copyrighted goods, without 
fear of legal consequence. The basic tenet of the claim is that even though the majority 
of recipient’s activity may be perfectly legal under copyright, the argument is that the 
environment created by the current copyright system is preventing people from using 
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A Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship, [2007] Law Library Journal, Vol. 99, at 285- 305: 
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generally, see Brewer, A., A guide to Marx’s Capital (Cambridge University Press, 1984), Part 8; 
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cultural goods for fear of legal repercussions and increasing costs in the digital age.194 
It is argued that this can prevent the development of new thoughts and ideas under 
the current system, specifically creativity in the music industry.195 This was highlighted 
in the Gowers Review where it was noted: 
“Much of the value from the inventions and creativity protected by IP can only 
be realised if that knowledge is widely accessible to others. To secure an IP 
right, the idea must be made public, thereby adding to the common stock of 
knowledge available for progress.”196 
The thesis highlights that in capitalist society there is a tendency for a few people to 
own considerable amounts of property in one form or another, even in digital 
copyright.197 Yet, restricted access to formal property systems is not necessarily a bad 
thing198 as a rising tide lifts all boats199 and it can be said that economic growth by a 
relatively small class of people could bring increasing wealth and higher living 
standards to all sections of society. This is supported under the theory of 'trickle-
down’ economics, which generally refers to economic policies which favour the 
wealthy and defend tax cuts for the rich based on the theory that greater wealth at the 
top ought to permeate all the way down to those with the lowest income.200 Thus, by 
deferring to the market, there is less need to rely upon theory for validation of the 
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Kills the Economy’ (6 September 2016), Economics, <http://evonomics.com/joseph-stiglitz-
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current capitalist system, as this allows the law to defer to the free market - leading to 
the “consumer knows best” validation of copyright advanced by Demsetz.201  
This is because competitive markets are believed to yield better levels of social welfare 
outcomes as opposed to monopolies. In a similar vein, the relation between copyright 
and competition is not a straightforward one. On the one hand, copyright can be seen 
as an intervention in a free market through the grant of “monopoly rights.”202 This 
intervention is considered essential to prevent the market failure of public goods and 
to avoid a scenario where negative incentives for creation lead to underproduction of 
intellectual creations and thus leave the society worse off.203 Some scholars have also 
suggested that copyright enables trading on the market and thus supports free 
markets and competition in the same way as the trickle-down notion.204 
Yet, although these assertions are considered to be relevant, as an ideology, 
however, trickle-down economics has been described as "non-existent" as “[n]o such 
theory has been found in even the most voluminous and learned histories of economic 
histories."205 From a practical standpoint, rather than trickling down, it is asserted that 
wealth has remained at the top where the development of copyright law continues to 
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be shaped by effective lobbying rather than expertise.206 This is because the “rising 
tide has only lifted the large yachts, with many smaller boats being left dashed on the 
rocks.”207 
However, these people receive large incomes, generally derived wholly or partly from 
ownership of that property.208 The creation of this environment stems from restricted 
access to formal property under law209 and is essential in copyright law.210 Thus, 
copyright is treated as a form of personal property right that can be exploited in a 
number of ways, most importantly by assignment or license.211 
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Legal systems have an impetus of their own, as they are deemed to be a professional 
tradition that can operate for good or bad. However, to change the law is not 
necessarily the exclusive task of the legislator or law reformers entirely as the task of 
lawyers and judges is to understand the social foundations of legal rules and develop 
them for the betterment of society.212 It is anticipated that the move away from 
download-to-own towards more flexible business models (such as subscriptions), 
would suggest that reform of the current system will unlikely be seen as a policy 
priority, and so the current proposals could help alleviate the need for a fully-fledged 
legislative overhaul.213  
As a result, the thesis outlines reforms which recognise the underlying principle that 
copyright is fundamentally a property right.214 Proprietary rights have been a 
foundational aspect of copyright since the inception of this legal area under the Statute 
of Anne in 1710.215 The developmental aspects of private property conceptually are 
the outcome of the social creativeness that is associated with individual human ability 
that provides for the free and independent use of the means of production.216  
The goal of the proposals as a result of the issues within the current system is to 
lessen the focus on economic exploitation. This could be done by how the reforms 
may enhance the transferability of digital assets by freeing up some of the constraints 
through creating more financially accessible works217 and limiting the impact of 
contracts.218 The reason for this approach is to push copyright towards more 
interdependent social, political and economic processes.219 This is because the 
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Statute of Anne limited the term of protection in the public interest. As stated, this 
thesis posits that increasing access to information should be the focus of any 
reform.220 This is because the inherent focus on economic exploitation221 in the current 
copyright system has created a legal environment that operates to increase costs to 
re-use works and this restricts creativity.222 Notwithstanding this, it is also contended 
that any adaptation of copyright law in the twenty-first century, the challenge is to 
respect the fundamentals of that law and to meet the needs of both creators and the 
public interest alike.223  
The thesis aims to provide reforms that do not seek to reduce copyright protection or 
to tax owners224 in capitalist society225 as well as ensuring that copyright remains 
fundamentally recognised as a property right.226 The thesis will focus on the factors 
which have influenced the development of the modern copyright system in the music 
industry. This will be achieved by identifying the developments that will be argued to 
have created the current system that is inherently focused on economic exploitation, 
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particularly the evolution towards the current streaming model.227 The proposals aim 
to learn from these developments to encourage access to existing content and 
facilitate creative re-uses by reducing the cost of producing and accessing that 
content. This is because an accessible system of culture is not one that denies 
property, or where musicians do not receive remuneration. A culture without 
proprietary rights, or in which musicians do not get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. 
Lawlessness is not what is advocated here, but instead, a balance between freedom 
and control, capitalism and copyright. 228  
The thesis will suggest that the nature of digital has pushed the boundaries of 
copyright law and digital works towards the “edge of the reach of the state”229 in an 
attempt to “free” itself from the confines of copyright limitations.230 This can also be 
suggested in some ways to be a “withering away”231 or “abolition” (Aufhebung)232 of 
the state. This is because contractual agreements are given legal credibility through 
their enforceability via the state apparatus (like the courts).233 However, it is argued 
that the inapplicability of statutory limitations in the digital context234  and the fact that 
copyright owners set the terms of these agreements,235 has amounted to an 
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oxymoronic situation that will be demonstrated to both strengthen and wither away the 
state.236  
It can be said however, that technology forced the law to adapt,237 but these 
contractual methods have prevented the creation of secondary markets by limiting 
distributions.238 This reflects the decision in the thesis to specifically deal with 
contracts239 when attempting to initiate change within the digital copyright world if the 
reforms are going to be successful and to prevent confusion.240 Professor Ian 
Hargreaves adopted a similar stance in his 2011 review, when talking about limits to 
copyright. Specifically, he recommended that the Government should legislate to 
ensure that copyright exceptions are protected from override by contract.241  
The thesis will assess how to decide when an agreement is invalid under the 
proposals, and also if an article would have otherwise be bound by the reform system 
using the but-for test.242 In the UK, this was established in Barnett v Chelsea and 
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Kensington HMC [1969],243 and in the US, the case of Stubbs v. City of Rochester.244 
Under this, the courts could assess whether or not a contract has been used to 
undermine the enforceability of the reforms and but for such items, the reforms would 
otherwise apply.245 It will then describe a theoretical framework for more appropriate 
future regulation. 
1.6 Methodological explanations.  
1.6.1 Rationale for the different methods used. 
The thesis identifies the relationship between copyright law and digital technology and 
how this has affected the relationship between right holders and content recipients. 
The initial chapters outline a theory of how the emphasis on control in the music 
industry led to the creation of a system of panoptic surveillance in response to digital 
technology as a result of capitalism. They do so from theoretical, philosophical, 
economic, historical, and sociolegal perspectives. The purpose of this is to build up a 
conceptual framework to enable understanding of the degree to which capitalism has, 
or has not, pushed copyright to become centred around economic exploitation.  
The later chapters deal with how developments within copyright law have facilitated 
the role of contracts in the current system and how they have increased the influence 
that copyright owners have in the current system. This includes the way in which these 
agreements limit the application of legitimate copyright limitations imposed by statute. 
The aim is to assess whether these agreements could undermine the enforceability of 
the reforms and if so, to what extent this can be prevented with reform. The reforms 
utilise the theoretical aspects discussed in the previous chapters in order to learn from, 
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the ideological aspects of the current legal framework and the factors that have led 
copyright law to its modern day position. 
1.6.2 Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. 
To begin, it is important to comment on some of the historical and theoretical analysis 
in the thesis. Regarding historical analysis, the thesis highlights the interplay between 
the modern development of copyright, along with historical events. For example, the 
development of the contractual methods discussed,246 are suggested to be akin to the 
effects of the UK Licencing of the Press Act 1662 and in the US, the ‘courtesy of the 
trade’ provisions.247 The purpose of this is to demonstrate the effects of these 
agreements in the way that the same way as the 1662 legislation did. It gave the 
stationers the ultimate say in what got printed and what did not and contracts are 
argued to be doing the same, to the point where copyright holders are now able to 
control what is distributed, and what is not.248 
Yet, when exploring historical patterns, there must be a degree of selectiveness by 
necessity. This thesis is concerned with the development of copyright in the context of 
digital technology and the internet and how capitalism has influenced these items to 
the point where creativity is being limited to maximise economic exploitation. The 
theoretical analysis throughout the thesis differs from existing texts. This is done by 
moving beyond a strictly rights-based or economic approach to explain the current 
shape of the copyright legal infrastructure, although the thesis does incorporate such 
texts. Typical of economic texts include those by Landes and Posner,249 Demsetz,250 
and Steiner.251 In terms of rights theories, examples include those that discuss 
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Lockean theory, such as Gordon252 and Blackstone.253 The importance of Locke’s 
labour theory254 is demonstrated by the fact that English copyright law is predicated in 
this theory.255   
Instead, however, the thesis attempts to introduce more sociological, philosophical, 
and political texts to explain the evolution of copyright, including how to conceptualise 
its current functionality in the context of capitalism in order so that reforms can work 
with these same principles. Typical of sociological texts is Luhmann,256 and 
Habermas,257 which are used to help the reader understand the functionality of 
copyright in the social sphere and the effects this has on the individual. Regarding the 
theoretical political texts used, examples include Foucault,258 and Bentham.259 The 
reason for the inclusion of these works is based on their usage of Panoptic theory, 
which is based on a circular prison with cells arranged around a central wall, creating 
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the potential of total, uninterrupted, and, permanent observation.260 This is discussed 
in Chapter two, but for now, it is worth noting that the theory is not without its flaws 
and has been described as controversial.261 Nonetheless, the primary reason for 
incorporating this theoretical approach is because it is suggested to best explain the 
effect of the approach taken by the music industry and in the regulation of copyright 
and information262 in the digital age.263 Finally, in the context of philosophy, the main 
works come from writers such as Deleuze and Guattari264 and were chosen as they 
conceptualise how the capitalist system functions and the extent to which it permeates 
into social systems like law. This provides fresh alternatives for thinking about culture 
and how copyright governs it in capitalist society. Also, there is minimal reference to 
these works in copyright law when attempting to explain the evolution of this legal 
area, with the panoptic theory being the most used, but is still nonetheless limited.265 
One of the assumptions within copyright is the notion that copyright exists primarily for 
providing monetary reward/incentive in exchange for the exploitation of a copyrighted 
work.266 Considering this, the thesis, by drawing on the theoretical and historical 
perspectives, creates a set of reforms to work with this notion, but in a way that could 
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Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015), chapter 8; Reckwitz, 
A., The Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of the New, (Polity press 2017), 159.   
266 Millar v Taylor [1769] 98 E.R. 201 at 220 (explicitly); Donaldson v Beckett [1774] 1 E.R. 837 at 
845.     
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see an increase in the dissemination of information and encourage creativity. The 
framework would also ensure that the reforms are not undermined by contract in the 
same way that copyright limitations are in the current system.  
1.6.3 Practical Analysis 
Copyright is made up of several rights. The rights provided by UK copyright law 
include, amongst others, the right of reproduction,267 the right to perform, show or play 
the work in public,268 the right to issues copies to the public,269 and the right to 
communicate the work to the public,270 and adaptation.271 In the US, 17 USC §106 
provides that there are copyrights over reproduction in copies and phonorecords,272 
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending,273 display of certain 
works,274 and digital audio transmissions of sound recordings.275  
Building upon the legal analysis discussed in the earlier chapters, the thesis proceeds 
to consider how the creative re-use of existing works has been affected by copyright 
law and contract. To assess this, the thesis considers the role that copyright law has 
played in facilitating the advancement of capitalist interests in the copyright industry.276 
This is achieved by first analysing the exclusive rights of communication in the UK,277 
and the public performance and display right in the US.278 In doing so, the thesis 
postulates that these exclusive rights have shaped the law of the present day by 
 
267 S.17 CDPA 1988.  
268 s.19 CDPA 1988. 
269 s.18 CDPA 1988. 
270 s.20 CDPA 1988. 
271 s.21 CDPA 1988. 
272 17 USC §106(2). 
273 17 USC §106(3). 
274 17 USC §106(5). 
275 17 USC §106(6).  
276  See this chapter at 3.4   
277 Specifically CDPA 1988 s.20(2).  
278 Specifically, see 17 U.S.C §106(6). 
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playing a “central” role in the “shaping of the landscape of the digital market.”279 These 
rights have provided what is considered to be a ‘cradle’280 away from file-sharing that 
enabled the music industry to adopt the current streaming model discussed,281 
performing what is contended to be a ‘bridge-gap’ function.282  
Following this, the thesis explores how contracts in the digital sphere have increased 
rightsholder control.283 The reason for this is to understand how digital technology, due 
to its relationship with contract law, has procured this situation and what the practical 
implications are for users regarding the accessibility of works electronically.284 This 
includes the fact that ‘electronic contracts’ are to be recognised as valid and 
enforceable under UK law. This is under the E-Commerce Directive Art.9(1)285 (as 
implemented via the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 
No.2013).286 Similarly, such agreements are recognised under US law via 17 U.S.C. 
 
279 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.5; See also, chapter 3 at 3.5, 3.7.   
280  See chapter 3 at 3.5 and 3.6.  
281 See chapter 4.  
282  See chapter 3 at 3.6.  
283 See this chapter at 4.5.1.  
284 For more information, see 4.2.  
285 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c); For 




286 The Directive was originally implemented by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 (“the 2002 Regulations”), which amongst other things implemented the Country of Origin 






§109 (1976).287  The significance of this is that the digital dissemination of information 
removes the intermediaries from the distribution process.288 A consumer who would 
have bought a CD directly from a retailer can now be supplied with an equivalent digital 
version over the internet directly from the copyright holder. By implication, this means 
that the rights owner can enforce any rights that they may have under copyright. 
However, this can now also include additional obligations imposed as part of the 
agreement.289  
Notwithstanding this, digital contracts often prevent the practical application of the 
exhaustion and first sale doctrines.290 This is because works which are ‘licenced’ and 
not ‘sold’ have the capacity, more so in the digital context,291 to prevent the limitations 
on the distribution right in a particular copy from applying. However, it is important to 
note that the matter of whether an act of electronic transfer has been made by way of 
a ‘sale’ is often difficult to investigate.292 The effect of this is that if the exhaustion 
 
287  More specifically, U.S.C. §109(d) (2012) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does 
not apply to a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as 
someone who as obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee. 
288  Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015), at 120-124. 
289  Issues of fitness for use and quality of digital content supplied by traders to consumers is 
regulated in part by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Ch.3. The European Commission, as part of the 
Digital Single Market strategy, has proposed harmonization: Proposal for a Directive on Certain 
Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, COM (2015) 634 final. The 
proposal requires the supplier of digital content to have undertaken relevant rights clearances in 
relation to third party intellectual property rights, but in other respects the proposed legislation 
leaves intellectual property rights intact.  
290 See this chapter at 1.1; For more information, see chapter 4.  
291 This is primarily facilitated by the fact that both doctrines (first sale & exhaustion) usually only 
apply to tangible copies of works. For more information, see A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. 
Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright Law (2009), 237-8. See also, 
Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; M Savič, ‘The CJEU 
Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual Property 
Review 378; (reviewing the benefits of the US concept of exhaustion and pushing the notion that it 
needs to continue in the digital sphere and not be restricted).  
292 Case C 166/15 Aleksandrs Ranks v. Finansu un ekonmisko noziegumu izmeklesanas prokutura, 
Microsoft Corp., EU:C:2016:762, [43], [44] (ECJ) (in relation to exhaustion of electronic copies, 
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doctrine applied, any action to curtail any attempted restriction on ‘any subsequent 
distribution’ in the UK under s. 18(3)(a)293 would be prevented. This is because under 
this section copyright owners cannot control the resale under the exhaustion principle. 
For purposes here, it is important to note that this has been widely assumed as only 
applying to the distribution of tangible copies.294 This is primarily due to the decision 
of Allposters v. Stichting Pictoright,295 but now also includes e-books following the 
recent Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Tom Kabinet case.296 Consent 
to the download of a work cannot be regarded as consent to the distribution. As a 
result, the distribution right cannot have been exhausted. Therefore, the Usedsoft 
principle297 does not apply to works other than software because Usedsoft was itself 
concerned with the distribution of a tangible copy.298 
The US equivalent is the ‘first-sale’ doctrine. The doctrine was first constitutionally 
codified under 17 U.S.C. §41 (1909) following the US Supreme Court decision of 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.299 The doctrine is now codified under 17 U.S.C §109(a) 
(1976) and is where the copyright owner’s distribution right in a particular copy of the 
work is ‘exhausted’ after its first sale under the doctrine.300 The first sale doctrine 
regulates the rights of the copyright and chattel owners by establishing that once 
 
differentiating between ‘back up’ copies made by the transferee, in relation to which there is no 
exhaustion, and copies received directly from the copyright-holder.) 
293  CDPA 1988; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 4(2), allows for exhaustion in cases of ‘first sale or other transfer 
of ownership in the Community’. 
294 A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU 
Copyright Law [2009], 237-8; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright 
[2015]. 
295 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; ]; M Savič, ‘The 
CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] E.I.P.R 378.  
296 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019 at [48], [58].  
297  See chapter 4 at 4.4, more specifically at 4.4.2.  
298 Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) 
Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London.  
299 (Supreme Court, 1908); See chapter 4 at 4.4, more specifically at 4.4.1.    
300 The principle is often traced back to the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  
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authorized copies have been lawfully distributed, the property rights of the chattel 
owners prevail. In essence, the doctrine prevents the copyright owner from controlling 
future transfers of a particular copy of a copyrighted work after he has transferred its 
“material ownership” to another.301  
The thesis suggests that once the system proposed in Chapter five enters into force, 
the use of contracts in such a way should be overseen by an administrative body and 
the courts to prevent owners contracting out of the reforms.302 This also involves the 
suggested imposition of a legislative proposal.303 If the regulatory body decides that 
the proposals are being used in a manner that restricts their application, including 
situations concerning re-use of copyright content, then a penalty scheme is 
introduced,304 which also involves voiding contracts or their respective terms.305  
It is important to recognise that the implementation of a capping system that restricts 
the level of economic exploitation that copyright owners can place on works may 
introduce problems concerning international obligations,306 like those under the Berne 
Convention.307 The reforms would need to satisfy certain parts of Berne, like Article 
9(2),308 although the thesis argues that these can be overcome,309 certain aspects like 
Article 17310 can be used to aid the practical enforcement of the proposals by UK and 




301 Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. (1984) at [159].  
302 See chapter 5 at 5.7.  
303 See chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c).  
304 See chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3.  
305 See chapter 5 at 5.4.  
306 See chapter 5 at 5.3.2 and 5.7.3.3(i).  
307 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886; On the Berne 
Convention generally, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 23-04. 
308 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886. 
309 See chapter 5 at 5.3.2. 
310 Berne Convention (Paris Act 1971) art.17; Vol.2 F1.  
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1.7 Context and Sources 
There have been many studies on the economics of copyright law that have come to 
dominate discourse,311 including general historical accounts of the development of 
copyright.312 For example, Professor Cohen suggests that: 
“...within the mainstream of copyright scholarship, it has been taken as self-
evident that a grand theory of the field must be grounded either in a theory of 
rights or in a theory of economic analysis.”313 
Although this thesis does consider economics and property, as they are foundational 
aspects of copyright, in contrast, the analysis throughout takes into account a broad 
range of factors that are not necessarily considered within copyright discourse to 
explain its modern-day position. This is done by considering the relationship between 
knowledge and power as discussed by Foucault314 and Bentham,315 which includes 
 
311  Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325; Breyer, S, ‘The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs’ 84 Harvard Law Review281 [1970]; Woodmansee, M., ‘The 
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the Author’, 
Eighteenth Century Studies, (1984), 17(4), Summer, 425-28; Stanley M. B. and Sheila N. Kirby and 
Salop, S.C., ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives’ Virginia Law Review, [1992] 78 (1), 
383-411; Towse, R. Handke, C, and Stepan, P., ‘The Economics of Copyright Law: A Stocktake of 
the Literature’ Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, [2008], vol. 5(1), pp.1-22; Hurt, 
Robert M. and Schuchman, R.M., ‘The Economic Rationale of Copyright’ American Economic 
Review (Papers and Proceedings), 56; 421-32; Gordon, W.J., ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors’ 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
1600 [1982]; Gordon, W.J., ‘An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory’ 41 Stanford Law Review [1989] 1343.  
312  Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 
2013); Richard Watt, Copyright and Economic Theory (Edward Elgar Publishing 2000); Merges, 
R.P., Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2011); Sherman, B. and Bently, L., 
The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
313  Cohen, J., ‘Creativity and culture in copyright theory’ 40 University of California Davis Law Review 
1151 (2007) at 1155.  
314 Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002). 
315 Bentham, J., Panopticon, Works, vol. 4, ed. Bowering [1838-43] (New York: Russel and Russel, 
1971). 
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the role that capitalism has played in this by assessing the evolution of copyright in 
the context of the theoretical approaches advocated by Deleuze and Guattari.316  
The aim of the thesis is to understand why copyright has become inherently focused 
on control and economic exploitation in capitalist society and how this has been 
achieved in the digital world.317 The reason for this approach is because it is argued 
that only when the development of copyright is understood in the wider socio-political 
context in which it operates, can lessons for the future then be learned.  
In doing so, the thesis aims to contribute to the shaping of the law by identifying the 
external factors that have contributed to the creation of a copyright system that is 
predominantly focused on exploitation. The end result is to create a system of change 
that works with capitalism to procure practical change for the future that increases 
access to works through lowering costs overall in copyright. The reason for this 
approach is because of the conceivable failure of things such as the Open Access 
scheme (OA),318 the lack of usage of DRM in the music industry,319 the diminishing 
role of licensing,320 and the increasing prevalence of contracts in undermining 
copyright limitations.321  
This thesis aims to provide: 
 
-  A demonstration of how panoptic surveillance was used by the music industry 
to maintain their market positions in the digital age (Chapter 2) 
- An assessment of the extent that capitalism and property have influenced the 
development of the current copyright system (Chapter 3) 
 
316 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983); Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Bloomsbury Academic 1987).   
317 Slaughter, S. and Rhoades, G., Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, State and 
Higher Education (John Hopkins University Press 2010); Vandenberghe, F. ‘Deleuzian capitalism’ 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 34(8) [2008]: 877-903.   
318 See chapter 3 at 3.1. 
319 See chapter at 4 at 4.1.  
320 See chapter at 5.4.  
321 See chapter 4.  
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- An analysis of how contractual agreements have increased copyright holder 
control and restricted creativity, and to what extent these agreements could be 
used to undermine the enforceability of reform (Chapter 4) 
- An investigation of how the proposed capping system could be implemented 
(Chapter 5)  
1.8 Overview  
The second Chapter considers how digital technology had the potential to undermine 
the market structure of the music industry. There is a particular focus on how this same 
technology enabled the creation of a system of panoptic surveillance. The Chapter 
analyses how this procured an exponential extension of legal liability for copyright 
infringement online. The chapter assesses whether there is now, in fact, a situation 
where information service providers have become policers of content in an attempt to 
avoid potential legal action. There is a consideration of whether certain aspects of 
copyright have meant that it has become a decentralized system that allows copyright 
owners to avoid the due process of law and create barriers to market entry.  
The third Chapter considers the underlying role of capitalism in the development of 
copyright in the digital age. This is done by analysing how it has become inherently 
focused on economic exploitation and restriction under proprietary-based reasoning 
and legally enforceable rights. The chapter considers how this assessment reveals 
inadequacies in copyright which have resulted in the formulation of legal doctrines that 
limit the amount of public knowledge in favour of private interests. This thesis contends 
that this has created a copyright system which is more about exploitation than creation, 
where the money is now concentrated into the hands of a few record labels. The 
chapter will conclude by suggesting that there is now a protectionist proprietary 
copyright policy that is shaped more by effective lobbying than evidence and expertise, 
the purpose of which is to preserve the status quo as a result of capitalism under 
copyright. 
The fourth Chapter considers the role of contract law because contracts can be used 
to both extend copyright protection, and, prevent the application of copyright 
limitations. It investigates how the music industry used digital licensing to create a 
more secure method of consuming music online. The thesis argues that this was an 
attempt to safeguard the unauthorised distribution of music against the seemingly 
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unlimited capacity to do so as a result of digital technology. It will then scrutinise how 
licensing has been chosen specifically as a method of exploitation in the digital world 
due to the way that contracts exploit the copyright legal infrastructure via the 
diminished applicability of the ‘first sale’ and ‘exhaustion’ doctrines. In doing so, it 
considers how the terms of these agreements have been strengthened to create what 
is agued as a two-tier system of protection. This means that subsequent transfers can 
be unlawful under copyright law as they are considered to breach the exclusive right 
of distribution, but also, failing this, there can be a breach of contract as there is no 
exhaustion of the exclusive rights. The thesis contends that contracts could impede 
future transfers of works because there will be no distribution, and this then reinforces 
the applicability of the e-contract and the control which restricts creativity. The thesis 
then considers the discussion outlined in the Chapter by analysing how the proposed 
reforms could be undermined by the functionality of contracts in the digital music age 
and how this can be counteracted.  
In chapter five, it is proposed that there is a need for a system which explicitly takes 
into account the factors which have led to the creation of the current system, as 
detailed in the previous chapters. The reforms encapsulate how the concepts of power 
and knowledge via panopticism (Chapter 2) can be used to create a more efficient 
system of reform overall regarding enforcement of the proposals;322 that the 
advancement of the technology of the internet and the evolution of copyright law in the 
digital age can be said to be products of capitalism which should be taken into account 
in the reforms323 (Chapter 3); and that digital licenses are an intensification of a pre-
existing music market which restricts creativity, and that the proposed system may 
need to deal with these contracts to ensure that enforcement is not subverted by these 
methods (Chapter 4). The proposed approach could help alleviate the issues 
discussed throughout this thesis by reducing costs across copyright concerning sale 
and re-use for a limited period. This may reduce production fees and this could lead 
to a corresponding decrease in the overall cost of works, as well as dealing with the 
issues posed by contract. By implementing this proposed strategy, both the amount of 
 
322 See chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(c)(iiii).  
323 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3, 5.9; Harari, Y.H., Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (Penguin 
Random House, 2015).  
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information disseminated and creative activity concerning works may increase by 
providing considerably greater certainty for the purchasers and re-users of copyright 
content. This would be a result of works being more financially accessible which could 
increase consumer compliance by the extension of legitimate markets through lower 
prices.324 The proposed system would be overseen by an administrative body similar 
to the UK Copyright Tribunal, or the US Copyright Royalty Board, with assistance from 
current regulatory bodies in the UK325 and the US.326  
  
 
324 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
325 See chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(c)(i). 





Chapter 2:  
Panoptic surveillance in copyright 
 
2.1 Introduction     
“Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central 
problem in copyright law.”1 
The expansion of digital communications technology has led to the “balance”2 that 
copyright law tries to achieve becoming an increasingly difficult task.3 Although 
recipients of digital content are in a technological position to readily re-use copyright 
works,4 legal sanction has been used to limit such capacities.5 This includes attempts 
 
1   W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 [1989] Journal of 
Legal Studies 325.  
2   “We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, 
who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just 
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of 
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.” – Per Lord Mansfield in Sayre v Moore 
[1785] at 362. 
3 “MGM and many of the amici fault the Court of Appeal‘s holding for upsetting a sound balance 
between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and 
promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for 
copyright infringement. The more artistic protection is favoured, the more technological innovation 
may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off” - 
Justice Souter, in MGM v Grokster, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (US Supreme Court, 2005) at 2775. 
4   See this chapter at 2.2.  
5   See this chapter at 2.3; See also, chapter 3 at 3.3; See also, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004 (2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Polydor Ltd v 
Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch) – A computer, connected to the internet, which is running P2P 
software and where music files containing copies of copyright works are placed in a shared 
directory, was held to constitute an infringement of the copyright owner’s “making available” rights 
by the person in control of the computer; See also, Foong, C., The Making Available Right, 
Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019).  
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to hold online service providers6 liable for the activity of their subscribers.7 This has 
created an increasingly unregulated system8 due to a lack of substantive legislative 
restraints to deter unfounded infringement allegations.9 In response to file-sharing, the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), which is a trade organization that 
represents the recording industry in the United States, began a highly publicised 
lawsuit campaign10 against individual users of file-sharing applications.11 In the UK, a 
speculative invoicing program was initiated,12 which is a practice concerns the sending 
of letters before action. These are based around alleged copyright infringement online.  
This procedure involves an entity acting on behalf of copyright holders (under a profit-
sharing arrangement) to pursue small-scale infringers.13 This is achieved by sending 
letters-before-action to internet subscribers, claiming a substantial sum in relation to 
alleged violations of copyright from the subscribers internet address.14 This drove 
 
6   See this chapter at 2.3.1.1(a) and 2.3.1.1(b).  
7   For more information, see the discussion in this chapter at 2.3.1.1(a), 2.3.1.1(b), 2.3.1.2, and 2.5; 
See also, BMG Rights Management v Cox Communications, 881 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018); EMI 
Christian Music v MP3Tunes, 844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016). See C. Doctorow, Information Doesn't 
Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age (San Francisco 2014), 80-89; See also this chapter at 
2.3 generally.    
8   See this chapter at 2.5. 
9   See this chapter at 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2(a), and 2.5 generally; Law Commission Report, ‘Patents, Trade 
Marks and Designs: Unjustified Threats (No. 360)’ [2015] - 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
68450/51672_Law_Commission_HC_510_TEXT.pdf accessed: 23/09/2019. 
10  See this chapter at 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2; See also, Capitol Records v Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 
(8th Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music Entertainment v Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
11  For more information, see this chapter at  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (No. C 99-5183 MHP 
No. C 00-0074 MHP), United States District Court for the Northern District of California - in A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Arista Records LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 (KMW) 
(US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010).  
12  For more information, see this chapter at 2.3.1.1.  
13See http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/acs-law-file-sharing (Accessed: 15/8/2016). 
14  Media CAT v. Adams [2011] FSR (28) 679, Golden Eye International Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd 
[2012] RPC (28) 698.  
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copyright legal proceedings to the edge of the reach of the State,15 to the point where 
copyright-based threats are kept away from the objective scrutiny of the courts16 under 
a system of panoptic surveillance.17  
For example, the take-down provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
§.51218 (in the US)19 have the potential to hold Internet Service Providers (ISPs) liable 
for infringing activity commissioned by their users unless it removes or disables access 
to the information. Thus, while it has emerged as a process capable of producing 
relatively consistent results, it also has significant problems. It is left open to different 
kinds of “abuse”20 which results in the removal of material without the need for judicial 
scrutiny.21  
In the UK, a similar procedure, under s.97A,22 encourages so-called ‘notice-and-take-
down’ relationships,23 or where such material reappears, a ‘notice-and-stay-down’ 
relationship.24 This means if a rightsholder provides notice, the service provider will 
 
15  See this chapter at 2.5; See also, Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] 
Intellectual Property Quarterly.  
16  See this chapter at 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2, and 2.5.  
17  See this chapter at 2.3 and 2.5 generally; Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the 
Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  ch.8.  
18 17 U.S.C. §512.  
19 For the UK equivalent, see the next section.  
20 Blythe, M.C., ‘Freedom of speech and the DMCA: abuse of the notification and takedown process’, 
E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(2), 70-88; J. Urban & L. Quilter, ‘Efficient Process or 'Chilling Effects'? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ Santa Clara Computer & High 
Technology Law Journal [2006].   
21 See this chapter at 2.5. 
22 CDPA 1988; [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] F.S.R. 
21; In that case the service provider was itself infringing and the relief under s.97A added nothing to 
what the claimant was already entitled to – For more information on the scope of these injunctions, 
see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 21-243.  
23 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber).  
24 Societe de Producteurs en France v. Google, No. 11-13,666 (French Supreme Court, 12 July 
2012).   
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take the material down25 or otherwise risk losing the immunisation from liability 
following the ruling of L’Oreal SA v eBay.26   
The thesis argues that such issues would be reduced if there was a more cost-efficient 
copyright regime that could increase individual accessibility to material.27 This also 
includes using specific legislation28 to counteract the issue of contracts in the digital 
system discussed in chapter 4.29 The chapter begins by analysing how digital 
technology had the potential to undermine the music industry’s market structure.30 It 
then assesses how this same technology created what is argued as a system of 
panoptic surveillance.31 It then considers how this had led to a gradual extension of 
legal liability for copyright infringement online,32 to the point where information service 
providers have become policers of content in an attempt to avoid being sued.33 The 
chapter then assesses how copyright has become a decentralized system that 
enables rightsholders to avoid due process.34 It concludes by considering how this 
also enables the removal of commercial competitors from the market and creates 
 
25 e-Commerce Regs, reg. 19 (based on e-Commerce Dir., Art. 14). On the Knowledge standard, see 
Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber), 
[118]-[124] (awareness of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have realized that [the activity was illegal]. 
26 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, EU:C:2011:757, [AG155] (AG Jaaskinen); This 
is discussed in this chapter at 2.5.    
27 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b), and 5.5.3(a) respectively.  
28 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.8; See also, chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c).  
29 Contracts are discussed more extensively in chapter 4 at 4.8;For a more extensive discussion on 
how they will be dealt with under the proposals, see chapter 5 at 5.4.  
30 For more information, see this chapter at 2.2 and 2.2.1 respectively; See also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: 
The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015).  
31 For more information, see this chapter at 2.3.  
32 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (No. C 99-5183 MHP No. C 00-0074 MHP), United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California - in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004 
(9th Cir. 2001);  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); See this 
chapter at 2.6.  
33  See this chapter at 2.3.1.1(b).  
34  For more information, see this chapter at 2.5.  
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barriers to entry,35 although the concept of such barriers has been suggested to be 
more imagined than real.36  
2.2 From real space to cyberspace: How have things changed since the 
introduction of digital technology? 
“In rooms around the country, there are posters taped to windows without 
compensation to the original creator. These uses occur without the express 
permission of the copyright holder. They are unlicensed and uncompensated 
ways in which copyrighted works get used.”37 
The above extract describes the usage of copyrighted material by individuals outside 
of the digital sphere. This scenario is unlikely to be the subject of a copyright lawsuit. 
This is due to the fact that tracking such behaviour in real space is difficult.38 However, 
digital technology moved this activity into cyberspace, and this had the quintessential 
effect of enabling rightsholders to access these dorms. This has allowed them to 
enforce copyright in ways never seen where online service providers have arguably 
become “policers” of content.39  
This has meant that the changes within technology and the amendments that have 
been made to copyright law to keep up with digitalisation have created a climate of 
 
35  For more information, see this chapter at 2.6; Shane, W., ‘I Want My MP3: Legal and Policy 
Barriers to a Legitimate Digital Music Marketplace’ 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. [2009] 95.    
36 Hovenkamp, H., ‘Antitrust Policy After Chicago’ 84 [1985] Univ Mich LR 213, 226–229. 
37 Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas (Vintage Books, 2001), at 180-181; For a general overview of the 
impact of the internet, see Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), chapter 4.  
38 Helberger, Hugenholtz, and Bernt., ‘No Place Like Home for Making a Copy: Private Copying in 
European Copyright Law and Consumer Law’ (February 23, 2012). Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2007; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-35; Institute for 
Information Law Research Paper No. 2012-29. Available at 
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010007> accessed: 25/06/2017). 
39 Griffin, J. and Nair, A., International Review of Law, Computers and Technology [2013]: Scientia 
potential est: Making threats of copyright infringement, International Review of Law, Computers and 
Technology. 
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“fear”40 within copyright law.41 This is because rather than embrace technological 
change, the music industry opposed it.42 As a result, a raft of new legal problems 
needed to be considered. This meant  that a system which was originally designed to 
ensure public benefit began to actively restrict the dissemination of information.43 I will 
now consider why this has happened and the results this produced.  
2.2.1 Digitalisation and the internet 
Due to the advances of the internet in the digital age, music consumers turned to 
online sources for their music in the 1990’s. This meant major record labels lacked a 
way to profit from selling music to consumers, and consumers turned to legally 
questionable sources for digital music.44 This is because the internet makes copying 
cheaper and on an unparalleled scale, and with this, came the greater danger of illicit 
copying. This has been counteracted with more expansive rights,45 harsher 
 
40 ‘Fear’ for purposes here is defined as “Apprehension of harm. Apprehension of harm or 
punishment, as exhibited by outward and visible marks of emotion” – http://thelawdictionary.org/fear/ 
accessed: 22/1/2016; On how fear and paranoia can be used for political ends, see  Plato, Laws 
(Translated by A. E. Taylor (1961) in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, (Eds. by Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns, Bollingen, New York); Glass, J.M., ‘Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political 
Philosophy: Fear, Anxiety, and Domination’ Political Philosophy, Vol 9, No. 2 (Jun. 1988), pp.209-
228;  Adam, J., Platonis Apologia Socratis (Cambridge University press,1910); Furedi, F., How Fear 
Works: Culture of fear in the Twenty-First Century, (Bloomsbury Continium, 2018) at 37-38; Plato, 
The Republic, (trans. Desmond Lee), (Penguin Books Ltd, 2007); Cooper, J.M., ‘Plato’s Theory of 
Human Motivation’ History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), at 3-21.  
41 See the discussion in this chapter at 2.3.1.2.  
42 Goldring, F., ‘Abandon the 'Shock and Awe' Tactics: An Eight-Step Recovery Program for a 
Healthier Music Industry’ Billboard, Oct. 25, 2003, at 14. Mr. Goldring describes himself as 
"someone who earns a living working with musicians, record companies and publishing companies." 
Id. In addition to being a columnist for Billboard magazine, Mr. Goldring is also a musician; Taken 
from Fedock, J.A., ‘The RIAA v. The People: The Recording Industry's Misguided Attempt to Use 
the Legal System to Save Their Business Model’ 32 [2005] Pepp. L. Rev. 4; Lessig, Free Culture 
(2004), at 199-207. 
43 Frith, S. and Marshall, L., Music and Copyright (2nd edn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
2004) , chs., 1, 6.  
44 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  chapter 7.  
45 See chapter 3 at 3.4.  
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penalties,46 and increasing use of digitalised contracts.47  This attempt to “staunch the 
flow from the internet artery”48 by rightsholders in the digital age resulted in a 
technology of freedom being turned into a technology of regulatory control and 
surveillance.49 
During the internet boom years, legal scholars opined that there were no borders in 
cyberspace. As the internet was so unique, they claimed it should have its own legal 
framework.50 The emancipatory nature of the internet inevitably clashed with the 
proprietary51 characteristics of capitalism and copyright law.52 This is argued to have 
created an “inescapable dynamic of tension”53 between abundance and scarcity in 
copyright markets because it is suggested that electronic communications were not 
immune from monopolisation in capitalist society.54  
Castells highlights that “the architecture of this network technology is such that it is 
very difficult to censor or control it.”55 By its very nature, it revolutionised computers 
 
46 E.g. in the UK, the Digital Economy Act 2017, has granted a significant extension of the term of 
imprisonment for online infringement (on an industrial scale) from two years to ten for offences 
committed on or after 20 November 2002 by the Copyright, etc. and Trade Marks (Offences and 
Enforcement) Act 2002 – and/or an unlimited fine. For more information, see this chapter at 2.3.1.1   
47 See chapter 4.  
48 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press 
2004) at 51-2 
49 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), at 60-61; On panoptic surveillance, see 
this chapter at 2.3; Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing 2015),  chapter 8.  
50 Johnson, D. and Post, D., ‘Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ 48 [1996] Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367.  
51 For more information on the role of property in capitalism and how it has been used in the 
development of copyright in the digital age, see chapter 3 at 3.2. 3.3 and 3.4.  
52 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic,  
1983), at 179.   
53 Mansell, R., ‘New Media Competition and Access: The Scarcity-Abundance Dialectic’ New Media & 
Society, [1999], 1(2), p.155.  
54  See the discussion in chapter 3 at 3.4; Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital 
Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015), chapters 1 and 2.   
55  Castells, Manuel, ‘The Rise of the Network Society’ (Vol.1 of The Information Age) [1996] at 352 in 
Hesmondhalgh, D., The Cultural Industries (3rd eds. SAGE Publications 2013), pp.327-28. 
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and communication and has a worldwide broadcasting capability, and a mechanism 
for information distribution, collaboration and interaction between individuals and their 
computers regardless of geographic locations.56 The nature of digital technology is 
argued to have created an ‘instability’ where copyright holders turned to litigation57 in 
an attempt to gain mastery over something that they could no longer control in the 
manner they had previously.58  
This is down to the end-to-end infrastructure of the internet, in that Cyberspace, by its 
very nature, is hard to control. This is because access cannot be curtailed by a middle 
man,59 which saw rightsholders “attempting to thrive by controlling the network that 
everyone else is forced to pass through.”60 It was an architecture which disabled the 
power of any middle-man to control how those at the ends interacted: this is the 
principle of end-to-end. This design choice of end-to-end assures that those with a 
new idea get to sell that new idea, the views of the network owner notwithstanding.61  
It is argued that mankind is on a perpetual quest to gain mastery over technology.62 
For example, Heidegger posits that “everything depends on our manipulating of 
technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, ‘get’ technology 
‘spiritually in hand.’ We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent 
 
56 Koutras, N., ‘History of copyright, growth and conceptual analysis: copyright protection and the 
emergence of open access’ I.P.Q. 2016, 2, 135-150.  
57 For more information, see this chapter at 2.3.   
58 For more information on this, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  chapter 1.  
59  For more information on the characteristics of the internet, and how it represented something of an 
unchained beast in the eyes of rightsholders, see Lessig, L., Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 
(New York: Basic Books 1999); Lanier, J., You are not a Gadget (Penguin Books, 2010).  
60  Lanier, J., You are not a Gadget (Penguin Books, 2010) at p.95. 
61  Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas: The fate of the Commons in a Connected World (Vintage Books 
2001) at 121 
62 Shanahan, M., The Technological Singularity (MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series, 2015); Von 
Neumann, J., The Computer and the Brain, (Yale University Press, 1958); Susskind and Susskind., 
The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the work of Human Experts (Oxford 
University Press 2015); Kurzweil, R., The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology 
(Duckworth publishing, 2006); Zuboff, S., In the age of the Smart Machine: the future of work and 
power (Basic Books, 1988).    
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the more technology threatens to slip from human control.”63 This is argued to be 
because digital technology disrupted the scarcity that intellectual assets otherwise 
enjoyed prior to digital advances. This newfound ability to instantaneously replicate 
and transfer information had what is contended to be a ‘destabilising’ effect. This 
created a considerable interest in getting a handle on technology through legal 
sanction.64  
Yet, an opposing stance may be that the internet65 was a network consciously 
developed within capitalism. This is because a global privatised network was 
necessary, along with free-trade policies, to deliver global capitalism efficiently.66 
Conversely, it can be said that the internet actually enhanced the stability of copyright. 
This is down to the fact that it otherwise enabled the monitoring of copyright in ways 
that would otherwise go undetected in the “real” world.67 Nonetheless, it is argued that 
whatever view is taken, law was still an essential feature in the procurement of this as 
copyright is about getting something for nothing.68  
As a result, digital technology represents what is argued as a ‘double-edged’ sword 
for rightsholders. This is because although there is an increased capacity to monitor 
infringers, it also opens up the potential for the instantaneous distribution of 
 
63 Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology (Trans. William Lovitt, Harper Torchbooks 
1977), p.2 
64 Callister, P.D., ‘Law and Heidegger's Question Concerning Technology: A Prolegomenon to Future 
Law Librarianship’ Law Library Journal, Vol. 99, pp. 285-305, 2007. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=960134 accessed: 21/2/1016.  
65 For more information now how the internet and copyright developed in accordance with capitalism, 
see this chapter at 3.4. 
66 Schiller, D., Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000) at 203 and Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing 2015),  at xx. 
67 Popper, K. & Eccles, J.C., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977); S.Vaidhyanathan, The anarchist in the library: how 
the clash between freedom and control is hacking the real world and crashing the system (Basic 
books, 2004). 
68 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), at 75.  
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information. As such, “mastering”69 the internet was essential and the expansion of 
copyright discussed in chapter 3,70 including the deployment of contracts in chapter 
4,71 are postulated to be a product of this attempted ‘mastery’.72  
In essence, the internet threatened to ‘slip’ the market away from the control of 
copyright right holders due to its architecture. The result is that copyright has 
expanded beyond its originally anticipated remit and failed to guard against two equally 
prejudicial extremes.73 It has filtered into homes through the desktops of recipients by 
implication of the creative and communicative acts that each of us perform daily for 
consumptive purposes.74 Yet, it is almost unthinkable that the market could stay 
forever outside of the internet network, as it is a mode of communication that is 
fundamental to its own organizational structure.75  The result is that culture has 
become ‘openly’, and ‘defiantly’, an industry ‘obeying’ the same rules of production as 
any other producer of commodities where culture production is “now an integrated 
component of the capitalist economy as a whole.”76 
 
69 Shanahan, M., The Technological Singularity (MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series, 2015); 
Kurzweil, R., The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Duckworth publishing, 
2006); Von Neumann, J., The Computer and the Brain (Yale University Press, 1958); Zuboff, S., In 
the age of the Smart Machine: the future of work and power (Basic Books, 1988); Susskind and 
Susskind., The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the work of Human 
Experts (Oxford University Press 2015);   
70  See chapter 3 at 3.4.  
71  See chapter 4.  
72 Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology (Trans. William Lovitt. Harper Torchbooks 
1977).  
73 “We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;; the one, that men of ability, 
who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just 
merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour;; the other, that the world may not be deprived of 
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.” – Per Lord Mansfield, Sayre v Moore 
[1785] at 362.  
74 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.52; Case C-466/12  Svensson and 
ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ).  
75 Terranova, T, ‘Free Labour: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy’ Social Text, [2000] 63 (18), 
p.35; Available at: http://web.mit.edu/schock/www/docs/18.2terranova.pdf Accessed: 9/12/2014  
76 Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein, Routledge Classics 1991), pp.9-11. 
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This is argued to provide evidence of the dialectical relationship between scarcity and 
abundance within capitalism. This is because inequality remains in the digital 
environment77 and the consumption of culture has become “fundamentally integrated 
into capitalism”78 in an environment of panoptic control. In this environment, users are 
unsure as to whether their activities are being monitored,79 or held as a contractual 
breach.80 This is argued to be an attempt by the copyright industry to ensure the 
continued extension of capitalist commodification in the digital age.81 The items 
discussed within this chapter and throughout this thesis are argued as an attempt by 
the culture industry to procure what Terranova described as a new digital economy by 
“reintroducing commodification”82 to digital assets that had been de-commodified by 
the mass infringement induced by these technological advances as a result of 
capitalism.83 It is to these matters we now turn.84   
 
77 Mansell, R. (1999) New Media Competition and Access: The Scarcity-Abundance Dialectic. New 
Media & Society, 1(2), 155-182; Mansell, R. (2004) ‘Political Economy, Power and New Media’ New 
Media and Society; See also, chapters 2 and 3 generally.  
78 Leyshon, A., Webb, P., French, S. Thrift, N., & Crewe, L. (2005) On the reproduction of the musical 
economy after the internet. Media, Culture and Society, 27(2), 177-209.  
79 See this chapter at 2.3 generally.  
80 See chapter 4 generally, and in particular, 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively.  
81 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus (Bloomsbury Academic, 1988), pp.532-33; 
(Deleuze and Guattari note that the term “subjection”, of course, should not be confined to the 
national aspect, with enslavement seen as international or even worldwide. For information 
technology is also the property of the States that set themselves up as humans-machines systems – 
at p.533); For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.4, and chapter 4 at 4.3.1 respectively.   
82 Terranova, T, ‘Free Labour: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy’ Social Text, [2000] 63 (18), 
p.35; Available at: http://web.mit.edu/schock/www/docs/18.2terranova.pdf (Accessed: 9/12/2017).  
83 Writers like Dan Schiller and David Arditi postulate the view that items like digital technology are a 
result of capitalism as well, by stating that the internet was a network consciously developed by 
reorganizing “telecommunications policy along neoliberal lines” and this global privatised network 
was necessary, along with free-trade policies, to deliver global capitalism efficiently – (For more 
information, see Schiller, D., Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000) at 203 and Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  P.xx at n.11).  
84 For a general discussion of the legal and commercial approaches of the US and the UK to file-
sharing, see Aditi Mene, ‘Piracy and illegal file-sharing: UK and US legal and commercial responses’ 
PLC Cross-border - <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-502-
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2.3 Copyright in the digital age  
2.3.1 A comparative analysis with ‘panoptic’ theory to explain the effect of 
copyright law in the digital age. 
The work of Jeremy Bentham,85 as discussed by Foucault,86 will be used in this 
chapter.87 This is to increase understanding of the way copyright regulates user 
behaviour in order to see how these observations could be used to facilitate the 
enforcement of the proposals88 discussed in chapter 5.89 Specifically, the reason for 
using this theoretical approach in this section is because it is suggested to best explain 
the effect of the approach taken by the music industry in the regulation of copyright in 
the digital age.90 However, Foucault’s interpretation of Bentham under his concept of 
panopticism has led to criticisms suggesting that Bentham is viewed through the 
reading of Foucault whereby Bentham’s thought should be re-examined.91 However, 
although such items have been extensively discussed,92 it is argued that a copyright 
thesis is not the basis for conceptual differences relating to different analysis of 
 
7956?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1#co_anchor_a7469
83> accessed: 21/04/2019 
85 Bentham, J., Panopticon, Works, vol. 4, ed. Bowering [1838-43] (New York: Russel and Russel, 
1971). 
86 Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002). 
87  See this chapter at 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6.  
88  See chapter 5 at 5.1, 5.7.3.3(c)(iii).   
89  See chapter 5 at 5.3.  
90 See this chapter at 2.3.   
91 Brunon-Ernst, A., & Tusseau, G. Epilogue: the panopticon as a contemporary icon? (2013) in A. 
Brunon- Ernst (Ed.), Beyond Foucault: New perspectives on Bentham’s panopticon (pp. 185–200), 
Ashgate Publishing. 
92 Lyon, D. Surveillance society: monitoring everyday life. Buckingham: Open University Press (2003); 
Galič, M., Timan, T. & Koops, B. Bentham, ‘Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance 
Theories from the Panopticon to Participation’. Philos. Technol. 30, [2017] 9–37. at 2.2; Lyon, D. 
(Ed.) Lyon, D. Surveillance studies: an overview. Cambridge: Polity (2007); Surveillance as social 
sorting: privacy, risk, and digital discrimination. London: Routledge (2003); Taekke, J. Digital 
panopticism and organizational power. Surveillance & Society, (2011) 8(4), 441–454.  
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panoptic theory.93 Therefore, for this section, the work of Bentham in this section 
concerns a comparative analysis of the functionality of the copyright court process 
against the surveillance architecture of panopticon theory. This theory is based on a 
circular prison with cells arranged around a central wall, creating the potential of total, 
uninterrupted, and, permanent observation.94  
The purpose of this comparative approach is to enable the reader to understand the 
rationale behind rightsholders employing the tactics discussed and the effect of the 
current copyright regulation in the digital world. This also includes analysing how this 
has removed such items away from the scrutiny of the courts. It will be demonstrated 
that the formidable power produced by these tactics has meant that users now present 
themselves as counterpart[s] of a power that endeavor[s] to administer, optimise, and 
multiply it[self], [under the] precise controls and comprehensive regulations [in 
copyright law].95 This will show why users simply engage in “self-censorship” rather 
than face the expense and risk of litigation.96 Yet, this is not always the case, and 
 
93 For a general account of the development of the concept of surveillance theories and concepts, see 
Galič, M., Timan, T. & Koops, B. Bentham, ‘Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance 
Theories from the Panopticon to Participation’. Philos. Technol. 30, [2017] 9–37. at 2.2.  
94 Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002), pp.58-59; See also, the discussion in this chapter at 2.3.1.1(b).  
95 Foucault, M., “The History of Sexuality” Volume I: An Introduction by Michael Foucault (Translated 
from French by Robert Hurley) Pantheon Books, New York, (1978), p.137; See also, this chapter at 
2.5.   
96 For more information, see chapter 4 generally, and more specifically at 4.8; See also, Netanel, 
N.W.,  Copyrights Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.112; Heins. M, & Beckles, T., “Will 
Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control” ii (New York University Brendan 
Centre for Justice (2005) (“Threatening ‘cease and desist’ letters cause many people to give up their 
fair use rights”); Lanjuow, O.J. & Lerner, J., “The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Survey of the Empirical Literature” (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6296, 
1997) (stating litigation costs fall most heavily on small firms, which may settle because they cannot 
afford long-term litigation); Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 13-7. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065; (Accessed: 
12/5/2015) (Outlined that companies are now reluctant to contest claims against them because of 
the excessive financial implications of doing so, highlighting that going to court is no longer a viable 
or desirable option commercially); See also the discussion in this chapter at 2.3 generally.   
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copyright can be said to encourage expressive diversity in some instances through 
things like the Open Access scheme (OA).97  
Foucault discusses how the State encourages individual societal cooperation with the 
rules laid down by it through a system of surveillance. In this system, citizens never 
know when, or if, they are being watched by the State. This is what makes this method 
so effective, due to the fact that this surveillance is so far-reaching in its effects, that it 
gives rise to “infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, and extremely 
meticulous orderings of space.”98  
It is recognised that this analysis does not relate specifically to copyright context per 
se. However, panopticism is argued to have direct applicability to the discussion in this 
chapter.99 This is because the panopticon is a generalisable model of functioning, a 
way of defining power relations in terms of everyday life.100 The panopticon, is a form 
of architecture that makes possible a mind-over-mind-type of power. It is a ring-shaped 
building in the middle of which there is a yard with a tower at the centre. In the central 
tower there is an observer who’s gaze can traverse the whole cell. Modern society is 
where panopticism reigns.101   
 
 
97 For more information, see the discussion on (open-access) in chapter 3 at 3.1.  
98 Foucault, M., “The History of Sexuality” Volume I: An Introduction by Michael Foucault (Translated 
from French by Robert Hurley) Pantheon Books, New York, (1978), p.145.  
99 See the discussion in his chapter at 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2 respectively.  
100 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977), p.205; For a general account of how this theory can be applied to copyright, see Arditi, 
D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  
chapter 8.  
101 Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002), p.58; Foucault also describes the law, being framed by mechanism of surveillance 
and correction, as a “disciplinary mechanism” – (See Foucault, M., Surveiller et Punir. Naissance de 
la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); English Translation by A. Sheridan, Discipline and Punish. Birth of 
the Prison (London: Allen Lane and New York: Pantheon, 1977)); See also, Shoshana Zuboff, The 
age of surveillance capitalism’ Public affairs, (2019).  
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The surveillance approach represents a form of control that stems from what Leyshon 
et al., described as a “significant defensive strategy” which has “slowly yielded results 
for record companies, by successfully shutting down infringing networks.”102 It is 
asserted that this approach has led to what is posited to be a change in consumer 
attitudes103 where litigation has been viewed as “deserving of avoidance.”104 Yet, it 
would seem that the results produced by this approach are mixed,105 but there has 
been an overall reduction in the numbers of files shared.106 Nonetheless, the 
discouragement of individuals from using digital networks107 is contended to be 
designed to limit the amount of infringing material circulating within the capitalist 
market. This is because file sharing networks were subject to the laws of network 
economics. In short, they only work well if many people use them108 and it is economic 
efficiency, not some other normative conception, is what determines legal 
prohibition.109   
 
102 Leyshon, A., Webb, P., French, S. Thrift, N., & Crewe, L. ‘On the reproduction of the musical 
economy after the Internet’ Media, Culture & Society, [2005] 27(2), 177-209. 
103 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. ‘Impact of Legal Threats on 
Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law 
and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
104 Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065; Accessed: 12/5/2015. 
105 For a general analysis of the effects caused by the litigation here, see this chapter at 2.4.1.   
106 Giletti, T., ‘Why Pay if it’s Free? Streaming, Downloading, and Digital Music Consumption in the 
iTunes era’ Media@LSE Electronic MSc Dissertation Series [2012], compiled by Dr. Bart 
Cammaerts and Dr. Nick Anstead.  
107 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005); Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch). 
108 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.78. 
109 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law (4th edn, 1992) in J.W. Harris, “Legal Philosophies,” second 
edition, Oxford University Press, pp.48-50. 
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2.3.1.1 The situation in the UK 
In the UK, usually it is the rights holder, as defined in the relevant legislation, who is 
able to bring an action for infringement.110 This can also be brought by other parties 
such as equitable owners whose rights have been breached (but they must join the 
legal owner before the final judgement can be given).111 This can also include co-
owners of intellectual property,112 and exclusive licensees.113  In some cases, courts 
have allowed representative actions to be brought, mainly by trade associations such 
as the British Phonographic Industry (BPI).114  
However, as a result of online piracy in the digital age,115 rightsholders and their 
representatives decided to use new methods, namely the practice of speculative 
invoicing in the copyright industry.116 The practice concerns the sending of letters 
before action, which will often be based around alleged copyright infringement online. 
This procedure involves an entity acting on behalf of copyright holders (under a profit-
sharing arrangement) to pursue small-scale infringers. This is achieved by sending 
letters-before-action to internet subscribers, claiming a substantial sum in relation to 
alleged violations of copyright from the subscribers internet address.117 Such 
information (or evidence) is obtained via the fact that intellectual property right holders 
are able to obtain a court order requiring a person to reveal information relevant to the 
 
110 This is not the same as the registered right holder: see Xtralite (Rooflights) v. Harrington Conway 
Ltd. [2004] RPC 7, [25].   
111 Columbia Pictures Industries v Robinson v. Robinson [1988] FSR 531, 547; Batjac Productions v. 
Simitar Entertainment [1996] FSR 139, 149-52.  
112 CDPA 1988, ss. 173(2), 259; Cescinsky v. Routledge [1916] 2 KB 325.  
113 CDPA 1988, ss. 101, 191L. (if the exclusive license specifically grants the right to bring 
proceedings); The situation of a bare licensee is somewhat precarious – CDPA 1988, s.101A; 
Douglas v. Hello! [2008] 1 AC 1.   
114 CBS Songs v. Amstrad [1988] RPC 567.  
115 On ‘piracy’ see chapter 3 at 3.3 generally.  
116 Lobato, R. and Thomas, J., ‘The Business of Anti-Piracy: New Zones of Enterprise in the Copyright 
Wars’ [2012] 6 Int J Comm 606.   
117 Media CAT v. Adams [2011] FSR (28) 679, Golden Eye International Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd 
[2012] RPC (28) 698.  
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action118 under a ‘Norwich Pharmacal Order’.119 This order remains one of most 
powerful tools available to rights holders in the fight against online infringement.120 
Article 8(1) of the EU Enforcement Directive,121 headed ‘Right of information’ requires 
Member States to ensure that judicial authorities may order information on the origin 
and distribution networks of infringing goods or services to be provided by the infringer 
and/or any other person, subject to certain factors.122 This can also include the source 
of goods and materials.123 This is in spite of the fact that the CJEU in Promusicae,124 
 
118 Civil Procedure Rules, r.31. J. Riordan, ‘The Liability of Internet Intermediaries’ (2016), ch.6, offers 
a concise account.  
119 Norwich Pharmacal Company & Ors v Customs And Excise [1973] UKHL 6, [1974] AC 133 (26 
June 1973); These orders were not available in Scottish law. Accordingly, provision was made by 
the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc) Regulation 2006 (SI 2006/1028), reg. 4; See also, 
Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th 
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), Part VI, chapter 21, part 7, section B (v); On Norwich 
Pharmacal Orders see chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(b)(i).  
120 Sachdeva, A. and McDonald, J., ‘The use of Norwich Pharmacal orders to identify online infringers 
- an old remedy updated for modern times’ Entertainment Law Review (2013).  
121 (SI 2006 No. 1028); Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights is a European Union directive in the field 
of intellectual property law, made under the internal market provisions of the Treaty of Rome; For 
background, see the Green Paper on combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, 
COM(98) 569 final; the follow-up to the Green Paper, COM (2000) 789 final; and the proposal for 
the Directive, COM(2003) 46 final. 
122 Namely, under Article 8(1), they would have to be: (a) found in possession of the infringing goods 
on a commercial scale; (b) was found using the infringing services on a commercial scale; (c) was 
found to be providing on a commercial scale services used in infringing activities; or (d) was 
indicated by a person within (a) to (c) as being involved in the production, manufacture or 
distribution of the goods or the provision of the services. Article 8(2) provides that the information so 
ordered shall, as appropriate, comprise (a) the names and addresses of the producers, 
manufacturers, distributers, suppliers and other previous holders of the goods or services, as well as 
the intended wholesalers and retailers and (b) information on the quantities produced, 
manufactured, delivered, received or ordered, as well as the price obtained. 
123 This is provided for by the Enforcement Dir, Art. 8; it has been made clear that Art. 8 also entitles a 
person to an order for disclosure after a finding of infringement: New Wave v. Alltoys, Case C-
427/15, EU:C:2017:18.  
124 Case C-275/06 Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v. Telefonica de Espana, [2008] 
ECR I-271.  
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ruled that there was no requirement for these orders in the Information Society 
Directive, the E-Commerce Directive, or the Enforcement Directive.125  
There is a need to strike ‘a fair balance’ between the various fundamental rights 
protected by the European legal order126 in a “proportionate” way.127 In Media CAT Ltd 
v Adams & Ors128 when asked to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief, the UK Patents 
County Court had carefully to consider the terms of the draft letter of claim and its 
impact upon ordinary “innocent”129 consumers who may not have access to 
specialised legal advice and who may be embarrassed or distressed at the 
allegations.130 This also includes where there was “a good indication” of 
wrongdoing.131 Moreover, as discussed below, such orders in this context may prove 
to be more difficult for applicants following Mircom International v. Virgin Media 
[2019].132 The fundamental basis of this approach is to “scare” people into paying.133 
 
125 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU 
[2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 17 at [57]-[60]. 
126 Ibid, at [71].  
127 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU 
[2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 17 at [70]. 
128 EWPCC 6 (08 February 2011).  
129 E.g. Just as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has said, (“some of these firms are using some extremely 
unjustified and unpleasant ways against perfectly innocent people. I hesitate to use the word 
"innocent", but in a sense they are because they have not breached copyright.”) – 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100126-0003.htm - at column 1305 
accessed: 21/09/2018.    
130 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch); Media CAT v. Adams [2011] FSR (28) 679; Golden Eye International Ltd v. Telefonica 
UK Ltd [2012] RPC (28) 698.  
131 Carlton Film Distributors Ltd v VCI Plc [2003] F.S.R. 47. See to the same effect Mitsui & Co Ltd v 
Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch); at [21] “a wrong must have been carried out, or 
arguably carried out” and Eli Lilly and Company Ltd v Neopharma Ltd [2008] EWHC 415 (Ch); 
[2008] F.S.R. 25 at [28] (names of customers who were arguably wrongdoers); Davies, G., Garnett, 
K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2016) at 21-213.  
132 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch); [2020] F.S.R. 5.  
133 Media CAT v. Adams [2011] FSR (28) 679, [112]. 
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There have also been explicit judicial recommendation in the UK that this procedure 
should be the subject of further regulation to prevent these abuses.134 However, there 
have been no moves to do so as of yet, but Lord Lucas expressed that the orders 
should not be given too easily.135 
Attempts to threaten infringement proceedings in the digital age became a particularly 
public concern following a number of people receiving letters from solicitors such as 
ACS Law, and Davenport Lyons. These firms began speculative invoicing campaigns 
where compensation was demanded for alleged copyright infringements discovered 
through the monitoring of Internet IP addresses in 2012.136 These campaigns targeted 
groups who were legally and technologically ‘unaware’.  
For example, sixty-year-old 'Mary' from Bedfordshire received a letter threatening legal 
action. She stated that, "I'm a pensioner, so it was such a shock. I didn't even know 
what file-sharing was before this," and "I didn't sleep for a week" she stressed.137 Lord 
Lucas, commenting on the issue, stated in the House of Lords that the “process 
 
134 Judge Birss QC suggested that safeguards might be needed to prevent abuse of Norwich 
Pharmacal orders in this way. He suggested that a group under CPR, Pt 19, might be a potential 
safeguard - Media CAT v. Adams [2011] FSR (28) 679, [112]; However, in Golden Eye International 
Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] RPC (28) 698, [142], Arnold J offers several reasons why such 
orders are unlikely to work along the lines of them being “disproportionate” - Golden Eye 
(International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 2012) at [36].  
135 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100126-0003.htm> (“we must have 
something to make sure that Norwich Pharmacal orders are not given, willy-nilly, to people who 
have not gone through this procedure. We have produced some comfort for the citizen in the Bill; we 
must at least make sure that judges consider whether or not this procedure should be used before 
Norwich Pharmacal orders are granted”) -Lord Lucas at column 1309 accessed: 21/09/2018.   
136 Griffin, J. and Nair, A.,  ‘Making threats of copyright infringement’ [2013] International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology; Fiveash, K. ‘Judge mulls “wasted costs” as ACS: Law cases 
close,’ The Register, available at 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/17acs_law_cases_closed_judge_considers_costs/> 
accessed: 22/8/2014; Williams, C., ‘Anti-piracy lawyers ‘knowingly targeted the innocent’, says law 
body,’ The Register, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/19/davenport_lyons_sra/ (last 
accessed: 24/8/2014); See also, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/acs-law-file-
sharing accessed: 15/8/2016. 
137 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/hi/technology/newsid_7766000/7766448.stm> accessed: 
19/05/2017. 
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produced a great deal of stress and indignation amongst many of our citizens...for 
redress of copyright-related issues.”138  
The effect of this meant that consumers were operating in an environment of 
“widespread uncertainty”139 when faced with the prospect of legal action. To explain 
further, recipients carrying out their daily activities online140 now become the new 
panopticon inmate, the observed individual who tries to keep his activity secret. 141 
This is because copyright law has arguably enabled legal owners to exert more control 
over the activity of recipients, which might be legally borderline. On the other hand 
individual recipients may feel free to copy unaware they are infringing certain 
copyrights. This may increase the issues resulting from uncertainty – a rightsholder 
could use the system to bring actions against content recipients who are more likely 
to have less knowledge of the legal system.142  
The extent of these figures whereby settlement was demanded totalled up to £500 
using its speculative invoicing procedure.143 Guy Trittion, a barrister acting on behalf 
of alleged file-sharers, argued that two companies who instructed ACS to act for them, 
wasted court time. He highlighted that they had “no intention of following through with 
the trial and had merely used the threat of legal action as a means to squeeze money 
from those targeted in the letter-writing campaign.”144 The solicitors representing those 
engaging in the speculative model had their independence compromised because of 
 
138 <https://youtu.be/dwKbQVzRHEg Per Lord Lucas at 4:40-4:56> accessed: 09/07/2018.  
139 Griffin, J. and Nair, A., ‘Making threats of copyright infringement’ [2013] International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology.   
140 Media CAT v. Adams [2011] FSR (28) 679, Golden Eye International Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd 
[2012] RPC (28) 698. 
141 Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein, Routledge Classics 1991), at 94-96.  
142  Griffin, J. and Nair, A.,  ‘Making threats of copyright infringement’ [2013] International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology; See also, IPO press release, at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/press/press-release/press-release-2012/press-release-20121001.htm 
accessed 30/4/2013.   
143 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/acs-law-file-sharing> accessed: 15/8/2016.  
144   Ibid; It is also worth noting that the individual who brought the infringement cases from ACS law 




the “financial interest” they had in the process,145 as well as “expecting to earn as 
much as £3 Million from [their] work.”146  
Murray notes that ACS law became a “beacon for consumer anger”147 as it developed 
a business model based on speculative invoicing, acting for a small number of clients 
such as Media CAT Ltd. These are businesses that were given contractual permission 
by copyright holders to “inquire, claim, demand, and prosecute, through the civil courts 
where necessary any person or persons identified as having made available for 
download [material] that has expressly licensed [by agreement].”148  
In Media CAT Ltd v Adams149 there was mention of 10,000 letters being sent out after 
a Norwich Pharmacal application that were served to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
where the identity of subscribers was obtained. The letters would be sent out, 
threatening litigation if the subscriber did not pay up. It took nearly three years to get 
some cases to full hearing, and HH judge Birss QC was outraged by the process. He 
stated that the letter writing campaign was:  
“founded on the threat of legal proceedings such as the claims before this 
court...simple arithmetic shows that the sums involved in the Media CAT 
exercise are considerable. 10,000 letters for Media CAT claiming £495 each 
would still generate about £1 Million if 80% of the recipients refused to pay and 
only the 20% remainder did so...I cannot imagine a system better designed to 
 
145 ACS law were set to receive 65% of the revenues from the letter writing exercise, much greater 
than the Media CAT client - Media CAT Ltd v. Adams EWPC 006, [41], [98]-[102]; Also, HH Judge 
Birss QC remarked, in a later hearing, that “It also seems to me as separate matter that there is a 
good arguable case that Mr Crossley's admitted revenue share from the letter writing campaign 
meant that he stood personally to benefit from success in the proceedings. The causes of action 
were all the same and victory for Media CAT in one of the court actions would obviously have 
boosted the revenues from the letter writing campaign” – Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 
010 at - [99]; Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] 
EWHC 1827 (Ch), Note 1; Flaux J in Ramilos v Buyanovsky [2016] EWHC 3175 (Comm) at [23].   
146 Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 010 (18/04/2011) at - [93]. 
147 Murray, A., Information Technology law: The Law and Society (2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2013), at 288.  
148  Media CAT Ltd v Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, [5].  
149 EWPCC 6 (08 February 2011).  
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create disincentives to test the issues in court. Why take cases to court and test 
the assertions when one can just write more letters and collect payments from 
a proportion of the recipients?”150    
The operationality of the procedure is as follows. An owner of copyright employs a 
device to highlight IP addresses that are perceived to be connected to apparent 
infringements. When they are identified, a legal letter is then issued with three key 
points. These are that: 1) a transgression of copyright has been committed; and 2) if 
the matter proceeds to court the defendant will be pursued for a significantly large sum 
of money; (or) 3) the defendant can simply settle and the matter will be stopped.”151  
These matters came to a head in the UK regarding speculative invoicing in the case 
of Golden Eye international Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd,152 presided over by Mr. Justice 
Arnold. The claimant was involved in making pornographic films and sought a Norwich 
Pharmacal order against a large ISP. This was to obtain disclosure of the names and 
addresses of more than 9,000 customers who were alleged to have committed 
infringements of copyright through file-sharing using the Bit Torrent protocol.153 The 
ISP did not oppose the application, but the court benefitted from an intervention from 
the Consumer Rights Group (Consumer Focus) who represented ‘real defendants’ – 
namely those whose names would be revealed. Justice Arnold observed the key factor 
in making a judgement was its ‘proportionality’.154 This involves balancing the need to 
 
150 Media Cat Ltd v Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, [98]-[102].  
151  <https://youtu.be/dwKbQVzRHEg Per Lord Lucas at 1:17-2:53> accessed: 09/07/2018. 
152 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012); EWCA Civ 1740; [2013] Bus. L.R. 414 (CA (Civ Div)); Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd [2001] 
EWCA Civ 1897, [2002] 1 WLR 1233; Rugby Football Union v Viagogo Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1585. 
Applied in Santander UK Plc v National Westminster Bank Plc [2014] EWHC 2626 (Ch); [2014] 7 
WLUK 1124; CHD; 31 July 2014.  
153 For a comprehensive account of the workings of the BitTorrent P2P protocol see Dramatico 
Entertainment Limited v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) [19] - [20]; See 
also, Hyland, M., ‘The seductive interface between adult entertainment and Norwich Pharmacal 
relief’ Communications Law, Bangor University law School, [2013].  
154 A number of factors must be weighed up. For more information, see – Rugby Football Union v. 
Viagogo Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 3333, [45] (Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore JSC); On ‘proportionality’ in this 
context, see chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(b)(i).  
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protect property rights,155 and the need to preserve privacy under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).156  
In his judgement, Justice Arnold described the practice as involving the sending of 
letters before action to thousands of internet subscribers whose internet connection is 
alleged to have been used for small-scale copyright infringement. This also included 
those whose names and addresses had been obtained by means of Norwich 
Pharmacal Orders157 against their ISPs. He dissented that:  
“The tactic is to scare people into paying the sums by threatening to issue court 
proceedings. If this does not work, proceedings are not normally issued. This 
is because the economic model for speculative invoicing means that it is more 
profitable to collect monies from those who pay rather than incur substantial 
costs in pursuing those who do not pay in court.”158  
The economic realities of the tactics used meant that “Golden Eye was chasing a 
Golden Egg” 159 since the company stood to collect between 25% and 37.5% of the 
money (which was a handsome £700 by way of compensation or potentially face court) 
that it collected for the other claimants if Consumer Focus did not intervene in the 
issue.160 However, despite such factors, it was ruled in Golden Eye161 that it was 
necessary and proportionate to reveal the identities of those whose IP addresses 
appeared to be implicated in illegal file-sharing as without such data, the copyright 
 
155 ECHR, First Protocol, Art. 1; Charter, Art.17(2).  
156 ECHR. Art.8(1); Charter, Art. 7; See also, Case C-275/06 Productores de Musica de Espana 
(Promusicae) v. Telefonica de Espana, [2008] ECR I-271.   
157 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] AC 133, HL and Civil 
Procedure Rules, Part 31 rule 31.18. (A Norwich Pharamacal Order is to find out the identity of an 
allaged wrongdoer, regardless of whether it was carried out unwittingly). These orders are not 
restricted to claims in tort – Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd, [2002] 1 WLR 2033.  
158 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012) at [36].  
159 <http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2012/04/700-demand-letters-no-golden-egg-for.html> accessed: 
22/07/2018.  
160 Ibid. 
161 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012). 
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owner would find it seemingly impossible to enforce his rights in an otherwise uncertain 
environment. Yet, it is important to note that Norwich pharmacal orders in this context 
may now prove more difficult for applicants following Mircom International v. Virgin 
Media [2019]162 (discussed below). Despite this, it is contended that the Norwich 
Pharmacal order is still available, implying that the courts provide “predictable legal 
consequences in capitalist society”163 where judges are often “professionalistically 
unconcerned in the results of these legal disputes.”164  
However, the courts still provide a necessary check on the power of copyright holders 
and it is submitted that without such an intervention, the power held by the claimants 
in Golden Eye  would have been devoid of judicial scrutiny and the letters would have, 
in fact, acted to scare individuals into financial settlement in a copyright-based “money-
making exercise.”165 This process is asserted to enhance the ability of rightsholders to 
enforce and administer copyright legal regulation outside of judicial scrutiny. This is 
because the potentiality of high costs in matters going to court has meant that the 
“threat or potentiality of an action may influence the individual more than if the action 
itself were to actually happen.”166  
 
162 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch); [2020] F.S.R. 5.  
163 Trubek, D.M., ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ Faculty Scholarship Series [1972] 
Paper 4001, Available at: 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4993&context=fss_papers> 
accessed: 12/9/2014.  
164 Gilmore, ‘From Tort to Contract: Industrialization and the Law’ Book Review, 86 Yale L. J. (1977) 
at 789 in Morton Horwitz, ‘Transformation of American Legal History’, Vol. 23, Issue 4 23 William & 
Mary Law Review 663 (1982).  
165 Katharine Stephens, Zoe Fuller and Hilary Atherton, ‘Copyright: Norwich Pharmacal orders 
against ISPs’ C.I.P.A.J. [2013], 42(1), 45.  
166  Frank, J. Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1949) chapter 1; Griffin, J. and 
Nair, A., ‘Making Threats of Copyright Infringement’ [2013] International Review of Law, Computers 
and Technology; Mazzone, J., ‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 40; New 
York University Law Review, Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026 - available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=787244> accessed: 22/5/2015.  
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Therefore, in cases like Media CAT v Adams, “both the claimant and the various 
copyright owners that it was representing received considerable income from the 
business model without any cost to them.”167 This was made possible by the threat of 
potential proceedings in the event of non-payment because there no intention to 
initiate such a course of action despite the letters being “founded on the threat of legal 
proceedings.”168 Also, the sums demanded in the letters included damages and “ISP 
administration costs (and legal costs where applicable) with no breakdown.”169  
However, when challenged at court, Media CAT and ACS Law attempted to issue 
notices of discontinuance. The notices are to designed to bring a case to an end where 
a claimant decides that they want to terminate proceedings after starting a claim in 
order to end the legal process, under Rule 38.2(1).170 This was in order to avoid judicial 
scrutiny of the sums procured by using copyright law in which to base the claims, and 
then the process of the court, in an attempt to mask the nature of their activity.  
In a damning verdict, HH Judge Birss, whilst throwing the case out, gave the following 
commentary:   
“The question in my judgement is whether the effect the notices of 
discontinuance undoubtedly have bringing these cases to an end and thereby 
terminating any scrutiny by the court of the claims is an unwarranted advantage 
to Media CAT amounting to an abuse of the courts process...Media CAT and 
ACS:Law have a very real interest in avoiding public scrutiny of the cause of 
action because parallel to the 26 court cases, a wholesale letter writing 
 
167 Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 010 (18/04/2011) at - [99]. 
168 Media CAT Ltd v Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, - [98].  
169 Media Cat Ltd v Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, [19].  
170 Civil Procedure Rules, Part 38 – Notice of Discontinuance; Advantage Insurance Co Ltd v 
Stoodley & Anor [2018] EWHC 2135 (QB) (09 August 2018) - Under the UK Civil Procedure Rule 
38.2(1), where the claimant discontinues the defendant may apply to have the notice of 
discontinuation set aside; On the tactical reasons for doing so, see Brian Kite -v- The Phoenix Pub 
Group [2015]; Renwick and Mitchell v Markerstudy Insurance Co Ltd [2015]; Edwards v Bristol City 
Council [2017]; Issa -v- Bristol City Council [2017]; 
<https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/beware-tactical-use-notice-discontinuance> 
accessed: 20/09/2018.  
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campaign is being conducted from which proceedings such as the claims 
before this court.”171   
It is asserted that items such as those discussed in this section will not be the last to 
surface in the UK legal system, but such occurrences may be limited following the 
recent Court of Appeal decision in Mircom International v. Virgin Media [2019]172 where 
there now appears to be a requirement, by applicants, to prove they have a “genuine 
intention”173 of obtaining legal redress.174 This is considered to be of vital importance, 
because the existence of companies like Mircom and Golden Eye, were submitted, by 
Virgin Media, in the case, to be entirely based on “obtaining disclosure orders of this 
kind, making threats of infringement and offering to settle for a fixed fee…"175 
Therefore, it can be said that in any future application for such an order, the court will 
expect to see credible evidence by those making an application that they have a 
genuine intention to obtain redress for the infringement as opposed to simply trying 
to “shakedown” defendants in a “money-making scheme” (in Virgin Media’s words) 
embarrassed individuals.176 In spite of this, it is nonetheless argued that the initial point 
remains, simply that the issues brought about in cases like Media CAT will not be the 
last to surface in the UK. The reason for this is because there is no specific provision 
to deal with threats of legal action under copyright law. Specifically, this relates to 
when a copyright work is being re-used. Interestingly, the UK does not actually have 
a specific system to deal with copyright threats – instead, an action needs to be 
brought for a declaration of non- infringement, abuse of process (which is limited)177 
 
171 Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, at [98]-[101].  
172 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch); [2020] F.S.R. 5.  
173  Ibid at [54]-[60].  
174 Fiona Clark, Cases on Intellectual Property Law, Fleet Street Reports, [2020] 93-186 at 110-128. 
175 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch) at [6] – (This was not specifically disputed by the Applicants, eg by identifying any other 
business activities conducted by Mircom or Golden Eye).  
176 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch) at [54].  
177 Grainger v. Hill [1838] 4 Bing NC 212. (132 ER 769). On the limits of the limits of the action, see 
Pitman Training v. Nominet [1997] FSR 797; Essex Electric v. IPC Computer [1991] FSR 690. On 
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or malicious falsehood (which is also limited).178 Moreover, the ‘malice’ required is 
often difficult to define and seems to require that the threat must be issued with a view 
to injuring the claimant rather than defending the defendant’s rights. However, an 
honest belief in an unfounded claim is otherwise considered to lack the necessary 
maliciousness.179  
Despite the conceptual difficulties this represents, these are considered to be further 
exacerbated by the European Commission Report, Communication: Towards a 
modern, more European, copyright framework (2015).180 In this, the Commission 
stated that it intended to engage with all parties to set up and apply “follow-the-money” 
enforcement mechanisms.181 However, given the apparent judicial distaste for such 
actions,182 it can be said that the potential of similar campaigns happening again is 
unlikely.  
In spite of this, it is asserted that the only reason why such items received such scrutiny 
is because they were challenged by an intervention that caused the matter to get to 
 
the distinction between the tort of abuse of process and malicious prosecution, see Speed Seal 
Products v. Paddington [1986] 1 All ER 91 (Fox LJ).  
178 Greers v. Pearman and Corder [1922] 39 RPC 406, 417; Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle (eds), 
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), ibid., at 
13-179; Laddie, J., Prescott, P., Vitoria, M., and Lane, L., The modern law of copyright and designs 
(Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2018) at 39.94.  
179 Greers v. Pearman and Corder [1922] 39 RPC 406, 417; Polydor v. Harlequin [1980] FSR 26, 31.  
180 COM (2015) 626 final, December 9, 2015, p. 11, following on from its Communication A Digital 
Single Market Strategy for Europe (COM(2015) 192 final) para. 2.4; See also, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-
online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud accessed> January 12, 2018.  
181 Examples of the “follow-the-money” approach are persuading advertisers not to advertise on 
websites which sell counterfeit goods and persuading payment providers to block financial 
transactions between the operators of such sites and advertisers and consumers. See “‘Follow The 
Money’: Financial Options To Assist In The Battle Against Online IP Piracy A Discussion Paper by 
Mike Weatherly 
MP” <http://www.olswang.com/media/48204227/follow_the_money_financial_options_to_assist_in_t
he_battle_against_online_ip_piracy.pdf> accessed January 27, 2018. 
182 Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 006; Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v 
Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 2012).  
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court.183 As such, if this was not the case, it is argued that the issues associated with 
the system remain the same. This is because claimants rely on “scaring people into 
paying the sums by threatening to issue court proceedings.”184 Therefore, it is the 
‘threat’ aspect where these letters carry their weight. Thus, it is submitted that 
speculative invoicing still represents a potential problem for users in the current UK 
copyright system. This is because when faced with allegations of infringement, and 
the fact that the UK does not actually have a specific system to deal with copyright 
threats, the accused would “rather pay than incur substantial costs...in court.”185 
Yet, there does seem to be improvement regarding taking the litigation element out of 
infringement allegations in light of the UK Government report titled Copyright 
Education and Awareness.186 In this report, it announced that it would contribute £3.5 
million to a three-year public education campaign called Creative Content UK (CCUK) 
(previously known as VCAP) in 2016.187 This scheme was negotiated between the 
 
183 The court benefitted from an intervention from the Consumer Rights Group (Consumer Focus) who 
represented ‘real defendants’ – namely those whose names would be revealed - Golden Eye 
(International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 2012). 
184 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012) at [36]. 
185 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012) at [36]. This approach may also be considered as “disproportionate” – See (Rugby Football 
Union v Consolidated Information Service [2012] UKSC 55; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2011] RPC 855;  Paramount Home 
Entertainment International v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), [2014] ECDR 
(7) 101; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [2012] 
3 CMLR (14) 328; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications Plc (No.2) 
[2011] EWHC 2174 (Ch); Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (No.2) [2012] 
EWHC 1152 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR (15) 360; M. Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: 
The case of Website Blocking’ [2013] JIPITEC (arguing that these remedies signify a transformation 
in the nature of remedies from tortious to in rem).  
186 Weatherly, M., ‘Copyright Education and Awareness: A Discussion Paper’ [2014].  
187 There has been significant investment in raising awareness of the value of copyright to a variety of 
audiences: The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) has a list of 147 IP 
awareness and education projects across the EU listed on the Observatory website: 
<https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/public-awareness-campaigns>; VCAP 
 90 
music and film industry and four ISPs (BT Virgin, Sky, and TalkTalk) and is modelled 
upon the ‘copyright alert system’ that was voluntarily adopted in the United States.188  
However, it should be noted that the CCUK scheme aimed to “send millions of 
educational notices” and “subscriber alerts” to those detected by copyright owners as 
infringing their content. Specifically, this concerned “unlawful” 189 the operation of 
BitTorrent networks (which will often reveal an individual’s IP address to the public and 
this can be visible to copyright owners.190 Under the scheme, there is a twenty day 
period of grace between letters. Thus, if you are a repeat infringer then you will not 
see another message until twenty days after the initial first letter.191 Yet, there are 
concerns that this could be spun into a threat of legal proceedings or something similar 
thereof.192  
Under the current copyright system, it is argued that the current CCUK scheme could 
be used to issue threatening letters in order to use the CCUK scheme as a assistive 
mechanism. In order to do so, it is reasonable to assert that the alerts under the 
scheme could be reworded in a way that attempts to induce payment, but in a less 
obvious manner than the method adopted by ACS law under the umbrella of the 
scheme. The concern is that this would have the effect of potentially avoiding judicial 
scrutiny or any liability (on part of those issuing the letters). Also, it is unlikely that any 
further claims can be brought for an abuse of process (as it is not a court claim). Thus, 
 
(Voluntary Copyright Alert Programme); Weatherly, M., ‘Copyright Education and Awareness: A 
Discussion Paper’ [2014], at 12-15.  
188 Similar schemes have been adopted or are being considered elsewhere, often facing substantial 
opposition: see, e.g., S. McVicar and C. Roche, ‘Proposed Amendments to Australian Copyright Act 
to Tackle Online Piracy will Increase Obligations on ISPs’ [2015] EIPR 120.  
189<http://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2017/01/big-uk-isps-send-first-internet-piracy-warning-
letters-month.html> accessed: 22/1/2017) 
190 Ibid.  
191<http://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2017/01/big-uk-isps-send-first-internet-piracy-warning-
letters-month.html> accessed: 22/1/2017) 
192 <https://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2018/04/nobody-wants-to-talk-about-uk-isp-internet-
piracy-alert-emails.html> accessed: 06/05/2019.  
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it remains likely that under the current system that rightsholders can "continue to ride 
the 'gravy train' of letter-writing in the absence of court supervision."194  
In turn, this could also be an instance where the lack of specific systems to deal with 
copyright threats in the UK again proves to demonstrate that matters (like the ACS 
Law Saga) will not be the last to surface in the UK legal system. This is significant as 
there are no provisions in copyright for persons subject to unjustified threats of 
litigation. They have to seek alternative remedies to combat such items.195 There are, 
however, special provisions that offer remedies against unjustified threats to litigate 
elsewhere in intellectual property law.196 For example, in the case of patents, 
trademarks, registered designs, the unregistered right, and community designs, 
whether registered or registered197 and this has caused writers to question whether 
the current system of threats in copyright is still justified.198 
It is also suggested that the lack of specific threats provisions to deal with claims could 
lead to further copyright infringement claims being monetized. For example, despite a 
general prohibition on trading litigation (otherwise known as ‘champerty’)199 the UK 
courts have permitted copyright holders to delegate to third parties decisions about 
whether to bring litigation, in exchange for a percentage of returns.200 Moreover, in 
March 2017, Broadband customers in the UK from both Sky, and Virgin Media, were 
 
194 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch) at [54] 
195 This also applies to passing off and breach of confidence; For a general discussion, see Reckitt 
Benkiser UK v. Home Pairfum [2004] FSR (37) 774.  
196 See I. Davies and T. Scourfield, ‘Threats: Is the Current Regime Still Unjustified?’ [2007] EIPR 
259; Schwartz, G., and Gardner, M., ‘Groundless Threats of Proceedings for IP Infringement’ [2006] 
Communications Law 85; For copyright, one potential avenue for those who have suffered damage 
from an unjustified threat can seek a declaration of non-infringement: see Leco Instruments v. Land 
Pyrometers [1982] RPC 133, 136.   
197 Community Design Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/2339), [2].  
198 See I. Davies and T. Scourfield, ‘Threats: Is the Current Regime Still Unjustified?’ [2007] EIPR 259 
199 A contract is void as contrary to public policy where it is for maintenance and champerty. They are 
no longer independent torts or crimes: see Criminal Law Act 1967, ss.13, 14.  
200 Golden Eye International Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] RPC 28; [2013] RPC (14) 452. On the 
emergence of anti-piracy businesses, see Lobato, R. and Thomas, J., ‘The Business of Anti-Piracy: 
New Zones of Enterprise in the Copyright Wars’ [2012] 6 Int J Comm 606.  
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the subject of a wave of almost identical letters of a similar nature, and which also 
demanded cash to make these supposed lawsuits ‘go away’.201  
Solicitor, Michael Coyle, who represented defendants in the 2012 ACS legal action, 
stated that the proceedings were an abuse of process203 and the “serious money” 
involved205 meant that the “whole process [was] indiscriminate and cause[d] immense 
worry and suffering.”206 It is suggested that such items are likely to be exacerbated by 
the fact that in the UK, the Digital Economy Act 2017,207 has granted a significant 
extension of the term of imprisonment for online infringement from two years to ten 
under the CDPA.208 Considering this, it is contended that such a measure could assist 
copyright trolls in obtaining settlements due to the fact that settlements could be 
obtained under the guise of the criminal law in the same way that law can be said to 
“coerce”209 the thief to use the market.210 
In the words of Cornish, this is because “the industry faces a problem that has always 
vexed it. The State is willing to treat copyright-taking as a civil wrong on generous 
terms, but it is prepared to fund the policing of naked commercial piracy through 
 
201<https://torrentfreak.com/received-a-piracy-letter-uk-solicitor-will-defend-you-for-free-
150320/>(March 20, 2015) (Accessed: 27/4/2016) 
203<https://www.ispreview.co.uk/index.php/2015/03/solicitor-offers-free-defence-for-victims-of-uk-
internet-piracy-letters.html> (Accessed/27/4/2016).  
205<https://torrentfreak.com/received-a-piracy-letter-uk-solicitor-will-defend-you-for-free-150320/> 
(March 20, 2015) (Accessed: 27/4/2016); Media Cat Ltd v Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, [98]-[102]. 
206 Ibid.  
207 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0087/17087.pdf> (Last accessed: 
21/11/2016); Felipe Romero-Moreno and James G.H. Griffin, ‘The UK's criminal copyright proposals 
in an era of technological precision’ E.J.L.T. 2016, 7(2), Internet. 
208 CDPA 1988 s.107(1)(a)+(b)+(d),(e), (2)(a),(2A), (4)(b), (4A)(b); It is not yet confirmed what would 
be considered to be an industrial scale.   
209 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed) at 251-52.  
210 Wisniewski, J.B., The Economics of Law, Order, and Action: The Logic of Public Goods 
(Routledge 2018); (e.g. capitalist transactions are unjust, then, in so far as they are coerced) – 
Carling, A.H., Social Division (Verso Books 1991) at 145.  
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criminal law.”211 Therefore, it is argued that legislation like the Digital Economy Act 
2017 is another example of the State responding to the needs of rightsholders via 
criminal law.212 Similarly, the current passage of the  European Union Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market (hereinafter ECDM)213 has been described as a 
policy tool for the copyright industry214 that protects the interests of incumbent right 
holders in the digital age.215 Thus, it can be said that the group which owns and 
controls the means of production in the copyright system (which here are 
rightsholders)216 are able, by virtue of their economic power, to use the State as an 
instrument in which to achieve their commercial aims.217  
2.3.1.1(a) Implications for information service providers following recent 
developments. 
 On September 24 2015 the European Commission also launched a consultation on 
the regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud 
computing and the collaborative economy. Significantly, the consultation includes 
questions relating to whether online intermediaries should be subject to a duty of care 
 
211 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press 
2004), p.59; See also, Felipe Romero-Moreno and James G.H. Griffin, The UK's criminal copyright 
proposals in an era of technological precision, E.J.L.T. 2016, 7(2).  
212 Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2012] EWHC 529 (Admin); [2012] 3 WLUK 262; 
Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1998 s.297(1); (“Europol wipes out 30,000+ piracy sites, three 
suspects cuffed to walk the legal plank using website take-downs”) - 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/12/02/europol_30000_piracy_sites/ (Accessed: 21/02/2020). 
213 COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD).  
214 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28].  
215 Kretschmer, "European Copyright Reform: is it possible?" (7 May 2019), 
re:publica19, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyujNlpxu9k[Accessed 30 October 2019] - 
Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [40].  
216 Travis, H., Copyright Class Struggle: Creative Economies in a Social Media Age, Entertainment 
Law Review, (2019), 30(4), 133-135.  
217 Miliband, R., The state in Capitalist Society: The analysis of the Western system of Power, Quartet 
books London, (1973), p.22; See also, Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market 
Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28]. 
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in relation to illegal content.218 It is postulated that such items will only serve to enhance 
the power of letter campaigns, which in accordance with the lack of specific defences, 
can only serve to compound such factors.  
In the UK, platforms such as YouTube are not responsible for copyright violations 
(although internet service providers can be),219 as long as the platform has no ‘actual 
knowledge’220 of unlawful activity or information. However, when such knowledge or 
awareness is obtained, it must act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the 
information.221 This encourages the so-called ‘notice-and-take-down’ relationships,222 
or where such material reappears, a notice-and-stay-down relationship.223  
Under this, if a rightsholder provides notice, the service provider will take the material 
down or otherwise risk losing the immunisation from liability following the ruling of the 
CJEU L’Oreal SA v eBay.224 However, the service of a notice is not, a precondition to 
a finding that the ISP had actual knowledge of another person using its service to 
 
218 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-
online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud [Accessed March 21, 2017]; See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., 
Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2016) at 21-08.  
219 C. Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright (Wolters Kluwer, 2017); J. Riordan, 
The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford, 2016); G. B. Dinwoodie (ed.), Secondary Liability of 
Online Service providers (Springer 2017); See also, the laws on accessory liability in the UK and 
störerhaftung in Germany under s 1004 of the German Civil Code. 
220 The phrase ‘actual knowledge’ is, under CDPA 1988 s.97A(2), a question of fact to be determined 
by the court by taking into account all of the matters which appear to the court to be relevant, 
although the court is required to have regard to the question of whether the ISP has received notice 
of the infringement, the notice specifying the full name and address of the sender of the notice and 
details of the infringement in question.  
221 e-Commerce Regs, reg. 19 (based on e-Commerce Dir., Art. 14). On the Knowledge standard, see 
Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber), 
[118]-[124] (awareness of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have realized that [the activity was illegal]. 
222 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber).  
223 Societe de Producteurs en France v. Google, No. 11-13,666 (French Supreme Court, 12 July 
2012).   
224 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, Case C-324/09, EU:C:2011:757, [AG155] (AG Jaaskinen).  
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infringe copyright. It is simply a matter to which the court must have regard.225 In 
deciding what constitutes ‘actual knowledge’ is not to be considered too strictly. For 
example, in Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (No.2)226 the 
defendant website in question facilitated the copying of sound recordings and indeed 
the vast majority of uses amounted to infringement.  
The significance of this procedure in accordance with the current environment is that 
there is little protest from the website-holders who inevitably lose out, despite a 
procedure available for objecting. What is seen here is a “combination of legal process 
and technology that begins to offer rightsholders an immediate weapon of mass 
action.”227 Adding to this, Recital 64228 states that Online Content Sharing Service 
Providers (OCSSPs) carry out acts of communication to the public when they give 
access to works/subject matter uploaded by their users, meaning they become directly 
liable for their users uploads.229  
Yet, despite there being a prohibition on ‘general monitoring’ i.e. rightsholders placing 
an obligation on service providers under the e-Commerce Directive,230 Article 15(1),231 
can help to counteract any overzealous operationality of these provisions. The section 
 
225 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch).  
226 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch). See also, 
EMI Records Ltd v Briitsh Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch).  
227 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press 
2004), p.59.  
228 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.) (Text with EEA relevance).  
229 DSM Directive art.17(1). On the complex CJEU case law on communication to the public, see 
Quintais, J.P., "Untangling the hyperlinking web: In search of the online right of communication to 
the public",= (2018) 21 J. World Intell. Prop. 385 – in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital 
Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [38].  
230 2000/31/EC.  
231 For discussion, see C. Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright (Wolters 
Kluwer, 2017) 100-5; Art. 15. Recital 47 States: ‘Member States are prevented from imposing a 
monitoring obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this 
does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders 
by national authorities in accordance with national legislation.’  
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states that Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers when 
providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13, and 14, to monitor the information 
which they transmit of store, nor a general obligation to actively seek facts or 
circumstances indicating unlawful activity.232  
In Scarlet v. SABAM,233 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had to 
decide whether the prohibition in Article 15 was breached. This concerned an order 
requiring an internet service provider (whose system had been used as a vehicle to 
facilitate file sharing) to screen all content uploaded to filter and thus identify musical 
works in which the claimant held copyright.234 The court also considered the roles of 
Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive 2004 and Article 16 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.235  The key question was whether the system would “require an 
intermediary provider, (such as an ISP), actively monitor all the data of each of its 
customers in order to prevent a future infringement of intellectual property rights.”236 
Ultimately, the CJEU confirmed its ruling in L'Oreal, namely that national courts have 
jurisdiction to order injunctions against online service providers to prevent future 
infringements of copyright. In doing so, it dismissed the blocking order in the SABAM 
case because it would have been ‘disproportionate’ to require ISP’s to actively engage 
in obligatory monitoring of its customers for an indefinite period.237  
 
232 A derogation in Art. 15(2) allows member States to require information society service providers 
promptly to inform ‘competent public authorities’ of alleged unlawful activities; Also, what happens 
when a platform has been required to take down specific material, can it be required to ensre that no 
user uploads the same material again? – see Societe de Producteurs en France v. Google, No. 11-
13,666 (French Supreme Court, 12 July 2012).   
233 Case C-70/10 [2011] ECR I-11959 (ECJ).  
234 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, Case C-70/10 [2011] ECR I-11959 (ECJ), [29] 
(describing ‘the contested filtering system’).  
235 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012); See also, O’Sullivan, K.T., 
‘Copyright and internet service provider "liability": the emerging realpolitik of intermediary 
obligations’ IIC [2019], 50(5), 527-558.  
236 Case C-70/10 [2011] ECR I-11959 (ECJ) at [40]; On ‘intermediaries’ see Arnold R (2018) Essential 
reading on intermediary accountability: injunctions against intermediaries in the european union: 
accountable but not liable? J Intell Prop Law Pract 13(3):247-249.  
237 Scarlet Extended v SABAM [2011] paras 46–53 – The CJEU held that allowing the blocking order 
would not respect the requirement of striking a fair balance between the competing interests. 
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However, in the case of UPC Telekabel,238 the CJEU upheld an injunction granted by 
a domestic court where it permitted the defendant to choose the means to restrict its 
customers’ access to the infringing websites. Thus, while UK procedural law may 
establish the conditions and procedural requirements, EU law can be said to place 
significant limits on the scope of the measures that may be ordered against online 
service providers.239 Thus, it can be argued that online service providers cannot be 
required to actively monitor all communications transmitted through their services, 
unless such monitoring was ordered as part of a criminal investigation as provided for 
by EU law.240  
Yet, this is not as simple as it may seem due Article 17 of the ECDM.241 This requires 
the social media platforms like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to take more 
responsibility for copyrighted material being shared illegally on their platforms.242 This 
is unsurprising as a key concern for rightsholders has been the position of those who 
provide services and facilities that facilitate infringement on the internet.  
Specifically, this relates to those who provide the means and infrastructural aspects 
for the information society to function with things such as streaming, browser and 
 
Striking a fair balance would necessarily include a proportionate outcome; To see the potential 
benefits of such orders, see Loc Xuan Le and Duc Anh Tran, ‘Vietnam: is site blocking the solution 
to online piracy?’ M.I.P. 2019, 284, 78. 
238 UPC Telekabel [2014] paras 51–53 and 64. 
239 Rizzuto, F., ‘Injunctions against intermediate online service providers’, Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review (2012), 18(3), 69-73, at 73.   
240 The Court of Justice confirmed the principles regarding the permissible scope of injunctions in 
Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog NV, judgment of the Court of Justice, February 16, 2012. The case 
involved a preliminary reference from the first instance Belgian court whose ruling had led to the 
preliminary reference from the Brussels Court of Appeal in the Scarlet Extended case and regarded 
the compatibility of an injunction being contemplated by the first instance national court with EU law 
that would place an obligation on Netlog NV, the owner of an online social network platform, to 
introduce a system for filtering information stored on its platform in order to prevent files being made 
available which infringe copyright. 
241 COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD).  
242 For more information, see the discussion in this chapter at 2.3.1.1(b).  
 98 
search-related activity.243 This also includes those which procure, induce, or have part 
of a common design244 the commissioning of acts such as downloading or the 
unauthorized streaming of protected works accessorily.245 It is to these matters I now 
turn.  
2.3.1.1(b) Article 17 and its associated implications246 
 
“This is the technology of policing: [where] crawlers and bots will spider around 
the Internet in order to locate versions of copyright material that ought not to be 
there at all, or in breach of contract...[and] over time this could be a major 
technique of control.”247  
 
243 C. Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright (Wolters Kluwer, 2017); J. Riordan, 
The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford, 2016); G. B. Dinwoodie (ed.), Secondary liability of 
Online Service Providers (2017).   
244 On ‘accessorial liability’ in the UK, and how accessory liability is found, they must have procured or 
induced an act, or it must have been the result of their common design. Such an act could also be 
both an act of primary liability and give rise to accessory liability – Twentieth Century Fox Film v. 
Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J). 
245 On the distinction between a ‘communication to the public’ and ‘accessory liability’ when 
considering the operator of a website, see Twentieth Century Fox v. Sky UK [2015] EWHC 1082 
(Ch); See also, G. B. Dinwoodie, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Liability of Online Service 
Providers’, in Dinwodie (ed.) Secondary Libaility of Online Service Providers (2017); An act, 
depending on the facts of each case, could be both an act of primary liability and give rise to 
accessory liability for the acts of others by way of ‘inducement’: Twentieth Century Fox Film v 
Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J); (a defendant may procure an infringement by 
inducement, incitement or persuasion) – CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc & 
Another [1988] 2 A11 ER 484 at [496].   
246 It is important to note that it is yet to be seen the true implications of Brexit for Copyright law in the 
UK. As a result, it is important to note that the discussion here is premised on the implementation of 
Article 17 as the law currently stands. However, it may be that it remains of part of the UK legal 
system by the adoption of a similar framework – R. Arnold, ‘The Need for a New Copyright Act: A 
case Study in Law Reform’ (2015) QMJIP 110-31.  
247 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press 
2004), p.55.  
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There is now a requirement, under Article 17, (discussed more in chapter 3),248 for 
information society service providers that store and provide access to large amounts 
of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users, to prevent the availability of 
these items identified by rightsholders.249 
The cumulative conditions, set out in art.17(4),250 are supported inter alia by an 
“ambiguous” Recital 66.251 The conditions specify that OCSSPs must demonstrate 
that they have:  
“(1) made best efforts to obtain an authorisation; 
(2) made best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works for which the 
right holders have provided them with the relevant and necessary information; 
and 
(3) acted expeditiously, subsequent to notice from right holders, to take down 
infringing content and made best efforts to prevent its future upload.” 
The second condition imposes what critics have described as an upload filtering 
obligation.252 Condition (3) introduces both a notice-and-takedown mechanism (similar 
to that of Article art.14 E-Commerce Directive) and a notice-and-stay-down (or re-
 
248 For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.5.1.4.  
249 Article 17(1), COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD); For example, this can include things such 
as parodies and quotations. Moreover, the problems may be greater in some fields, such as 
photography, than others, such as perhaps recorded sounds. It is still nonetheless unclear as to 
what the true extent may be as case law will develop such items in due course.  
250 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.)  
251 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.) 
252 On the use of the term, see Julia Reda, ‘Article 13 in conjunction with Recitals 38 and 39 of the 
proposed EU copyright’ reform/expansion https://juliareda.eu/eu-copyright-reform/censorship-
machines/ [Accessed 30 October 2019] – in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single 
Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [39].  
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upload filtering) obligation.253 As such, to avoid liability, it is likely that platforms would 
have to deploy automatic recognition technologies to examine all uploaded content,254 
despite this being explicitly rejected by art.17(8).255 Thus, it remains difficult to see 
how the ECDM will not ultimately result in general monitoring.256 Quintais also notes 
that OCSSPs are expressly excluded in para.3 from the hosting safe harbour 
for copyright relevant acts,257 previously available to many of them under art.14(1) E-
 
253 For an analysis of these preventive obligations see Husovec, M., "How Europe Wants to Redefine 
Global Online Copyright Enforcement" in Synodinou. T.E., (ed.), Pluralism or Universalism in 
International Copyright Law (Kluwer Law, 
forthcoming), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372230 [Accessed 30 October 2019] – in Quintais, 
J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 
28-41 at [39]. 
254 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [39]. 
255 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.) 
256 That the provision will lead to filters has in fact been conceded by some EU officials and national 
governments: see Masnick, M., ‘EU Commissioner Gunther Oettinger Admits: Sites Need Filters To 
Comply With Article 13" (3 April 2019), 
Techdirt, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190329/15501341902/eu-commissioner-gunther-
oettinger-admits-sites-need-filters-to-comply-with-article-13.shtml; Masnick. M, ‘After Insisting That 
EU Copyright Directive Didn’t Require Filters, France Immediately Starts Promoting Filters’ (28 
March 2019), Techdirt, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190327/17141241885/after-insisting-that-
eu-copyright-directive-didnt-require-filters-france-immediately-starts-promoting in Quintais, J.P., ‘The 
new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at 
[39]. 
257   Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [38]. 
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Commerce Directive.258 This makes legislation like art.17259 lex specialis260 to the E-
Commerce Directive.261 The significance of this is that it is likely that this will 
exacerbate the issues associated with so-called ‘notice-and-take-down’ 
relationships,262 especially since it is difficult for platforms to avoid liability.263 
Nonetheless, it can be said that the current law in the UK would prohibit orders 
requiring filtering or content-recognition systems to be installed on user-generated 
content platforms such as YouTube, or social media, such as Instagram.264 Also, to 
enforce such orders would be conceivably incompatible with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, as interpreted by the CJEU.265 Yet, such filtering 
 
258 DSM Directive art.17(3). On the intersection between the DSM and E-Commerce Directives, 
see Peguera, M., "The New Copyright Directive: Online Content-Sharing Service Providers lose 
eCommerce Directive immunity and are forced to monitor content uploaded by users (Article 17)" 
(26 September 2019), Kluwer Copyright Blog, http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/09/26/the-
new-copyright-directive-online-content-sharing-service-providers-lose-ecommerce-directive-
immunity-and-are-forced-to-monitor-content-uploaded-by-users-article-17/ [Accessed 14 October 
2019] - in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ 
E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [38]. 
259 COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD). 
260 Lex specialis, in legal theory and practice, is a doctrine relating to the interpretation of laws and 
can apply in both domestic and international law contexts. The doctrine States that if two laws 
govern the same factual situation, a law governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides 
a law governing only general matters (lex generalis) - https://www.trans-lex.org/910000/_/lex-
specialis-principle/ (Accessed: 19/02/2019).  
261 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [38]. 
262 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber).  
263 See the discussion in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a 
critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [39]; Warner Music UK Ltd v Tunein Inc [2019] EWHC 
2923 (Ch) [2019] 11 WLUK 6 at [205]-[213].  
264 For more information, see the above section – 2.3.1.1(a).  
265 Stalla-Bourdillon, S and Rosati, E, Turk, K. et al., ‘A Brief Exegesis of the Proposed Copyright 
Directive’ (24 November 2016), SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875296[Accessed 30 October 
2019]; Senftleben et al., ‘The Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Fundamental Rights’ 
[2018] 40 E.I.P.R. 149; Angelopoulos, and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market (2017), 
SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947800 [Accessed 30 October 2019] 
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technology would arguably apply whenever a user uploaded content. Thus, although 
it may be aimed, in theory, at particular acts, the objective result on a practical level in 
terms of how it would operate would nevertheless involve the direct or indirect 
screening of all uploaded content. However, recent EU reform proposals may change 
this. 
There are also potential complications pursuant to the utilisation of such mechanisms 
due to its potential to interfere with the capacity of hosts to conduct their business 
(procuring possible contraventions of Article 16 of the Charter).266 For purposes here, 
this can reinforce the dominance of existing operators like YouTube by creating 
indirect barriers of entry for host services due to the costs associated with developing 
sufficient adequate technologies in which to carry out the monitoring function.267  
Yet, under the proposals in chapter 5,268 it is argued that the reduction in the cost of 
works,269 which includes re-use,270 could lessen these barriers. This is due to the 
potential decrease in the amount of infringing works uploaded due to the increased 
financial accessibility of works under the proposed system. This could mean that host 
services may have less instances infringing material being uploaded and this may 
lessen the need to monitor over time.271  
 
- Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [39].  
266 Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, Case C-70/10 [2011] ECR I-11959, [46]-[49], [53] (ECJ); Case C-
360/10 SABAM v. Netlog NV, EU:C:2012:85, [44]-[46], [52] ECJ.  
267 ECS, General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package (2017), 7. Quite how big a problem 
this is would depend on the expense of such technologies. Apart from Google’s famous ‘Content-ID’ 
system, which is said to have cost many millions of dollars to develop, other commercial offerings, 
such as ‘Audible Magic’, appear to be much less costly.  
268 For more information on the proposals, see chapter 5 at 5.3, on their proposed benefits, see 5.5. 
269 For more information on the proposals, see chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
270 For more information on the proposals, see chapter 5 at 5.4 generally. Specifically, see 5.4.1(b).  
271 Note that there is no empirical evidence to support this directly. However, Danaher Smith and 
Telang ‘Website Blocking Revisited’ (18 April 2016), SSRN, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795> [Accessed 30 June 2019]  did find 
that in the aftermath of the November 2014 website blocks, there was a 6% increase in 
subscriptions to legitimate sources such as Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on 
legitimate ad-revenue supported sources such as BBC and Channel 5’s streaming sites. 
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Article 17272 reflects potential illegalities pertaining to Article 15 of the e-Commerce 
Directive.273 This includes a potential disregard for fundamental rights,274 as well as 
censorship technology posing a possible intrusion on personal data.275 Other 
situations where interference with the rights of personal data has been found 
unjustifiable was in the conjoined cases of Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och 
Telestyreben.276 These concerned retention of traffic data, but they seem rather far-
removed from filtering copyright-protected content to offer any real precedent-based 
guidance. This is due to a lack of quintessential contextual applicability regarding the 
subject matter concerned.  
According to Angelopoulos, the conclusion may be that Article 15 is never compatible 
with the Charter for a host to be obliged to install content recognition technologies.277 
This is because the Charter and the e-Commerce Directive being (assumed to be) 
irrelevant to agreements between private actors as per UPC Telekabel v. Constantin 
 
Furthermore, it is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. 
Poort and J. Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of 
Amsterdam [2018], p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the 
communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]. 
272 Directive (EU) 2019/790.  
273 Scarlet, Case C-70/10, [2011] ECR I-11959, [34]-[40] (ECJ); Netlog NV, Case C-360/10, 
EU:C:2012:85, [33]-[38] (ECJ);   
274 C. Angelopoulos, ‘Outside the Safe Harbours, Intermediary Liability Capsizes into Incoherence’ (6 
October 2016).  
275 EDRI, ‘Deconstructing Article 13’, Available online at 
https://edri.org/files/copyright/copyright_proposal_article13.pdf; Scarlet, Case C-70/10, [2011] ECR 
I-11959, [50], [53] (ECJ); Netlog NV, Case C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, [48]-[52] (ECJ) (Note that at 
the time of writing, the Article was 13, but has now been changed to Article 17).  
276 Joined Cases 203/15 and C-698/15, EU:C:2016:970. 
277 C. Angelopoulos, On Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market (January 2017). The installations of such systems seems to 
be obligatory, at least in relation to some other wrongs, under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Delfi v. Estonia, Application No. 64569/09 ([2015] EMLR (26) 563, ECHR, Grand Chamber).  
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GmbH.278 Also, in the case of Bonnier Audio,279  the CJEU upheld a domestically 
issued order requiring an ISP to provide the names and addresses of copyright 
infringers. 
This new tool280 in the arsenal of copyright owners is likely to encourage letters 
threatening legal action which remains an unregulated aspect of copyright law in the 
UK. This could mean that the cost and burden of intellectual property litigation may 
make the mere threat of court proceedings become a viable method in which to 
procure financial settlements,281 with little scope to deter such claims in the copyright 
context.282 As such, it is argued that letters can be written against the backdrop of the 
threat of court action and then furthered via legislation such as CPR, r.31284 and 
Directive 2004/48/EC (the “Enforcement Directive”) (SI 2006/1028).285  
 
278 C-314/12 Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, EU:C:2014:192, [52]-[54] - in 
this respect, it is notable that the Court of Justice, in UPC, required the ISP to ‘ensure compliance 
with the fundamental right of internet users to freedom of information’ when formulating the manner 
in which it implemented a ‘blocking order.’ It might be that this implies that all ISP behaviour that is 
designed to protect third party rights, but as a result affects users, must comply with fundamental 
rights; See also, Twentieth Century Fox v. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 US 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 [2005].   
279 Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio AB, Earbooks AB, Norstedts Förlagsgrupp AB, Piratförlaget AB, 
Storyside AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB [2012], ECLI:EU:C:2012:219.  
280 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28]. 
281 See chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(b)(i); Ashworth Hospital [2002] 1 WLR 2033; Norwich Pharmacal v. CCE 
[1974] AC 133; Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 
723(Ch) (26 March 2012); EWCA Civ 1740; [2013] Bus. L.R. 414 (CA (Civ Div)); Wilko Retail v. 
Buyology [2015] FSR (17) 432; Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin 
Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 1827 (Ch); [2020] F.S.R. 5.; Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 006; 
Jade Engineering [1996] FSR 461.   
282 (e.g. an alternative course to combat unjustified threats to sue to avoid unnecessary litigation is the 
issuing of certificates of contested validity. As well as presenting itself as a potential victory article, it 
can also deter subsequent threats of litigation): RDA 1949, s.25; PA 1977, s.65; TMA 1994, s.73.  
284 This provision enables intellectual property right holders to obtain a court order requiring a person 
to reveal information relevant to that particular action; See also, J. Riordan, ‘The Liability of internet 
Intermediaries’ (Oxford Uni. Press 2016) at chapter 6.  
285 Article 8 – This enables the disclosure of the names and addresses of relevant parties, the dates 
and quantities imported, and the source of goods or materials otherwise connected to infringement; 
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Moreover, this is also likely to increase the censorship of content because  art.17286 
could enable copyright holders to recognise potential infringements immediately. 
Article 17(1) ECDM requires that service providers issue rightsholders with adequate 
information on the functioning and deployment of monitoring measures and content 
recognition technologies, as well as, when relevant, adequate reporting on the 
recognition and use of the works and other subject-matter found on their platforms.287 
Thus, it is asserted that matters like the ACS Law Saga could “come alive again with 
greater intensity”288 under the legislative obligations provided for by Article 17. 
Therefore, it is likely that art.17 will not just have an influence on the copyright-based 
claims issued in relation to infringement proceedings or threats thereof in the UK, but 
it is also likely continue to generate judicial and academic debate for the foreseeable 
future.289  
Finally, there may be hope for smaller UK firms and individuals who are subjected to 
infringement claims, coming from the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC). 
This court is designed to provide a streamlined and more cost-effective forum to hear 
lower value and less complex intellectual property claims than the Patents Court.290 
 
It has been made clear that Art. 8 also entitles a person to an order for disclosure after a finding of 
infringement: New Wave v. Alloys, Case C-427/15, EU:C:2017:18; In Scotland, under the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement, etc) Regulation 4.   
286 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.)  
287 Article 17(1), COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD).  
288 <https://acsbore.wordpress.com/2016/06/18/view-from-the-lords-copyright-trolls-are-villains-and-
scammers/> accessed: 18/06/2018.  
289 For an exploration of different interpretation options for art.17 DSM Directive, see The European 
Copyright Roundtable, ‘How to Implement Article 17 
DSMD?’, <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCl1OA6-H9MTCJJBPvTn4LLw> Accessed 30 
October 2019.   
290 For more information on IPEC, see HM Courts and Tribunals Service, ‘Guide to the Intellectual 
Property Enterprise Court Small Claims Track’ Issued July (2014). Available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/426129/patents-
court- small-claims.pdf> (Accessed: 19/8/2016). 
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IPEC offers both a small claims track (up to £10,000) and a multi-track procedure 
(between £10,000- £500,000), with anything above this going to the Patents Court.  
There is no need for parties to be legally represented (although they can choose to 
be, with costs recoverable from the other party only in exceptional circumstances).291 
As the procedure is designed for this, and if the parties agree, the court (IPEC) will 
deal with the written arguments of the parties instead of a hearing. Yet, there are 
concerns about the nature of IPEC regarding the access to justice for parties with less 
financial backing. For example, interim remedies (which are remedies ordered before 
the final hearing of the claim) such as injunctions,292 asset freezing orders,293 and 
 
291 Civil Procedure Rules at part (27.10) – For more information, see 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules> (Accessed: 31/07/2017).    
292 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch); [2012] 
E.C.D.R. 14, citing Twentieth Century Fox Corp v Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); [2010] F.S.R. 
21; [2010] E.C.D.R. 8; [2010] E.M.L.R. 17, para.89. (“In a case which involves an allegation of 
authorisation by supply, these circumstances may include the nature of the relationship between the 
alleged authoriser and the primary infringer, whether the equipment or other material supplied 
constitutes the means used to infringe, whether it is inevitable it will be used to infringe, the degree 
of control which the supplier retains and whether he has taken any steps to prevent infringement.”); 
Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch). 
On blocking injunctions see K. O’Sullivan ‘Enforcing Copyright Online: Internet Service Provider 
Obligations and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ [2014] E.I.P.R. pp.577–583; R. 
Arnold ‘Website-blocking Injunctions: The Question of Legislative Basis’ [2015] E.I.P.R. at 623–630, 
which contains a detailed review of the corpus of existing case law and discusses the impact of 
art.10(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights and the ECHR cases of Yildirim v Turkey 
(App. No.3111/10, 18 December 2012) and Delfi v Estonia (App. No.64569/09, 16 June 2015). On 
September 24, 2015 the Commission launched a consultation on the regulatory environment for 
platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy. The 
consultation includes questions relating to whether online intermediaries should be subject to a duty 
of care in relation to illegal content: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-
consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud> [Accessed 9 
January 2015] – in Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James 
on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 21-253, 26-137. 
293 On ‘freezing orders’ see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), Part VI, chapter 21, Part 7, 
Section B; See also, chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(b)(i). 
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search and seizure orders,294 are not available on the small claims track, but are 
available on the multi-track. The consequence is that those with claims below £10,000 
will be left with no real opportunity to prevent something like the disposal of assets 
prior to a final judgement which may cause concerns regarding access to justice and 
the recovery of assets. 
2.3.1.2 The situation in the US  
The rapid advancement of technology saw copyright infringement through online file-
sharing become a serious problem for the recording industry. Evidence at trials relating 
to this showed that revenues across the music industry decreased by fifty percent 
between 1999 and 2006.295 This was a decline that the record companies attributed 
to piracy.296 As a result, the response by the music industry was to dramatically change 
the surveillance of music consumers online in the US.297  
Statutory damages under §504298 have the greatest deterrent and remedial bite when 
the defendant infringes large quantities of works. The basic level of damages under 
this section is between $750 and $30,000 per work, and this is at the discretion of the 
court. Also, the US Congress further amended §504(c) to increase the minimum per-
work from $500 to $750. It further increased the maximum per-work award from 
$20,000 to $30,000, which also included the maximum per-work award for wilful 
infringement from $100,000 to $150,000, with no need for commercial motive.299 This 
 
294 Anton Pillar KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch. 55; For more information, see chapter 5 
at 5.7.3.3(c)(i).  
295 Cohen, E.J. Loren, L.P. Okediji, R.L, O'Rourke, M.A., Copyright in a Global Information Economy, 
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2019), at 838; RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America). 
2003a. ‘Recording Industry to Begin Collecting Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits against File 
`Sharers' Who Illegally Offer Music Online.’ June 25. 
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062503.asp. (Last accessed: 15/11/2014).   
296 Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenebaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2011).  
297 Arditi, D., ‘Disciplining the Consumer: File-Sharers under the Watchful Eye of the Music Industry’ 
(2011); Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishing 2015),  chapter 8.     
298 17 U.S.C.  
299 See H.R. Rep. 106-216 at 3 [1999], whereby it seems that Congress was well aware of the threat 
of non-commercial copyright infringement when it established the lower end of the range, in that it 
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meant that individual end-users engaged in large-scale “file-sharing” faced the 
prospect of millions of dollars of personal liability.  
However, the few adjudicated cases have awarded substantially less than these sums. 
For example, in the 2012 case of Capitol Record Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset,300 the 
damages award reached §1,920,000, but was eventually settled at $222,000.301 
Rasset was sued by record company copyright owners for infringing copyright in 24 
sound recordings by exchanging them over digital networks. After several appeals, 
the case arrived at the Eighth Circuit which evaluated the previous award and 
concluded that the sum of $220,000 was constitutionally permitted. This was because 
the US Supreme Court in St. Louis Co. v. Williams302 historically decided that damages 
awarded pursuant to a statute violates due process only if they are “so severe and 
oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to the offence and obviously 
unreasonable.”303 Thus, under this standard, Congress arguably possessed a “wide 
latitude of discretion” in setting statutory damages.304     
 
 
noted, amongst other things, “By the turn of the century the Internet is projected to have more than 
200 million users, and the development of new technology will create additional incentive for 
copyright thieves to steal protected works...Many computer users are either ignorant that copyright 
laws apply to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for 
their conduct...even after copyright owners put them on notice that their actions constitute 
infringement and that they should stop the activity or face legal action...”.  
300 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012).  
301 The case was originally named Virgin Records America, Inc v. Thomas-Rasset.   
302 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).  
303 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919). 
304 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 66 (1919); On the “guideposts” of statutory 
damages, there are three factors in determining whether an award is excessive or unconstitutional: 
“(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendants misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual 
or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference 
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed by 
comparable cases.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003); see also 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996). (Note that the punitive damages have 
never been held to be applicable in the context of statutory damages).    
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It is argued that the music industry created this online surveillance through a 
combination of monitoring file-sharing programs,305 filing lawsuits,306 and requesting 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block users’ internet access.307 Thus, although 
the judicial trend favoured the exoneration from direct liability of “mere conduit” service 
providers, the prospect of liability on the grounds of contributory infringement308 
pushed service providers to lobby Congress for reductions and exemptions in their 
liability to copyright owners.  
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) were the leading advocates of 
the legal campaign,309 along with several more similar business and interest groups.310 
One of the first significant instances of the lawsuits from the RIAA came on June 26 
2003, whereby legal threats were redirected toward individual subscribers of these 
networks311 who, in the past, were never subject to legal action in online environments. 
Such actions are enabled by Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
permissive joinder of parties312 which enables the filing of a single lawsuit against 
multiple defendants. This was in response to what the copyright industry perceived as 
an “epidemic of illegal file sharing.”313 This was because prior to this move, such users 
 
305 Strowell, A., Peer-to-peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2009), at 151-58, 166-171; Latta, S.L., Cybercrime: Data Trails DO Tell Tales, (Enslow 
Publishers 2012), p.64.  
306 Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (2013); Capitol Records Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2010).   
307 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 US 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
308 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (No. C 99-5183 MHP No. C 00-0074 MHP), United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California - in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004 
(9th Cir. 2001);  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
309 <https://www.riaa.com/what-we-do/> (Accessed: 21/03/2019).  
310 Reyman, J., ‘The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law and the Regulation of Digital 
Culture’ 115 (Routledge 2010) at 61.  
311 On P2P networks and the challenges they pose to the copyright system, see Davies, G., Garnett, 
K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2016), Part VIII, chapter 26, Part 3, section F(i)(b).  
312 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 
313 RIAA 2003a. ‘Recording Industry to Begin Collecting Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits against File 
`Sharers' Who Illegally Offer Music Online.’ June 25. 
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062503.asp. (Last accessed: 15/11/2014).  
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were perceived to be immune to legal repercussion314 and these lawsuits against 
small-scale infringers changed this notion dramatically.315 This approach was chosen 
because of the difficulty of filing lawsuits against every individual file sharer. 
Consequently, the RIAA chose to focus on a limited number of individuals and 
maximise the publicity316 surrounding its legal action to discourage the overall 
production of file-sharing networks.317  
In the process, the RIAA successfully threatened thousands of other people, where 
the option was either to settle out of court (and stop sharing music); or risk paying up 
to $2,500 per shared song if they were to lose in court. This also included thousands 
more in legal fees even if one wins.318 The RIAA also admitted that in 2007, more than 
 
314 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. ‘Impact of Legal Threats on 
Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law 
and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
315 Graham, J., RIAA Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos, USA Today, Sept. 10, 2003, at 4D, 
Available at: <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-09-10-riaa-suit-
reax_x.htm> Accessed: 11/4/2015; Lichtman, D.G., ‘Kazaa and punishment’ Wall Street Journal, 
September 9, (2009) in Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. (2006) 
Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal 
Actions. Journal of Law and Economics, 49, 91-114. 
316 Two cases that went to court and received extensive publicity were - Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (2013); Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-
1497 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2010). 
317 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. ‘Impact of Legal Threats on 
Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law 
and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
318 Park,  D.J., Conglomerate Rock: The Music Industry’s Quest to Divide Music and Conquer Wallets 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2007); Knopper Steve, Reinventing Record Deals: Rolling Stone, 
November 29, 2009. Appetite for self-destruction: The Spectacular Crash of the Record Industry in 
the Digital Age (New York: Free Press 2007) in Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the 
Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015). 
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18,000 individuals had been sued by its companies, with new reports showing the 
number to be around 30,000 in the US,319 most of whom settled out of court.320   
A useful example showing the effect of this approach comes from PhD student, Joel 
Tenenbaum. He was being sued by the RIAA “for alleged piracy”321 that involved the 
sharing of music online in July 2009. The case, Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. 
Tenenbaum,322 concerned infringements alleged to have taken place between 1999-
2007. This case was only one of two file-sharing cases to go to verdict in the RIAA’s 
anti-downloading litigation campaign. The majority were settled out of court,323 with 
the other case being Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset.324 
Commenting on the case, Tenenbaum wrote that: 
“Even now, I am scared to write this. Though they have already seized my 
computer and copied my hard drive, I have no guarantee they won't do it again. 
I face up to $4.5m in fines and the last case like mine that went to trial had a 
jury verdict of $1.92million. No matter how many people I explain this to, the 
reaction is always the same: dumbfounded surprise and visceral indigence, 
both of which are a result of the amazing secrecy the RIAA has operated under. 
“How did they get you?” I'm asked. I explain that there are 40,000 people like 
 
319 Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later’ Accessed:13/8/2014 
https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf; Engel, J., ‘Music Industry Targets CMU’ The 
Saginaw News, Apr. 16, 2007 (quoting the RIAA as filing 18,000 lawsuits); Jeff Leeds, ‘Labels Win 
Suit Against Song Sharer’ New York Times (2007), Available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/05music.html?_r=0> Accessed: 19/6/2016. 
320 Kravets, D., ‘Dec. 7, 1999: RIAA Sues Napster’ (December 12, 2009) 
<https://www.wired.com/2009/12/1207riaa-sues-napster/> accessed: 22/5/2015.  
321 <http://www.digitaltrends.com/music/appeals-court-denies-piracy-penalty-plea/> Last accessed: 
22/23/4/2016.  
322 Sony BMG v Tenenbaum No. 07cv11446-NG (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009).  
323 Weiner, S., ‘Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum’ Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology (August 12, 2009) Available at: http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/sony-bmg-
music-entertainment-v-tenenbaum (Accessed: 23/5/2016); Sony BMG v Tenenbaum No. 
07cv11446-NG (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009); See, Ben Jones, ‘Court Upholds $675k Verdict in RIAA 
Piracy Case’ (August 24, 2012) https://torrentfreak.com/court-upholds-650k-verdict-in-riaa-piracy-
case-120823/ (Accessed:6/7/2016).  
324 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012).  
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me, being sued for the same thing, and we were picked from a pool of millions 
who shared music. And that's when a look appears on the face of whoever I'm 
talking to, the horrified "it could have been me!" look.”325  
The RIAA won the case,326 but damages were reduced from $675,000 to $67,500,327 
because the fee was deemed “constitutionally excessive” rather than on the grounds 
of the US “remittitur” procedure. This is a ruling by a Judge where damages are 
reduced in civil cases because they are deemed to exceed the amount in question.328 
However, both parties appealed.329 The First Circuit Appeal Court reinstated the initial 
$675,000 and ruled that the case be sent back to the District Court for consideration 
of the remittitur issue.  
However, Harvard Law Professor, Robert Neeson, representing Tenenbaum, 
immediately opposed this, stating that such a procedure would do nothing more than 
to allow the plaintiffs to appeal any reduced fee and send his client on a financially 
draining retrial. He said that, “the First Circuit’s misuse of remittitur threatens to push 
the defendant down an endless litigation rathole…the prospect of which forces 
defendants onto a retrial ‘merry-go-round’ that forces them to settle, avoiding 
 
325 Tenenbaum, J., ‘How it feels to be sued for $4.5million’ The Guardian Music Blog (July 2009) (last 
accessed: 11/7/2015) (Available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2009/jul/27/filesharing-music-industry>  
326 Weiner, S., ‘Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum’ Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology (August 12, 2009) Available at: <http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/sony-bmg-
music-entertainment-v-tenenbaum> (Accessed: 23/5/2016); Sony BMG v Tenenbaum No. 
07cv11446-NG (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009).  
327 <https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2010/nov/09/joel-tenenbaum-a-year-on> 
(Accessed 12/9/2016)  
328<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_turns_down_file_sharing_appeal_challen
ging_remittitur_procedu/> (Accessed: 12/9/2016); A high profile file-sharing case where this was 




constitutional issues.”330 Yet, the US Supreme Court refused to hear the matter,331 and 
all subsequent appeals by Tenenbaum were refused. This meant that the outstanding 
fee of $675,000 that was issued by District Court Judge Rya Zobel upheld.332  
Significantly, the attention such awards have drawn has enhanced prior criticisms of 
heavy-handed copyright enforcement and excessive damages awards.333  
Prior to digitalisation, major record labels maintained their market positions because 
of their control of distribution networks – specifically the access of major record label 
artists to brick-and-mortar stores.334 Yet, as music became digital, the major record 
labels began to look for new ways to profit from selling music under a new digital 
system.335 This was because digitalisation created a “disintermediation”336 (i.e. 
 
330 Weiss, D., ‘Supreme Court Turns Down File-Sharing Appeal Challenging Remittitur Procedure’ 
(May 21, 2012) Available at: 
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_turns_down_file_sharing_appeal_challengi
ng_remittitur_procedu/> (Accessed: 3/10/2016)   
331<https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17968294347924737000&q=Sony+BMG+Music+
Entertainment+v.+Tenenbaum&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1> (Accessed: 17/10/2016) 
332 Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (2013); The award was upheld 
because $22,500 per infringement was not only held to be on the low end of the spectrum – only 
15% of the statutory maximum – for wilful infringement, and the Jurys verdict was not so excessive 
as to warrant remittitur – See, Ben Jones, ‘Court Upholds $675k Verdict in RIAA Piracy Case’ 
(August 24, 2012) (Available at: https://torrentfreak.com/court-upholds-650k-verdict-in-riaa-piracy-
case-120823/) (Accessed:6/7/2016); The details of the appeal are available at:  
https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/12-2146/12-2146-2013-06-25.pdf (Accessed: 
20/10/2016) - Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum (June 25, 2013).    
333 See Samuelson, P. & Wheatland, T., Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform 51 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 439, 454-55 [2009]; See also, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-
Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding Jury’s award of $220,000). 
334 Arditi, D., ‘Disciplining the Consumer: File-Sharers under the Watchful Eye of the Music Industry’ 
(2011).  
335 Arditi, D., ‘Music Everywhere: Setting a Digital Music Trap’, SAGE Journals, Vol.45, [2017] 617-
630.    
336 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  at 105.  
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removal of the middle man) that changed the brick-and-mortar-based market-model 
that the music industry operated under prior to digital technology.337  
Gillespie suggests that file sharing “threatened to change the balance of power of who 
did the distributing”340 and it is argued that Tenenbaum, by sharing files online for free, 
was engaging in the exact kind behaviour that “challenged the recording industry’s 
exclusive control over the distribution of sound recordings.”341 By implication, it is 
suggested that this is the reason why the case against Tenenbaum was absent of the 
usual justifications for, and economic checks that otherwise prevent large-scale 
copyright litigation.342 As a result, Tenenbaum was labelled ‘thief’ and a ‘pirate’ and 
was identified as such on his very first appearance345 in a case that was placed in the 
national spotlight.347 This is hypothesised to have been an attempt to gain what is 
posited to be a degree of ‘justification’348 for the case, whereby the plaintiffs depicted 
 
337 Garnham, N. and Fred Ingilis, ‘Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economics 
and Information’ Newbury Park, [1990] CA Sage Publications; Arditi, D., ‘Disciplining the Consumer: 
File-Sharers under the Watchful Eye of the Music Industry’ (2011). 
340 Gillespie. T, Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
2007), at 43.  
341 Burkart, P., and McCourt, T. Digital Music Wars: Ownership and Control of the Celestial Jukebox, 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2006) at 49.  
342 Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 
47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06 at 893.  
345 Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 
47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06.  
347 Moya, J., Harvard Prof Fighting RIAA Back in Court Tomorrow, zeropaid.com (Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://www.zeropaid.com/news/9942/harvard_prof_fighting_riaa_back_in_court_tomorrow/; Jon 
Newton, ‘RIAA Faces Power Team in Tenenbaum Case’ (Nov.20,2008, 9:26 AM), 
<http://www.p2pnet.net/story/17640>; ‘Sue Walsh, Harvard vs. the RIAA’ (Dec. 15, 2008, 11:21 
AM), <http://www.technologytell.com/gadgets/42833/harvard-vs-the-riaa/> At trial, Tenenbaum was 
also represented by a small Boston criminal defence firm, Feinberg & Kamholtz. See Ben Sheffner, 
‘Tenenbaum Seeks Reduction in Jury’s Award Against Him; Argues $675,000 Verdict Violates 
Constitution, copyrights and campaigns’ (Jan. 4, 2010, 12:15 PM), 
<http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/01/tenenbaum-seeks-reduction-in-jury s.html.> 
– Taken from Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum 
Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06. 
348  See chapter 3 at 3.2 . 
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file-sharing as “sophisticated criminal-theft ring.”349 This is further postulated to be the 
reason why, according to Professor Karol, that the plaintiffs developed and 
emphasized consistently in the trial, an overarching theme of downloading as “theft”350 
as Tenenbaum “embodie[d] the industry’s decade-long attempt to shape the narrative 
of online downloading through the rhetoric of theft.”351  
Kleiman and Kilmer demonstrate how the dynamic of this litigation tactic works under 
this approach.352 They posit that the intensity is held constant under this method. The 
more credible the commitment to punish rule-breaking is, the more likely it is to 
succeed in discouraging the targeted behaviour, and therefore the less likely it is that 
the threatened punishment will actually take place.  This recalls the chess maxim that 
‘the threat is stronger than its execution’.353 Yet, under this analysis, if this maxim was 
entirely true, then it would suggest that these dynamics would reduce the number of 
files shared due to the potential of legal repercussion. As will be seen below,354 these 
tactics have generated mixed results, with 36.5% of users suggesting that the threat 
of legal repercussion had failed to curb their behaviour online, and in contrast, 38% 
 
349 Transcript of Jury Trial Day 2 at 68-70, Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 
85 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-11446), at 17-20 (describing how P2P file- sharing enterprises are 
able to share copyrighted files on a massive scale for free) - Taken from Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole 
My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law 
Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06 at 894.  
350 Green, P.S., ‘13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age’, [2012] 270-76; Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013) (emphasis added) – (“new 
technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works.”); See also the discussion 
on ‘theft’ and the role this has played in the current system in chapter 3 at 3.3. 
351 Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 
47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06. 
352 Kleiman, M. and Kilmer, B., ‘The dynamics of deterrence’, Department of Public Policy, University 
of California, 3250 Public Affairs Building, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1656; Drug Policy Research 
Rand, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. Communicated by Thomas C. Schelling, 
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, June 15, 2009 (received for review September 7, 2007) 
<http://www.pnas.org/content/106/34/14230.full.pdf> accessed: 23/5/2017.  
353 Ibid.  
354 See this chapter at 2.4.  
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agreed it did.355 However, it is submitted that the success or failure of the legal 
approach used by the RIAA in the file-sharing saga does not detract from the intention 
of the campaign itself. Although the success or failure of the campaign may undermine 
the credibility of the above maxim in certain instances, it is nonetheless postulated that 
the legal methods used were aimed at inducing a psychological356  impact on the mind 
of the individual users online. The purpose of doing so is contended to have been to 
attempt to procure widespread compliance357 via copyright law358 to the point where 
the potentiality of a threat being carried out can have greater influential effects than if 
the act were to be carried out itself.359 
Alternatively, Bhattacharjee et al., provide a further reason for the general approach 
used by the RIAA where they note that it was simply due to the “impracticality” of filing 
lawsuits against every individual file sharer.360 They posit that the RIAA chose to focus 
on a “relatively small group of individuals and maximise the publicity surrounding its 
 
355 Giletti, T., ‘Why Pay if it’s Free? Streaming, Downloading, and Digital Music Consumption in the 
iTunes era’ Media@LSE Electronic MSc Dissertation Series [2012], compiled by Dr. Bart 
Cammaerts and Dr. Nick Anstead.  
356 How Fear Works: Culture of fear in the Twenty-First Century, Bloomsbury Continium, (2018), 
pp37-38; Bellemare, M. F. & Holmberg, A. M. “The Determinants of Music Piracy in a Sample of 
College Students,” (2010), Duke University – Sanford School of Public Policy; Duke University – 
Department of Economics.  
357 On how fear and paranoia can be used for political ends, see  Plato. Laws, Translated by A. E. 
Taylor (1961). In The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 
Bollingen, New York in Glass, J.M., Notes on the Paranoid Factor in Political Philosophy: Fear, 
Anxiety, and Domination, Political Philosophy, Vol 9, No. 2 (Jun. 1988), pp.209-228.  
358 For more information, see this chapter at 2.4.1; Griffin, J., and Nair, A., International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology [2013]: Scientia potential est: Making threats of copyright 
infringement, International Review of Law, Computers and Technology. 
359 Frank, J., Law and the Modern Mind, (New York: Tudor Publishing 1949), Ch.1. (Law and the 
Modern Mind is a 1930 book by Jerome Frank which argued that judicial decisions were more 
influenced by psychological factors than by objective legal premises); The book has also been the 
subject of criticism, see  Lon Luvois Fuller, Thomas W. Bechtler, Law in a Social Context: Liber 
Amicorum Honouring Professor Lon L. Fuller (1978), p. 17. 
360 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. (2006) Impact of Legal Threats 
on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 49, 91-114. 
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legal action to discourage the overall production of file-sharing networks.”361 
Nevertheless, it is contended the RIAA approach, due to the publicity involved, was 
designed to create a panopticon-style system in its functionality and enforcement that 
was centred upon the aforementioned psychological impact in order to influence public 
opinion. Yet, the RIAA could also be said to be conducting the litigation simply as a 
means of enforcing their client’s intellectual property rights to enable their effective 
economic exploitation in the same way third parties finance copyright litigation for the 
associated profits.362  
However, it is suggested that although this is a valid consideration, the reason why 
the RIAA  are suggested to have pursued the case363 for the former psychological 
reasoning is because of the lack of economic sense to the litigation. Simply put, any 
collectable judgements would be almost certainly “dwarfed” by their litigation costs 
because the recording industry had spent $17 million in legal fees and collected just 
$391,000 in settlements.365  This also led to claims that the only reason the recording 
industry stopped the litigation was because it simply run out of money to file such 
uneconomical lawsuits.366 Therefore, the panoptic approach is argued to have enabled 
 
361 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. ‘Impact of Legal Threats on 
Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law 
and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
362 See, e.g., Steinitz, M., Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 Minnesota 
Law Review, 1268, 1275-86 (2011); Lyon, M., Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party 
Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA Law Review 571, 577 (2010); Molot, J.T., Litigation 
Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 Georgetown Law Journal 65, 90 (2010).  
363 Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013).  
365 (The record companies’ indifference to the negative anticipated value of the Tenenbaum litigation 
is consistent with their attitude throughout the broader campaign against file sharing) – Jeff Stone, 
Critics Say the MPAA and RIAA Should Stop Lying About Piracy Loss Before Shutting Down 
Demonoid, The Pirate Bay , INT’L BUS.TIMES (Oct.20, 2012), <http://www.ibtimes.com/critics-say-
mpaa-riaa-should-stop-lying- about-piracy- loss-shutting-down-demonoid-pirate-bay-850179> – 
Taken from Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum 
Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06; 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100713/17400810200.shtml (Accessed: 21/04/2018).  
366 <https://hbr.org/2008/12/why-the-riaa-stopped-suing> accessed: 08/03/2015; In the UK, costs 
should be borne out by those rightsholders initiating proceedings – Twentieth Century Fox Film 
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the RIAA to extend its vision into the homes of consumers, placing them, by analogy, 
in a peripheric ring. In this ring, rightsholders sit in the central panoptic tower. This is 
because [t]he panopticon “disassociates the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric 
ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything 
without ever being seen.”367   
However, there is the potential for improvement. In January 28, 2016, the Internet 
Policy Task Force of the Department of Commerce published a White Paper on 
Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages.368 The Task Force supports the 
streamlining of the procedure for adjudicating small claims of copyright infringement 
[in which statutory damages award would be capped]. This would also give further 
consideration to the proposal of the Copyright Office to establish the risk of 
disproportionate levels of damages against individual file-sharers.369  The US 
Copyright office in 2013 also expressed such an intention in Copyright Small Claims, 
a Report of the Register of Copyrights (September 2013),370 but none of these items 
have been initiated as of yet. 
2.3.1.2(a) Can the Copyright Misuse Defence in the US help alleviate these 
issues?371 
It is argued that the Copyright Misuse defence can offer a potential mechanism to 
which claims without credibility or abuses of procedure can be dealt with in order to 
help alleviate some of the current issues. However, it is not without its faults, as 
Copyright Misuse can also be said to suffer from the fact it is a defence. What is 
 
Corp. v. British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), [53]-[55] (differentiating between 
various stages in proceedings).    
367 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977), pp.201-202 
368 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf  
369 https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/copyright/white-paper-remixes-first-sale-
and-statutory-damages (Accessed: 18/02/2019).  
370 http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/usco-smallcopyrightclaims.pdf. (Accessed: 
27/06/2018).  
371 There is a similar doctrine in the UK known as ‘restraint of trade’ - Macaulay v Schroeder [1974] 1 
WLR 1308 at 1314; See also, Joined cases Silvertone Records v Mountfield, Zomba Music v 
Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152.  
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significant about the Copyright Misuse doctrine is that it operates as a defence – and 
it not a cause of action in itself. This was discussed in Online Policy Group v Diebold.372 
Ultimately, the application of this defence varies between different courts,373 whereby 
it suffers a degree of uncertainty.  
The defence is relevant because it restricts the ways in which a right holder may invoke 
copyright infringement proceedings. Yet, it may problematic to use it for the purposes 
discussed as it does not seem to deal with the matter of threats issued by way of a 
letter writing campaign or threats issues in absence of official court proceedings. This 
means that formal proceedings need to be initiated by the individual issuing the threats 
in order to employ this mechanism.  
Consequently, it is dependent on the threat being acted on, and so this is where the 
potential of the defence being successfully invoked can become problematic. This is 
posited to be a significantly limiting feature considering that in most instances, letter 
writing campaigns are often started with little or no intention of going to court in order 
to avoid judicial scrutiny.374 Moreover, the defence also suffers from inconsistent 
application because it is a defence,375 with some US courts such as the Eleventh 
Circuit in Bell South376 going so far as to introduce an additional requirement that any 
application of misuse must also entail a violation of anti-trust laws. Yet, because the 
endorsement of the doctrine is an extension of the ‘misuse doctrine from patents to 
copyright, this in effect embraces the ‘unclean hands’ principle. This is because the 
 
372 Online Policy Group v Diebold 337 F.Supp.2d 1195 (ND Cal. 2004), and 17 USC §512(h); See 
also, Lasercomb v Reynolds 911 F2.d. 970 (4th Circuit, 1990).  
373 For more information, see Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A 
Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, Ph.D. (2010) at 5.5.3.  
374 Only two file-sharing cases have ever been fully adjudicated - Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. 
Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (2013); Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. 
Jan. 22, 2010); In the UK see also, Media CAT Ltd v. Adams [2011] EWPCC 006, at [98]-[101]. 
375 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996) – the doctrine could have reasonably 
been referred to in this case but it did not so.  
376 BellSouth Advert. & Pub. Corp. v Donnelley Information. Pub., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993). For 
a comprehensive list of each circuits case law with synopsis, see Gervaise-Davis III, G., ̳The 
affirmative defence of copyright misuse’, 867 Practising Law Institute/Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook 103 (2006) at 134-138. 
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doctrine extends from the equitable principle that the courts “may appropriately 
withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public 
interest.”377 This is contended to be the case since it is altogether outside of the sphere 
of the copyright fair use doctrine as per Alcatel v. DGI Techs.378   
However, this can be considered to have been reversed in some respects, although it 
is important to note that the case may be specific to its facts. In PMI Corp v. AMA379 
the US Court of Appeals set forth the strongest statement of what had been developing 
as a doctrine of copyright misuse. It outlined the way in which an infringer may assert 
it as a complete defence on the basis that copyright owner is using his copyright in an 
unfairly anticompetitive manner.380 The court also concluded that it was not necessary, 
in order to invoke the copyright misuse doctrine, that there be proof that the copyright 
owner had technically committed a violation of antitrust laws.381 
Nevertheless, despite this apparent widening of the scope in which to bring a ‘misuse’ 
defence against infringement, it still seems that the potential future issues associated 
with things like letter-writing campaigns remain for the foreseeable future. This is 
because its application has been seemingly limited to situations such as when a 
licensor attempted to extend copyright protection by contract.382 Thus, in Lasercomb 
v. Reynolds383 (of the Fourth Circuit), Circuit Judge Sprouse considered the history of 
copyright law and focused particularly on those bodies involved, such as Parliament 
and the Stationers’ Company.  
 
377 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942) at 492.  
378 Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999). 
379 Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Association 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 
1997).  
380 Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Association 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 
1997).  
381 Ibid.  
382 ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996).  
383 Lasercomb v Reynolds 911 F2.d. 970 (4th Circuit, 1990). 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In doing so, he stated, amongst other things, that “...the granted monopoly power does 
not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright.”384 With this, the misuse 
defence can also be said to be very much unpredictable with regards to its application 
in copyright following the later decision of Video Pipeline v. Vista Home385 (of the Third 
Circuit). In this case, it was ruled that ‘neither the Supreme Court nor this Court, has 
affirmatively recognized the copyright misuse doctrine.386  This is based on the notion 
that misuse is not a cause to invalidate the copyright or patent, but instead “precludes 
its enforcement during the period of misuse”387 as the “ultimate aim [of copyright law] 
is to stimulate creativity for the general public good.”388  
Comparatively, in the UK, the common law doctrine of restraint of trade389 could 
potentially be used.  Under the doctrine, covenants which are in restraint of trade are 
prima facie unenforceable at common law and are enforceable only if they are 
reasonable as between the parties and so far as the public interest is concerned.390 
The reason for applying this doctrine is because it can be “applied to factual situations 
with a broad and flexible rule of reason.”391 Thus, Lord Reid in Macaulay v 
Schroeder392 asserted that if contractual restrictions are capable of oppressive 
enforcement, they must be justified prior to enforcement by the courts,393 although 
 
384 Ibid., Lasercomb v. Reynolds at 974; This principle was recognised half a century before the 
Supreme Court in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).   
385 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).  
386 Ibid. See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 221 (3d 
Cir. 2002). There is however, a well-established patent misuse doctrine, see, e.g., Morton Salt Co. 
v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 
614 (3d Cir. 1975).  
387 Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Association 121 F.3d 516, 520 n.9 
(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Lasercomb v Reynolds 911 F2.d. 970, 979 n.22 (4th Circuit, 1990).  
388 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc (Supreme Court, 1984) 464 U.S. at 432; see 
also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 769, 787 (2003).   
389 For more information, see Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, (2016), chapter 28, part 6.  
390 See in particular Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] A.C. 269.  
391 Per Lord Reid in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] A.C. 269 at 331. 
392 Macaulay v Schroeder [1974] 1 WLR 1308;  See also Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA 
Records Ltd [1975] 1 W.L.R. 61, CA.  
393 Macaulay v Schroeder [1974] 1 WLR 1308 at 1314. 
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parties choosing to enforce such agreements are not acting illegally if they choose to 
do so.394   
However, it is argued that although restraint of trade could be used in the context of 
contracts discussed in chapter 4, it is suggested to lack the contextual enforceability 
of the US equivalent copyright misuse defence for purposes here. To expand, it is 
suggested that the UK doctrine lacks the ‘defence’ element in threats of proceedings 
situations in that it is often applied to instances where parties have chosen to engage 
in contractual relations.395 As such, it is suggested that restraint of trade is a limited 
public policy tool, but one that would be ill-suited to operate as a defence in the context 
of threats to sue in copyright. This is opposed to the US misuse doctrine, which is 
more akin to a formed defence though it is still also limited.396    
2.4 Have these tactics reduced file-sharing?  
The effect of the surveillance tactics is argued to have encouraged consumers to self-
regulate.397 This was due to the potentiality of being monitored by rightsholders and 
their representatives. This is submitted to be further evidenced by the element of 
variety regarding those targeted in the US and UK, including those targeted by the 
letter writing campaigns like ACS law. This was suggested to be aimed at manifesting 
a degree of uncertainty among all age groups operating online.  
The reason for this is because the more anonymous and temporary the observation 
is, the greater the risk for the user being surprised and the greater his anxious 
 
394 Boddington v Lawton [1994] I.C.R. 478.  
395 On further instances where restraint of trade has been raised in contractual situations see 
Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling [1990] (4) S.A.782; John v James [1991] F.S.R. 397; 
Silvertone Records Ltd v Mountfield [1993] E.M.L.R. 152; Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment 
(UK) Ltd [1994] E.M.L.R. 229, Jonathan Parker J; For a general discussion of the principles of the 
doctrine see Chitty on Contracts 31st edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at paras 16–076.  
396 See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003); 
See also, Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 221 (3d 
Cir. 2002). There is however, a well-established patent misuse doctrine, see, e.g., Morton Salt Co. 
v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 
614 (3d Cir. 1975).  
397 See the discussion in this chapter at 2.4.1.  
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awareness of being observed.398 As such, the methods used are postulated to have 
created a dual system of enforcement that worked synergistically to create a scenario 
where users began to self-regulate due to the mechanics of the approach taken. It is 
to these matters we now turn.  
2.4.1 A “microphysics of power”: why users adopted self-regulation in the 
copyright system399    
The current environment is argued to be a product of “the overall effect or result of a 
series of interacting structures which are located at a completely different levels of the 
copyright system to where they are enforced, constituting a ‘microphysics of 
power’.”400 Put simply, it is submitted that the nature of copyright threats provisions 
and the expense associated with the court process, have served to create a “bottom-
up” transfer of power back to rightsholders, where copyright litigation is now seen, in 
the words of Balganesh, as “deserving of avoidance.”401 This also meant that 
downloading music via file-sharing networks become synonymous with music 
piracy.402   
It is hypothesised that this was influenced by the large number of early settlements, 
due to the threats of increased costs even if one wins, or the threat of tying defendants 
 
398 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977), p.202 
399 Deleuze, G., “Foucault”, Translated and edited by Sean Hand, Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 
(2006), p.23.  
400 Deleuze, G., “Foucault”, Translated and edited by Sean Hand, Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 
(2006), p.23; Also, there is a predominant categorization within copyright-based legal discourse to 
argue that the rightsholder is all powerful (See, for example: Vaidhyanathan, S. 2001. Copyrights 
and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and how it Threatens Creativity,” 2nd ed, chapter 
1, New York: New York University Press.  
401 Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065; Accessed: 12/5/2015. 
402 For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.3; See also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording 
Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  chapter 8.  
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up in court with more money than they can afford to pay.403 This was to avoid the due 
process of law404 and shape the behaviours of those operating online.405 In this 
process the RIAA also made mass media announcements outlining their intention to 
spend the next month identifying users who offer songs for others to copy. These 
campaigns changed consumer attitudes toward online file-sharing. This was done by 
suing hundreds of individual computer users, representing a marked shift in RIAA 
policy that increased a user’s “perceived risk of getting caught illegitimately sharing 
unauthorised music files and [this caused] a change in consumer behaviours.”406  
With surveillance, even if it is discontinuous or not necessarily everywhere at the same 
time, the user never truly knows if he or she is being observed, and this resulted in a 
decrease in user activity on targeted illegitimate sites.407 In a similar vein, 
Bhattacharjee et al., (in a study which assessed the impact of legal threats on online 
music sharing activity) showed that legal threats appear quite effective against 
individuals whose initial file-sharing levels were low. An overwhelming majority of 
these individuals also further reduced the average number of files they shared by more 
than a third.408 
 
403 Park,  D.J., 2007. Conglomerate Rock: The Music Industry’s Quest to Divide Music and Conquer 
Wallets. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; Knopper Steve, 2007. “Reinventing Record Deals.” Rolling 
Stone, November 29, 2009. Appetite for self-destruction: The Spectacular Crash of the Record 
Industry in the Digital Age. New York: Free Press in Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in 
the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015).  
404 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.126. 
405 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. (2006) Impact of Legal Threats 
on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 49, 91-114. 
406 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. ‘Impact of Legal Threats on 
Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law 
and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
407 Groennings, K., Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation against Individuals, 20 
Berkeley Technology Law Jorunal. 571 (2005). Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/btlj/vol20/iss1/51 (Accessed: 17/10/2016) at n.38 
408  Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. (2006) Impact of Legal Threats 
on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 49, 91-114, Tables 10, 11 
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The further consequences of this change are outlined in a study by Giletti,409 (when 
examining the motive behind the intention of consumers to purchase music). He posits 
that 38% of participants who had previous experience using file-sharing networks 
agreed that the threat of legal repercussions had curbed their usage.410 However, in 
the same study, it should also be noted that 36.5% of people felt that the threat of legal 
repercussions did not curb their usage. Yet, other studies also show that the file-
sharing litigation has made users respond to the threat of going to court411 and since 
the RIAA began to initiate legal proceedings against illegal file-sharers, Madden and 
Lenhart found that usage of illegal downloading site (Kazaa) had experienced a 25% 
reduction in usage between November 2002-2003.412   
Although this analysis can indicate mixed success in the US for the RIAA’s strategy, 
the majority of substantial sharers decreased the number of files shared, typically by 
more than 90 percent.413  The majority of non-substantial sharers actively reduced 
sharing activity, typically to a third of their original levels, and a substantial number of 
 
409 Giletti, T., ‘Why Pay if it’s Free? Streaming, Downloading, and Digital Music Consumption in the 
iTunes era’ Media@LSE Electronic MSc Dissertation Series [2012], compiled by Dr. Bart 
Cammaerts and Dr. Nick Anstead.  
410 Ibid; Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, ‘Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits’ The Wall Street 
Journal (Dec. 19, 2008). 
411 Rainie, L. & Madden, M., ‘Pew Internet Project and comScore Media Metrix Data Memo’ 6 (Apr. 
2004), available at <http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharing-April-04.pdf> accessed: 
9/9/2016. 
412 Madden, M. and Lenhart, A., ‘Music Downloading, File Sharing, and Copyright’ Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, (July 2003) available at: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2003/07/31/music-
downloading-file-sharing-and-copyright/> accessed: 17/8/2015; By the end of 2002 Kazaa estimated 
that it had 140 million users - Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 26-135. 
413 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. (2006) Impact of Legal Threats 
on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 49, 91-114. 
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sharers exhibited some risk mitigation behaviour.414 Also, in a study conducted by 
Rainie and Madden, it was demonstrated that, in response to these tactics: 
“the total number of individuals sharing files online dropped from twenty-eight 
percent in June 2003 to twenty-three percent in February 2004. Only eighteen 
percent of total Internet users downloaded music files according to an April 
2004 survey, compared to twenty-nine percent in the spring of 2003. Thirty-
eight percent of those in the April survey also claimed that the reason why they 
were downloading fewer files was because of the RIAA suits, up from 27 
percent before the end of 2003.”415 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that although these results suggest there may be a 
drop in the percentage of traffic, this may be due to the rise of Netflix and video 
streaming generally. As a result, this could mean that there is not a drop in the actual 
usage of illegal file-sharing sites – it is just less as a percentage of Internet traffic 
generally. This could be a likely consequence as video streaming doesn’t always 
needs such a high degree of compression, thereby reducing the flow416 of data over 
the internet.417 It could have also been the case that users are not downloading less 
but are sharing less (that is, making fewer of their music files shared or accessible for 
 
414 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. (2006) Impact of Legal Threats 
on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 49, 91-114. 
415 Rainie, L. & Madden, M., ‘Pew Internet Project and comScore Media Metrix Data Memo’ 6 (Apr. 
2004) at 4. Available at <http://www. pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharing-April-04.pdf> (Accessed: 
9/9/2016). 
416 Waldfogel, J., Digitization, Copyright, and the Flow of New Music Products, in Ginsburgh, 
Victor/Throsby, C.D. (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, Vol. 2, Amsterdam 
2014, 277.  
417<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2835762_Distributed_Video_Streaming_Over_Internet> 
(Accessed: 20/05/2017).  
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downloading).418 However, it is argued that the threat of legal repercussions helped to 
pave the way for these new forms of media.419  
This was done by the way in which legal proceedings impacted on the choices made 
by consumers who are now opting for legal methods of consumption. For example, 
60% of users who have not tried downloading said that the impact of the suits would 
prevent them from partaking in such activity in the future.420 This is argued to have 
increased popularity of legitimate distribution channels like Spotify, Netflix, and Apple 
Music by channelling consumers to these methods of distribution.421 This is because 
the biggest reason for culture companies conducting litigation and threats thereof is to 
ensure that “the company maintains its dominance within the networks of distribution 
by shutting down file-sharing networks, [and then] replacing them with their own 
subscription and downloading services.”422 Groenning supports this, suggesting that 
 
418 Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. ‘Impact of Legal Threats on 
Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law 
and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
419 Other legal factors are also argued to be associated with this – Specifically, see the rights of 
‘communication’ and ‘public display’ in chapter 3 at 3.6; Foong, C., The Making Available Right, 
Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019); Jane C, Ginsburg, ‘The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public’ in Vaver, 
D. and Bently, L., (eds), Property in the New Millennium: Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) 234-37. 
420 Rainie, Lee, et al. ‘The Impact of Recording Industry Suits Against File Swappers’ Pew Internet 
and American Life Project, (January 2004) (Available at: <http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media/Files/Reports/2004/PIP_File_Swapping_Memo_0104.pdf.pdf> accessed: 15/9/2016; See 
also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishing 2015),  chapter 8. 
421  Richwine, L., and Aishwarya, V., ‘Netflix records new sky-high share price and subscribers’ The 
Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/netflix-latest-news-share-price-
subscribers-numbers-streaming-tv-june-us-a7846316.html> accessed: Tuesday 18 July 2017; 
Wlomert, Nils/Papies, Dominik, ‘On-Demand Streaming Services and Music Industry Revenues – 
Insights from Spotify’s Market Entry’ 33 IJRM 314 [2016]; This is also discussed in chapter 4 at 4.6 
and 4.7 respectively.  
422 Leyshon, A., Webb, P., French, S. Thrift, N., & Crewe, L. ‘On the reproduction of the musical 
economy after the Internet’ Media, Culture & Society, [2005] 27(2), 177-209. 
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there has been an increased level of popularity among legal sites like iTunes since the 
initiation of litigation from the RIAA.423  
The music industry wanted to make the public aware that illegal downloading was “the 
equivalent to shoplifting, but online.”424 This was an attempt to add disincentive much 
like the legal prohibitions to the laws on theft, which are designed to encourage the 
thief to use the market.425 For Posner, the reason why theft is punished is because it 
is inefficient to permit the thief to bypass the market.426 As such, universities have 
adopted internal policing mechanisms and joint initiatives with legitimate online music 
providers.427 Also, a report by the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI), showed that these waves of well publicised legal actions had a very 
significant impact in raising awareness of the law on unauthorised file-sharing in both 
the US and UK. In Europe, a study found that after legal actions awareness of illegality 
levels reached 70%, and this was similar in the US.428 
However, since 2009, file-sharing cases have seen a decrease in the amount brought 
to court. Yet, settlement rates from 2009-2015 for file-sharing cases stand at 90.6%, 
which is much higher than the 64.1% settle rate seen over that time period for every 
other copyright infringement suit outside of the file-sharing arena. This can be used to 
suggest there is a greater tendency to settle under the conditions of the current 
 
423 Groennings, K., ‘Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation against Individuals’ 20 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal [2005] 571. 
424 Denegri-Knott, J., & Taylor, J., ‘The Labelling Game: A Conceptual Exploration of Deviance on the 
Internet’ [2005] Social Science Computer Review, 23(1), 93-107. 
425 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law (4th edn, 1992).  
426 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law 77 (1973), at 68.  
427 Groennings, K., ‘Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation against Individuals’ 20 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal [2005] 571. 
428 IFPI, Digital Music Report 2010 - Litigation against individual users does not seem to be actively 
pursued in the UK at the time of writing. In its response to the Government’s Digital Britain report, 
UK Music remarked, (‘[W]e do not believe that the form of intervention proposed by today’s report—
suing consumers is the best way 
forward’) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/4387285/
Digital-Britain-Report-reaction.html> [Accessed December 5, 2015] - Davies, G., Garnett, K., 
Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2016), at 26-138.  
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system. With this, it is important to note that the majority of cases that were filed during 
this time period were by Malibu Media LLC, who are an adult entertainment company 
(however, this is only speculative with regards to why individuals may want to settle), 
but this can also be a factor in these settlements.429  
Yet, despite all of these suits, illegal file-sharing continued to grow even after several 
global lawsuits by the RIAA. However, the joint strategy of pursuing individual users430 
and software distributors deterred large quantities of these illegitimate sharers.431 
Bakker highlights that this eliminated many illegal file-sharing sites, with the few left 
being the “preserve of the committed niche of users.”432  This is argued to demonstrate 
that the litigation-based tactics have been met with some success, but this can be said 
to have been somewhat limited.433  
Nonetheless, Bellemare and Holmberg found that the subjective probability of legal 
threats was a significant determinant of illegal downloading.434 This shows that for 
some users a formal exercise of power is arguably no longer needed. This is because 
in light of the findings discussed, it can be said that some users were anticipating the 
potentiality of legal repercussions. Therefore, despite the suits predominantly stopping 
 
429 Howard, B., ‘Lex Machina Publishes Copyright Litigation Report’ (August 11, 2015) Available at: 
https://lexmachina.com/lex-machina-2015-end-of-year-trends/ (Accessed: 2/10/2016). 
430 Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenebaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2011); Capitol Record 
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
431 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005); Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch). 
432 Piet, B., ‘File-sharing – fight, ignore or compete: paid download services vs. P2P networks’ 
Telematics and Informatics, 22 (1-2): 41-55:d_Services_vs_P2P-Networks (Accessed: 19/5/2015); 
For a general overview of how litigation has deterred file-sharing as a whole, see Groennings, K., 
‘Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation against Individuals’ 20 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal [2005] 571., Part II. Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/btlj/vol20/iss1/51 (Accessed: 17/10/2016).  
433 Bridy A.M., ‘Why pirates (still) won't behave: regulating P2P in the decade after Napster’ Rutgers 
Law J [2009], 40(3): 565-611.  
434 Bellemare, M. F. & Holmberg, A. M. ‘The Determinants of Music Piracy in a Sample of College 
Students’ (2010), Duke University – Sanford School of Public Policy; Duke University – Department 
of Economics in Giletti, T., ‘Why Pay if it’s Free?: Streaming, Downloading, and Digital Music 
Consumption in the iTunes era’ Media@LSE Electronic MSc Dissertation Series, Compiled by Dr. 
Bart Cammaerts and Dr. Nick Anstead, [2012].  
 130 
in 2009, there is now argued to be more wholescale monitoring of activity online under 
Article 17435 in a ‘decentralized’436 system.437 This means ISPs are now required to act 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to infringing material when they have 
knowledge of it.438 This is the result of a copyright system that states that Online 
Content Sharing Service Providers (OCSSPs) carry out acts of communication to the 
public when they give access to works/subject matter uploaded by their users, 
meaning they become directly liable for their users uploads439 under Recital 64.440 This 
also includes the use of blocking injunctions,441 alongside lawsuits and settlements, 
as well as the internet access restrictions.  
 
435 Directive (EU) 2019/790.  
436 Decentralisation is the process by which the activities of an organization, particularly those 
regarding planning and decision making, are distributed or delegated away from a central, 
authoritative location or group. 
437 See the discussion in this chapter at 2.5.  
438 e-Commerce Regs, reg. 19 (based on e-Commerce Dir., Art. 14). On the Knowledge standard, see 
Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber), 
[118]-[124] (awareness of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have realized that [the activity was illegal). 
439 DSM Directive art.17(1). On the complex CJEU case law on communication to the public, see 
Quintais, J.P., ‘Untangling the hyperlinking web: In search of the online right of communication to 
the public’ [2018] 21 J. World Intell. Prop. 385 – in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital 
Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [38].  
440 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.) (Text with EEA relevance).  
441  Blocking injunctions can also be used against ISP’s whereby they can be ordered to block 
customer access to websites, such as Newzbin and the Pirate Bay, containing or giving access to 
copyright material without the permission of the relevant rights holder – Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. v. British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2011] RPC 855;  Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications Plc (No.2) [2011] EWHC 2174 (Ch); 
Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [2012] 3 
CMLR (14) 328; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (No.2) [2012] EWHC 
1152 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR (15) 360; Paramount Home Entertainment International v. British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), [2014] ECDR (7) 101. See also, M. Husovec, ‘Injunctions 
against Innocent Third Parties: The case of Website Blocking’ [2013] JIPITEC (arguing that these 
remedies signify a transformation in the nature of remedies from tortious to in rem). 
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These are submitted to be designed to eliminate the due process of law in the interests 
of capitalism and this is made possible by judging how the lawsuits were received.442  
This is because knowledge and power, as Foucault would argue, are interrelated 
factors that form part of a unified whole, and by this, it is meant that there can be no 
power without knowledge and vice-versa.443 Therefore, in the current copyright 
system, it is asserted that the power being exercised comes from the knowledge 
[recipients] themselves form. This is then extracted, re-transcribed, and accumulated 
according to new norms, or else objects of knowledge that will also make possible new 
forms of control in the copyright system.444  
As a result, the change in human behaviours is contended to be the result of the 
knowledge that users themselves form under the panoptic system, whereby they 
create the subjective probability of legal threats themselves and govern their own 
behaviours accordingly due to their own perceptions of what could happen445 within a 
decentralized system.446 It is hypothesized that this is the consequence of the panoptic 
approach discussed in this chapter,447 which is designed to induce in the [user] a state 
of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power.448 The result is that things are arranged so that the surveillance is permanent 
in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action.449 This renders its actual exercise 
 
442 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  chapter 8; See this chapter at 2.5.   
443   Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002), at 37-83.  
444 Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002), at 84.  
445 See this chapter at 2.3.   
446 See the discussion below at 2.5.  
447 See this chapter at 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.  
448 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977), at 201; Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, 
edited by James Faubion, 2002); Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein, 
Routledge Classics 1991), at 12.  
449 See this section at 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 generally.   
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unnecessary in a system of observation.450 In short, users are caught up in a power 
situation where they are themselves the bearers in copyright law451 because panoptic 
structures function as architectures of power, not only directly but also through (self- 
disciplining) of the watched subjects.452 
2.5 An example from patents to demonstrate the effects created by the 
current system 
Online service providers are increasingly the focus of renewed efforts to enforce 
copyright online. Traditionally, these providers enjoyed safe-harbour immunity to the 
extent that their role in assisting online enforcement was relatively minimal.453 Yet, in 
light of recent reforms,454 and the spread of the "blocking injunction"455 in the EU, this 
traditional position is coming under pressure.456  
This section will briefly discuss the recent activity in the context of patents in the UK 
to help understand the issues copyright is likely to face, as the take-down procedure 
 
450 Frank, J. Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1949) chapter 1; Griffin, J. and 
Nair, A., ‘Making Threats of Copyright Infringement’ [2013] International Review of Law, Computers 
and Technology; Mazzone, J., ‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 40; New 
York University Law Review, Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026. 
451 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977) p. 201; Mark Huggard, Power: a Reader (Manchester University Press, 2002), at 196.  
452 Galič, M., Timan, T. & Koops, B. Bentham, ‘Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance 
Theories from the Panopticon to Participation’. Philos. Technol. 30, [2017] 9–37.; Lyon, D. The 
search for surveillance theories (2006) in D. Lyon (Ed.), Theorising surveillance: The panopticon 
and beyond (Portland: Willan Publishing 2006) at 3-20. 
453 O’Sullivan, K.T., ‘Copyright and internet service provider "liability": the emerging realpolitik of 
intermediary obligations’ IIC [2019], 50(5), 527-558. 
454 Article 17 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 
on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.); For more information, chapter 3 at 3.5.1.4.  
455 For example, in the UK, this type of relief is known as a "Norwich Pharmacal" order; Norwich 
Pharmacal Co v. Customs and Excise Commissioners[1974] A.C. 133; See also, chapter 5 at 
5.7.3.3(b)(i).  
456 O’Sullivan, K.T., ‘Copyright and internet service provider "liability": the emerging realpolitik of 
intermediary obligations’ IIC [2019], 50(5), 527-558.  
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is equally applicable in the UK under s.97A457 and in the US via 17 U.S.C §512.458 
Specifically, this concerns the fact that manufacturing giant Epson continues to shut 
down UK businesses by requiring eBay and Amazon to take down compatible product 
listings under the previously discussed ‘take-down’ procedure.459 The purpose of doing 
so is to illustrate the effects of high costs surrounding liability and litigation and how 
this applies to copyright law.  
This is to show how this decentralized system can be used to discourage commercial 
competition in a manner that is almost (in the UK at least) entirely devoid of judicial 
scrutiny. This is asserted to be due to the desire of  service providers to escape any 
potential damages for breach of statutory duty.460 It will be shown how there are 
parallels within the copyright system that can be said to go further than matters here 
and this is considered to warrant such discussion. The US, however, does have a 
slightly different system which prevents behaviours like those carried out by Epson 
and will be discussed later in this section.  
Online sellers have the disadvantage of being visible, and eBay and Amazon’s 
automatic and inflexible takedown policies make them by far the easiest target. 
Epson’s ruthless patent-trolling is steadily shutting down small UK businesses, forcing 
them to lay off employees or close entirely. Takedown notices are damaging UK 
entrepreneurship, competition and independent business activity.461 Alternatively, it 
could also be argued that this same process could also be used as a method in which 
 
457 CDPA 1988; [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] 
F.S.R. 21; In that case the service provider was itself infringing and the relief under s.97A added 
nothing to what the claimant was already entitled to – For more information on the scope of these 
injunctions, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James 
on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 21-243.  
458 17 U.S.C.  
459 See the discussion in this chapter at 2.3.1.1(a).  
460 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.  
461 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber), 
[118]-[124]; Similar criticisms have been given in the US - Lemley, Chris Sprigman and Mark. ‘Why 
notice-and-takedown is a bit of copyright law worth saving’ Los Angeles Times. Retrieved [2018]-06-




to prevent or disrupt piracy on the internet.462 Nonetheless, it is argued that CJEU 
cases such as the  L’Oreal SA v eBay International463 are exacerbating matters here 
due to the inherent requirement for platforms such as Amazon and eBay to act 
‘expeditiously’ to remove information in order to escape liability.  
The UK Open Rights Group (hereinafter ORG) in February 2019 condemned the 
actions of Epson, calling the take-down procedure a “personal patent guard-dog”464 
with similar concerns about the procedure expressed in the US.465 This led to 
discussions in the American House of Representatives, before a subcommittee of the 
 
462 E.g., (“Europol wipes out 30,000+ piracy sites, three suspects cuffed to walk the legal plank using 
website take-downs”) - The operation was part of an 18-country joint effort involving the European 
police agency and local cops targeting sites that trafficked in both pirated digital content (streaming 
video, media files, and cracked software downloads) and sale of counterfeit real-world goods and 
pharmaceuticals. In total, Europol says it was able to shut down 30,506 domains - 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/12/02/europol_30000_piracy_sites/ accessed: 21/02/2020).   
463 e-Commerce Regs, reg. 19 (based on e-Commerce Dir., Art. 14). On the Knowledge standard, see 
Case C-324/09 L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG, [2011] ECR I-6011, [116] (Grand Chamber), 
[118]-[124] (awareness of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have realized that [the activity was illegal]. 
464 Shapherd, A., ‘Patently unfair – Epson takedowns continue’ (February 14th 2019) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2019/patently-unfair-epson-takedowns-continue> accessed: 
12/04/2019.  
465 Online service providers have expressed concern at the levels of takedown notifications they 
receive that abuse the DMCA provisions which also require a significant and disproportionate 
amount of resources to deal with effectively as opposed to the time spent on legitimate notices - 
(Urban et al., ‘Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice’ (2017), paras 2 and 3);  
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Committee on the Judiciary in March 2014.466 This has been made possible, as is the 
same with copyright in the UK, by the Electronic Commerce Directive.467  
The Electronic Commerce Directive (e-Commerce Directive; Online Services 
Directive) 2000/31/EC allows an online intermediary to immunize themselves from 
liability if they are not responsible for content transmitted via their services because 
they are a "mere conduit"468 for the content. This also applies to instances where they 
are merely "caching"469 or "hosting"470 it.471 This is because, amongst other items, the 
information alleged to be infringing is likely to fall under e-Commerce Directive 
regulation 2(1) as a “commercial communication”472 “relating to goods [or] services.”473 
Specifically, the take-down procedure is given substance by the fact that under Reg.13 
of the e-Commerce Directive,474 the duties imposed by regulations 6, 7, 8, 9(1) and 
 
466 Masnick, M., ‘If We’re Going to Change DMCA’s ‘Notice and Takedown’, Let’s Focus on How 
Widely It’s Abused’ (14 March 2014), 
TechDirt, <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140314/11350426579/if-were-going-to-change-
dmcas-notice-takedown-lets-focus-how-widely-its-abused.shtml> accessed 14 December 2018]; As 
notice-and-takedown is still the basis of today’s trade mark enforcement - Alibaba Group, 2018 
Global Intellectual Property Rights Protection Annual Report (May 
2019), https://www.alizila.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Final_Alibaba_2018_IPR_Report.pdf[Accessed 24 October 2019] in Sylvia 
Polydor, ‘The interplay between technology and trademark protection: a study of infringement, 
intermediary responsibility and protection measures in the digital age’ E.I.P.R. [2020],  42(1), 4-12.  
467 2000/31/EC.  
468 e-Commerce Directive, Article 12 
469 e-Commerce Directive, Article 17 
470 e-Commerce Directive, Article 14 
471 For more information on the defences applicable here, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. 
Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2016), chapter 21.  
472 ‘commercial communication” means a communication, in any form, designed to promote, directly 
or indirectly, the goods, services or image of any person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft 
activity or exercising a regulated profession, other than a communication’ - e-Commerce Directive, 
Reg. 2(1). 
473 e-Commerce Directive, Reg. 2(1)(c).  
474 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002. 
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11(1)(a) shall be enforceable, at the suit of any recipient of a service, by an action 
against the service provider for damages for breach of statutory duty.475  
Any means in which to improve the matter for a seller by challenging listings removal 
is considered to highlight an all but too common theme throughout this chapter. This 
is that those subject to infringement claims often lack the funds or expertise to force 
(those like Epson) to defend strategies in an open judicial forum.476 Instead, Shapherd 
posits that eBay and Amazon’s automatic takedown notice procedures provide the 
multi-million-dollar corporation with “a blunt tool it can brazenly use to circumvent fair 
judicial process.”477 As a result, it is argued that these disputes are an increasingly 
private affair that seems to be dictated by the assumption of liability against service 
providers. This is suggested to be a product of the fact that capitalism unintentionally 
produces a large number of new and unpredictable social and cultural phenomena. 
This includes new social and commercial inequalities.478  
The reason for this is posited to be due to the fact that in capitalist society there is a 
growing tendency to establish a legal order that protects established interests against 
competitors through formal monopolies, whereby certain persons become protectors 
of the monopolistic practices.479 This is because the lack of regulation for threats of 
proceedings and the effects which follow are asserted to be based on the rationale 
that  this “monopolization is directed against competitors and users who share some 
positive or negative characteristics: and its purpose is always the closure of social and 
economic opportunities to outsiders.”480  
 
475 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.  
476 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012); EWCA Civ 1740; [2013] Bus. L.R. 414 (CA (Civ Div)); See also the discussion in this chapter 
at 2.3.1.1.   
477 Shapherd, A., ‘Patently unfair – Epson takedowns continue’ (February 14th 2019) 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2019/patently-unfair-epson-takedowns-continue (Accessed: 
12/04/2019). 
478 Reckwitz, A., The Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of the New (Polity press, 
2017), 87; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The communist manifesto in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The 
Marx-Engels Reader, (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1978), at 469-500.  
479 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), at 341-343.  
480 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.342.  
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Therefore, it is contended that such actions by rightsholders have been to ensure the 
successful orchestration of an environment designed to save their traditional market 
paradigm.481 This has occurred to the point where it appears again that copyright has 
served to create a situation where “wealth is only being redistributed in the direction 
of the already well-to-do.”482 In comparison, however, the US seems to more 
effectively safeguard against such items under §512(g).483 This provides that any 
material taken down will be replaced within 10 business days unless the copyright 
owner, within that time, files an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber 
from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider’s 
system or network under §512(g)(2)(C).484 Failing the prerequisite initiation of 
proceedings by the copyright owner in order to comply with the legislation, the service 
provider must put the material back no more than 14 days after the initial take-down.  
This is significant as it ensures, unlike the UK, that the take-down process must be 
substantiated with court proceedings as a matter of law. Also, the procedure goes one 
step further by seemingly excluding any attempts by individuals who try and use 
falsified information in a manner to induce any false use of the procedure. This is done 
by ensuring that a person, who knowingly misrepresents that material or activity is 
infringing will be the subject of damages incurred any person injured as a result of the 
service providers’ removal of the material under §512(f).485  
 
481 P. Drahos, Information Feudalism (London: Earthscan, 2002) 19-38, 74-107 and 169-86; Taken 
from  Savirimuthu, Joseph, ‘P2P@ software(e).com: Or the art of cyberspace 3.0’, in Macmillan, 
New  Directions in Copyright Law, Vol 6, p.250.  
482 Coleman, J.L., ‘Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic 
Approach to Law’ Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4. (Jul., 1984), pp. 649-679. Available at: 
<http://www.ppge.ufrgs.br/giacomo/arquivos/econ-crime-old/coleman-1994.pdf> Accessed: 
27/6/2015.  
483 17 U.S.C. §512(g)(1)-(3).  
484 17 U.S.C.  
485 "Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents … that material or activity is infringing, or that 
material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any 
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred." – DMCA §512(f); See also, Online Policy 
Group v Diebold 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Automatic Inc v Steiner 82 F. Supp. 3d 
1011, 1030, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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However, the more recent decision of by the United States Court of Appeals Ninth 
Circuit in Lenz v Universal Music486 ruled that copyright holders must consider fair use 
in good faith before issuing a takedown notice for content posted on the internet.487 
Yet, this also involves a requirement by the plaintiff to show bad faith by a rights 
holder,488 as well as a consideration of whether the use of the material was allowed 
by the copyright owner or the law under §512(c)(3)(A)(v).489 
A key issue here is that there are few examples available of successful claims brought 
under §512(f) for abuse of the takedown process. Ultimately, this means that it is 
"exceedingly difficult for an end-user to succeed in a claim for misrepresentation 
against a copyright holder."490 Consequently, such provisions, which could be used to 
prevent the scenario in the UK happening in the US seem to be of little use. This is 
particularly relevant since there are very little “real”491 consequences for misuse of the 
DMCA argues Cobia.492 Thus, it is fair to suggest that the process can represent a 
procedure that is devoid of any substantive deterrents regarding the discouragement 
of misuse due to the lack of legal repercussions.493 In turn, this could give rise to the 
view that its operationality is theoretical with regards to limiting any malpractice on part 
of those who use the system. This is because even where such actions are victorious, 
 
486 Lenz v Universal Music Corp. 801 F.3d 1126 (2015), (9th Cir. 2015).  
487 Ibid.  
488 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  
489 17 U.S.C. 
490 O’Donnell, ‘Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. and the Potential Effect of Fair Use Analysis Under the 
Takedown Procedures of §512 of the DMCA’ (2009) 10 Duke Law & Technology Review, available 
at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=dltr [Accessed 3 
January 2019]. 
491 Popper, K. & Eccles, J.C., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977); S.Vaidhyanathan, The anarchist in the library: how 
the clash between freedom and control is hacking the real world and crashing the system (Basic 
books, 2004). 
492 Cobia, ‘The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure’ (2009) 10 Minn. Journal 
of Law, Science, and Technology 387, 394, para.2. 
493 M. Masnick, ‘If We’re Going to Change DMCA’s ‘Notice and Takedown’, Let’s Focus on How 
Widely It’s Abused’ (14 March 2014).  
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there can be difficulties with collecting the damages awarded.494  Also, anyone can 
submit a DMCA takedown notification, and where the complainant is located outside 
America, it can prove extremely difficult to enforce against them any judgments made 
under §512(f).495  
The current take-down procedure could lead to a scenario where rightsholders 
effectively avoid due process in copyright due to the convergence of law and 
technology in the digital age under this system.496 This is because capitalism will 
ultimately annihilate itself with the ultimate exchange without sufficient State 
regulation.497 Information exchange could lead to the self-annihilation of due-process 
under the take-down procedures where matters remain uncontested as such items in 
the UK system remain devoid of judicial scrutiny.498  
As a result, Griffin and Nair note that it is reasonable to infer that the current system 
favours threats that maintain a more divisive system, favouring knowledge that arises 
through conflict in a legal environment that is geared towards creating barriers to both 
the market, and the sharing of content and reproduction.499 Yet, this notion remains 
questionable because evidence of monopolization by creating barriers-to-market-
 
494 Blythe, M.C., ‘Freedom of speech and the DMCA: abuse of the notification and takedown process’, 
E.I.P.R. 2019, 41(2), 70-88 at 78. 
495 Blythe, M.C., ‘Freedom of speech and the DMCA: abuse of the notification and takedown process’, 
E.I.P.R. 2019, 41(2), 70-88. 
496 Similar to the notion of self-destructive capitalism: see Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (1977), 
pp.240-262; cf. Habermas, J., Theory of Communicative Action, vol.2 (1992), pp.332-373 on 
colonization in Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 44. 
497 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983).  
498 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
499 Griffin, J. and Nair, A.,  ‘Making threats of copyright infringement’ [2013] International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology; See also, Stefan Michel, Digitisation of art in the public domain - 
museum urges Wikimedia to take down reproductions of out-of-protection artworks, J.I.P.L.P. 2019, 
14(6), 427-429 – (Notes the German Federal Supreme Court decision in Bundesgerichtshof (1 ZR 
104/17) (Museumfotos) on whether Wikimedia's uploading of digitised versions of paintings owned 
by a museum, but in the public domain and appearing in an exhibition catalogue, infringed 
copyright.); See also, Bundesgerichtshof (1 ZR 104/17) (Museumfotos) unreported 20 December 
2018 (BGH (Ger)).  
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entry is scant or non-existent,500 as the cost of the monopolist of integrating is prima 
facie the same as the cost to the new entrant of having to integrate.501 Yet, barriers to 
entry, as a cost that differentially affects new entrants compared to firms already in the 
market, is now generally accepted502 on the basis that they are forced to pay higher 
fees.503 Despite this, the clearance of rights in the current copyright system prevents 
the widespread establishment of new online music services504 and this may stifle the 
creation of new works.505 Thus, the reforms507 discussed in chapter 5508 aim to help 
counteract these issues by creating the possibility of producing cheaper works to 
lessen the severity of such items which could decrease costs throughout copyright.509  
Yet, the reason for this problem is posited to be because in capitalist societies “power 
has always invoked the existing power relationships when seeking the approval of 
those subjected to power.”511 However, the proposals could counteract this in that they 
provide a framework designed to encourage creative re-uses under a legislative 
scheme.512 This is done by reducing the cost of production through placing a 
temporary limit on the price that can be charged for a copyrighted item, pertaining to 
both sale and re-use.513  
Consequently, it is argued that the current system could push information regulation 
towards the edge of the State,514 to the point where rightsholders would develop a 
 
500 Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in Public Policy Toward Mergers 167 (1969).  
501 Williamson, Book Review, 83 Yale L.J. 647, 656-7 (1974).  
502 G. Stigler, The Organisation of Industry, (1968), at 67-70.   
503 Williamson, Book Review, 83 Yale L.J. 647, (1974) at 656-59.  
504 Rights Clearance for Online Music (A. Wiebe ed.), Vienna: Medien und Recht 2014, ISBN 978-3-
900741-66-2 (with G Spindler, M Schaefer, L Reis, S Soubelet-Caroit, E Traple).  
505 See chapter 4 at 4.7; Vernon & Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 
J. Political Econ. 924 (1971).  
507 For a brief overview, see chapter 5 at 5.3.  
508 See chapter 5 at 5.5 generally.   
509  For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
511 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and   E., 
Jephcott, Stanford University Press 2002), p.125.  
512  For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.8 and chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c).  
513 On re-use, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b) and 5.4.1(c).  
514 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
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self-serving system of information regulation to which they themselves are the 
regulators under the current system due to the lack of opposition to the usage of the 
take-down procedure.515 This is due to a lack of judicial criticism in what is argued to 
be a customary private law system.516 However, this appears to only be in the context 
of the current provisions and the issues surrounding threats to sue specifically in 
relation to copyright.   
As such, without enacting specific provisions to deal with unjustified threats claims, it 
is suggested that the proposals can go some way to solving these issues. They would 
do so by making material more accessible517 which could increase compliance and 
thereby reduce the matters discussed as a result. This is based on the notion that 
more uses could be compliant under the proposed system.518 This may lessen the 
 
515 Case comment, Internet hosting provider liability for copyright infringement: Reti Televisive Italiane 
SpA (RTI) v Yahoo! Italia SrL, IIC 2020, 51(3), 389-402; See also, Blythe, M.C., ‘Freedom of speech 
and the DMCA: abuse of the notification and takedown process’, E.I.P.R. 2019, 41(2), 70-88; CJEU 
12 July C-324/09 L'Oréal v. eBay International, paras. 127 and 131); M. Masnick, ‘If We’re Going to 
Change DMCA’s ‘Notice and Takedown’, Let’s Focus on How Widely It’s Abused’ (14 March 2014); 
Sylvia Polydor, ‘The interplay between technology and trademark protection: a study of 
infringement, intermediary responsibility and protection measures in the digital age’ E.I.P.R. [2020],  
42(1), 4-12. 
516 Customary legal systems generally exhibit the following features: (1) a predominant concern for 
individual rights and private property; (2) laws enforced by the victims backed by reciprocal 
agreements; (3) standard adjudicative procedures established to avoid violence; (4) offences treated 
as torts punishable by economic restitution; (5) strong incentives for the guilty to yield to prescribed 
punishment due to threat of social ostracism; and (6) legal change via an evolutionary process of 
developing customs and norms - Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press 1969); Benjamin Zipursky, The Inner Morality of Private Law, 58 Am. J. Juris. 27 
(2013); Ludwig von Mises, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth, at 85-86; cited by Baumgarth, 
Ludwig von Mises and the Justification of the Liberal Order at 96-97. See also, the economic 
arguments supporting this proposition in F. A. Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ Menlo 
Park, California: Institute for Human Studies, 1977; [revised and reprinted from The American 
Economic Review, vol. 35, No. 4, Sept 1945]. Available at: 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/601 (Accessed: 22/5/2015) 
517 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
518 See chapter 5 at 5.2 and 5.9 respectively.  
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amount of infringing uses due to access being more economically viable which could 
encourage legitimate uses generally.519  
This approach is posited to be the most viable in the current environment as opposed 
to attempting to introduce a specific provision to deal with unjustified threats. This is 
because a 2015 report by the UK Law Commission520 specifically excluded copyright 
from the protection from threats provisions under the Intellectual Property (Unjustified 
Threats) Bill 2016.521 This resulted in the passing of Intellectual Property (Unjustified 
Threats) Act 2017522 which also excluded threats relating to copyright infringement. 
This means copyright is not within the scope of the new law as there are no existing 
threats provisions for copyright. The current approach has also enabled copyright 
owners to effectively eliminate competitors by avoiding the due process of law.  
However, rather than using an external process like the take-down orders, 
rightsholders use the deleterious financial consequences created by the court process 
to eliminate commercial competitors.523 This is achieved by the fact that those 
subjected to an infringement allegation are forced to settle or face potential 
bankruptcy.524 This has meant that cases never actually get to trial because of limited 
 
519 E.g. it is tenable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may increase overall compliance 
with copyright and correlatively reduce piracy or non-compliance: J. Poort and J. Quintais, ‘Global 
Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam [2018], p.27.  
520 Law Commission Report, ‘Patents, Trade Marks and Designs: Unjustified Threats’ (No. 360) 2015 
- 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
468450/51672_Law_Commission_HC_510_TEXT.pdf> accessed: 23/09/2019.  
521 Law Commission Report, ‘Patents, Trade Marks and Designs: Unjustified Threats’ (No. 360) 2015, 
Appendix C.  
522 For more information on the changes brought in by the Act, see Audrey Horton, ‘Intellectual 
Property (Unjustified Threats) Act 2017’ - https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/uk/it-and-
ip-law-bytes-june-2017/intellectual-property-unjustified-threats-act-2017 (Accessed: 21/05/2018).  
523 See the discussion in this chapter at 2.6.  
524 See the discussion in this chapter at 2.6.  
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funds in a judicial system that “changed the distribution system” in the digital age.525 It 
is to these matters we now turn.  
2.6 Tying all this together: the role of the legal process  
Davies et al., argue that file-sharing networks were targeted because they were 
“perceived by many in the entertainment industries to be a much greater threat than 
standalone devices capable of making or storing digital copies of content.”526 Michael 
Robertson, of MP3.com, argues that the objective of copyright litigation:  
“is as much about straddling the competition as anything else and its had its 
effect by successfully drying up the capital markets for any digital music 
company.”527  
Robertson’s company that was sued, in the case of In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
MP3.com.528 This was a landmark case which considered MP3.com's unauthorized 
duplication of music on Compact Discs (CDs). This was for the purposes of launching 
a service entitled My.MP3.com or "Beam-it"529 which allowed users to access their 
private music collections online from anywhere in the world. The court held that 
defendant's, My.MP3.com, service infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights.  
This was due to the act of converting the plaintiffs' CDs into MP3 files. This provided 
access to these files to users which infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights in the sound 
recordings. The court rejected the defendant's argument that this was a fair use of 
plaintiffs' sound recordings. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that defendant's 
 
525 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  chapter 8.  
526 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 26-135.  
527 Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas: The fate of the Commons in a Connected World (Vintage Books, 
2001), p.201; See also, Wlomert, Nils/Papies, Dominik, On-Demand Streaming Services and Music 
Industry Revenues – Insights from Spotify’s Market Entry, 33 IJRM 314 [2016].  
528 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 2000). 
529 (The mechanism used for the verification is a program called Beam-it which reads a random 
subset of an audio CD and interacts with the My.MP3.com servers using a proprietary protocol. This 
paper presents a reverse-engineering of the protocol and the client-side code which implements it) - 
https://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/beam-it.html (Accessed: 19/04/2019).  
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use was commercial (as the defendant intended to sell advertising on its site once it 
had adequate user traffic) and not transformative. The protected work was close to 
the core of those intended to receive copyright protection, and the defendant had 
copied virtually all of plaintiffs' works and by its actions, which adversely impacted the 
plaintiffs' ability to license their works in this fashion.530 In doing so, relying on Infinity 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood,531 (rejecting the fair use defence by an operator of a 
service that retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over telephone lines), the 
court ruled that: 
“[A]lthough the defendant recites that My.MP3.com provides a transformative 
"space shift" by which subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings contained 
on their CDs without lugging around the physical discs themselves, this is 
simply another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being 
retransmitted in another medium - an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim 
of transformation.”532 
What was significant about this case for purposes here, is that, although MP3.com 
settled for $54 million. This was due to a fine imposed by the US courts of $118 million, 
as the defendant company simply could not pay. The result was that the plaintiff 
subsequently purchased the company MP3.com around a year later for a discounted 
fee.533 
A similar scenario happened in February 2001, in the US Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit 
decision in A&M Records v. Napster.534 This was the first service that provided a 
simplistic method users to exchange files of copyright-protected sound recordings and 
 
530 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 2000).  
531 150 F3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).  
532 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 356 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 2000); This can also be compared with the ruling of 
Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [49]; See also, 
Murray, A., ‘Information Technology law: The Law and Society’ (2nd edition), (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp.263-291.  
533 For more information on this case, see Lessig, Free Culture (2004), pp.188-99; UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
534 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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was estimated to have had 70 million users at its peak.535 It enabled users to identify 
and transfer music from other users. Essentially, it enabled peers, that is, to get music 
from other peers. It did this not through a completely peer-to-peer architecture – there 
was a centralised database of who had what, and who, at any particular moment, was 
online. But the effect was file-sharing and sites which provided the basis for which 
users could facilitate access to copyrighted material. This enabled users to ‘steal’ 
copyrighted work,536 making them ‘pirates’.537  
In response to this, the recording industry, headed by the RIAA, filed a suit against 
Napster on the grounds that the system provided the means in which to procure and 
facilitate the theft of copyrighted material.538 The system was shut down accordingly 
due to its effect on the present and future digital download market.539 Amongst other 
 
535 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 26-135.  
536 Patry, W., Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (New York: Oxford University Press 2009) at 44; 
See also, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); For more information on 
how this concept has been used in the current system, see chapter 3 at 3.2 and 3.3 respectively; 
See also, Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright 
Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06. 
537 For more information on how this concept has been used in the current system, see chapter 3 at 
3.3; Also, in the UK, this approach was adopted by Templeman LJ who stated that “a defendant 
may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion” – CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad 
Consumer Electronics plc & Another [1988] 2 A11 ER 484 at [496].   
538 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); The essence of the Napster systems 
functionality is explained by Lessig in Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas: The fate of the Commons in a 
Connected World (Vintage Books, 2001), Ch.8.  
539 The original Napster was effectively shut down following a series of legal challenges in the USA, in 
which the court found that Napster had engaged in “contributory copyright infringement” - These 
culminated in two successful applications by the recording industry in A&M Records Inc v Napster 
Inc 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (US N.D. Cal 2000) and A&M Records Inc v Napster Inc 239 F.3d 1004 (US 
9th Cir 2001) – On contributory copyright infringement, see chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(a)(ii); See also, 
Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas: The fate of the Commons in a Connected World (Vintage Books, 
2001), pp.130-32, 194-96; Also, in contravention of precedent, in A&M Records, Inc vs. Napster, the 
Ninth Circuit of Appeals ruled that Napster had to shut down because it was designed with the intent 
of circumventing copyright law – (Langenderfer, Jeff, and Don Lloyd Cook.  ‘Copyright Policies and 
Issues Raised by A&M Records v. Napster: ‘The Shot Heard “Round the World” or “Not with a Bang 
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things, it was also ruled that lack of harm to an established market did not prevent 
such harm being accrued to the potential for new markets in different forms.540 This 
included things like the digital download market that was very much in its commercial 
infancy at the time.541 This is because capitalism has to capture the externalities in an 
information-heavy economy. This is to the point where capital has extended its 
ownership rights to new areas and has to own our selfies and our playlists.542 It is 
argued that it does so through using copyright law543 to capture the technology544 that 
allows any sort of resistance to it.545  
 
but a Whimper?’ [2001] Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 20 (2): 280-88.); McCourt, T. and P. 
Burkart, ‘When Creators, Corporations and Consumers Collide: Napster and the Development of 
On-line Music Distribution’ [2003] Media Culture & Society 25(3): 333-50; Waldfogel, J., ‘Bye, Bye, 
Miss American Pie? The Supply of New Recorded Music Since Napster’ NBER Working Paper No. 
16882, March 2011, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16882) (accessed: 21/02/2018).  
540 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) at 915; See also, L.A. Times v. Free 
Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1469-71 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that online markets for plaintiff 
newspapers’ articles was harmed because plaintiffs demonstrated that “[defendants] are attempting 
to exploit the market for viewing their articles online”); (“any allegedly positive impact of defendant’s 
activities on plaintiffs’ prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly 
derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”) - See also UMG Recordings, 92 
F.Suppd.2d at 352; This can be compared with Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015] - (an alteration of the copy of the protected work, which provides a result 
closer to the original, is actually sufficient to constitute a new reproduction of that work, within the 
meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, which is covered by the exclusive right of the author 
and requires his permission) - at [43]. 
541 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) at 915 (The essence of the reasoning 
adopted was that having digital downloads available for free on the Napster system necessarily 
harms the copyright holders’ attempts to charge for the same downloads.”) 
542 Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016), p.175.  
543 Wiebe, A., Right Clearance for Online Music: Legal and Practical Problems from the Perspective of 
a Content Provider and Alternative Models (Medien und Recht Publishing, 2014), p.4.  
544 Waldfogel, J., ‘Bye, Bye, Miss American Pie? The Supply of New Recorded Music Since Napster’ 
NBER Working Paper No. 16882, March 2011, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16882) 
(accessed: 21/02/2018).  
545 Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016),  p.175.  
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Significantly, in the case,546 the US Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit did conclude that 
the defendant had raised defences which were not frivolous, and the company should 
have been granted permission to try to prove them at a full trial. The court granted an 
injunction whilst the case was pending, based on the rationale that it was appropriate 
to prevent any damage to copyright owners against the issue of online file-sharing (the 
exchange of digital music files online), to block any such action whilst the case was 
ongoing. The trial never commenced. This was due to the fact that Napster’s legal 
fees had eaten up all of its capital, forcing it to declare bankruptcy in June 2002. It was 
then sold following its liquidation in autumn, for $5,300,000 by Software company 
Roxio, who then paid $39,500,000 to buy another unsuccessful company, and 
rebranded it with the Napster label because of its commercial popularity.547  
However, Napster did, in fact, attempt to obtain a license from the labels suing them. 
It alleged that repeated attempts to obtain the aforementioned were refused, 
suggesting that the record labels had colluded to refuse to deal with the upstart new 
media.548 According to Napster, the major labels established and exclusively licensed 
their own online joint ventures, not just to corner the market in online distribution of 
music, but to slow online distribution altogether. The purpose of this was to stave off 
competition to their less than optimal core business of CDs, whilst at the same time 
securing secured methods of distribution for the digital future.549  
Significantly, in the case,550 the trial court found that “even on the underdeveloped 
record before the court, the joint ventures look[ed] bad, sound[ed] bad, and smell[ed] 
bad.”551 Yet, despite the “stench of anticompetitive collusion”552 the court in the case 
 
546 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001).  
547 See Litman, Digital Copyright [2001], p.197. 
548 Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  
549 Netanel, N.W., Copyrights Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.77 
550 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Cal. 2000).  
551 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  
552 Netanel, N.W., Copyrights Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.77. 
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refused to issue a compulsory license by limiting the record label plaintiff’s relief for 
Napster’s contributory copyright liability to an award of reasonable damages.553  
In doing so, the court reasoned that: 
“the [p]laintiffs would [otherwise] lose [the] power to control their intellectual 
property; they could not make a business decision not to license their property 
to Napster.”554  
Following Napster, new file-sharing networks555 evolved with less technical control 
over users activities. The US Supreme Court ruling in MGM Studios Inc v Grokster556 
overturned a previous decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.557 In 
doing so, it found that liability could not be escaped if the infringement was promoted 
by the defendant and was given a broad interpretation.558 Pursuant to this, Grokster 
was held to be “inducing infringement”559 and this approach has been used to find 
defendants liable in subsequent litigation, notably the 2010 LimeWire case involving a 
file-sharing service in the District Court.560 Grokster was shut down abruptly as part of 
 
553 These culminated in two successful applications by the recording industry in A&M Records Inc v 
Napster Inc 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (US N.D. Cal 2000) and A&M Records Inc v Napster Inc 239 F.3d 
1004 (US 9th Cir 2001). 
554 A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1029 
555 E.g., Aimster, Blubster, Morpheus and Grokster – (Those variants avoided centrally based 
directories of users in favour of decentralised networks that largely resided and operated on users’ 
own computers).  
556 Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (US S.Ct. 2005).  
557 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).  
558 Promotion need not be subjective or overt to result in liability—it could be proven by the presence 
of more than one objective activity evidencing such promotion, including communications (e.g. 
soliciting infringing users), failure to prevent or curtail infringement (i.e. to filter), or profiting from the 
infringement. In such circumstances, actual or potentially lawful uses, even if substantial, would be 
no defence - Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright, 17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, (2016), at 26-136; See also, Arista Records 
LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 (KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010). 
559 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 US 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); Gregorian, 
Jamie, Grokster, Bittorrent, Copyright Infringement, and Inducement: How Modus Operandi Can 
Provide a Functional Standard for Future File-Sharing Cases (May 1, (2007). 
560 Arista Records LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 (KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010).  
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a settlement with the recording industry.561 Similar approaches have been taken in the 
UK under the notion of ‘authorization’562 in cases like Twentieth Century Fox v. 
Newzbin,563 and others,564 which is discussed in chapter 5.565 
Ultimately, the conclusion of these deliberations resulted in Napster being driven out 
of business before it could pursue discovery on the label’s anti-competitive collusion, 
and Grokster being shut down. However, the fundamental difference between Napster 
and Grokster for purposes here is that there is evidence that Grokster was deliberately 
set up to take customers from Napster by offering what it did, but for free566 and 
referring to itself “the next Napster.”567 This meant it can be reasonably said to be a 
get rich scheme that was fully expected to close down. Yet, on the other hand, Napster 





settlement.html&usg=AOvVaw2cfekyk9aw4G3aOuVO29Rm> (Accessed: 03/11/2017).  
562 This is discussed in chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(a)(i).  
563 [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) - (a defendant may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or 
persuasion) – CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc & Another [1988] 2 A11 ER 484 
at [496]; In the US, this is known as “inducing infringement”, and has been used to find similar 
defendants liable in subsequent litigation, notably in the 2010 District Court decision involving P2P 
service LimeWire - Arista Records LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 (KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. 
May 25, 2010) - B. Sisario, ‘Major Record Labels Settle Suit With LimeWire’, New York Times, May 
12, 2011).  
564 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2010] F.C.A. 24 (Australia February 4, 2010) (finding internet 
service provider not engaged in authorising infringement with respect to users that infringed 
copyright via the BitTorrent P2P system); L’Oreal SA v Ebay International AG [2009] EWHC 1094 
(Ch); [2009] R.P.C. 21 (finding no “procurement” of users’ infringements, whether by inducement, 
incitement or persuasion, by online auction site eBay for counterfeits sold through its service) - ), 
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, (2016), at 26-
137.  
565 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5 at 5.7.3.3(a)(i),(ii). 
566 Levine, R., Free Ride: How the internet is destroying the culture business and how it can fight back 
(Vintage Books 2011), p.37.  
567 (Plaintiffs’ Joint Excerpts of Record, 2003) MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) in Sandler. R.L., Ethics and Emerging Technologies, (Palgrave Macmillan 2014), p.310.   
568 Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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The problems experienced by Napster are summed up by the journey of Spotify co-
founder and CEO, Daniel Ek, regarding the formation of the streaming business model 
discussed in chapter 4. In essence, he claims the business model was built as a result 
of his positive consumer experience using the Napster model in his childhood and 
wanted to replicate it.569 However, the key thing for purposes here is that Ek 
recognised that he needed to avoid the issue experienced by Napster of having to 
obtain permission from the music labels570 to enable his company to have their songs 
on the Spotify platform. This is because, without it, he risked being sued.571  
 
 
569 <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/revenue-streams> (Accessed: 
8/11/2019).  
570 Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
571 <https://qz.com/1683609/how-the-music-industry-shifted-from-napster-to-spotify/> (Accessed: 
25/07/2019); In the US - Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In the UK – Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 
(Ch); Download from peer-to-peer systems -  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015] [43]-[46]; and when they access an Internet stream – FAPL v. British 
Communications [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) [31] (Arnold J);  this also includes the image created on a 
television screen being regarded as a copy for the purposes of what constitutes a reproduction here 
– FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083, [159], see also, Football 
Association Premier League Limited and ors v. QC Leisure and ors and Karen Murphy v. Media 
Protection Services Ltd (‘FAPL’), Joined Cases  C-403/08 and C429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, 
Grand Chamber); ITV Broadcasting Ltd v. TV Catchup Ltd [2011] EWHC 1874 (Pat); Often the most 
passive/incidental acts are caught by the reproduction right, such as upload onto a USB – 
Technische Universitat Darnstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG, Case C-117/13, EU:C:2014:2196, [52] (ECJ).      
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Therefore, it is posited that this creates a process of rational exchange572 in the 
copyright system.573 To explain, this form of exchange that is only possible when one 
[party] is under compulsion because of his own need for the others economic power, 
with exchange serving the purposes of consumption or acquisition.574 This is because 
Napster tried to become legal but was closed down via the court process due to their 
lack of funds, it is contended that rightsholders can use the courts to induce a legal 
process of elimination in absence of judicial scrutiny as matters can remain untried.  
The court process is where culture industries can shut down and/or purchase 
defendant organisations by exploiting the functionality of the copyright legal process 
and technology itself. As a result, is it asserted that the nature of the court process 
enables applicants to remove competition by causing them to either settle or go 
bankrupt. Yet, this is not necessarily a bad thing as civil procedure is designed to 
maximise the efficiency of trial and encourage settlement, thereby reducing the costs 
associated with the judicial system575 by using factors such as risk, relative costs of 
settlement, and the relative costs of litigation.576  
However, the current system is suggested to be inefficient under the analysis of 
Posner because cases remain unconsidered on the basis that the accused has no 
money to continue their claim or simply does not want to litigate matters due to the 
potential financial consequences.577 Consequently, it is submitted that by creating a 
 
572 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, 77 (1973) at 104-13, 393-94; Posner, R., ‘The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925; Weber, M., Economy and Society (G. 
Roth and C. Witrich, eds, University of California Press, 1978), p.1394; Posner, R.A., "Rational 
Choice, Behavioural Economics, and the Law," 50 Stanford Law Review 1551 (1997); Becker, G.S., 
The Economic Approach to Human behaviour, 153, 158 (1976); Thomas J. Miceli, The Oxford 
Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts, Oxford University Press, 
(2017), 15.2.  
573 Griffin, J., Copyright evolution - creation, regulation and the decline of substantively rational 
copyright law, I.P.Q. 2013, 3, 234-252.  
574 Weber and Parsons, “The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation” The Free Press New 
York, (1947), p.171. 
575 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, 77 (1973) at 337-339. 
576 Ibid. 
577 (E.g. even a £2,000 claim for copyright infringement...can run up costs of £20-£30k) - Hargreaves, 
I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011), p.83; Lanjuow, O.J. & 
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more financially accessible under the reforms discussed in chapter 5 could help to limit 
such issues.578 Thus, lower access fees may mean that works are, in fact, more 
financially accessible. This could result in fewer disputes as compliance may increase 
by extending the appeal of legitimate markets579 within copyright.580   
2.7 Where to from here? 
This chapter has focused on how digitisation was turned into an opportunity for the 
music industry under copyright law. This was to the point where the economic power 
conferred upon rightsholders and their representatives, made them able to use the 
State as an instrument in which to re-establish their market positions.618 This resulted 
in a copyright system of threats which created an environment of panoptic control.619  
In this system, the litigation approach was arranged in such a way to ensure that 
multiple levels of the public were targeted,620 including considerable media attention 
for two trials621 that were of little economic significance,622 but were designed to shape 
 
Lerner, J., ‘The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature’ 
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6296, 1997) (stating litigation costs fall 
most heavily on small firms, which may settle because they cannot afford long-term litigation); 
Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065; (Accessed: 12/5/2015) (Outlines that 
companies are reluctant to contest claims against them because of the financial implications of 
doing so, highlighting that going to court is no longer a viable or desirable option commercially); See 
also, this chapter at 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6.     
578 For a brief introduction of the reforms see chapter 5 at 5.3; For their proposed benefits see 5.5. 
579 Extending the appeal of legitimate markets was an aim suggested by Professor Hargreaves in - 
Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth [2011], at 8.45; See 
also, chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
580 See chapter 5 at 5.5.  
618 For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5; See also, chapter 4 at 4.6.  
619 See this chapter at 2.3.  
620 See this chapter at 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 respectively.  
621 Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (2013); Capitol Records Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2010).   
622 Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 
47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06 at 893; See also, this 
chapter at 2.3.1.2.  
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consumer attitudes623 surrounding the file-sharing so that it was viewed as “stealing” 
and “theft.”624 This had the effect of arranging the copyright system in such a way that 
the exercise of power is not added from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to 
the functions it invests. Instead, it is so subtly present to increase its efficiency by itself 
increasing its points of contact,625 where consumers began to self-regulate.626 The 
result is argued to be that the copyright system is not simply a hinge, a point of 
exchange between a mechanism of power and a legal function. It is a way of deterring 
opposition to infringement claims and maximising compliance in an environment 
controlled by permanent and omnipresent surveillance that is capable of making all 
visible but remains invisible.627  
This transformed digital music online into a “field of perception: thousands of eyes 
posted everywhere.”628 The consequences of this, was that the ability of rightsholders 
to enforce and administer copyright legal regulation over the internet had been 
strengthened, whereby the mere threat or potentiality of action may influence the 
individual more than if the action itself were to happen.629 Thus, litigation performs 
 
623 See this chapter at 2.4.1. 
624 Green, P.S., ‘13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age’, [2012] 270-76, ; Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013) (emphasis added) – (“new 
technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works.”); For more information, see 
chapter 3 at 3.3.  
625 The copyright system sued various levels of the user spectrum in an attempt to ensure that small-
time users at home, to those in the commercial sector were not immune from this multi-faceted 
approach – See this chapter at 2.3 and 2.6; On the way that contracts have been used to extend the 
control that rightsholders are able to exert over intangibles in the digital context, see chapter 4 
generally.  
626 See this chapter at 2.4.1. 
627 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977), pp.206-214; See this chapter at 2.3 and 2.5 generally; See also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: 
The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  chapter 8. 
628 Foucault, M., ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’ (Trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books 1977), p.214.  
629 Frank, J. Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor Publishing 1949), chapter 1; Griffin, J. and 
Nair, A., ‘Making Threats of Copyright Infringement’ [2013] International Review of Law, Computers 
and Technology; Mazzone, J., ‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 40; New 
York University Law Review, Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026.  
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more than just a remedial function in copyright law (i.e., merely correcting harm) and 
instead, provides a constitutive function that enables proceedings to be brought in the 
first place.630 What remains is to flesh out how the impact of capitalism on copyright 
law has caused the law in this area to evolve to accommodate the emergent 
technologies for the benefit of rightsholders in the music industry at the expense of the 
user.631  
To this end, the next chapter looks at how copyright law developed as a result of 
capitalism.632 It will also discuss how such developments provided the basis for the 
success of the ‘streaming’ business model633 (which is discussed in chapter four).634 
This includes the influences635 of the UK (communication right)636 and the US (public 
performance right).637  
 
630 Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065; Accessed: 12/5/2015; See also, Waldron, J., 
‘From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property’ 68 Chicago-
Kent Law Review [1993] 841, 844.  
631 See chapter 3 at 3.3; See also, chapter 4 at 4.3.2, 4.5 and 4.7 respectively.  
632 E.g., see chapter 3 at 3.1 and 3.4; See also, chapter 4 at 4.5.1; Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations    
(Book IV, 1776) in Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ Intellectual Law Quarterly, 
[2016].  
633 For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.5;  Paying subscribers to subscription services grew from 
eight million in 2011 to 28 million in 2013 (source: IFPI, Digital Music Report 
2014, http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2014.pdf [Accessed December 5, 2015] - 
Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th 
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 26-141.  
634 See also, chapter 4 generally and also at 4.6.  
635 The way they have done this is by providing a ‘cradle’ away from p2p file-sharing and into the 
current streaming model discussed in the fourth chapter, for the benefit of rightsholders, essentially 
performing what is described as a ‘bridge-gap’ function; For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.5.   
636 In the UK, under section 20 CDPA 1988, a right to communicate a work to the public arises with 
respect to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound recordings, films, and broadcasts, in 
order to secure the successful implementation of the Information Society Directive Info. Soc. Dir., 
Art. 3, itself implementing WCT, Art. 8; Rel. Rights. Dir., Art. 8(3), Recital 16. 
637 A “public performance” of music is defined in the U.S. copyright law to include any music played 
outside a normal circle of friends and family. Songwriters, composers, and music publishers have 
the exclusive right to play their music publicly and to authorize others to do so under the copyright 
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Chapter four then looks at the role of contracts and how the streaming model has led 
to the proliferation of digital licencing that maximises the imperative control638 over 
consumers.639 This is because digital licenses enable the terms of the relationship to 
be dictated to a greater extent as the agreements give rise to obligations which are 
enabled640 and subsequently recognised by law.641 This will be demonstrated to 
dramatically restrict the freedom associated with contracts.642 This includes the 
transferability643 and individual usage644 of copyrighted material in the interests of 
capitalism. It then looks at why this is an issue,645 including how a proposed system 
could counteract this.646 chapter five will then outline how this system could be 
implemented.647   
 
law. This is known as the “Performing Right”. This right was designed to enable and encourage 
music creators to continue to create music - §106(6) 17 U.S.C. 
638 The example given by Weber here refers to a corporate group, by virtue of the fact that the 
members are subjected to the legitimate exercise of imperative control, that is to ‘authority’, and so 
are labelled as an ‘imperatively coordinated’ group. He also notes that in this case, ‘imperative 
control’ is confined to the legitimate type, but it is not possible in English to speak here of an 
‘authoritarian’ group. The citizens of any State, no matter how ‘democratic,’ are ‘imperatively 
controlled’ because they are subject to law – (Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organisation (The Free Press, 1947), pp.152-53.  
639 For more information, see the discussion in this chapter generally, and in particular, parts 4.5, , 
4.6, respectively; See also, Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf 
Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs 
Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th 
Cir. 2016); Savic, M., ‘The Legality of Resale of Digital Content after UsedSoft in Subsequent 
German and CJEU Case Law’ [2015] EIPR 414-29. 
640 See the discussion in this chapter at 4.5; See also, CDPA 1988 s.28(1), and 17 U.S.C. §109(d) 
(1976).  
641  Edwin Peel, The Law of Contract (14th eds. Sweet and Maxwell 2015), p.1; See also, chapter 4 at 
4.5 & 4.6.   
642 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.3.2. 
643 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.4. 
644 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5.1. 
645 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.7 generally. 
646 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.8.  






Property and the role of the communication and public performance 
rights in the digital music industry  
 
3.1 Introduction. 
“The capitalist ideology infiltrates into the lives and minds of those who operate 
within this economic system. It changes the way individuals view the world – 
his or her emotions, perceptions, speech, and thought – the entire existence of 
individuals operating with the capitalist sphere are influenced and formed by 
the material relations that operate within it; it is the way he or she understands 
the world at large.”1 
The thesis creates an understanding of how and why the copyright legal system has 
become predominantly focused upon protecting and creating new and pre-existing 
business interests in the economy, but this is not always the case.2 To this end, the 
 
1  Lasch, C., The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations [1978]; 
Capitalism is described by Maurice Dobb as a “system of economic activity that is dominated by a 
certain type of motive, the profit-motive” – (Dobb, M., Studies in the development of capitalism 
(London Routledge, 1963) p.5; Popper, K., and Eccles, J.C., The Self and its Brain (Routledge 
Publishing 1977); However, views on capitalism are beginning to change, with suggestions that the 
current system needs to rethink how it redistributes wealth by its own billionaires, otherwise 
suggesting that the degree it affects the way individuals view the world may not be so extensive -   
https://www.forbes.com/sites/randalllane/2019/3/4/reimagining-capitalism-how-the-greatest-system-
ever-conceivedand-its-billionairesneed-to-change/#33a1a27b64c8 (Accessed: 27/08/2019); Some 
also suggest capitalism isn’t working – <https://economicprinciples.org/Why-and-How-Capitalism-
Needs-To-Be-Reformed/> (Accessed: 05/11/2019); Marx saw capitalism as the harbinger of “misery, 
agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, and mental degradation” for working men, it is less clear 
whether this was meant to rule out real wage growth – Marx, K., Capital, (Vol. 1, 1867) Ch.25, 
Section 3.  
2 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 944 who 
establishes the issue of economic concentration and deconcentration policies as the fundamental 
difference between the Chicago School and the Harvard School; See also, See R.J. van den Bergh 
and P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Perspective(Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia/Hart Publishing, 2001), at 16, who emphasize the great 
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chapter analyses the operation of copyright in the economic and political realms. This 
is to explain why copyright has evolved as a result of the market. The chapter will 
assess how capitalism has influenced the development of the copyright legal area 
using proprietary rights.3 This has been done by maximising the proprietary control 
that rightsholders have over their copyrighted assets, which is also a focal point of 
debate.4 In doing so, this chapter will explain why there has been a gradual 
 
divergences among economic schools since classical theory. However, competition economics has 
been nourished by these interactions between movements, schools, and doctrines so that today it is 
relatively stable and reliable, at least in those applications with a longer history; See also, Richard. 
A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University press, 1983); G. Calabresi and A. D. 
Melamed [1972] 85 Harvard L.R. 1089 and [1997] 106 Yale L.J. 2081; A prominent critic of Posner’s 
work is Ronald Dworkin, see his work – A Matter of Principle, (Clarendon Press, Oxford) chapter 13; 
Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1512, 1518-19 [1972].  
3 James Griffin notes that “copyright is a property right, which also protects the intangible property 
within the copyright work. The notion of property has been central to the development of copyright 
law” – (See ‘The Five Cornerstones of Copyright: Democratic Proprietary Entitlement’ in Griffin, J., 
‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary exploitation in 
Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly.  
4 See e.g. Phillips v. Mulcaire [2012] UKSC 28; [2013] 1 AC 1; J. Griffiths and R. Howe (eds), 
Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge Uni. Press. 2013), ch.3; Patry, Moral 
Panics and the Copyright Wars ,pp.109-32; M. Grynberg, ‘Property Is a Two-Way Street: 
Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization’ [2010] 79 Fordham L. Rev. 435; A. Mossoff, 
‘Is Copyright Property?’ [2005] 42 San Diego L.Rev. 29; F. MacMillan (ed.), New Direections in 
Copyright Law (2008), 1, 11-15; R.P. Merges, ‘The Concept of Property in the Digital Era’ [2008] 45 
Hous.L.R. 1239; S. Aistars, D. Hartline and M. Schultz, Copyright Principles and Priorities to Foster 
a Creative Digital Marketplace [2016] 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 769; Litman, J., ‘What we don’t see 
when we see copyright as property’ Cambridge Law Journal [2018], 77(3), 536-558; L. Bently, ‘What 
is Intellectual Property?’ (2012) 71 CLJ 501; L. Lessig, Free Culture (New York 2004), 83-173; 
Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly; R. Burrell and A. Coleman., 
Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (2005), 180-239; Y. Benkler, ‘Free to the Air to Common 
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’ (1999) 74 NYU L. Rev. 354.    
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strengthening of the position of rightsholders and a withering away5 of the copyright 
limitations6 that member states are able to use in their laws.7 
The second chapter outlined how the internet created new forms of dissemination that 
were extremely difficult to control with law8 and this has made copyright “one of the 
defining issues of contemporary times.”9 In turn, the internet has been held to r[u]n 
counter to capitalism’s process of commodification in the culture industry, as this is a 
process that relies on the existence of copyrighted material.10 Moreover, other 
theorists have suggested that the internet was devoid of capitalist intent and was a 
network designed to encourage freedom.11 Yet, the internet has also been regarded 
as being consciously developed within a global privatised network, along with free-
trade policies, in order to deliver global capitalism more efficiently.12 However, 
 
5 Engels referred to the State “withering away” - Jessop, B., ‘Recent theories of the capitalist 
state’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, Volume 1, Issue 4, 1 December [1977], at 353–373; See 
also, Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Marx, K., [1968].   
6 For more information, see this chapter at 3.4  
7  Rel. Rights Dir., Art. 10(1).  
8  See chapter 2 at 2.2 and 2.2.1, 2.3 and 2.4.1 respectively.  
9 Fenwick, T. and Locks, I., ‘Copyright in the Digital Age: Industry Issues and Impacts’ (Wildy, 
Simmonds and Hill Publishing, 2010), pp.2-3; The pressure that the rise of the internet and digital 
technology have placed upon copyright law have been comprehensively documented – (Lessig, 
Free Culture [2004]; Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist [2004]; Vaidhyanathan, Copyright and 
Copywrongs [2003]; Boyle, Software and Spleens [1996]; Boyle, The Public Domain [2008]. 
10 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015), p.116; See also, Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas: The fate of the Commons in a Connected 
World (Vintage Books, 2001), p.223; For more information on how copyright is essential to the 
capitalist process of ‘commodification’ see Hesmondhalgh, D., The Cultural Industries (3rd eds. 
SAGE Publications 2013), pp.68-71; Rheingold, H., The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier (Revised edition, Cam. MA: MIT Press 2000)ence that capitalism has had on this 
process, see this chapter at 3.4 generally.  
11  Rheingold, H., The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Revised edition, 
Cam. MA: MIT Press 2000); John, Foster, and  McChesney, Robert Waterman, ‘The Internet’s 
Unholy Marriage to Capitalism’ Monthly Review, March (2011) in Arditi, D., iTake-over: The 
Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015), p.136.  
12  Schiller, D., Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000) at 203 and Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing 2015), at xx. 
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globalisation or boundary erosion due to the internet's explosive growth has also been 
much overstated.13  
This chapter builds on the previous chapter by focusing on why the copyright legal 
system has expanded in both scope and duration.14 This includes analysing how it has 
become inherently focused on economic exploitation15 and restriction under 
proprietary-based reasoning,16 and legally enforceable rights.18 The previous chapter 
also considered the ways in which digital technology represented an ideological 
challenge to the very legal and economic principles on which copyright holders 
depended.19 This chapter goes further by assessing what has happened within the 
copyright legal framework as a result of this.21   
 
13  A growing number of scholars and writers have countered that globalisation is not necessarily a 
uniform, irreversible and inexorable trend creating social, economic and cultural convergence 
throughout the world. See, for example: Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad v McWorld: How Globalism and 
Tribalism are Shaping the World [1996]; Friedman, T.L., The Lexus and the Olive Tree: 
Understanding Globalisation [2000] (finding a balance between American free-market capitalism 
and powerful local forces, including religion, race and cultural identity); and Shanthi Kalathil and 
Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian 
Rule (2003).  
14 Litman., Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001), p.25.  
15  Plant, A, ‘The Economics of Copyright’ (1934) Economica 167.   
16  See this chapter at 3.2  
18  See this chapter at 3.2 
19 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.2, 2.2.1 respectively;  Gillespie, Tarleton, Wired Shut: 
Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007) at 43 in Arditi, D., 
iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  
p.116; Lanier, J., You are not a Gadget (Penguin Books, 2010); Susskind and Susskind, The Future 
of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the work of Human Experts (Oxford University 
Press 2015) – (This book argues that technological advances will bring transformation to 
professional work that will resemble the impact of industrialization on traditional craftsmanship – due 
to the fact that expertise is more accessible and affordable than ever before). On the effect of 
technology as a whole, see pp.289-95.   
21 For more information, see this chapter at 3.4.  
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Yet, although this same technology has increased the costs associated with accessing 
electronic publications,24 it also gave rise to things like the Open Access scheme (OA). 
This refers to free, unrestricted online access to research outputs such as journal 
articles and books. OA content is open to all, with no access fees.25 For example, a 
renowned author in the open access area, Michael Carroll, has argued that the 
concept of open access was born out of the frustrations caused by the increasing 
diffusion of scholarly research on the internet and the ever-rising price of journal 
subscriptions.26  
However, such items are not the focal point of discussion here, but it is pertinent to 
highlight that progress in OA has arguably stalled. This is because only 20% of new 
papers are ‘born‐free’, and half of all versions of records are pay‐walled.27 This is to 
the point where scholarship is typically locked up in journals that are so expensive that 
even university libraries may be priced out of the market.28 
To this end, the chapter begins by looking at how capitalism creates an attitude of 
accumulation among individuals that is perpetuated by the notion of property.29 This 
is because copyright is a property right,30 but copyright law is concerned, in essence, 
 
24  Turner, F., From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the 
Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); David Lyon, The Electronic 
Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society—Computers and Social Control in Context (John Wiley and 
Sons, 2013). 
25  It is regularly argued that open standards will allow for increasing interaction at both the personal 
and technological level - R. Stallman, Free Software Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. 
Stallman (Free Software Foundation, 2002); M. O’Sullivan, ‘Making Copyright Ambidextrous: An 
Expose of Copyleft’ [2002] 2 Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, <https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2002_3/osullivan/> [Accessed 19 
December 2015]. 
26 Carroll, M.W., ‘The Movement for Open Access Law - Symposium.’ Lewis & Clark Law Review 10, 
no.4 (Winter 2006): 741-760.  
27  Green, T., ‘Is open access affordable? Why current models do not work and why we need internet‐
era transformation of scholarly communications’, Wiley online Library, (24 Jan 2019) Available at:  
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/leap.1219> (Accessed: 16/05/2019).  
28  <https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Fallacy-of-Open-Access/241786> Accessed: 04/11/2019.  
29  See this chapter at 3.2.  
30  CDPA 1988 ss.1(1), 90(1) and 96(2); cf. Copyright Act 1956 s.36(1) and Copyright Act 1842 s.25  
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with the negative right of preventing the copying of material.31 It then evaluates the 
role that the property rhetoric played in the commodification of culture32 under the 
digital copyright regime.33 It then takes these ideas forward and assesses them within 
the market context,34 arguing that individuals are acting together to facilitate the 
development of capitalism.38  
The chapter then considers the role that copyright law has played online39 in facilitating 
the advancement of capitalist interests in the culture industry and the effect this has 
 
31 British Leyland Motor Corp v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1986] A.C. 577; [1986] R.P.C. 279 at 302; 
Fraser v Thames Televison Ltd [1984] Q.B. 44 at 60; George Hensher v Restawhile Upholstery 
(Lancs.) Ltd [1976] A.C. 64; [1974] F.S.R. 173 at 98; Performing Rights Society Ltd v Rangers FC 
Supporters Club [1975] R.P.C. 626 at 633.   
32 E.g. (“Tenenbaum “embodie[d] the industry’s decade-long attempt to shape the narrative of P2P 
downloading through the rhetoric of theft.”) - Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on 
Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research 
Paper No. 13-06. 
33 See this chapter at 3.3; See also, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); 
Green, P.S., ‘13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age’, [2012] 270-76, ; Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013) (emphasis added) – (“new 
technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works.”); Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole 
My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law 
Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06. 
34 For more information, see this chapter at 3.4 generally.  
38 See the discussion in this chapter at 3.4; Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ 
Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]; This idea has been discussed extensively - Adorno, T.W., The 
Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein) Routledge Classics, (1991); Adorno, M., and T. W., 
Horkheimer., Dialectic of Entitlement, (trans. J. Cumming, New York: Herder and Herder, 1972); 
Ciaffa, J.A., Max Weber and the problems of value-free social science: A critical examination of the 
Werturteilsstreit (Associated University Presses, Inc. 1998); Similar points are also made in Griffin, 
J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]; Marx, K., Das 
Capital (London: Penguin version, 1990); Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis 
of the Western System of Power, (Quartet Books London, 1973); Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of 
Political Economy, (Int’l Pub. Ed. New York 1967) (1st ed. 1867); Marx, K., Capital, (Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd, 2013).  
39 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ); Case C- 476/17 
Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December 
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had on digital music.40 This involves analysing the exclusive rights of communication41  
in the UK (s.20 CDPA),42 and the public display right in the US (17 U.S.C. §106).43 
Specifically, in the UK, streaming is protected under s.20(2)(b) because in FAPL v 
British Communications,44 it was held that a ‘communication’ is an electronic 
transmission of a work, coming in the form of internet ‘streaming’ according to Arnold 
J.45 In the US, streaming is protected under §.106(6)46 which governs the digital 
performance right in the context of sound recordings. This has been interpreted 
broadly47 due to the effects of the landmark US Supreme Court decision of Herbert v 
Shanley48 discussed in this chapter.49  
It is contended that these rights have shaped the law of the present day and thus play 
a central role in the shaping of the digital music market.50 They have provided what is 
argued as a ‘cradle’51 away from file-sharing and into the current streaming model 
discussed in the fourth chapter, essentially performing what is described as a ‘bridge-
 
(2018); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Football 
Association Premier League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, Paras 107-109; Case C-263/18 Nederlands  
Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others December 
(2019). 
40  See this chapter at 3.4   
41 CDPA 1988  – the ‘communication’ right was introduced in this form to implement the Information 
Society Directive; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 3, itself implementing WCT, Art. 8; Rel. Rights. Dir., Art. 8(3), 
Recital 16. 
42 CDPA 1988 s.20(2) CDPA 1988.  
43 17 U.S.C §106(6). 
44 EWHC 480 (Ch).  
45 Ibid at [33] (per Arnold J).  
46 US Copyright Act 1976.  
47 See this chapter at 3.5.2.1;   
48 242 U.S. 591 (1917).  
49 See this chapter at 3.5.2. 
50 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.5.  
51  See this chapter at 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.  
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gap’ function.52 This analysis reveals inadequacies within the current system which 
have resulted in the formulation of legal doctrines that limit the amount of public 
knowledge in favour of private interests.53 For instance, in the UK, certain permitted 
acts54 in relation to the usage of copyright works are allowed under Chapter III of the 
CDPA 1988.55 Yet, these are often defined with in a high degree of rigidity56 whereby 
they can be said to be otherwise confined to activity that is fundamentally non-
commercial.57 The result is that such provisions are not to be understood as “mere 
examples of a general wide discretion vested in the courts to refuse to enforce 
copyright where they believe such a refusal to be fair and reasonable.”58 Alternatively, 
in the US, under (17 U.S.C. §107)59 there is a system of fair use.60 However, this is 
 
52  See this chapter at 3.6.  
53  What this means is that the amount of information now available to be freely accessed or used by 
the public is now limited under the current system by the existence and potential enforceability of 
private interests, with private interests being specifically those granted by copyright law over 
intangible assets; For more information, see this chapter at 3.5 generally, see also chapter 4, 
particularly at 4.7.   
54 The Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC) also provides for exceptions to the rights of 
reproduction, communication, and distribution, and the circumstances to which such exceptions may 
be recognised – under Art.5; See also, the requirements of the Related Rights Directive, Art.10; 
Software Directive, Art.5 and 6; See also the Database Directive Art.6.   
55 The majority of these are found in Chapter III of Part I of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 and are referred to as ‘permitted acts’. 
56 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1998] FSR 43, 48 (Laddie J); See also, the more liberal 
interpretation of CDPA 1988, s.30(1) in Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television [1999] FSR 610, 614 
(Walker LJ).  
57 Navitaire Inc. v. Easy Jet Airline Co. & Bulletproof Technologies Inc. [2006] RPC (3) 111, [77]. 
58 Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 43 at 49 (reversed by the Court of 
Appeal, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 605 per Laddie J; [1999] F.S.R. 610, but not with any disapproval of this 
statement). 
59 Copyright Act 1976 (US).   
60 Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. s.107; Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios (1984) 
464 US 417; Comparatively, see Herbert v Stanley 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (here it was held that a 
music performance by a small orchestra in a restaurant was ‘for profit’ despite the fact that no 
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also interpreted narrowly,61 to the point where even where there is no direct economic 
benefit to demonstrate commercial use, an act can still be infringing.62  
It will be argued that this has created a copyright system which is more about 
exploitation than creation,63 concentrating money in the hands of the few in an 
economic system that rewards the absolute commitment to profit.64 Yet, it is important 
to note that the concentration of wealth into the hands of the few is not always 
detrimental65 as capitalism can promote wealth that benefits society,66 but such views 
have a “strong conservative bias.”67 The chapter will conclude by suggesting that there 
is now a protectionist proprietary copyright policy that is shaped more by effective 
 
separate admission charge was made to her the music); See also, this chapter at 3.4 and 3.5 
respectively.     
61 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc, Inc. v. Nation Enterprise 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
62 Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000).  
63 Griffin notes that the development of copyright has been predominantly centred around the 
capitalist principles of economic rights - Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ 
Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016].  
64  <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/12/capitalism-isnt-broken-its-working-all-
too-well-and-were-the-worse-for-it> (Accessed: 22/11/2019).  
65 See this chapter at 3.2; On the economic analysis of law generally, in the US – see A. M. Polinsky, 
An Introduction to law and Economics (1989) (and) Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed., 
1998); Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A., The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 
(Harvard University Press, 2003); In the UK – see A. Ogus and C. Veljanovski, Readings in The 
Economics of Law and Regulation (1984);   W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of 
Copyright Law’ 18 Journal of Legal Studies [1989] 325. 
66 Raghuram G. and Zingales, L., Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of 
Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity (Princeton University Press, 2004); 
Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations (Book IV, 1776); Mises, L.W. Human Action: A Treatise on 
Economics, (Liberty Fund Inc., 2007); F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Routledge Classics, 
2001). 
67  Posner states that “perhaps this is less accurately described as a "criticism" than as a reason for 
the distaste with which the subject is regarded in some quarters” – Posner, R.A., ‘The Economic 
Approach to Law’ 53 Texas Law Review 757 (1975), p.775, Part III; See also, the discussion in this 
chapter at 3.2.  
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lobbying than evidence and expertise68 to preserve the status quo (rightsholders) as 
a result of capitalism under copyright.69  
3.2 A Digital enclosure: demarcating the boundaries 
“All this chaos and uncertainty, all these feuds and enmities, have one and the 
same cause; the existence in the world of a kind of property, which is at once 
the most precious, the easiest stolen, and the worst protected.”106 
It is postulated that there has been what has been called a “digital enclosure”107 under 
copyright law, where intangible assets in the digital world have been commodified by 
rightsholders who are using law to ring-fence their assets,108 that is, prevent others 
from gaining access to them under the property-based monopoly granted by 
copyright.109 However, because society has become “increasingly virtualized”110 as a 
 
68 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28]; See also, the discussion in this chapter at 3.5.1.4, 3.6 and 3.6 generally.   
69 See the discussion in this chapter at 3.5.1.4, 3.6 and 3.6.   
106 Parton, ‘International Copyright’ AM 20 (10/1867): 430-451; Seville, C., The Internationalisation of 
Copyright Law: Books, Buccaneers and the Black Flag in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), chapter 2; Lanier, J., You are not a Gadget (Penguin Books, 2010), p.29.  
107 Boyle, J., Public Domain [2008].  
108 See the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.5; Case C-666/18 IT Development v Free Mobile SAS [2020]  
E.C.D.R. 7 at [49]; Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian 
Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018); Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep 
Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others December (2019) at [48]; (see, to that 
effect, judgment of 19 November 2015, SBS Belgium, C-325/14, EU:C:2015:764, paragraph 14 and 
the case-law cited); In the US, see Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 
2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016). 
109 ‘...the law by bestowing a right of copyright on an unpublished work bestows a right to prevent its 
being published at all...’ – Beloff v Pressdram [1973] 1 A11 ER 241; David Arditi compares this 
process to the property enclosures enacted in Britain from the fifteenth to early nineteenth centuries 
as described in Marx, K., Capital, Volume 1 (1992) – (Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry 
in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  p.45); See also, Cheung, ‘The Structure 
of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource’, 13 J.Law & Econ. 49 (1970); Demsetz, 
‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proceedings 347 [1967].  
110 Balkin, J.M., ‘Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds’, 90  
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result of the ever-expanding role of digital technology in the life of the individual111 the 
following can be argued. It can be said that the digital enclosure is an example of the 
dualities inherent in a type of mind-brain-dualism that is associated with the “Three 
Worlds” doctrine advocated by Popper and Eccles in their philosophical and 
neuropsychological book called The Self and the Brain.112 Popper's theory rests on 
the notion of a three-tiered world, comprising not only of material objects and states of 
mind (which he calls "World 1" and "World 2," respectively) but also a domain of 
intelligibles, virtual objects or abstract entities (which he calls "World 3").113  
However, a criticism of the approach by Popper is that he proceeds by excluding 
numerous things from the mental and physical arenas, only to then assert their 
discovery in the Third World. This approach is then demonstrated as a methodological 
principle, stipulating that we must pragmatically resort to Occam's razor only after we 
have decided which entities are irreducible.114 Despite the weaknesses highlighted in 
relation to these arguments philosophically115 it is hypothesized that despite the fact it 
 
Virginia Law Review 2043 (2004); Lastowka, G, & Hunter, D., ‘The Laws of the Virtual Worlds’ 92 
California Law Review 1 [2004]; Moringiello, J.M, ‘What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law’, 62 
Florida Law Review 159 [2010].  
111 For example, statistical evidence suggests that this type of format encompasses around 21% of 
adults - Rainie, L., ‘The Rise of e-reading’ Pew Internet and American Life project, [2014], Available 
at- <http://libraries.pewinternet.org/2012/04/04/the-rise-of-e-reading/> Accessed- 9/10/2014; In 
addition, another study by the national literary trust analysed the reading habits of almost thirty five-
thousand 8-16-year-olds, whereby a seemingly similar pattern was visible regarding the readership 
of printed newspapers, suggesting that the control exerted by these digitalised contractual methods 
will exponentially increase in the future. The results were that this form of reading has tumbled from 
46% in 2005 to 31% in this latest study in 2013, which is in contrast to the 41% of these young 
people who now read news stories online - Sean Coughlan, 'Young People Prefer to Read on 
Screen” BBC News Education, 16/5/2013. Accessed: 12/12/2014. Available at: 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-22540408).  
112 See Popper, K. & Eccles, J.C., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977).  
113 https://reasonpapers.com/pdf/07/rp_7_10.pdf (Accessed: 21/06/2019).  
114 https://reasonpapers.com/pdf/07/rp_7_10.pdf Accessed: 21/06/2019. 
115 Some of the weaknesses of Popper's argument for World Three have been identified by Paul 
Feyerabend in his masterly review of Popper's Objective Knowledge (Inquiry 17 [1974]: 475-507). 
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may be said that people can simply avoid using online facilities, it is asserted that this 
is not a realistic option as life has moved increasingly online116 and offers numerous 
benefits.117  
This is significant because it is posited that there is an interaction between all three of 
the worlds in the copyright context within the digital world, creating “downward 
causation”118 which is an interaction involving the influence of one or more of each 
world. Thus, in the digital world, copyright, although it covers objects which may also 
be classified as material (such as a book) (world 1); it nonetheless also covers 
intelligables (world 3) that subsequently has the effect of changing the way these items 
are perceived by individuals, thereby altering their state of mind in relation to 
intangibles (world 2).119 This is based on the notion that the fencing off of the intangible 
subject-matter fulfils the economic function equivalent to that of ownership of physical 
property.120 Significantly, this is made possible by the property rhetoric which has been 
 
Feyerabend notes correctly that none of Popper's arguments for the autonomy of abstract objects 
establishes their irreducibility in terms of mental or physical states and processes. Pointing out, as 
Popper does, that such things as numbers, arguments, and theories exert a causal influence in the 
mental and physical realms cannot by itself show that such things do not themselves belong to 
those realms: to show a causal connection is not to mark an ontological distinction. - 
<https://reasonpapers.com/pdf/07/rp_7_10.pdf> Accessed: 21/06/2019.  
116 <https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/04/future-digital-will-change-world/> (Accessed: 
22/02/2020); <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/technology/virus-older-generation-digital-
divide.html> (Accessed: 22/02/2020); <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/coronavirus-covid-19-03-
17> (Accessed: 22/02/2020).     
117 <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/07/03/the-positives-of-digital-life/> (Accessed: 
20/02/2020).  
118 Andersen, P.B., Emmeche, C., Niels O. Finnemann, and Christiansen, P.V., Downward causation: 
Minds, bodies and matter (Aarhus: Aarhus Univ. Press, 2000); Ayala, Francisco J. and Theodosius 
Dobzhansky, Studies in the philosophy of biology: Reduction and related problems (London: 
Macmillan, 1974); Campbell, D.T., Downward Causation in Hierarchically Organised Biological 
Systems in Ayala; Dobzhansky, Studies in the philosophy of biology, 179–86. 
119 Popper, K. and Eccles, J., The Self and its Brain (Routledge Publishing 1977). 
120 Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Allied 
Rights (6th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2007), p.37.  
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central to the development of areas like copyright and capitalist society itself regarding 
the ability of individuals to generate profit autonomously.121    
By implication, this has resulted in a digital enclosure that has been extended by the 
advances in digital technology across people’s lives, meaning that the digital 
enclosure, has, in fact, began to enter the “real world” of Popper and Eccles.122  
Consequently, at least two of the worlds are submitted to have merged on a 
conceptual level creating an information society that has to be “exploited to the full”123 
according to the UK government. This is because the state supports and protects 
property rights in support of capitalism.127 The inevitable result is a merging of the 
‘worlds’ in copyright law, particularly worlds 2 and 3 in the digital context due to the 
expansion of copyright law.128 This has led to the degree of diversity of the fields of 
activity to which copyright is relevant to expand to the extent that there was a need for 
us all to become specialists.129 Thus, in the copyright system our education and our 
expertise is the microscope through which we contemplate, identify and analyse the 
 
121 For an explanation see under: The Five Cornerstones of Copyright: Democratic Proprietary 
Entitlement”- This is found in Griffin, “Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to 
the notion of proprietary exploitation in Copyright”, [2013], Intellectual Property Quarterly; On the 
usage of the legal system and proprietary rights regarding an individuals to preserve wealth in 
Western capitalist societies, see De Soto, H., The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the 
West and failed everywhere else, (Black Swan Publishing, 2001); On the role of property in 
copyright, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing 2015), chapter 3. 
122 Popper, K. & Eccles, J.C., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977). 
123 House of Lords – Agenda for Action in the UK – Chapter 5 opinion of the committee -  
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199596/ldselect/inforsoc/ch5.htm> (Accessed: 05/07/2018).  
127  Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.44. 
128 See Popper, K. & Eccles, J.C., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977).  
129 Derclaye, E., Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright Research Handbooks in 
Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA 2009), p.194.  
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teeming life-forms that interact in an unending cycle of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis130 within a proprietary base.131 
Despite the uneasy analogy of intellectual property to real property, intellectual 
property rightsholders have widely used the rhetoric of private property rights to push 
for stronger protection132 in a copyright system where individuals are generally 
unwilling to share their property.133 This can be due to the fact that those who exploit 
assets in return for capital owe their wealth to their ability to use this implicit legal 
infrastructure hidden deep within property systems.134 In turn, this proprietary 
reasoning has simply become so dominant that it has clouded the analysis of the 
underlying basis for copyright. In turn, the rise of digital technology has meant that 
there is less uncertainty over the proprietary boundaries owing to digital technology 
allowing clear demarcation of those boundaries.135 
 
130 For a rationale for a flexible, multi-layered systematic analysis of copyright see Westkamp, G., 
Changing mechanisms on copyright’s ontology – structure, reasoning and the fate of the public 
domain in Guido Westkamp (ed.) Emerging issues in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, 2007); See also, Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of 
the Sociology of Law [1936], throughout.  
131 For a rationale for a flexible, multi-layered systematic analysis of copyright see Westkamp, G., 
Changing mechanisms on copyright’s ontology – structure, reasoning and the fate of the public 
domain in Guido Westkamp (ed.) Emerging issues in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, 2007); See also, Emerging Issues in Intellectual 
Property: Trade, Technology and Market Freedom Essays in Honour of Herchel Smith, ed. 
Westkamp, G., 78-103 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar); For a contrasting account in the context of 
Trademarks, see Dinwoodie, G.B., ‘The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark 
Law’ 84 [1999] Iowa L. Rev. 611.    
132  Robert C. Bird and Subhash C. Jain, The Global Challenge of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2008) p.162. 
133  A. Birrell, The Law and History of Copyright in Books [1899] p.17 
134   De Soto, H., Why Capitalism Works in the West but Not Elsewhere found in the ‘International 
Herald Tribune’ January 5th, 2001. Available at: <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-
capitalism-works-west-not0elsewhere> – (Last Accessed: 29/10/2014).   
135 For instance, the use of digital rights management over the right to read aloud, or the right to make 
any reproduction: see, e.g., Lessig, Free Culture (2004), pp.147-155 in Griffin, J., ‘Making a new 
Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary exploitation in Copyright’ 
[2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
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Therefore, the attachment of proprietary rights137 to copyrights by the State “solidifies 
a genial relationship between capitalism and the state for the culture 
industry...[because] by creating copyright as a property right, the state codified the 
selling, buying, and hoarding of copyrighted material...where the [rightsholder] thinks 
that they own the song.”138 Here, it is copyright that provides the proprietary element 
(that gives the owner the right to do and to authorise other persons to do the acts 
restricted by copyright law).139 This is opposed to the underlying work which has the 
physical element, and so again, what is seen is an interaction with worlds 1 (material 
objects), 2 (state of mind), and, 3 (intelligibles). For example, in this scenario, the state 
uses copyright law to give a world 1 status to world 3 articles due to the way in which 
proprietary status can be said to effect their world 2 aspects. Thus, it argued that this 
creates a synergistic effect whereby state legal codification gives material status to 
 
137 Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proceedings 347 
[1967]; Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.Law & Econ. 11 [1964]; 
Posner, R.A., ‘The Economic Approach to Law’ 53 Texas Law Review 757 [1975].  
138 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  pp.44-5; An alternative view is given by Patry, who argues that copyright has never been 
regarded as a property right, and is simply a regulatory granted by the grace of congress – (Patry, 
W., Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, p.110); See also, 
Westkamp, G., Changing mechanisms on copyright’s ontology – structure, reasoning and the fate of 
the public domain in Guido Westkamp (ed.) Emerging issues in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA, 2007).  
139 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 1-04. 
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intellectual assets under copyright, which changes the way that they are viewed140 to 
the point that they are ‘owned’ creating the notion of “thine and mine.”141  
As a result, the current copyright system does not adequately consider the wider issue 
of creativity,142 whereby access to works is being discouraged by a combination of 
legal threats,143 controlling access points,144 contractual methods,145 and high costs 
(to the point where infringement is being ‘monetized’).146 It is asserted that this is made 
 
140 For example, music was viewed as a public good because it was both nonrivalrous and part of the 
public domain before copyrights. This meant that anyone could perform or listen to music without 
affecting the ability of others to perform or listen to that same music. Copyright law stipulates a 
defined period for which something can be copyrighted, and after that period it is released into the 
public domain and ownership is technically held by the public, meaning that everyone can perform 
and reproduce music that is in the public domain; For more information on the rivalrous/non-
rivalrous debate, see E.E. Johnson, ‘Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy’ (2011) 39 
Florida State Law Review 623. 
141 J. Boyle, The Public Domain, (2008), p.45 in Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new 
system parallel to the notion of proprietary exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property 
Quarterly.  
142 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.7; Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), 
Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 3-
229 - “While creative works will by definition be ‘original’ and covered by copyright, creativity is not 
required to make a work ‘original’” - CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] SCC 
13 (Sup Ct of Can). Note, however, that the court decided that, under the Canadian statute, 
originality required more than mere labour, and thus a higher test of originality than that laid down 
in University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch. 601 (and lower than 
the test laid down by the US court in Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co 499 U.S. 
340 (1991). In this, Canadian law is thus different from UK law.   
143 See chapter 2, more specifically, see 2.3 and 2.5 respectively. 
144 See chapter 3 at 3.5 generally. 
145 See chapter 4 generally.  
146 See chapter 2 at 2.3, and 2.3.1.2(a) respectively.  
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possible by the proprietary laws147 that support a “foundational entitlement”148 in 
relation to protected works. This is due to the fact that once copyright is characterized 
as a form of property, the noninstrumentalism of ownership is considered an end in 
itself. This allows for the scope of its exclusive privileges and exclusionary right to be 
extended with little regard for its underlying purpose.149 
Yet, the reforms150 discussed in chapter 5151 aim to help alleviate such issues. They 
could do so by creating the possibility of producing cheaper works to lessen the 
severity of such items which could decrease costs throughout copyright.152 In turn, the 
proposals aim to counteract the effects of the current system, in that they provide a 
framework designed to encourage creative re-uses.153 This is done by reducing the 
cost of production through placing a temporary limit on the price that can be charged 
for a copyrighted item, pertaining to both sale and re-use.154 This is important as being 
culturally involved and challenged is an important part of development.155 Thus, by 
 
147 On the role of ‘property’ generally to describe items like copyright, patents and trademarks to 
convey the impression that they are fundamentally “like” interests in land or tangible personal 
property, see W., Fisher, ‘The growth of intellectual property: A history of ownership of ideas in the 
United States’ (1997) in D. Vaver, Intellectual Property Rights: Critical Concepts in Law (Vol 1, 
Routledge Publishing 2006), chapter 3.  
148  Netanel, N.W.,  Copyrights Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.7.  
149 Balganesh, S, ‘Debunking Blackstonian Copyright’ 118 Yale Law Journal [2009] 1126-1181, 
available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389483?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents> accessed: 
21/11/2015.  
150 For a brief overview, see chapter 5 at 5.3.  
151 See chapter 5 at 5.5.  
152  For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
153  On re-use, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b) and 5.4.1(c).  
154  In terms of what items would be covered by the law, this is covered by the existing scheme of 
legal protection i.e. whatever items are capable of being protected by copyright are also capable of 
being protected under the current scheme. However, ‘Artistic’ works are not included under the 
reforms, for more information, see this chapter at 5.6  
155 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly; R.S. Albert and M.A. Runco, A 
History of Research on Creativity in R.J. Sternberg, Handbook of Creativity [1999]; See also, M. 
Csikzentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and psychology of discovery and invention (Harper Collins 
Publishers 1996) at 77-83; R. Weisberg, Creativity: Beyond the Myth of Genius (1993).  
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changing the prices (lowering them), it is argued that this would help alleviate the 
operationality of the current system through maximising the economic efficiency of 
copyright.156  
From a social perspective, this limitation may be viewed under two aspects, (a) the 
assignment or allocation of the available productive forces and materials among the 
various lines of industry, and (b) the effective co-ordination of the various means of 
production in the copyright industry into such groupings as will produce the greatest 
result.’157 
The reason being is that it would indirectly enable access to works due to the possible 
reduction in costs overall across the copyright spectrum. This could also incidentally 
increase compliance with copyright due to the reduced prices158 and thereby 
potentially reduce piracy159 through procuring cost-effective options.160 Yet, empirical 
 
156 Hovenkamp, H., ‘Antitrust Policy After Chicago’ [1985] 84 Univ Mich LR 213, 226–229; N. Mercuro 
and S.G. Medema, Economics and the Law—From Posner to Post-Modernism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), at 53; R. H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself (Basic Books, 1978, reprinted with a new Introduction and Epilogue, 1993), at 90–91.  
157 R. H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books, 1978, reprinted with a 
new Introduction and Epilogue, 1993), at 90–91.  
158 W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 Journal of Legal Studies 
[1989] 325. 
159 Devos, K., Tax Compliance Theory and the Literature (Springer Publishing 2014); See also, part 
5.5 in this chapter generally, and specifically, 5.5.3(a).  
160 “Although it is impossible to eradicate piracy, in the absence of more affordable and accessible 
options, there will always be a high level of pirate streams for example, and the reforms will help to 
facilitate cheaper, and subsequently, more accessible options” – Koo, J., ‘The influence of football 
on the development of the communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at 
[576]; See also, BBC, "Premier League: Third of fans say they watch illegal streams of matches – 
survey", (4 July 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/40483486>; The Guardian, "Premier 
League launches major fightback against illegal streaming" (29 March 
2017), <<https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/mar/29/premier-league-illegal-streaming-tv-
audiences>> [both accessed 30 June 2019].  
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evidence to support this assertion lacking161 as the demand curve is negatively sloped 
because there are good but not perfect substitutes.162  
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that near ‘perfect’ substitutes can be made 
in the digital age where works are no longer of “inferior quality [and] a pirate doesn’t 
have to compensate for the risk of failure.”163 Consequently, this creates a bigger profit 
overall for copies sold outside the legitimate market.164 To counteract this, it is 
suggested that such items could be overcome by creating cheaper works under the 
proposals discussed in chapter 5.165 This could achieve the same result as when large 
firms, which tend to have greater efficiency than smaller ones, because they are able 
to sell products that are less costly and better quality.166 For example, under the 
proposed approach, the overall reduction in costs could create a situation where 
quality167 remains a forefront consideration for those subject to the capping proposals. 
This is important as consumers will not pay a higher price for another brand unless it 
 
161  Note that there is no empirical evidence to support this directly. However, Danaher Smith and 
Telang ‘Website Blocking Revisited’ (18 April 2016), 
SSRN, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795> [Accessed 30 June 2019] 
did find that in the aftermath of the November 2014 website blocks, there was a 6% increase in 
subscriptions to legitimate sources such as Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on 
legitimate ad-revenue supported sources such as BBC and Channel 5’s streaming sites. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. 
Poort and J. Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of 
Amsterdam [2018], p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the 
communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]. 
162 W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies at 326.  
163 W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies at 329. 
164 W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies at 328. 
165  See chapter 5 at 5.5.  
166 H. Demsetz, ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy’ [1973] 16 J Law and Economics, 
1-9; J. S. Bain, Industrial Organization (London: Wiley, 1959) at 424;  R. Coase The Nature of the 
Firm (1937) 4 Economica 386; O. Williamson, Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications (New York: The Free Press, 1975). 
167 See chapter 5 at 5.5.2. 
 176 
can demonstrate that is either cheaper or  better.168 Thus, the cost of producing works 
and the ultimate sale price could be less costly and better quality under the capping 
system.169  
This could also mean that the production of works is increased overall because the 
product, and its distribution, are complements, and an increase in the price of 
distribution will reduce the demand for the product.170 Thus, the reforms could combat 
this by increasing demand for the product through ensuring that the price of distribution 
remains low, which may lead to the product being cheaper overall and this could create 
more efficiency and lessen monopolistic practice.171 However, this may create price 
competition among dealers, but it is contended that this will happen regardless of the 
system in place as price discrimination is a product of the market172 and this could 
lead to smaller, rather than larger, output than a single-price monopoly.173 Yet, larger 
output can also reduce the welfare gains from a higher output, but only where the 
output is in fact higher.174  
Notwithstanding this, the proposed approach could also help solve issues of predatory 
pricing175 that is sometimes used to drive out competitors and is often difficult to 
detect.176 The effect of predatory pricing is that it is designed to undercut competitors 
due to the substantial gains made by the market seller during the timeframe where the 
 
168 Nelson, ‘Advertising as Information’ 82 J. Political Econ. [1974] 729.  
169 See chapter 5 at 5.3 and 5.5.  
170 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 927.  
171 However, the costs of creating and maintaining monopolies may exceed the misallocative costs 
resulting from the smaller output of monopolized compared to competitive markets – Posner 
‘Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust laws’ 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 508, 510-13 (1974).  
172 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 927. 
173 J. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, The Econ. Journal. [1933] vol.43, issue 172 
at 190-94. 
174 O. Williamson, Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: The Free 
Press, 1975) at 11-13.  
175 Isaac, R. Mark, and Vernon L. Smith. ‘In Search of Predatory Pricing’ Journal of Political Economy, 
93.2 [1985] 320-345.  
176 McGee J, ‘Predatory price cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) case’ Journal of Law and Economics 
[1985] 1 at 137–169; McGee J. ‘Predatory pricing revisited’ Journal of Law and Economics 23 [1980] 
at 289–330.  
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goods are sold below cost for an extended period of time.177 Essentially, the actions 
of the predator are designed to establish the reputation that it will not in any way 
accommodate the entry of new firms into the market.178  
This is done by setting a price that makes its competitors’ business unprofitable at 
minimum cost to itself179 and is an issue within digital copyright.180 The reforms could 
help alleviate such issues because it is suggested that the reduction in costs overall 
could mean that copyright is less susceptible to such tactics during, and, post-
reform.181 This is based on the idea that the reforms, by setting a maximum price, 
could mean that any strategic price reductions from those engaging in practices like 
predatory pricing, will have less of an impact.  
The rationale behind this hypothesis is based on the notion that if prices are already 
reduced, then any lower pricing will have less of an impact on the intended targets of 
the predation, which could mean that they will have better chances of outlasting such 
behaviours. This is because the predator will attempt to induce the target to a position 
where he simply thinks it is not worthwhile to outlast the practice he is being subjected 
to.182 In accordance with this, it is asserted that the reductions imposed by the reforms 
could mean that predatory pricing practices will have less impact, and thus, less 
appeal, based on the notion that the targets will be seemingly less sensitive to the 
behaviour as prices will already be reduced.183  
However, the extent to which this is needed is questionable as selling below cost in 
order to drive out a competitor is unprofitable long-term. This is because the predator 
loses money during the predation phase, and any attempt to recoup any lost funds will 
 
177 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 940.  
178 Dalton, J., and Esposito, L., ‘Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact’ (Springer 
Review of Industrial Organization, 2011), 38: 245–266. 
179 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 942. 
180 Stokes, S., Digital Copyright: Law and Practice, art Publishing (5th Revised edition 2019) at 5.5.4.  
181 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
182 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 940.  
183 W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies.  
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be potentially counteracted by new entrants who will bid down to a competitive level.184 
Also, EU law could help deal with items like potentially anti-competitive agreements 
which involve the distribution of digital content, including the related grant of 
intellectual property (IP) rights which may be open to challenge under Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).185 Under this provision, 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market, and in particular those which: 
“(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions...”186 
Yet, the reforms aim not to make such items unlawful, as it is reasonable to suggest 
that the law already deals with such items.187 Instead, the proposals aim to create 
conditions where, by setting a maximum price or reducing the price that can be 
charged for a copyright work in the short-term, this could ‘disincentivise’ the act of 
predatory pricing and thereby ‘discourage’ it. This is because the impact of such 
activity may be minimal as the proposed approach would put all competitors at the 
same level of price on market entry. Thus, predatory pricing may be discouraged on 
the basis that prices would already be lower and because consumers will not pay more 
unless a brand is cheaper or better,188 it is submitted that the focus may be on 
producing better works rather than predatory pricing due to this potentially 
‘disincentivising’ effect.  
Moreover, the reduction in prices could also deal with the issue of free riding. A ‘free 
rider’ in this context would be a dealer who undersold competing dealers by selling the 
product itself at a lower price while relying on them to provide the necessary presale 
 
184 Posner notes that rather than suffer financial loss as a result of a price war, the rational would-be 
monopolist would buy the competing company - Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 927.  
185 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012 (‘TFEU’).  
186 TFEU Art.101.  
187 Case T-198/98 Micro Leader Business v Commission (“Micro Leader”) [1999] ECR II-3989. 
188 Nelson, ‘Advertising as Information’ 82 J. [1974] Political Econ. 729.  
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services and tests to ensure that the product is profitable.189 For example, when a 
copier can defer making copies until he knows whether the work is a success, the 
potential gains from free riding on expression will be even greater. This is because the 
difference between the price and marginal cost of the original work will rise to 
compensate for the uncertainty of demand, and create bigger profit for copies.190  
It is suggested that producing cheaper works in the digital age could provide a 
potentially effective solution to the current situation as a corollary of the proposals 
under these predicted effects.191 This is because, at present, there is no need for such 
economic deference by pirates as the costs of reproduction are minimal due to the 
capacity for instantaneous and near-perfect replication.192  
Therefore, if the settings in which the cost of voluntary transactions is low, the effect 
of the reforms193 can be said to create incentives for people to channel their 
transactions through the market. This is because when the allocation of resources by 
voluntary transactions is prohibitively high, the market becomes an infeasible method 
of allocating resources194 and this could encourage things like piracy.195 
3.3 Creating a thief: the justificatory role of the pirate in capitalist 
copyright 
“The turbulence accidentally caused by a bird in flight is taken advantage of by 
the bird flying immediately after to propel itself forward. Yet, the restricted 
 
189 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 927.  
190 W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies at 328-29. 
191 Taleb, N., The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbably (New York, Random House, 
2007).   
192 Gladwell, M. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (London: Abacus 
2000).   
193 See chapter 5 at 5.3, 5.5.   
194 Posner. R, Economic Analysis of Law, (4th edn, 1992), pp.251-2.  
195 Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the communication to the public right’ 
E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577.  
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economy of capitalism shows up as a mirror of anti-production, where the first 
bird would sue the second bird for piracy.”199  
Digital technology meant that information became “real” and “alive”200 in that it enabled 
the collaboration and interaction between individuals and their computers regardless 
of geographic locations201 where they could participate in the creation of works rather 
than be passive consumers.202 This meant that it was important for rightsholders in 
capitalist society to redesign culture, the economy, and the law, so as to reinforce the 
perception that information is real and can be “stolen.”203 Proprietary rights are 
contended to be a central element, not just in the discourse of the previous chapter,204 
but also, in the construction of the modern system under what Arditi calls the “piracy 
panic narrative.”205  
 
 
199 Soderberg, J., Hacking Capitalism: The Free and Open Source Software Movement (Routledge 
Publishing, 2008), at 148.  
200 Popper, K. & Eccles, J.C., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (Berlin, 
Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977); S.Vaidhyanathan, The anarchist in the library: how 
the clash between freedom and control is hacking the real world and crashing the system (Basic 
books, 2004). 
201 Koutras, N., ‘History of copyright, growth and conceptual analysis: copyright protection and the 
emergence of open access’ I.P.Q. 2016, 2, 135-150.  
202 Lessig, L., Free Culture (The Penguin Press, 2004); Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry 
in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015); Balkin, J.M., ‘Virtual Liberty: Freedom to 
Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds’, 90 Virginia Law Review 2043 [2004].  
203 Lanier, J., You are not a Gadget (Penguin Books, 2010) at 26-29. 
204  See the discussion in sections 2.3 and 2.6 generally.   
205 For more information, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015), pp.xxii-xxv. 
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The narratives structure is as follows: file sharing is piracy, piracy is ‘stealing’,206 and 
stealing hurts [rightsholders]207 although this is debatable.208 The rhetoric became that 
music fans who share files were not listening to free music but rather “stealing.”209 For 
example, in the trial of Joel Tenenbaum, discussed in the second chapter, the theme 
of theft was so strong that the court highlighted that the claimants put such “...a 
criminal gloss over [the matter], [that it would] deal with at the end of the case should 
the damages be substantial...”210  
 
 
206 In the UK, the notion of ‘stealing’ approach was adopted by Templeman LJ who stated that “a 
defendant may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion” – CBS Songs Ltd 
v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc & Another [1988] 2 A11 ER 484 at [496]; In the US, congress 
commented on the issue of ‘stealing’- “By the turn of the century the Internet is projected to have 
more than 200 million users, and the development of new technology will create additional incentive 
for copyright thieves to steal protected works...Many computer users are either ignorant that 
copyright laws apply to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or 
prosecuted for their conduct...even after copyright owners put them on notice that their actions 
constitute infringement and that they should stop the activity or face legal action...” - See H.R. Rep. 
106-216 at 3 (1999).  
207 The fact that the right of a phonogram producer is aimed at protecting his legitimate financial 
investment (i.e. protection of property against piracy) did not mean that the right did not also cover 
other exploitation, such as authorising or prohibiting sampling. Somewhat unsurprisingly, it was 
deemed incorrect to limit the legitimate financial interests of producers of phonograms to protection 
against the distribution or the communication of their phonograms as such to the public - Case C- 
476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben [2018] 
at [30], [31], [32], [33].  
208 Expert Report of Stanley J. Liebowitzat App. A, Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. 
Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009) (No. 1:07-cv-11446), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/~nesson/Liebowitz%20Expert%20Report.pdf – (Accessed: 21/03/2020).  
209 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.xxii 
210 See Transcript of Jury Trial Day 4 at 6 – Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F.Supp.2d 
85 (D.Mass.2010) (No.1:07-cv-11446).   
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This narrative labels file-sharers and those who access intellectual property without 
consulting the rightsholder as property thieves211 where file-sharers were repeatedly 
labelled as “criminals engaged in an act of stealing.”212 This approach was in order for 
the music industry to construct a victim (the rightsholder) and property was essential 
to this due to the exclusory elements it is often associated with the term213 even 
historically.214  
Correspondingly, this allowed the copyright industry to go after the pirate with the long 
yardstick of the law.215 In turn, this enabled the industry to pursue all those who failed 
to comply with the regime as ‘pirates’216 allowing copyright to facilitate217 the “capitalist 
 
211 Green, P.S., ‘13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age’, [2012] 270-76, ; Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013) (emphasis added) – (“new 
technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works.”).  
212 The industry’s rhetoric of theft is explored throughout Reyman. See, e.g., Reyman, J., ‘The 
Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law and the Regulation of Digital Culture’ 115 [2010] at 
67 (describing announcement on RIAA website comparing downloading to theft); at 116 (describing 
RIAA ad campaign showing an eye exam chart and noting, “[i]f you can’tsee that illegal downloading 
is stealing then keep reading”); at 124 (describing the Recording Academy website, which compares 
downloading to “stealing” and the Music United website, which refers to downloading as “stealing 
music”) in Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright 
Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06 at 890. 
213 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
214 Gray and Gray, Elements of land law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2009), p. 87; (In archaic 
English, the word 'proper' served to indicate relationships of proprietary significance. Thus the poor 
were described as not 'hauyng ony thynge proper'; and a very early 15th century reference describes 
someone as having been slain 'with his own propre swerd' (Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon 
1933) Vol VIII at 1469 ('proper', I, 1)). 
215 For more information on how “piracy” developed out of a combination of political and economic 
convergences see: Johns, A., Piracy: The intellectual property wars from Guttenberg to Gates 
(University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp.17-40. 
216  See chapter 3 generally.  
217 McCourt, T. and P. Burkart, ‘When Creators, Corporations and Consumers Collide: Napster and 
the Development of On-line Music Distribution’ [2003] Media Culture & Society 25(3): 333-50. – 
(Here it is argued that major record companies have successfully used the emergence of Internet 
Piracy as a foil to defer anti-trust law suits being filed against them in the US courts and facilitate the 
music industry growth).   
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production of music.”218 As was seen in the previous chapter219 this resulted in a 
“calculated political strategy to demonize opponents to make them appear to be bad 
people”220 who must be punished by being sued221 following bitter complaints about 
online consumer piracy.222 This resulted in cases going to court that were absent of 
the usual justifications for, or the economic checks that prevent, such large-scale 
copyright litigation.223 
Rightsholders have lobbied for laws that have allowed them to term the majority of 
unauthorised acts in relation to intangibles as piratical acts,231 and because of this, it 
can be said that a literary232 pirate is not only an outlaw; he is protected by the law. 
He is a product of the law.233 Therefore, the typical and uncritical use of the term piracy 
– detached from the legal conditions that permitted and even encouraged it – gave a 
 
218 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.44. 
219 See chapter 2 at 2.3.  
220 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.xxii; See also, chapter 2 at 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2 and 2.5; See also, A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); 
Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); See also, R. Arnold, ‘Content Copyrights and Signal 
Copyrights: The Case for a Rational Scheme of Protection’ (2011) 1 QMJIP 272.   
221 Patry, W., Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (New York: Oxford University Press 2009) at 44. 
222 See e.g. ‘Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and 
the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry’ (Hearing Before the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs) 108th Congress 
(30 September 2003), 19-20 (testimony of L.L. Cool, recording artist); Promoting Investment and 
Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Para-sites, Hearing Before the Subcommittee On 
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 112th Congress (14 March 2011), 61-62 
(testimony of Frederick Huntsberry, Paramount Pictures). 
223 Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 
47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06 at 893.   
231 See Litman, J., Digital Copyright (Amhurtst, NY: Prometheus Books 2006); See also, Lessig, Free 
Culture (2004). 
232 R. Hauhart, ‘The Origin and Development of the British and American Patent and Copyright Laws’ 
(1983) 5 Whittier Law Review 539, 558. 
233 ‘The Authors Best Friend’ NYEP (9/1/1882); reprinted in PW, no. 558 (9/23/1882): 430.  
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false aura of illegality to a practice that was then called the courtesy of the trade, which 
was a lawful form of cultural diffusion well into the twentieth century.234  
However, the uncritical use of the piracy term now means that any novel use of a 
protected work, even within an unforeseeable market devised by the follow-on creator, 
is likely to be infringement if it finds commercial demand.236 This has been done by 
creating a sense of illegality to maintain the “economic interests of the author and 
publisher.”237 The problem is that in the digital world this has created a situation where 
users feel that every unauthorised use will be the subject of infringement 
proceedings238 and this has been exacerbated239 due to contracts.240  
 
234 Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp.3-4; On courtesy, see Spoo’s book at pp.30-64.  
236 Sharkova, K., ‘The author, the fan and the in-between: in search of a copyright regime for the 
everyday creative’ [2018] E.I.P.R. , 40(12), 784-796 – Sharkova also notes that (it is interesting to 
note that copyright has refused to protect business plans, and therefore the originality and ingenuity, 
involved in devising a market and subsequent demand, are incapable of being protected. However, 
the secondary creative’s unprotected labour is subsequently free to be utilised by the right holder of 
the original work). 
237 Newman, S., ‘Intellectual Property Law – Rights, Freedoms and Phonograms: Moral Rights and 
Adaptation Rights in Music and Other Copyright Works’ Computer Law & Security Report 13(1), 
(1997), at p.22 in Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing 2015),  p.xxiv 
238 Griffin, J. and Nair, A., ‘Making Threats of Copyright Infringement’ [2013] International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology; Mazzone, J., ‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies 
Paper No. 40; New York University Law Review, Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026.  
239 (This is due to the fact that items are no longer subject to the otherwise limiting rules on 
exhaustion or distribution) - Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg SA v. Cassina SpA, [2008] ECR I-
2731(ECJ); Also, due to the lack of ‘permission’ it is likely that this could be treated as an 
unauthorised reproduction and distribution, but then the initial distribution in the physical world would 
suggest no, but licensed transfers in the digital area are likely to be judged/treated differently - Art & 
Allposters, Case C-419/13, EU:C:2015;27 (ECJ); In the US, see Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi 
Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5.1. 
240 Hargreaves Review, Recommendation 5, and 51, [5.40] (explaining that permitting contractual 
variation ‘replaces clarity...with uncertainty’); For more information, see this same review at chapter 
9, p.229; On the issue of uncertainty within copyright, see chapter 4 of this thesis at 4.7. 
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The result of this is that as inhabitants of the digital age, the word pirate exemplifies 
the violator of a formal, legally enforceable right – a copyright.245 This is because the 
word often concerns proprietary interests that are always concerned with relationships 
between persons as to the use or exploitation of things (objects, resources, items of 
wealth).246 However, what is seen now is a “slippage in discourse [that has occurred] 
during the digital transformation”247 that has seen the ‘piracy’ term become so common 
that it seems to describe “any unlicensed activity.”248 Interestingly, however, the 
criminal prosecution of company directors under s.110249 is not necessarily limited to 
‘pirates’.250 However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decision of 
Martin Hass v Ralf Hutter,251 (referred from the German Federal Court of Justice)252 
correctly demonstrates that the term piracy does have genuine economic purposes, 
such as “protecting legitimate financial investment[s] (i.e. the protection of property 
 
245  Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 
2013), p.19. 
246  See, e.g. Ackerman, B.A., ‘Private Property and the Constitution’ (Yale University press 1977), 26-
7; Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property in J. Rowland Pennock and Munzer, A theory of 
Property (Cambridge University Press, (990), 15-17.   
247 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.xxv. 
248 Litman, J., Digital Copyright (Amhurtst, NY: Prometheus Books 2006) p.85.  
249 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988.  
250 Thames & Hudson Ltd v Design and Artists Copyright Society Ltd [1994] 7 WLUK 49.  
251 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben (2018). 
252 This is discussed in chapter 4 at 4.5.1.  
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against piracy).”253 Nonetheless, this still does not detract from the current stance and 
the issues associated with the term in the digital age.254  
Therefore, the current approach was fundamental as political power must always seek 
at least the appearance of moral power if it is to be secured and maintained because 
authorities routinely impose considerable costs on their citizens.261 This is due to the 
fact that not only do they forbid countless actions, but they create a whole set of 
affirmative obligations that citizens owe to the state itself.262 This is because the 
greater the number of people who accept the law's authority to impose such duties, 
the fewer the resources that the state must devote to the enforcement of its laws. Once 
the state has won its people's hearts and minds, their bodies will follow.265  
This is due to the fact that rightsholders, in areas like the recording industry, profit from 
the sale of music. Thus, to encourage users to purchase music in a way that facilitates 
the capitalist goal of profit, the music industry constructed an argument claiming that 
bypassing the explicit authorisation of the rightsholder is the equivalent of stealing.270 
 
253 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [30], [31], [32], [33]; Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 22, 2010); Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenebaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 
2011); See also, chapter 4 at 4.5.1; The Advocate General acknowledged that the main purpose of 
the  Rental Directive art.9(1)(b) is to protect against what is commonly referred to as "piracy", being 
the production and distribution of counterfeit copies of phonograms intended to replace lawful copies 
- Bryant, C. and Heeley, R., ‘The Kraftwerk case - does a two-second sample infringe copyright?’ 
Ent. L.R. [2019] 30(4), 125-128; Hopton, P.,‘Advantage Kraftwerk in long running copyright dispute: 
Pelham (C-476/17) (also known as the Metall auf Metall case)’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(8), 279-281. 
254 See this thesis generally, and specifically, chapters 2 and 4; See also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: The 
Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  chapter 8.  
261 For more information, see Shapiro, J.S., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
of Law (Oxford University Press, 2004), p.397. 
262  Ibid at 397.  
265 Shapiro, J.S., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p.397; On how similar reasons are used for the approach to the enforcement of the 
reforms, see chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(c)(iiii).     
270 Green, P.S., ‘13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age’, [2012] 270-76, ; Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013) (emphasis added) – (“new 
technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works.”); Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole 
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This was an attempt by rightsholders to gain public attention for the argument that any 
circumvention of paying for music is an act of property theft.273 The purpose of this 
was to create an association with the societal conceptions relating to tangible theft 
where downloading became “a shoplifting case only in the digital world.”274   
As a result, there is now a “war” 280 against piracy to defend property against acts that 
“rob” 285 the author of his profit, or “financial investment.”286 This is because piracy is 
as much a function of the boundaries of the law as it is of the actual behaviours 
 
My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law 
Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-06 at 893.  
273 For example, see the highly publicised legal and press campaigns against file sharer Joel 
Tenenbaum: (Joel Tenenbaum, ‘How it feels to be sued for $4.5million’ The Guardian Music Blog 
(July 2009) Last accessed: 11/7/2015, Available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2009/jul/27/filesharing-music-industry>); This is 
discussed in  chapter 2 at 3.52.3.1.2.  
274 See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487,493 n.5, 494 (1st Cir. 2011); Transcript 
of Jury Trial Day 2 at 82, Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 
2010) (No. 1:07-cv-11446) in Karol, P., ‘Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the 
Tenenbaum Copyright Case’ 47 [2013] New England Law Review, Boston Research Paper No. 13-
06 at 893; Green, P.S., ‘13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle: Theft Law in the Information Age’, [2012] 270-
76, ; Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 71 (1stCir. 2013) (emphasis added) – 
(“new technologies that would allow Internet users to steal copyrighted works.”).   
280 Lessig, L., Free Culture (The Penguin Press, 2004) at 17-18.  
285 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777); See also, Macmillan, F., New Directions in Copyright 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Vol 2, 2006), p.83, where it states that: (A study by the Market 
Research Organisation IDC for the Business Software Alliance, for example, reported that in 2003, 
36 percent of the software used around the world was pirated, amounting to a loss of $29 billion).  
286 The fact that the right of a phonogram producer is aimed at protecting his legitimate financial 
investment (i.e. protection of property against piracy) did not mean that the right did not also cover 
other exploitation, such as authorising or prohibiting sampling. Somewhat unsurprisingly, it was 
deemed incorrect to limit the legitimate financial interests of producers of phonograms to protection 
against the distribution or the communication of their phonograms as such to the public - Case C- 
476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben [2018] 
at [30], [31], [32], [33]; Recital 62 DSM Directive provides further guidance on how to interpret the 
definition. The same Recital mentions “piracy” websites in ambiguous language, which appears 
allow Member States to exclude these not from the scope of the OCSSP definition but rather from 
the special liability regime in art.17(4). 
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committed. This is because underlying the industry’s response to piracy was an 
implied right to re-assert commercial copyright in a set of relations that were 
deregulated287 and at the same time this process enabled capitalism to offer the 
appearance of “choice”288 in copyright.  
3.4 The narrowing of ‘permitted acts’399 and ‘fair use’400 
The copyright system of the present day is argued to be inseparable from the primitive 
territorial coding process while classes are relative to the process of commodity 
production decoded under the conditions of capitalism.401 Under these conditions, 
rightsholders are at the top, controlling the legal changes that affect this system and 
recipients are at the bottom, mere “subordinates” 402 left to fight over what is left in the 
UK via a small list of permitted acts.403 These are often defined with extraordinary 
precision and rigidity404 under what is considered to be an objective approach.405 
 
287 Rojek, C., ‘P2P Leisure Exchange: Net Banditry and the Policing of Intellectual Property’, Leisure 
Studies, 24 (4), 357-369 in Giletti, T., ‘Why Pay if it’s Free? Streaming, Downloading, and Digital 
Music Consumption in the iTunes era’ Media@LSE Electronic MSc Dissertation Series [2012], 
compiled by Dr. Bart Cammaerts and Dr. Nick Anstead.  
288 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]. 
399 CDPA 1988, chapter III, the concept of ‘fair dealing’. 
400 Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. s.107. 
401 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.179; See also, chapter 3 generally.  
402 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.179.  
403 CDPA 1988, chapter III, the concept of ‘fair dealing’; The various permitted acts are sometimes 
referred to as defences, but strictly speaking this is not the case, cf. CDPA 1988 s.97; A. Sims, 
‘Strangling Their Creation: The Courts’ Treatment of Fair Dealing in Copyright Law Since 1911’ 
[2010] IPQ 192; It is impossible to define ;fair dealing’ and is a question of ‘degree’ – Hubbard v 
Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84; [1972] 1 A11 ER 1023 per (Lord Denning MR); Hyde Park Residence v 
Yelland [2000] RPC 604, CA.  
404 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1998] FSR 43, 48 (Laddie J); See also, the more 
liberal interpretation of CDPA 1988, s.30(1) in Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television [1999] FSR 
610, 614 (Walker LJ); See also, R.A. Posner, ‘When is parody fair use?’ (1992) Journal of Legal 
Studies 67.    
405 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton TV [1999] FSR 610 (CA), 620; England & Wales Cricket Board v 
Tixdaq [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch), [75]; Motive of an infringer can also be relevant – Hyde Park 
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Consequently, all other acts outside are not permitted no matter how “fair”406 they may 
be and are confined to activity that is predominantly non-commercial.407 However, this 
is in contrast to the US system, which has a fair use system.408 This system provides 
guidelines as to what amounts to fair use.409 Yet, this is often interpreted narrowly after 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.410 The result is that US courts are reluctant to 
find fair use when an original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium411 with 
no requirement for users to have direct economic benefit to demonstrate commercial 
 
Residence v. Yelland [2000] EMLR 363 (CA), [36]; Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television [1999] 
FSR 610, 614 (Walker LJ); Fraser-Woodward Ltd v British Broadcasting Corporation Brighter 
Pictures Ltd [2005] EWHC 472.    
406 “It is fair dealing directed to and consequently limited to and to be judged in relation to the 
approved purposes. It is dealing which is fair for the approved purposes and not dealing which might 
be fair for some other purpose or fair in general”, per Ungoed-Thomas J. in Beloff v Pressdram 
[1973] F.S.R. 33; For further discussion, see J. Griffiths ‘Preserving Judicial Freedom of 
Movement—Interpreting Fair Dealing in Copyright Law’ [2000] I.P.Q. 164. See also,  
407 Navitaire Inc. v. Easy Jet Airline Co. & Bulletproof Technologies Inc. [2006] RPC (3) 111, [77].  
408 Copyright Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. s.107; M. de Zwart, ‘A historical analysis of the birth of fair dealing 
and fair use: lessons for the digital age’ [2007] I.P.Q. 1, 60. 
409 Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios (1984) 464 U. s.417. This approach has 
been criticised for ignoring the principle of statutory construction noscitur a sociis (i.e. that the 
meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated 
with it). See P. Goldstein, Copyright (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1989) para.10.2.1. 
410 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprise 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Fair use is defined as "a 
privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." 
H. Ball, The law of copyright and literary property § 125, at 260 (1944). The Supreme Court partially 
quoted this definition in Harper& Row. 471 U.S. at 549; Robin Feingold, ‘When Fair Is Foul A 
Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in Harper& Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises’ 72 
Cornell L. Rev. 218 [1986]; Aufderheide, P., Milosevic, T., and Bello, B., ‘The impact of copyright 
permissions on the US visual arts community: The consequences of fear of fair use’ SAGE 
Publications, [2015].   
411 e.g. Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that a 
retransmission of a radio broadcast over telephone lines is not transformative; UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2000) (finding that the reproduction 
of audio CD to MP3 format does not “transform” the work); For a comparison, see Case C- 419/13 
Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [49]; See also the discussion in 
chapter 4 at 4.4.2  
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use.412 This also includes the effect on the potential market for the original (and the 
market derivative works) which is “undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.”413 Exceptions to this often depending on the use being ‘non-commercial’,414 
their economic impact,415 with non-commerciality under Recital 42 referring to the 
‘activity as such’416 and can include indirectly commercial acts.417 
It is asserted that this is made possible by virtue of the fact that the “capitalist 
machine”419 is a primitive machine that focuses on, and is not ignorant of exchange, 
commerce, and so it exorcises them, localizes them, cordons them off, and maintains 
the users in a subordinate position. This is so that the flows of exchange and the flows 
of production do not manage to break the codes of the copyright system and fall 
 
412 See Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that church that copied religious text for its members “unquestionably profited” from the 
unauthorized “distribution and [use of] text without having account to the copyright holder”); 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (rd. Cir. 1994) (finding researchers 
at for profit laboratory gained indirect economic advantage by photocopying copyrighted scholarly 
articles); This can be compared to Case C-306-05Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL, [2006] ECR I-11519.   
413 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprise 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) – the Court of 
Appeals faulted the District Court for “refus[ing] to indulge the presumption” that “harm for purposes 
of the fair use analysis has been established by the presumption attaching to commercial uses.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 972 F.2d, 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 08/17/1992). 
414 CDPA 1988 s29(1) (research for a non-commercial purpose); The limitation to non-commercial 
research is required under a number of EU law provisions: Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 5(2)(b), (c), (e), 
5(3)(a), (b).  
415 (The provision of such exceptions or limitations by Member States should, in particular, duly reflect 
the increased economic impact that such exceptions or limitations may have in the context of the 
new electronic environment. Therefore, the scope of certain exceptions or limitations may have to 
be even more limited when it comes to certain new uses of copyright works and other subject-
matter) - Football Association Premier League Limited v. QC Leisure [2012] EWCA civ 1708, 2012 
WL 6151864 at [35], [44].      
416 Directive 2001/29/EC.  
417 For example, a public house that shows copyrighted material to customers without directly 
charging them for it, in the hope that it results in them buying drinks or food – The Controller of Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, Ordenance Survey v. Green Amps [2007] EWHC 2755 (ch), [23].  
419 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury 
Academic 1987), chapter 12.  
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outside of legal regulation.420 The reason for this is because such breakage could 
otherwise deprive rightsholders of the possibility of financial reward for the commercial 
exploitation of their works.421 Yet, financial reward for authors is considered to be 
necessary for copyright law.422 Accordingly, this thesis does not advocate against this 
notion.423  
However, it is argued that the existing regulation focuses too much on the form, the 
‘stock’ of information rather than the use or ‘flow’ of that information in order to maintain 
the monopolistic status of right holders.424 This has led to a copyright system where 
“every commercial use is presumptively unfair”425 not just those uses which are 
“blatantly”426 commercial. As such, the provisions [of permitted acts] are not to be 
regarded as a general wide discretion vested in the courts to refuse to enforce 
copyright where they believe such refusal to be warranted.427 It is argued that copyright 
law has been used as the means in which to suppress the release of such decoded 
flows (digitalised decommodification)428 incapable of control by the capitalist, whereby 
copyright expanded.429 This invariably was a response to technological change, 
 
420 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.178; Griffin also talks usefully about the effects of capitalism on the flow and exchange of 
information in his article – (Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property 
Quarterly [2016]).  
421 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]. 
422 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
423 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5 generally.  
424 The Phrase “information flow” was introduced by Elkin-Koren: see Elkin-Koren, ‘Cyberlaw and 
social Change: A democratic approach to copyright law in cyberspace’ [1996] 14 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 215.  
425 Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios (1984) 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).   
426 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 972 F.2d, 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 08/17/1992) at 1439. 
427 Per Laddie J. in Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 43 at 49 
(reversed by the Court of Appeal, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 605; [1999] F.S.R. 610, but not with any 
disapproval of this statement). 
428 Frow, J., Time and Commodity Culture Oxford University Press, (1997) pp.143-4 in 
Hesmondhalgh, D., The Cultural Industries (3rd eds. SAGE Publications 2013), p.69. 
429 The pressure that the rise of the internet and digital technology has placed upon copyright law has 
been comprehensively documented - See, inter alia, L. Lessig, Free Culture (2004); S. 
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expanding in terms of scope, breadth and duration at the behest of rightsholders.430 
This then led to the notion of the information state,431 information society432 or the 
information age433 and more works being protected now than ever before.434  
It is postulated that this is the result of capitalism, as the now established diagnosis is 
that we are living in a post-industrial society, where the late modern economy is an 
economy of knowledge and work with information and ideas – promoted by digital 
information technologies – and this takes up increasingly more space for more 
workers.435 This is known as a reflexive economy of knowledge or, a ‘cognitive 
capitalism’.436 The result is that in capitalist society, knowledge has become the 
 
Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property and how it threatens 
creativity, 2nd edn (2003); J. Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens (1996); BPI, "Reducing online 
copyright infringement", http://www.bpi.co.uk/our-work/policy-and-lobbying/article/second-
article.aspx - in Taken from Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to 
the notion of proprietary exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly Also, in 
Griffin (2013) see (The expansion of copyright and the development of technology—the diverging 
interests of authors and right holders, and a solution) at 70-74; S. Vaidhyanathan, The anarchist in 
the library (2004). 
430 Justice Laddie, ‘Copyright: Over-strength, over-regulated, over-rated?’ [1996] E.I.P.R. 253. 
431 Hesmondhalgh, D., The Cultural Industries (3rd eds. SAGE Publications 2013), pp.327-28. 
432 House of Lords – Agenda for Action in the UK – Chapter 5 opinion of the committee -  
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199596/ldselect/inforsoc/ch5.htm> (Accessed: 05/07/2018). 
433 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]; See 
also, Castells, Manuel, The Rise of the Network Society (Volume 1 of The Information Age) (1996) 
at 352; Nederlands Uitgeversverbond v Tom Kabinet Internet BV (C-263/18) EU:C:2019:697, [2019] 
9 WLUK 59, [2019] E.C.D.R. 27; See also, Crown copyright in the information age, Comps. & Law 
1998, 8(6), 5-6; Hilary E. Pearson, Information in a digital age - the challenge to copyright, C.L.S.R. 
(1996), 12(2), 90-94. 
434 Laddie, ‘Copyright’ [1996] E.I.P.R. 253, 253–256. 
435 Reckwitz, A., The Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of the New (Polity press, 
2017), p.89; On digitization, Castells, M., The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, vol. 
1: The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.  
436 This interpretation is derived from Daniel Bell. See Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society: 
A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books, 1999; see also Stehr, Wissen and 
Wirtschafter. On the concept of cognitive capitalism, see Vercellone, C., (ed.), Capitalismo cognitive: 
conoscenza e finanza nell’epoca post-fordista, (Rome: Manifestolibri, 2006) in Reckwitz, A., The 
Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of the New, (Polity press, 2017), 123-4.  
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resource, rather than a resource. It fundamentally changes the structure of society and 
creates new economic dynamics – and that land, labour, and capital have become 
secondary to information – in an information revolution, based on ‘the application of 
knowledge to knowledge.’437 
The end result will be that  th[is] new economic reality of information regulation will be 
such that it will reveal the “shadow law” 438 of the capitalist state.439 This is because 
the state was the first abstract unity that integrated sub-aggregates functioning 
separately. Now, the copyright system is postulated to have become subordinated to 
a field of forces whose flows it co-ordinates and whose autonomous relations of 
domination and subordination it expresses in the culture system through the copyright 
legal infrastructure.440 It is argued that these moves were to prevent the destruction of 
its market, a direct subordination to the dominant forces, the rightsholders, who 
pushed for expanded laws.441 These laws then created what are considered to be legal 
 
437 Ducker, P., Post-capitalist Society (Oxford, 1993), p.140 in Mason, P., Post-capitalism: A guide to 
our future (Penguin Publishing 2016),  pp.112-14. 
438 Bibas, S., ‘Plea bargaining outside the Shadow of trial’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review2464. (The 
essence of this article is that Plea-bargaining literature predicts that parties strike plea bargains in 
the shadows of expected trial outcomes. In other words, parties forecast the expected sentence 
after trial, discount it by the probability of acquittal, and offer some proportional discount. This 
oversimplified model ignores how structural distortions skew bargaining outcomes, causing them to 
diverge from trial outcomes). Available at: 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=464880> (Last accessed: 14/3/2015).  
439 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]; Griffin 
notes that “shadow law” is meant in the broadest sense of norms: e.e. H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory 
of Law, (trans. M. Knight Berkely, CA: University of California, 1970). 
440 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.179; See also, chapter 3 generally. 
441 For example, right holders previously considered that the copyright system insufficiently protects 
their economic interests - see, inter alia, L. Lessig, Free Culture (2004); S. Vaidhyanathan, 
Copyrights and Copywrongs: The rise of Intellectual Property and how it threatens creativity, 2nd 
edn (2003); J. Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens (1996); BPI, "Reducing online copyright 
infringement", http://www.bpi.co.uk/our-work/policy-and-lobbying/article/second-article.aspx - in 
Taken from Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of 
proprietary exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly Also, in Griffin (2013) see 
(The expansion of copyright and the development of technology—the diverging interests of authors 
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codes in the form of new legislation for the decoded flows of commodities and private 
property that were deterritorialized by digitalisation.442 Thus, the predominant focus of 
copyright has been on the traditional economic exploitation of proprietary rights443 
because it was property that enabled the commodification required for copyright to 
flourish in the digital world444 under the “regulatory capture”445 of the copyright 
system.446  
3.4.1 Why the normal pricing rules of demand and supply do not apply in 
the digital age: associated implications 
The equilibrium state of an info-tech economy is one where monopolies dominate and 
people have unequal access to the information they need to make rational buying 
 
and right holders, and a solution) at 70-74; S. Vaidhyanathan, The anarchist in the library (2004); It 
seems that this may still be the case when looking at the discussion of the recent passage of the 
Digital Single Market Directive – see Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market 
Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28]; Recipients argue the contrary, namely 
protection is ‘overbroad’ and limits their cultural freedom – A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property [2006]; I. Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and Growth 
(2011); Analysys Mason, ‘Final Report for the Department of Media, Culture and Sport, Fostering 
Creative Ambition in the UK Digital Economy’ (2009), pp.27–28. 
442 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.255.  
443 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new copyright economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in copyright’, Intellectual Property Quarterly (2013); See also, Griffin, J., Copyright 
evolution - creation, regulation and the decline of substantively rational copyright law, I.P.Q. [2013], 
3, 234-252.   
444 See this chapter at 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.   
445 This refers to situations where regulations end up being “gamed” by an agent, often in divergence 
from the original intent of the regulation. Some bureaucrats and businesspersons may owe part of 
their income to protective regulations like copyright law. Note that regulations are easier to put in 
than to correct and remove.  
446 Taleb, N., Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life, (2018), chapter 7.  
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decisions,447 but this isn’t always the case where the law makes allowances.448 
However, profit does not always arise by monopolistic behaviour because although it 
may play some role, it can be said to be the result of a combination of often objectively 
unquantifiable factors.449 Yet, info-tech destroys the normal price mechanism, 
whereby competition drives prices down towards the cost of production. For example, 
a track on iTunes costs next to zero to store on Apple’s server, and next to zero to 
transmit to my computer. Whatever it cost the record company to produce (in terms of 
artists fees and marketing costs) it costs me 99p simply because it is unlawful to copy 
it for free.  
This is somewhat paradoxical to the normal pricing mechanism of supply and demand 
in copyright law,450 as there is normally a ‘downward-slumping demand curve’ in 
 
447 Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp.2d 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Bridgeport 
Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, (2005) (a three-note sample was not considered to be 
fair use and users were told to “get a licence or do not sample”); Bartlett, C., ‘Bridgeport Music’s 
Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Big Chill on the Music Industry’, 15 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. L. 301 (2005); Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, 
Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018) at [14] and [25] – (“even approximately two 
seconds” of unlicensed sampling, from a phonogram (i.e. a sound recording) is regarded as 
copyright infringement in absence of express authorization); Clips lasting only a few seconds taken 
from films of football matches lasting 90 minutes were held to be substantial parts of the films: they 
reproduced incidents of particular interest to the viewers, such as goals, near misses, 
demonstrations of particular skill and the like, and sufficient footage was shown to enable the 
viewers to appreciate the incidents Football Association Premier League Ltdv QC Leisure [2008] 
EWHC 1411 (Ch); [2008] F.S.R. 32; [2008] 3 C.M.L.R. 12 at [209]. 
448 In Napster, the court in the case refused to issue a compulsory license by limiting the record label 
plaintiff’s relief for Napster’s contributory copyright liability to an award of reasonable damages. In 
doing so, the court reasoned that the “[p]laintiffs would [otherwise] lose power to control their 
intellectual property; they could not make a business decision not to license their property to 
Napster.” - A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1029; Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television 
[1999] FSR 610, 614 (per Walker LJ).  
449 Demsetz notes that profit is often a product of superior performance by firms, and not monopoly 
alone. This often is a combination of great uncertainty plus luck or atypical insight by the 
management of a firm –  H. Demsetz, ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy’ [1973]  
16 J. Law. and Economics, 1-9 at 3.  
450 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325.. 
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relation to copyrighted works.451 That is, “for a new work to be created, the expected 
return – typically, and…exclusively, from the sale of copies – must exceed the 
expected cost.”452 The demand curve for copies of a given book is assumed, to be 
negatively sloped because there are good but not perfect substitutes for a given 
book.453  
However, it is postulated that because digital items are unlike physical records (or 
books), for example, the price doesn’t change as demand fluctuates. This means that 
there is no such curve in this instance because supply will arguably never have to 
correlate with demand. This is because the interplay of these factors does not come 
into the price of an iTunes track as the supply is infinite. As such, it can be said that 
“natural prices are determined by the cost of production, independent of demand.”454  
This is because until we had sharable information goods, the basic law of economics 
was that everything was scarce.455 Supply and demand assumes scarcity.456 Now that 
certain goods are not scarce, like digital music, they are technically abundant – as 
they do not perish etc, and so supply and demand is removed from the equation.457 
Thus, Apple’s absolute legal right to charge 99p is what sets the price. Therefore, what 
 
451 See the discussion in chapter 5 at 5.2, 5.3, 5.3.1, and 5.5.3(a) respectively.   
452  Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
453 This view is maintained through their analysis, namely the assumption of a downward-sloping 
demand curve for copies of a given work - Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of 
copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal Studies 325.. 
454 Smith, A., His Life, Thought, and Legacy (Eds. Ryan Patrick Hanley, Princeton University Press 
2016), p.242. (It should also be noted that this is, of course, not the entire story of economic growth, 
but nonetheless one essential element according to Smith).  
455 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. 
456 The lack of ‘scarcity’ in relation to intellectual property is now a key reason why some writers 
suggest that such rights are no longer justified in their current form – e.g. A. Plant, ‘The Economics 
of Copyright’ (1934) Economica 167; D. Boldrin and M. Levine, Against Intellectual Property 
Monopoly (2005); J. Silbey, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators and Everyday Intellectual 
Property (2015).  
457 Also, there is a similar argument, but in the context of tangible and intangible goods in what is 
known as the “rivalrous/non-rivalrous” debate - in E.E. Johnson, ‘Intellectual Property and the 
Incentive Fallacy’ (2011) 39 Florida State Law Review 623.  
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info-capitalism does, which is the idea that capitalism is now profiting from information, 
is create a monopoly as it is the only way that an industry of this nature can run. Yet, 
Landes and Posner argue that copyrights rarely confer monopoly power, but posit that 
there are two types of tracing problem.458   
In short, information technology in the digital age is corroding the normal operationality 
of the price mechanism. This has had revolutionary implications for copyright and 
anyone associated with it. This is because fundamental categories of economic 
analysis and law459 ceased to be, as they have been, for two hundred years. The 
catagories of economic analysis had been based around land, labour, and capital. 
This most elementary classification was supplanted by people, ideas and things. 
Central to this was the principle of scarcity which had been augmented by the 
important principle of abundance.460 As a result, the copyright legal framework is 
argued to have been adopted by capitalism accordingly to ensure that the music 
industry could adapt in the digital age and has “emerged stronger and smarter”461 as 
a result.    
The operationality of the current copyright system in the digital world means that 
private property no longer expresses the bond of personal dependence. Instead, it 
expresses the independence of a subject that now constitutes the bond. This makes 
for an important difference in the evolution of private property: private property in itself 
 
458 First, it is hard to keep track of heirs over many generations. This is a potential problem with real 
estate as well, but is solved by having a registry of land titles. A similar system could be instituted for 
copyrights. Second, books may go out of print  and older works in general may not be easily 
available. - W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 Journal of Legal 
Studies [1989] 325, 361-363. 
459 On the economic analysis of law generally, in the US – see A. M. Polinsky, An Introduction to law 
and Economics (1989) (and) Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed., 1998); Landes, W.M. 
and Posner, R.A., The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University Press, 
2003); In the UK – see A. Ogus and C. Veljanovski, Readings in The Economics of Law and 
Regulation (1984);   W. Landes and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of Copyright Law’ 18 Journal 
of Legal Studies [1989] 325. 
460 D. Warsh, Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations: A Story of Economic Discovery (New York, 
2007) in Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016),  pp.119-20.  
461 <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/12/streaming-revenues-bring-big-boost-to-global-
music-industry> accessed: 25/3/2018).  
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relates to rights, instead of the law relating it to intangibles.463 This resulted in the view 
that intellectual property needed to be more rigorously policed and laws changed so 
that the music industry could make more money out of their copyrights.469 This is done 
by creating opportunities for exchange470 in a capitalist economy where the law 
operates beneath the surface and profits and rents are deductions from the value 
produced by labour.471  
Primarily, this rests on the notion that intangibles generally have no monetary value 
until they are considered property. Thus, the law generally defines the taking of 
someone else’s property without permission as stealing to facilitate opportunities for 
exchange within the capitalist economic system.473  Thus, the evolution of copyright 
has been considered as a “second enclosure”474 movement. This is the idea of 
converting unregulated articles into private property that had perhaps been outside 
 
463 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.527 
469 For more information, see Hesmondhalgh, D., The Cultural Industries (3rd eds. SAGE Publications 
2013), chapters 5, 6, 9, 10; (Frith and Marshall argues that copyright is the vehicle that drives the 
music business, essentially the value of the copyright industry can be measured in copyright terms) 
– Frith, S. and Marshall, L., Music and Copyright (2nd edn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
2004) , chapter 6; Greenfield, S. and Osborn, G, Contract and Control in the Entertainment Industry 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth 1998); Greenfield, S. and Osborn, G, Spirits in the Material World. Musicians, 
Lawyers, and the Scope and legal enforceability of Music Contracts in E.M. Barendt and A. Firth 
(eds), The Yearbook of Copyright and Media Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 149-
61. The importance of copyright law in adding value to the music industry is also seen in the central 
role it has played in the restriction of peer-to-peer file-sharing - Carey, M. and Wall, D, ‘MP3: more 
beat to the byte’ International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 15 (1): 35-55.  
470 Weber, M., The Protestant ethic and Spirit of Capitalism (London: Unwin University Books, 1971 
11th impression) p.17.  
471 Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016),  p.148; See also, 
Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations   (Book IV, 1776); Berry, Paganelli, & Smith, The Oxford Handbook 
of Adam Smith (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
473 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.46; See also the discussion in this chapter at 3.2; See also, Posner R. Economic Analysis 
of Law (4th edn, 1992). 
474 Boyle, J., Public Domain (2008), at 42-53. 
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the property system altogether.476 This is because under the capitalist axiomatic, profit 
accumulation in the digital age has been unleashed from any external limitations.477 
This has created a cycle of manipulation and “retroactive need”478 that is unifying the 
copyright system ever more tightly in the digital world. In this system, digital works are 
now controlled479 in the name of profit480 where the value of works now means their 
“macro-economic”481 value. 
This is contended to be the result of what Boyle described as the “new vision for 
intellectual property, where property should be extended everywhere using digital 
barbed wire.”483 This is because the commodity form is a central element for the 
 
476 Boyle, J., Public Domain (2008), at 45.  
477 Nail, T., Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari and Zapatismo (Edinburgh University Press, 
2012), p.64.     
478 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002), p.95.    
479 For more information, see chapter 4.3; (In the UK) - see Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015]; (In the US) - see Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., 
Cal., Jan 20, 2015); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
480 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.4, 4.5, and 4.7 respectively; Case C- 476/17 Pelham 
GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018); 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG 
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016).   
481 See the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.7; (“More accurately, the law turned its attention away from 
the value of the labour embodied in the protected subject matter, to the value of the object 
itself...meaning that value now tend[s] to mean the macro-economic value of the property rather 
than, as had been the case previously, the quantity of the mental labour embodied in the property in 
question.”) - Bently, L. and Sherman, B., The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The 
British Experience, 1760-1911 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.174-195; See also, 
Bamgboye and Another v Reed and Others [2002] EWHC 2922 (QB) 2002 WL 31961976.  
483  Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.50; For more information on how 
otherwise legitimate defences like “fair-use” (In the UK it is known as “fair-dealing”) are not being 
relied upon for financial reasons, see chapter 2 at 2.3 and 2.3.1 respectively; Balganesh, S., 
‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 113, 2013; 
University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7. Available at 
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development of capitalist society484 where the central role of the state is to ensure that 
“the veins of commerce in every part will be replenished.”485 Thus, it is asserted that 
the items discussed within this chapter, are, in fact, a reactionary response to the 
effects produced by the capitalist ideology on society as a whole, with copyright and 
its associated parties a part of it. What is meant by this, is that, the commodification of 
digital assets, as well as the role of both property and the pirate, is argued to provide 
evidence which points to the fact that the elusive tentacles of capitalism have made 
their way into the copyright legal area.486 
In essence, individuals are postulated to be acting together in the development of a 
capitalist society without necessarily being aware, or knowing of the larger picture. 
This is argued to have created a form of regulation that becomes self-defining and it 
is this that can lead to law becoming the self-defining autopoietic prophecy discussed 
in the previous chapter.505 This is due to the fact that modern capitalist enterprise rests 
 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065; Accessed: 12/5/2015. See also: See Aufderheide, P. and 
Jaszi, P., Reclaiming fair use (University of Chicago Press, 2011); Gibson, J., ‘Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law’ 116 Yale Law Journal 882, 887-906 [2007]; 
Balganesh, S., ‘The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls’ 86 South California Law Review [2013].  
484 Marx, K., 1867 [1976], Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume One, (London, Penguin), 
Ch.7 – More specifically, the discussion concerned the notion that a discussion in which the 
quantitative value of the commodity is ‘exchange-value’, or the ‘labour-time socially necessary for its 
production’ at p.129.  
485 H. W. Brands, The Money Men: Capitalism, Democracy, and the Hundred Years’ of War over the 
American Dollar (Atlas Books, 2006), p.37. 
486 See the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2.1; See also, the discussion in this chapter at 3.4; Schiller, 
Schiller, D., Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000) at 203 and Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing 2015),  P.xx at n.11).  
505 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.4.2 and 2.5 respectively, and this chapter at 3.4; See 
also, Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]; 
See also, Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems in (Sociocybernetic Paradoxes 1986), 
pp.172-192; Teubner and Febbraio, State Law, and Economy as Autopoietic Systems [1992]; 
Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law [1985].  
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primarily on calculation and presupposes a legal and administrative system, whose 
functioning can be rationally predicted.506 
Therefore, all societal relations, including the legal system, are argued to be 
inadvertently geared towards the procurement and generation of capital. This is 
contended to be the result of individualistic subjections to the ideological aspects of 
capitalism. Copyright is postulated to be no different515 because law and economic 
forces are “crucially related.”516 This is due to the fact that as a system, capitalism 
arises as a worldwide enterprise of subjectification by constituting an axiomatic of 
decoded flows.517 This subjectification sees individuals in the culture system insist 
unwaveringly on the ideology by which they are enslaved and the industry bows to the 
vote it has itself rigged which is argued to be reinforced by the survival of the music 
market in the industry.518 The outcome of this is that the copyright system operates on 
the basis of maximising519 proprietary-based economic exploitation.520 Thus, 
 
506 Weber, M., Economy and Society (G. Roth and C. Witrich, eds, University of California Press, 
1978), p.1394.  
515 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  pp.19-20. 
516 Per A. Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law (1978), p.120 in M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd’s 
Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet and Maxwell, 9th edition 2014), p.706.   
517 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus (Bloomsbury Academic, 1988), p.532.  
518 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002), pp.106-108; Nicolaou, A., ‘How streaming saved the music 
industry’ The Financial Times: January 16 2017. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/cd99b95e-
d8ba-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e (Accessed: 10/05/2017).  
519 For example, in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films Inc. 410 F.3d 792 at 801 (6th Cir. 2005) per 
Guy J it was stated that users should “get a licence or do not sample”; Also, “two seconds” in 
duration of an unlicenced work can be potentially infringing, see Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, 
Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben [2018] at [14] and [25]; 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004); See also, the 
discussion in chapter 4 at 4.5, 4.6, respectively.   
520 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new copyright economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in copyright’, Intellectual Property Quarterly (2013); See also, Griffin, J., Copyright 
evolution - creation, regulation and the decline of substantively rational copyright law, I.P.Q. [2013], 
3, 234-252.   
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rightsholders are also “slaves”521  in this system who are contended to be acting in 
concert,522 to facilitate the development of capitalism523 in copyright.524 
Yet, it is argued that to truly be able to see what has happened in the development of 
the current copyright system, it is important to consider the relationship between the 
current streaming business model and the communication right in the UK, and the US 
public performance right. This is because these rights are contended to have been 







521 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983) p.292.  
522 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]. 
523 This idea has been discussed extensively - Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. 
Bernstein) Routledge Classics, (1991); Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of 
Enlightenment Verso Books, (1997).   
524 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41.  
531 Koo, J., ‘The Right of Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law’ Hart Publishing, (2019). 
532 For example, See also the discussion in chapter 4 generally. 
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3.5 How the current ‘streaming’552 business model was built on the 
communication right in the UK, and the US public performance right,553 
under capitalism554 
3.5.1 The UK approach 
Central to the digital licensing infrastructure of the ‘streaming’ model discussed in the 
next chapter555 is the communication right. This has played what is considered to be 
a fundamental role in the functioning of the music industry.556 As stated,557 the 
communication right,558 specifically under section 20(2)(b)559 enables material that is 
placed on the internet for download or stream by a recipient at a time chosen by 
themselves to be protected by copyright. This is because a ‘communication’ is an 
electronic transmission of a work, coming in the form of Internet ‘streaming’ as per the 
 
552 On ‘streaming’ see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 26-141. 
553 It is acknowledged that there is a public performance right in the UK, but the communication right 
is considered to be most applicable contextually for purposes here when comparing it with the US 
system as it is also more developed in terms of case law; The right to perform a work in public in the 
UK is known as the ‘performing right’ and is located at section 19 of the CDPA 1988; See also, M.F. 
Makeen, ‘Rationalising Performance “in public” under U.K. Copyright Law [2016] IPQ 117.    
554 The streaming model is discussed in chapter 4 generally; Streaming in both TV and Music 





555 See chapter 4 generally, and more specifically at 4.3.  
556 Nicolaou, A., ‘How streaming saved the music industry’ The Financial Times: January 16 2017. 
Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/cd99b95e-d8ba-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e> (Accessed: 
10/05/2017); See chapter 4 at 4.6.  
557 See this chapter at 3.1.  
558 CDPA 1988 s.20 – the right was introduced in this form to implement the Information Society 
Directive; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 3, itself implementing WCT, Art. 8; Rel. Rights. Dir., Art. 8(3), Recital 
16. 
559 CDPA 1988.  
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comments of Arnold J in FAPL v. British Communications [2017].560 If it is at a time 
chosen by the person making it available, then it will become a broadcast under 
s.20(2)(a).561 However, the latter is not going to be discussed as the primary concern 
here is those items which cover streaming as this is central to the music industry and 
the discussion in the next chapter.  
The extension562 of the communication right is argued to be part of a wider and 
seemingly unforeseen process procured by capitalism itself because the decoding and 
the deterritorialization of flows define the very process of capitalism.563 As such, the 
interpretation of the communication right has had a predominant focus on the copyright 
owners’ economic and proprietary perspectives.564 This is contended to be because  
copyright was charged with repressing whatever escapes the axiomatics and the 
applications of reterritorialization in other flows. This was in order to keep the flows 
from escaping the system, and maintaining the axiomatic framework of intellectual 
property in the digital age.565   
It is posited that capital and intangibles have become intertwined with the industrial 
essence of capitalism, meaning that rightsholders and the courts have become the 
servants of the capitalist machine. In this system, the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
state finds itself grounded in the economy itself.566 Consequently, Samuelson notes 
that no matter how economically trivial, acts will be deemed illegal unless they can be 
 
560 EWHC 480 (Ch), [33] (per Arnold J); For a detailed legal, historical, and, theoretical analysis, of the 
‘making available’ right, see Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of 
Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019).  
561 CDPA 1988.  
562 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp.12-50.  
563 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.365. 
564 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), chapter 5.  
565 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.365; See also, Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of 
Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp.18-28.   
566 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), pp.422-3.  
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“shoe-horned”567 into some other exception. This has meant that the evolution of the 
copyright system, in particular, is now expressing the two-fold nature of capitalism 
under the conditions of rights holders and capital,568 within what is argued in the next 
chapter as a ‘two-tier’ system of protection.569 
It is submitted that the copyright system has displaced the harshest forms of 
exploitation away from those with legal rights and pushed it outwards to those without 
legal rights. This displacement is argued to have tolerated opposition to it from 
doctrines like ‘freedom of expression’;570 ‘permitted acts’ (which are defined with 
extraordinary precision and rigidity);571 (including the Court of Justice of the European 
Union preference for a ‘narrow’ interpretation of any derogations from the general 
rules);572 and ‘fair use’ (which has become presumptively unfair as a result in the 
US).573  
This is contended to be because the legal apparatus of the copyright system in 
capitalist society is part of the economic mechanism of selection, which is the idea that 
the common determination of the executive powers serves to produce or let pass 
nothing which does not conform to the copyright industry’s way of doing things, to their 
 
567 Samuelson, P., ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright reform’ (2007) 3 Utah Law Review 551, 565.  
568 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.423. 
569 See the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.5.  
570 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.424; On the freedom of expression limitations imposed by copyright, see generally, 
Netanel, N.W.,  Copyright’s Paradox (2008) Oxford University Press, in particular chapter 6.  
571 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1998] FSR 43, 48 (Laddie J).  
572 See e.g., Painer, Case C-145/10 [2012] ECDR (6) 89 (ECJ), [109]; VCAST v RTI SpA, Case C-
265/16, EU:C:2017:913, [32]; Infopaq Int. v. Danske Dagblades Forening, Case C-5/08 [2009] ECR 
I-6569 (ECJ) (iInfopaq I), [57]; AKM v Zurs.net Betriebs GmbH, case C-138/16, EU:C:2017:218, 
[37]-[38] (ECJ).   
573 Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc. ibid., at 451; See also, Aufderheide, P. and 
Jaszi, P., Reclaiming fair use (University of Chicago Press, 2011), ch.1; Gibson, J., Risk Aversion 
and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale Law Journal (2007) at 888-906; On ‘fair 
use’ see, Aufderheide, P., Milosevic, T., and Bello, B., ‘The impact of copyright permissions on the 
US visual arts community: The consequences of fear of fair use’ SAGE Publications, [2015].  
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concept of the consumer, or, above all, to themselves.574 Consequently, copyright law 
had to exponentially develop to ensure a high level of protection575 to ensure that their 
sphere of mass society and the specific product is not subjected to a series of digital 
purges.576 Thus, the law was adapted via the respective laws on communication (in 
the UK), and, the right of public performance (in the US) accordingly.   
It is argued that there has also been a gradual erosion in the independence of the 
state in capitalist society pertaining to copyright law, where law often reflects the 
commercial interests of copyright industries.577 This is to the point where capitalist 
reflections of the individual spirit can be reflected contra legem upon the individual; a 
state that has come to govern that individual’s own aspiration, future and will.578 Due 
to this, Griffin notes that copyright law, because of the effect of capitalism upon the 
state, has gained an Oedipal standing over information regulation.579 This is argued to 
be enabled by virtue of the fact that those with the most economic power in the music 
industry are able to wield legal discourses with the facility and authority to pay others 
(lawyers, legislators) to act on their behalf and this is a large part of what it means to 
 
574 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002) p.96; See also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the 
Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  pp.103-54.  
575 SGAE v Rafael Hotels [2006] para 36; Stitching Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, Case 
C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456, [22] (ECJ) (high level); Case C-117/15 Reha Training Gesellschaft fur 
Sport-und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft fur musikaliche Auffurhungs-und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungrechte eV (GEMA), EU:C:2016:379, [36] (ECJ, Grand Chamber) (this was the 
subject of a broad interpretation); Verwertungsgesselenschaft Rundfunk GmbH v. Hettegger Hotel 
Edelweiss GmbH, Case C-641/15, EU:C:2016:795, [AG14] (Ag Spunzar) (a very ‘broad’ right, but 
less discussion in this case was given). 
576 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002) p.96. 
577 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28]; Kretschmer, ‘European Copyright Reform: is it possible?’ (7 May 2019), 
re:publica19, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyujNlpxu9k[Accessed 30 October 2019]; See also 
the discussion in this chapter at 3.5.1.4.  
578 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]. 
579 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus (New York: Viking Press, 1977) in Griffin, J., ‘A call for 
a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]). 
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possess power in society.580 As such, legal discourses therefore tend to reflect the 
interests and the perspectives of the powerful people who make most use of them581 
and copyright is contended to be no different.582 
3.5.1.1 The communication right 
In the UK, under section 20 CDPA 1988, a right to communicate a work to the public 
arises with respect to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound recordings, 
films, and broadcasts, in order to secure the successful implementation of the 
Information Society Directive.583 However, in EU jurisprudence, the European Court 
of Justice has aimed at securing a ‘high level of protection’ that has resulted in 
subsequently ‘broad’ interpretations of what constitutes a communication across 
Europe,584 and this has resulted in a wide range of activities falling under the 
concept.585  
This is primarily due to Recital 23 of the Information Society Directive, that states that 
the right of communication should be understood in the broad sense.586 Yet, some 
writers argue that the interpretation of the communication to the public right should be 
 
580 (e.g. Weber would describe this as evidencing the dispensability of legal coercion, which is actually 
dispensed only with the coercive legal power of the state) - Weber, M., Economy and Society 
(University of California Press Version, 1978), p.756. 
581 Gordon, R.W., Law and Theology from Tikkun (1988) Vol.13(1) from Tikkun (1988) Vol. 3 (No. 1). 
582 See the discussion in this chapter at 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 generally.   
583 Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 3, itself implementing WCT, Art. 8; Rel. Rights. Dir., Art. 8(3), Recital 16. 
584 Referring to info. Soc. Dir, Recitals 9, 10, 23: Reha Training Gesellschaft fur Sport-und 
Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft fur musikaliche Auffurhungs-und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungrechte eV (GEMA), Case C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379, [36] (ECJ, Grand Chamber) 
(this was the subject of a broad interpretation); Verwertungsgesselenschaft Rundfunk GmbH v. 
Hettegger Hotel Edelweiss GmbH, Case C-641/15, EU:C:2016:795, [AG14] (Ag Spunzar) (a very 
‘broad’ right, but less discussion in this case was given). 
585 C. Angelopoulos, European intermediary liability in Copyright: A Tort-Based Analysis (Information 
Law Series Volume 39 Kluwer Law Intnl [2016], at 54-64. See also, J. Groom, I. Silverman, and B. 
Clark, ‘Still Lost in the Labyrinth?’ [2017] EIPR 591; Koo, J., The Right of Communication to the 
Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 2019)at 117. 
586 This was reiterated in the case of SGAE v. Rafael Hotels SL, Case C-306/05 [2006] ECR I-11519, 
[36].  
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abandoned in lieu of a more clearly defined right that that is more ‘coherent’ and places 
less of ‘burden’ on the communication to the public right.587 
Nonetheless, currently, to be an act of ‘communication’ requires five specific elements: 
(1) an intervention to give access to or experience works or other subject matter. The 
case law of the CJEU has tended to identify ‘communication’ with ‘transmission’588 
which is also reiterated in Recital 23.589 Thus, communication to the public was also 
expressed to cover any means or process other than the distribution of physical copies 
in the memorandum accompanying the Commission Proposal for what became the 
Information Society Directive.590 Therefore, the user must intervene in a manner that 
gives access to a work that recipients would otherwise not enjoy, in order to be 
classified as a communication.591 This includes hyperlinking to material592 (potentially 
even where it is otherwise freely available) on the internet,593 but this is not necessarily 
 
587 Koo, J., The Right of Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 
2019)p.118.  
588 The Grand Chamber of the CJEU in FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 [2011] ECR I-
9083 [193], stated, amongst other things, that ‘the concept of communication must be constructed 
broadly, as referring to any transmission of the protected works, irrespective of the technical means 
or process used’. See also, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hotels SL, Case C- 306/05 [2006] ECR I-11519 [AG37]; ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp Case C-
607/11 [[2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ), [23].  
589 Recital 23 says that the right ‘should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to 
the public by wire or wireless means, including ‘broadcasting’, but should not cover any other acts. 
590 COM(97) 628 final 25; See also, P. B. Hugenholtz and S. C. van Velze, ‘Communication to a New 
Public? Three Reasons why EU Copyright Law Can Do Without a “New Public”’ (2016) 47 IIC 796, 
813.   
591 Case C- 162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) v Ireland, [2012] 2 CMLR (29) 859, [31] 
(ECJ).  
592 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ),- [24]. 
593 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), [18]-[20]; Mackie 
v Maxi Construction [2017] SC LIV 11.  
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the case,594 and it must be to a ‘new public’.595 Also, other factors which intervene in 
a manner that gives access to a work that recipients would otherwise not enjoy, also 
includes the selling of a multimedia device loaded with links to streaming services,596 
as well as creating platforms with indexes to facilitate unauthorised peer-to-peer file 
sharing.597  
(2) going beyond the mere provision of physical facilities. The person ‘communicating’ 
must provide more than a ‘mere facility’ to procure the communication. This limitation 
stems from Recital 27.598 It seems, somewhat paradoxically, that any act that involves 
the content being made accessible (as opposed to the mere technical infrastructure 
that can supply content) is sufficient to take an intervention beyond the ‘mere provision 
 
594 Article 3(1) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
must be interpreted as meaning that the provision on a website of clickable links to works freely 
available on another website does not constitute an ‘act of communication to the public’, as referred 
to in that provision (AND) article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as precluding a 
Member State from giving wider protection to copyright holders by laying down that the concept of 
communication to the public includes a wider range of activities than those referred to in that 
provision - Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at 
[42.(1),(2)].  
595 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [24]-[30] - 
None the less, according to settled case-law, in order to be covered by the concept of 
‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, a 
communication, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, concerning the same works as those 
covered by the initial communication and made, as in the case of the initial communication, on the 
Internet, and therefore by the same technical means, must also be directed at a new public, that is 
to say, at a public that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the 
initial communication to the public (see, by analogy, SGAE, paragraphs 40 and 42; order of 18 
March 2010 in Case C-136/09 Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai 
Optikoakoustikon Ergon, paragraph 38; and ITV Broadcasting and Others, paragraph 39) – at [24].  
596 Case C- 527/15 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems, EU:C:2017:300 (ECJ), [39]-[42].  
597 Case C- 610/15 Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, EU:C:2017:456 (ECJ), [35]; 
EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [45]-[46]; This may also 
procure accessorial liability, for more information see – Twentieth Century Fox Film v Newzbin 
[2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J); On considering how those operating websites help to facilitate 
the aforementioned, see Twentieth Century Fox v Sky UK [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch), [17]-[24]. 
598  Directive 2001/29/EC.  
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of facilities, as the cases of Ziggo,599 Wullems,600 and SGAE,601 have arguably 
demonstrated. 
(3) to a public that is not present at the place where the work or subject matter 
originate. Under this notion, ‘the public’ should not be present at the place of the 
communication, and so converting electronic signals and ‘streaming’ them is a 
communication (rather than a public performance). However, the CJEU does not 
define the place where the communication ‘originates’ as being the location, and 
instead, it is deemed to be the location to which the broadcast was issued.602  
(4) when it would not otherwise have had such access. This is based on the idea that 
the action of the user must be ‘indispensable’ to enable the public to access the 
work,603 in that the public would have been ‘unable’ to see or hear the work.604 
Significantly, for purposes here, in Ziggo605 the Court found that The Pirate Bay 
communicated works made accessible by its users to the public. Significantly, it did 
not require that the intervention render ‘possible’ access to the work that is otherwise 
‘impossible’, but simply that the intervention makes access to the work ‘less difficult’.606  
 
599 C- 610/15 Ziggo BV, Case, EU:C:2017:456, at [38] (ECJ) - The Pirate Bay could not claim to have 
been engaged in ‘mere provision’ because the various acts of indexing and classifying of the torrent 
files made them readily accessible to users.  
600 Case C- 527/15 Stichting Brein v Wullems, EU:C:2017:300 (ECJ) – (pre-instillation of structured 
menu of hyperlinks onto a multimedia player which enabled users to have direct access to 
‘unauthorized’ was deemed to go beyond ‘mere provision’ of physical facilities.  
601 Case C- 306/05 SGAE, [2006] ECR I-11519 EU:C:2006:764, [45] (ECJ) – The distribution signals 
collected from an antenna to such televisions is enough to constitute communication; Warner Music 
UK Ltd v Tunein Inc [2019] EWHC 2923 (Ch), 2019 WL 05684849.  
602 (e.g. ‘the place where the communication originates...is...the place where the original performance 
or representation was recorded on the phonograms') – (AG Trstenjak). Societa Consortile 
Fonografici (SCF) v. Marco Del Corso, Case C-135/10, EU:C:2011:431, [AG125].   
603 Ziggo BV, Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456, [26] (ECJ); SCF, Case C-135/10, EU:C:2012:140, [82] 
(ECJ).   
604 Case C-117/15 Reha Training, EU:C:2016:379, [46] (‘otherwise would not be able to enjoy’); 
Football Association Premier League, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083, 
[195] (‘Without his intervention the customers cannot enjoy the works broadcast’). 
605 Case C-610/15 Ziggo BV, EU:C:2017:456.   
606 Case C-160/15 GS Media NV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al., EU:C:2016:644 (ECJ); C-
610/15 Ziggo BV, EU:C:2017:456, [26]-[36], (ECJ) (‘less efficient’) (AG Szpunar).  
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(5) which is a deliberate act, carried out by a person with full knowledge of ‘the 
consequences’. For the act to constitute a communication, there must be a 
requirement of deliberateness or intentionality pertaining to the understanding of the 
consequences of their acts.607 This is similar to the UK stance in assessing ‘secondary 
infringements’ (as discussed in chapter 5).608 However, this requirement was 
expressly highlighted in SGAE v Rafael Hotels609 whereby the court referred to the 
fact that the defendant hotel proprietor communicated signals that it received and 
relayed to hotel rooms ‘to the public’.610 This was because it was ruled that it is the 
organisation which intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to 
give access to the protected work to its customers.611 
3.5.1.2 To the public 
The Court of Justice has treated the definition of the public as a matter of European 
Union law and has attempted to define the terminological and conceptual boundaries 
of what ‘the public’ actually entails.612 The criteria for assessment comes from the 
 
607 Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456, [34], (ECJ) 
(‘full knowledge of the relevant facts’). Illegality is discussed later on by the court at [46] but this 
would appears to be a somewhat distinct requirement.  
608 For more information, see chapter 5 at 7.7.3.3(a)(i); ‘Mere suspicion’ is not enough to constitute 
sufficient belief under UK law for secondary liability - Pensher Security Doors v Sunderland City 
Council [2000] RPC 249; See also, CDPA 1988 s.22. (The entirety of secondary infringement in 
relation to the specific acts is contained in ss.23-26, as well as ss296-299 which deals with unlawful 
decryption of decrypted signals and subverting copyright-protection measures); Secondary liability 
differs by Member State – See C Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright: A 
Tort-Based Analysis (Kluwer Law International BV, 2017).    
609 Case C-306-05Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  
[2006] ECR I-11519.   
610 J. Koo, ‘Walking Forward with Backward facing Feet: The CJEU Decision in Reha Training and the 
Development of the Communication to the Public Right’ [2016] 11 JIPLP 732.  
611 Case C-306-05Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  
[2006] ECR I-11519, [42] (emphasis added). 
612 SGAE, Case C- 306/05 [2006] ECR I-11519.  
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Information Society Directive613 and the Related Rights Directive.614 Yet, the 
developmental aspects of the jurisprudence of the CJEU led to the creation of two 
similar, but somewhat distinct categories of criteria when assessing whether a 
communication has been to ‘the public’. 
These relate primarily to the notions of ‘public’ and whether it is a ‘new public’; with 
the CJEU referring to three inter-related criteria for the assessment thereof, namely: 
(i) the size of the group which normally needs to be fairly large615 to comprise the 
public;616 (ii) the character of the group which is interpreted broadly so as to cover an 
‘indeterminate number of potential listeners or viewers’;617 (iii) the character of the 
communication must be that the relevant communication is made with a view to 
making profit, and whether customers were targeted deliberately or by chance.618  
 For example, in applying the criteria, the CJEU has held that communicating films and 
sound recordings to hotel patrons (notwithstanding the fact that it was in the privacy 
 
613 Directive 2001/29/EC.  
614 Case C-117/15 Reha Training Gesellschaft fur Sport-und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft 
fur musikaliche Auffurhungs-und mechanische Vervielfaltigungrechte eV (GEMA), EU:C:2016:379, 
[31]-[34].  
615 ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catchup Ltd (C-607/11) EU:C:2013:147 – at [32]; Societa Consortile 
Fonografici (SCF) v Del Corso (C-135/10) EU:C:2012:140 at [84]; Sociedad General de Autores y 
Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (C-306/05) [2007] E.C.D.R. 2 at [37]-[38]; 
Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland (C-162/10) EU:C:2012:141 at [33].   
616 Warner Music UK Ltd v Tunein Inc [2019] EWHC 2923 (Ch), 2019 WL 05684849 – [48]; VCAST v 
RTI SpA, Case C-265/16, EU:C:2017:913, [47] (ECJ); Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (C-306/05) [2007] E.C.D.R. 2 at [36], [54]; Football Association 
Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [186]; ITV Broadcasting 
Ltd v TV Catchup Ltd (C-607/11) [2013] E.C.D.R. 9 at [20].  
617 For example, in ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 [2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ), [33]-
[36], the Court indicated that a large number of individual transmissions to individuals could be to an 
indeterminate number and therefore was to a public); Foong, C., The Making Available Right, 
Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019), pp.115-6. 
618 Societa Consortile Fonografica v Marco Del Corso, Case C-135/10 [2012] ECDR (16) 276, [88], 
[90]-[91]. The ‘profit-making’ quality of a transmission is relevant, but not an essential requirement 
when assessing whether it is ‘to the public’: in ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 
[2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ), [42]. 
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of their own rooms),619 and individual subscribers to a recording system,620 was a 
communication. However, a dentist surgery playing sound recording broadcasts does 
not621 (but this was considered to turn on its own facts according to Advocate-General 
Bot).622    
Regarding the concept of a ‘new public’, this was primarily put in place to deal with 
instances where a work is retransmitted in a manner that would otherwise not have 
been within the authors contemplation when the work was communicated with the right 
holder’s consent. Thus, in instances where there has already been a communication, 
retransmission, or initial communication, if it falls in accordance with the 
aforementioned factors, then there will be a communication to a ‘new public’. However, 
this has been subjected to much discussion623 and has been labelled as ‘unnecessarily 
complex’. This has indicated that the ‘extremely broad’ scope624 of communication 
right is ‘unworkable and counterproductive’625 especially in light of the Svensson626 
and Sanoma627 decisions.628   
 
619 Case C-306-05Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  
[2006] ECR I-11519.   
620 VCAST v RTI SpA, Case C-265/16, EU:C:2017:913, [47] (ECJ).  
621 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland and another (Court of Justice of the European 
union, Case C-162/10, 15 March 2012) [31]; Societa Consortile, Case C-135/10 [2012] ECDR (16) 
276 (ECJ).  
622 Reha Training, Case C-117/15, EU:C:2016:109, [AG55] (AG Bot).  
623 P. B. Hugenholtz and S. C. van Velze, ‘Communication to a New Public? Three reasons Why EU 
Copyright Law Can Do Without a “New Public”’ (2016) 47 IIC 797; See also, Koo, J., The Right of 
Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 2019)Part III; J. Koo, ‘Walking 
Forward with Backward facing Feet: The CJEU Decision in Reha Training and the Development of 
the Communication to the Public Right’ [2016] 11 JIPLP 732.  
624 Case C-610/15 Stitching Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, EU:C:2017:456; Stichting 
Brein v Wullems, Case C- 527/15, EU:C:2017:300 (ECJ). 
625 Karapapa, S., ‘The Requirement for a “New Public” in EU Copyright Law’ [2017] ELR 63.  
626 Case C-466/12 Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ; This case is also 
discussed in this chapter at 3.5 and 3.6.   
627 Case C-160/15 GS Media NV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al., EU:C:2016:644 (ECJ). 
628 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), at 131-43.  
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The concept of a ‘new public’ was first deployed in SGAE629 where it was ruled that 
the rationale for the defendants obtaining the licence to broadcast was used in a way 
that was otherwise to considered to be outside the contemplation of the right holder at 
the inception of the agreement. By implication, the retransmission of the work to 
separate hotel rooms was considered an ‘additional service’ supplied by the hotel and 
was ‘profit-making’ by nature.630 This is because capitalism ‘decodes’ and 
‘deterritorializes’ everything by means of capital, and it is suggested that the  
retransmission of the work to separate rooms was an example of the communication 
potentially escaping’ the rightsholder.  
However, such activity in the capitalist system is violently ‘reterritorialized’ by means 
of ancillary apparatuses like the courts and the legal system. Thus, the court’s 
interpretation in SGAE631 is regarded as being for the purpose of ensuring that surplus 
value can be extracted from the new reterritorialized territory as it was the first case to 
deploy the ‘new public’ idea and has been described as a confusing concept.632 This 
meant that the case was essential for instances where a communication had already 
occurred, but where there was also a subsequent retransmission of that initial 
communication.633 Moreover, the retransmission was considered to be an additional 
 
629 Case C-306-05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  
[2006] ECR I-11519.   
630 Case C-306-05   Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  
[2006] ECR I-11519 at [41], [44]; This can be compared to the US approach of ‘market harm’ which 
replaced the “for profit” criterion under the 1976 Copyright Act – HR Rep No 94-1476 (1976) (House 
Report on the Final Bill for the US Copyright Act 1976) 62-63; See Herbert v Stanley; John Church 
Company v Hilliard Hotel Company 242 US 591 (1917); This is discussed below at 3.5.2.1.; By 
similar comparison, see the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.4.2; See also, Case C- 419/13 Art & 
Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the 
Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v 
Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London; For an opposite conclusion to the 
CJEU, the Canadian Supreme Court suggested that in similar circumstances there was no 
reproduction of a work under copyright law when an image is transferred to an alternative medium, 
see – Galerie a’Art du Petit Champlain Inc v Theberge [2002] SC 34 (Supreme Court, Canada).  
631 Case C-306/05 [2006] ECR I-11519.  
632 G. B. Dinwoodie, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers’, in 
Dinwoodie (ed.) Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers (2017), 14.  
633 SGAE Case C-306/05 [2006] ECR I-11519 at [40]-[44].  
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service offered by the defendants, making it profit-making.634 However, although this 
is relevant, the profit-making quality of the transmission is not essential to whether the 
transmission is ‘to the public’.635 The end result of this was that such activity, despite 
being initially ‘licenced’ was a communication to the public and this decision has been 
confirmed in numerous cases.636  
In ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp637 it was ruled that each transmission or 
retransmission of a work which uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be 
individually authorised by the author of the work in question.638 This also includes 
situations where there is a different technical means to that in which the initial 
communication was procured.639 By implication, this means that it does not matter if 
the public was the public targeted by the initial communication. This is because there 
is a new communication by using ‘new technical means’.640 Yet, it is important to note 
that this was ignored in a 2017 case.641 However, in Svensson v Retriever Sverige642 
the Court ruled that communications by the same technical means, using hyperlinks, 
in order to be infringing, must be directed at a new public. Essentially, this means a 
 
634 SGAE Case C-306/05 [2006] ECR I-11519 at [44]. 
635 Case C-135/10Societa Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v. Marco Del Corso, [2012] ECDR (16) 276, 
[88], [90]-[91]; The ‘profit-making’ quality of a transmission is relevant, but not essential to whether is 
it ‘to the public’: ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 [2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ), [42].  
636 FAPL, Joined Cases, C-403/08 and C-429/09 [2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, Grand Chamber), [197], 
[198]; ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 [2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ), [39]; Reha 
Training, Case C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379, [45].    
637 ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 [2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ).  
638 ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 [2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ) at [24]; This point has 
also been reiterated in Wullems, Case C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300, [33]; Ziggo BV, Case C-610/15, 
EU:C:2017:456, [28] (ECJ).  
639  Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), at 4.3.2.3.  
640 ITV Broadcasting v TV CatchUp, Case C-607/11 [2013] 3 CMLR (1) 1 (ECJ), at [39]. 
641 See AKM v Zurs.net Betriebs GmbH, Case C-138/16, EU:C:2017:218 (ECJ) – This case that 
seems to represent a contrasting viewpoint, but is nonetheless considered to be likely ruled as 
confined to its facts and/or overruled by legislative intervention, 
642 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ). 
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public that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised 
the initial communication to the public.643  
Interestingly, albeit in a different context,644 a similar line of reasoning was given in the 
Allposters case.645  Here, an alteration of the copy of the protected work, which 
provided a result closer to the original, was considered to be sufficient to constitute a 
new reproduction of that work.646 This was held to be within the meaning of Article 2(a) 
of Directive 2001/29, which is covered by the exclusive right of the author and requires 
his permission.647 It is suggested again, that the proposed reforms could help to 
alleviate some of the associated issues here due to the increased compliance with 
copyright that could be induced by reduction in prices proposed.648 
 
643 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [24] (see, by 
analogy, SGAE, paragraphs 40 and 42; order of 18 March 2010 in Case C-136/09 Organismos 
Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon, paragraph 38; and ITV 
Broadcasting and Others, paragraph 39).  
644 This is discussed in chapter 4 at 4.4.2.  
645 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015].  
646 S.17 CDPA 1988; VG Wort v. KYOCERA Document Solutions Deutschland GmbH, Joined Cases 
C-457/11, C-458/11, C-459/11, and 460/11, EU:C:2013:34, [AG33] (AG Sharpston, referring to 
reproduction as the ‘fundamental’ right); cf. J. Litman, Digital Copyright (2001), 180 ff (proposing 
instead a general right to control commercial exploitation); See also, chapter 4 at 4.3.1, 4.7 and 
4.7.1 respectively.  
647 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [43]-[49]; 
Download from peer-to-peer systems -  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting 
Pictoright [2015] [43]-[46]; Often the most passive/incidental acts are caught by the reproduction 
right, such as upload onto a USB – Technische Universitat Darnstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG, Case C-
117/13, EU:C:2014:2196, [52] (ECJ); when infringers access an internet stream – FAPL v. British 
Communications [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) [31] (Arnold J);  this also includes the image created on a 
television screen being regarded as a copy for the purposes of what constitutes a reproduction here 
– FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083, [159]; Football Association 
Premier League Limited and ors v. QC Leisure and ors and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection 
Services Ltd {‘FAPL’), Joined Cases  C-403/08 and C429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, Grand 
Chamber) at [198]; ITV Broadcasting Ltd v. TV Catchup Ltd [2011] EWHC 1874 (Pat).    
648 For more information, see the discussion in this chapter at 3.2; See also, chapter 5 at 5.5; Devos, 
K., Tax Compliance Theory and the Literature (Springer Publishing 2014).  
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3.5.1.3 Who makes a communication? 
In most situations, it will be relatively clear who is responsible for making a 
communication. This is usually the person who uploads or streams the material. 
However, in instances where video-sharing platforms (like YouTube) provide the 
means to which their users can upload works onto their sites, can it be said that they 
are ‘communicating’ that material?  
Traditionally, UK law has distinguished between primary liability and accessory 
liability, and for an accessory to be liable, they must have procured or induced an act, 
or it must have been the result of their common design.649 The legal theory, referred 
to as inducing infringement’ (discussed in chapter 5),650 has been used to find similar 
defendants liable in subsequent litigation, notably in the 2010 US District Court 
decision involving the file-sharing service LimeWire.651 
For example, in Twentieth Century Fox v Sky UK,652 a distinction was drawn by Birss 
J between communication to the public and accessory liability when assessing the 
operationality of a website653 called ‘Popcorn Time’.654 This site was fundamental to 
an arrangement that enabled peer-to-peer users to view unauthorised streams of 
movies. In the case, Birss J found that ‘Popcorn Time’ did not communicate the films 
to the public, and instead, it was considered to provide a mechanism that would enable 
access to the streams. Rather, taking into account the perspective of the users, it was 
the application (on their computers) that was considered to be the origin of the 
 
649 The same act could be both an act of primary liability and give rise to accessory liability for the acts 
of others by way of ‘inducement’: Twentieth Century Fox Film v Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) 
(Kitchin J). 
650 See the discussion in chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(a)(ii). 
651 See Arista Records LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 (KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) 
in Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 26-136.  
652 [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch).  
653 Football Association Premier League Limited and ors v. QC Leisure and ors and Karen Murphy v. 
Media Protection Services Ltd {‘FAPL’), Joined Cases  C-403/08 and C429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083 
(ECJ, Grand Chamber) at [194].  
654 For an illustrative analysis of the technical functionality of how ‘Popcorn Time’ operates, see 
Twentieth Century Fox v Sky UK  [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch) at [17]-[24]. 
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communication.655 Instead, the court did however, find that the providers of the 
‘Popcorn Time’ were liable as accessories, jointly with the operators of the host 
websites. This is primarily due to the technical functionality of the application which 
served to procure the users access to the host website and thereby to make the 
unauthorized communication.656  
Dinwoodie notes that the CJEU however has abstained from defining the question of 
responsibility, and has instead chose to widen the conceptual aspects of 
‘communication’ as opposed to addressing questions of responsibility.657 The 
implications of this were outlined by the CJEU in the case of Stichting Brein v Ziggo 
BV,658 where it was acknowledged that many people may be involved in very different 
ways in a communication, and the Court found that operators of a website also 
communicated the works to the public. This was based on the notion that the acts of 
indexing, categorizing, and deleting unusable file, procured a situation where access 
to the platform by users was less difficult. Thus, it is submitted that although this ruling 
could strengthen a right holder’s armoury against the perpetuation of illegally streamed 
content, it can also be aid to act as a potential limitation on those caught in the wider 
net of liability. Nonetheless, the ruling means that rights owners also now have a 
potential claim of infringement against viewers, but this could also assist to limit the 
market for devices that assist with illegal streaming.659  
Therefore, it is hypothesised that this broad definition has ensured that multiple 
individuals or entities within the infringement chain, could now be separately and 
distinctly, deemed as legally responsible for unauthorised communicative acts. This 
approach has been adopted by the High Court of England and Wales, in both the case 
of Twentieth Century Fox Film v Newzbin,660 (with similar orders being made against 
 
655 Twentieth Century Fox v Sky UK  [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch) at [40]-[42]. 
656 Twentieth Century Fox v Sky UK  [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch) at [55].  
657 G. B. Dinwoodie, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers’, in 
Dinwoodie (ed.),  Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers (2017).  
658 Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456 (ECJ, Second Chamber).  
659 <https://www.mondaq.com/uk/copyright/613162/online-copyright-communication-to-the-public-
right-is-being-redefined> (Accessed: 21/04/2018).  
660 [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J).  
 219 
ISPs in relation to Newzbin).661 This also includes multiple cases concerning the matter 
of blocking injunctions662 for issues concerning streaming sites,663 other BitTorrent 
 
661 As explained in Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch); 
[2012] E.C.D.R. 14 at [3] and [4]. 
662 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch); [2012] E.C.D.R. 
14 citing Twentieth Century Fox Corp v Newzbin [2010] E.C.D.R. 8; [2010] E.M.L.R. 17 para.89. (“In 
a case which involves an allegation of authorisation by supply, these circumstances may include the 
nature of the relationship between the alleged authoriser and the primary infringer, whether the 
equipment or other material supplied constitutes the means used to infringe, whether it is inevitable 
it will be used to infringe, the degree of control which the supplier retains and whether he has taken 
any steps to prevent infringement.”) Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd 
[2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch); Scarlet Exteneded SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et 
editeurs SCRL (SABAM) (C-70/10 [2012] E.C.D.R. 4; Paramount Home Entertainment International 
v British Sky Broadcasting [2013] EWHC 3479 )Ch) (Arnold J) (‘SolarMovie’) at [12] (setting out 
features for a ‘communication to the public’); Football Association Premier League v BSB [2013] 
EWHC 2058 (Ch), [2013] ECDR (14) 377, [39]-[42] (aggregating streams, indexing them and 
offering a simple link for users to gain access was considered to be ‘responsible for the 
communication’); Such site-blocking injunctions must, however, be specific: the CJEU has 
suggested that, while injunctions could be granted against ISP’s whose services are being used by 
a third party for infringement, these injunctions may not go so far as to the extent that they otherwise 
require the service provider (as a preventative measure) to install a filtering system for monitoring 
the traffic of all customers indiscriminately to identify and block infringing files; 
On blocking injunctions see K. O’Sullivan “Enforcing Copyright Online: Internet Service Provider 
Obligations and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights” [2014] E.I.P.R. pp.577–583; See 
also, FAPL v British Communications [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) (Arnold J); EMI Records v British Sky 
Broadcasting [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [2013] ECDR (8) 224 (‘The Pirate Bay’), [46] (communication 
involves both operators of website and users); See also R. Arnold ‘Website-blocking Injunctions: 
The Question of Legislative Basis’ [2015] E.I.P.R. at 623–630, which contains an extensive account 
of the corpus of current case law and assesses the impact of art.10(2) of the European Convention 
of Human Rights and the ECHR cases of  Delfi v Estonia (App. No.64569/09, 16 June 2015) and 
Yildirim v Turkey (App. No.3111/10, 18 December 2012). Moreover, on September 24, 2015 the 
European Commission also began a consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy. The consultation contains 
questions pertaining to whether online intermediaries should (or should not) be subject to a duty of 
care in relation to illegal content: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-
regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud> [Accessed 9 January 
2017]; See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James 
on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 21-253, 26-137.  
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sites,664 and other associated websites,665 including websites selling counterfeit 
goods,666 which have proved successful in some regard.667      
3.5.1.4 Will the passage of Article 17 of the European Union Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market affect the current situation?  
 
The passing of the European Union Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
(hereinafter ECDM),668 can be traced back to the Public Consultation on the Review 
 
663 The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 2058 
(Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 and Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch); [2014] E.C.D.R. 7; For the facts, see paras 21-60 above. 
In each case, the users and operators used the ISPs’ services to infringe: see at [51] and [39] 
respectively. 
664 EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch); [2013] E.C.D.R. 8 and 
1967 Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 4444 (Ch); [2015] E.M.L.R. 8.See para.21-
59 above. In each case, both users and operators had used the ISPs’ services to commit infringing 
acts: for more information see at [88] and [24] respectively. 
665 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v SKY UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch). The operators of 
the target websites used the ISPs’ services to infringe: [59]. For more information, see Davies, G., 
Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) current ed. at para.21-61.  
666 Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 658; See also, Cartier 
International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch); [2015] E.M.L.R. 10 at 
[155]. This decision was upheld on appeal: Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd 
[2016] EWCA Civ 658; [2017] R.P.C. 3; [2016] E.M.L.R. 23 (for the decision of the Supreme Court 
on the incidence of costs see Cartier International AG v British Telecommunications Plc [2018] 
UKSC 28; Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) current ed. at para.21-259A). 
667 Empirical research conducted by Danaher, Smith and Telang suggested that the blocking of 53 
major piracy websites in November 2014 had a significant impact on UK access to blocked 
websites. UK users visiting blocked websites reduced 90 per cent with no increase to unblocked 
websites – Taken from: Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the communication 
to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577. 
668 COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD); For an earlier overview of the directive, see Shapiro, T., 
and Hansson., "The DSM Copyright Directive — EU copyright will indeed never be the same" (2019) 
41 E.I.P.R. 404; For a critical review of the legislation, see Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the 
Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41; For more information on 
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of EU Copyright Rules, held between December 2013 and March 2014,669 amongst 
other things.670 This included a leaked Commission “white paper” in June 2014,671 and 
a more recent Communication “Towards a modern, more European copyright 
framework” in December 2015 which explicitly stated the intention to regulate content-
sharing platforms.672 Also, in September 2016, the Commission released yet another 
Communication entitled “Promoting a fair, efficient and competitive European 
copyright-based economy in the Digital Single Market.”673 The legislation was 
eventually approved by the Council on 15/17 April by a qualified majority,674 despite 
 
the Directive and the events leading up to its passage and possible implications, see Davies, G., 
Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), Part VII, chapter 24, Part 5, Section D.  
669 Commission, "Public Consultation on the Review of EU Copyright Rules" (2013) (on file with the 
author). 
670 The consultation covered a broad range of issues on the application of EU copyright rules in the 
digital environment, including territoriality, the definition of online rights and exceptions, fair 
remuneration, and even the possibility of single EU copyright title. The consultation produced 
thousands of responses, summarised by the Commission in a report published in July 2014 - 
Commission, "Report on the responses to the Public Consultation on the Review of the EU 
Copyright Rules", Directorate General Internal Market and Services, Directorate D — Intellectual 
property, D1 — Copyright (July 2014) (on file with the author) in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in 
the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41. 
671 Commission, White Paper, "A Copyright Policy for Creativity and Innovation the European Union" 
(2014), https://www.dropbox.com/s/0xcflgrav01tqlb/White%20Paper%20%28internal%20draft%29%
20%281%29.PDF[Accessed 29 October 2019] – in Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital 
Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41. 
672 Commission, "Towards a modern, more European copyright framework", COM(2015) 626 final (9 
December (2015), p.10. Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a 
critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41. 
673 COM/2016/0592 final. 
674 Commission, "Copyright reform clears final hurdle: Commission welcomes approval of modernised 
rules fit for digital age" (15 April 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-
2151_en.htm [Accessed 30 October 2019]. 
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hard opposition.675 It marks the end of a controversial legislative process at EU level 
but the potential beginning of a contentious process of national implementation.676 
Specifically, it requires social media platforms like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to 
take more responsibility for copyrighted material being shared illegally on their 
platforms, and this may have further implications for this area.677 This requirement has 
led to it being called an industrial policy tool, shaped more by effective lobbying than 
evidence and expertise678 and has become a tool for industrial policy, focused on 
protecting the interests of incumbent right holders.679  
 
675 (e.g. Multiple expert statements by trusted research institutes and academics - Create, "The 
Copyright Directive: Articles 11 and 13 must go — Statement from European Academics in advance 
of the Plenary Vote on 26 March 2019" (24 March 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yxmudrdg[Accessed 30 
October 2019]. (Disclosure: I have signed and co-ordinated a number of these statements); The 
resistance included civil society protests - Julia Reda, ‘EU copyright reform: Our fight was not in 
vain’ (18 April 2019), https://juliareda.eu/2019/04/not-in-vain/> [Accessed 30 October 2019]; digital 
rights NGOs - Liberties, "Article 13 Open letter — Monitoring and Filtering of Internet Content is 
Unacceptable" (16 October 2017), https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/delete-article-thirteen-open-
letter/13194 [Accessed 30 October 2019]; Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single 
Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41. 
676 The passage of the ECDM has already seen a Member State file an action for annulment under 
art.263 TFEU in relation to Article 17 - The Polish Government has filed an action for annulment 
under art.263 TFEU, focusing on the most problematic aspects of art.17, discussed below. 
See Poland v Parliament and Council (C-401/19) (Action brought on 24 May 2019). See 
also Tomasz Targosz, "Poland’s Challenge to the DSM Directive — and the Battle Rages On …" 
(10 June 2019), Kluwer Copyright Blog, http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/06/10/polands-
challenge-to-the-dsm-directive-and-the-battle-rages-on/ [Accessed 29 October 2019] - Quintais, 
J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 
28-41. 
677 C. Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright (Wolters Kluwer, 2017); J. Riordan, 
The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford, 2016); G. B. Dinwoodie (ed.), Secondary liability of 
Online Service Providers (2017).  
678 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28].  
679 Kretschmer, ‘European Copyright Reform: is it possible?’ (7 May 2019), 
re:publica19, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyujNlpxu9k[Accessed 30 October 2019] - 
Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [40].  
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This is argued to be because high international intellectual property standards meant 
that “private property rights in creative expression and innovation have been strongly 
institutionalised in an international regime that is one-sidedly driven by the economic 
interests of corporate players.”680 This is due to the fact that capitalism is an indirect 
system of governance based on a complex and continually evolving political bargain. 
Thus, private actors are empowered by a political authority to own and control the use 
of property for private gain subject to a set of laws and regulations.681 Consequently, 
despite opposition, Quintais asserts that lobbying by right holders’ representatives—
especially the recording industry and (music) collecting societies—appears to have 
been the most intense and effective, often outweighing empirical research in support 
of opposite views leading up to the passage of ECDM.682 
For purposes here, however, there is now a requirement, under Article 17, for 
information society service providers that store and provide access to large amounts 
of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users, Namely, this is that they 
shall, in cooperation with rightsholders, prevent the availability of such works or other 
subject-matter identified by rightsholders through the cooperation with the service 
providers.683 This particular provision comes from, Article 17(1),684 which critics claim 
will have a detrimental impact on creators online,685 with YouTube, and YouTubers, 
 
680 Frankel, S. and Gervais, D., The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.252; Also, there was an emphasis on the money invested in 
Baigent v Random House Group Ltd [2006] F.S.R. 893 Ch D at 904-918.   
681 Scott. B.R., The political economy of capitalism (Harvard Business School, 2006). 
682 See Corporate Europe Observatory, "Copyright Directive: how competing big business lobbies 
drowned out critical voices" (10 December 2018), https://corporateeurope.org/en/2018/12/copyright-
directive-how-competing-big-business-lobbies-drowned-out-critical-voices; [Accessed 14 October 
2019] On this topic, see also Kretschmer, M., "European copyright reform: Is it possible?" (7 May 
2019), re:publica19, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyujNlpxu9k[Accessed 30 October 2019]; 
and Benjamin Farrand, "Towards a modern, more European copyright framework", or, how to 
rebrand the same old approach? (2019) 41 E.I.P.R. 6. - Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the 
Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. [2020], 42(1), 28-41. 
683 Article 17(1), COM/2016/0593 final - 2016/0280 (COD). 




being the most vocal opponents.686 More specifically, Article 17, requires online 
platforms to filter or remove copyrighted material from their websites via the utilization 
of content recognition technologies. 
Specifically, two obligations are identified upon ‘hosts’, that is ‘information society 
service providers that store and provide access to large amounts of works or other 
subject-matter uploaded by their users.’ This is argued to be problematic not just 
because it is difficult to filter out infringing material only, but also, it is near impossible 
to objectively ascertain whether a use has, in fact, been infringing as permitted uses 
may be caught.687 This is postulated to be because the more that information 
regulation, such as copyright, becomes broader in terms of its own subject-matter, and 
in terms of its fluidity, then the more likely such regulation will come to cover more 
aspects of societal interactions to a deeper level.688  
Significantly, Article 17 is aimed at tackling the so-called value gap, that is, the alleged 








law.html&usg=AOvVaw36tIEoIoMIC0dedcPx04Rm> (Accessed: 26/03/2019).  
686 <https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18283800/youtube-copyright-directive-article-13-memes-
grandayy-philip-defranco-european-union> (Accessed: 21/04/2019).  
687 For example, such as parodies and quotations. Moreover, the problems may be greater in some 
fields, such as photography, than others, such as perhaps recorded sounds. It is still nonetheless 
unclear as to what the true extent may be as case law will develop such items in due course.  
688 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly; See also, M. Csikzentmihalyi, 
Creativity: Flow and psychology of discovery and invention (Harper Collins Publishers, 1996) pp.77-
83; R. Weisberg, Creativity: Beyond the Myth of Genius (1993); R.S. Albert and M.A. Runco, A 
History of Research on Creativity in R.J. Sternberg, Handbook of Creativity (1999).  
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content and the revenue returned to the copyright holders.689 Recital 62690 of the 
ECDM specifically mentions “piracy” in ambiguous language when defining online 
content-sharing service providers. They are defined as platforms with a profit-making 
purpose that store and give the public access to a large amount of works/subject-
matter uploaded by their users, which they organise and promote.691  
As a result, it is postulated that, in accordance with the above points,692 that the 
proposals693 can also help to counteract the workings of art.17 by creating the 
possibility of producing cheaper works.694 In turn, this could indirectly limit 
unauthorised sharing or usage on online platforms as access to works would be 
cheaper overall.695 By implication, this could also mean that there is less emphasis 
placed on content recognition technologies to limit, filter, or, remove works, whereby 
more focus could be directed towards creating new avenues of compliance, especially 
since enforcement costs are reduced under the proposed system.696 This is because 
 
689 Angelopoulos and Quintais, ‘Fixing Copyright Reform’ [2019] 10 J.I.P.I.T.E.C. 222. See also 
Annemarie Bridy, ‘EU Copyright Reform: Grappling With the Google Effect’ [2019] Vanderbilt J. 
Entertainment & Tech. L. SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3412249 [Accessed 30 October 2019] 
(with a "critique the ‘value gap’ as a policy rationale for altering the scope of generally applicable 
copyright safe harbors"); and Niva Elkin-Koren, Yifat Nahmias, and Maayan Perel (Filmar), ‘Is It 
Time to Abolish Safe Harbor? When Rhetoric Clouds Policy Goals’ [2019] Stanford Law & Policy 
Review (forthcoming), SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344213 [Accessed 30 October 2019] in 
Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41. 
690 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC.) (Text with EEA relevance). 
691 Recital 62 DSM Directive provides further guidance on how to interpret the definition. The same 
Recital mentions “piracy” websites in ambiguous language, which appears allow Member States to 
exclude these not from the scope of the OCSSP definition but rather from the special liability regime 
in art.17(4). 
692 For more information, see this chapter at 3.2.  
693 See chapter 5 at 5.3 and 5.5 respectively.  
694 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
695 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, and, 5.9 respectively. 
696 On enforcement, see chapter 5 at 5.7, and specifically, 5.7.3.3; On how costs will be driven down 
regarding the introduction and enforcement of the proposals, see 5.7.3.3(c)(iiii).  
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works could more financially accessible and so there may be less need to filter material 
by intermediaries as compliance with copyright could be increased697 as legitimate 
uses could be encouraged under the proposed system.698  
Despite this, although this remains uncertain, it is argued that the current law may see 
that ‘communication’ and the notion of liability of those involved in a ‘chain’ of 
communication may be extended even further. In turn, it is suggested that this could 
lead to ‘communication to the public’ becoming even more all-encompassing 
regarding liability. This is suggested to be the result of the introduction of the ECDM 
legislation that sees a “normative preference for private ordering over public choice in 
EU copyright law.”699 This is further postulated on the basis that the current ECDM 
passage would suggest that copyright regulation is “hemming” online activity700 and 
those that provide the means in which to do so “even more tightly.”701 Thus, although 
not part of ‘communication’ per se, the acts covered by it will no doubt be questioned 
in the context of the communication right702 and it is likely in the current legal climate 
that the concept of communication, and circumstances capable of procuring liability, 
are likely to increase exponentially as a result. This is considered to be especially likely 
 
697 See chapter 5.5 generally, see also, section 5.9.  
698 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a). 
699 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41.  
700 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012); EWCA Civ 1740; [2013] Bus. L.R. 414 (CA (Civ Div)). 
701 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002), p.106. 
702 The communication right has been central to the development of the current success of the 
streaming business model of the Football Association of the Premier League due to its capacity to 
be used in accordance with “blocking injunctions” – Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the 
development of the communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577; See also, 
FAPL v. British Communications [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch), [33] (per Arnold J); FAPL, Joined Cases 
C-403/08 and C-429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083, [159], see also, Football Association Premier League 
Limited and ors v. QC Leisure and ors and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd {‘FAPL’), 
Joined Cases  C-403/08 and C429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, Grand Chamber).  
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in light of the historical evolution of the concept.703 Ultimately, it is argued that the act 
of ‘communicating’ is therefore likely to be expanded even further under Article 17.704  
This could also mean that what constitutes ‘reproduction’ and ‘authorisation’ may also 
be expanded under the current law as the focus is contended to be increasingly based 
around restricting what can be done with information.705 This is also argued as being 
responsible for the perpetuation of an environment of ‘licencing’706 in order to limit the 
scenarios where works can be shared without legal consequence.707 This legal 
development has been hypothesised to come from the fact that capitalism is 
inseparable from the movement of deterritorialization. However, this movement is 
exorcised through fictitious and artificial reterritorializations that have occurred within, 
and are manifested throughout, the copyright legal system. This is due to the digital 
age and the ‘deterritorializing’ potential that ‘communications’ have to negatively affect 
 
703 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp.1-113.  
704 To an extent this could already be arguably achieved under s.296ZG CDPA 1988, (incorporating 
Article 7 Directive 2001/29/EC) concerning Electronic Right Management Information (ERMI) - 
However, it is argued that this section is a lot more niche and Article 17 (Directive 2019/790) is likely 
to generate a lot more debate around its imposition, as it is argued to have a wider application than 
s.296ZG.  
705 Toynbee, J., ‘Copyright, the work and phonographic orality in music’ Social and Legal Studies, 
(2006), 15(1) pp.77–99.  
706 For more information, see chapter 4 generally.  
707  J. Groom, I. Silverman, and B. Clark, ‘Still Lost in the Labyrinth?’ [2017] EIPR 591; Koo, J., The 
Right of Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 2019)p.117; C. 
Angelopoulos, European intermediary liability in Copyright: A Tort-Based Analysis (Information Law 
Series Volume 39 Kluwer Law Intnl [2016]; Reha Training Gesellschaft fur Sport-und 
Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft fur musikaliche Auffurhungs-und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungrechte eV (GEMA), Case C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379, [36] (ECJ, Grand Chamber) 
(this was the subject of a broad interpretation); As stated, the Court of Justice has aimed at securing 
a ‘high level of protection’ that has resulted in subsequently ‘broad’ interpretations of what 
constitutes a communication - Referring to info. Soc. Dir, Recitals 9, 10, 23: Stitching Brein v. Ziggo 
BV and XS4All Internet BV, Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456, [22] (ECJ) (high level); 
Verwertungsgesselenschaft Rundfunk GmbH v. Hettegger Hotel Edelweiss GmbH, Case C-641/15, 
EU:C:2016:795, [AG14] (Ag Spunzar) (a very ‘broad’ right, but less discussion in this case was 
given); The need for a ‘high level’ of protection was reiterated in SGAE v Rafael Hotels [2006] para 
36. 
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the digital music economy.708 Thus, the expansion of the communication right is 
considered to be an example of the ‘reterritorialization’ effects of capitalism in the 
digital age.  
Therefore, it can be said that copyright law has become the backbone in which 
rightsholders rely upon to achieve the process of economic exploitation because it is 
private property that constitutes the centre of the fictitious reterritorializations of 
capitalism under the communication right. Thus, without it, the objective 
representation of intangibles would cease to be objective, they would become a 
subjective infinite – that is to say, imaginary – effectively lose all consistency. This is 
because unless they are supported by a legal structure that determines the place and 
the functions of the subject of representation, as well as the objects represented as 
intangible property, then the formal relations between them all would mean they would 
cease to exist.709  
This has made luxury itself into a means of investment [by limiting] “production for 
production’s sake”710 (although this is not always the case)711 in a copyright system 
that rediscovers the primitive connections for [intellectual] labour, on condition – on 
the sole condition – that they be linked to capital and to the new reterritorialized full 
 
708 Nicolaou, A., ‘How streaming saved the music industry’ The Financial Times: January 16 2017. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/cd99b95e-d8ba-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e (Accessed: 
10/05/2017). 
709 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.348.  
710 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039; Case C- 
419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and 
the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International 
BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London; See also the discussion in 
chapter 4 at 4.4 and 4.4.2 respectively. 
711 The opposite conclusion to Allposters was reached, where a company that removed copyrighted 
images from the surface of greeting cards and then applied them to ceramic plaques was held as 
having no duplication in this instance, and so no reproduction.CM Paula Company v. Logan, 355 F. 
Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973) US District Court for the Northern District of Texas - 355 F. Supp. 189 
(N.D. Tex. 1973) March 5, 1973; In comparison, see Mirage Editions Inc v Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. 
856 F. 2d. 1341 (9th Cir. 1988); See also the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.4.1. 
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body that has been enhanced by digital contracts.712 For the recipient, this is the 
reterritorialization of the digital network through legally-induced privatisation via the 
decoding of the instruments of production through proprietary appropriation. This then 
procures the loss of the means of consumption through the dissolution of means in 
which information can be distributed without legal consequence.713 In turn, this has 
created what is described in the next chapter as a ‘two-tier’ system of protection in the 
digital world.714  
3.5.2 The situation in the US  
3.5.2.1 Right of public performance under §106.   
Public performing rights came relatively late in US statutory copyright development. 
Under this section, there was a longstanding emphasis on ‘for profit’ over the public’s 
interest in access regarding the interpretation of this right.722 However, since then, 
there has been a shift toward protecting authors from ‘market harm’.723 Congress first 
recognized the right as to dramatic compositions in 1856, and to music compositions 
in 1897. As to the latter, however, the main source of revenue for the composer had 
been by the way of royalties from the sale of copies of his or her work in the form of 
sheet music, and sometimes these ran into large sums: but since then, the 
 
712 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.4. 
713 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.260; On the issue of legal consequence and how individuals fear that any online activity will 
be the subject of legal proceedings without prior authorization of rightsholders, see generally 
chapters 2 and 4. 
714 See the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.5. 
722 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), at 5.2.3 generally; See also, Herbert v 
Stanley; John Church Company v Hilliard Hotel Company 242 US 591 (1917); Wu, T., ‘Copyright’s 
Communications Policy’ (2004) 103 Michigan Law Review 278, 305; See also, the US Second 
Circuit Decision in Associated Music Publishers Inc v Debs Memorial Radio Fund Inc 141 F 2d 852 
(2d Cir 1944) 855 – (a non-profit radio station was held to be ‘for profit’ because it ‘resulted in profit 
to the advertisers and to an increment to its own treasury, whereby it might repay its 
indebtedness...and avoid an annual deficit.)   
723 The replaced the “for profit” criterion under the 1976 Copyright Act – HR Rep No 94-1476 (1976) 
(House Report on the Final Bill for the US Copyright Act 1976) 62-63.  
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contemporaneous decline in the revenue gained via the sale of copies, served to wake 
up composers to the economic possibilities inherent in the performing right.  
Nonetheless, this section will explain briefly the basis of these rights for the purposes 
of introduction and understanding, but it will focus primarily on §106(6)724 as these are 
the most relevant for the purposes of this thesis. This is because this section governs 
the digital performance right in sound recordings and its limitations and how these 
impact on the current system of protection.  
In 1909, the Copyright Act – which retained the right of public performance of dramatic 
works – was amended to give to the owner of copyright in a musical composition the 
exclusive right to perform it ‘publicly for profit’. As was not unusual with the 1990 Act, 
none of the central terms – such as perform, public, or profit – was defined, and it fell 
to the courts to give meaning to this language. This was not an easy task pursuant to 
the development of new technologies for the dissemination of music. However, in the 
landmark US Supreme Court decision of Herbert v Shanley,725 it was held that a 
musical performance by a small orchestra in a restaurant was ‘for profit’ despite the 
fact that no separate admission charge was made to hear the music.726  
These phrases have been interpreted liberally by the lower courts, to cover things such 
as live music accompanying silent motion pictures which required a licence from the 
copyright owner.727 This also includes a broadcast of music, on a commercial-free 
program, by a non-profit radio station which paid for one-third of its airtime by 
accepting commercial advertising.728 Moreover, this is also the case where a radio 
broadcast was a “public” performance, even though members of the public received 
the broadcasts on their sets were in their private homes and in separate locations.729 
 
724 US Copyright Act 1976.  
725 242 U.S. 591 (1917).  
726 This can be contrasted with the CJEU decision of Case C-135/10 Societa Consortile, [2012] ECDR 
(16) 276 (ECJ) – (holding that the playing of a radio broadcast to patients in a dental surgery does 
not constitute a ‘communication’ to ‘the public’) – Compare these to OSA, Case C-351/12, 
EU:C:2014:110 (ECJ); C-117/15 Reha Training, case, EU:C:2016:379.    
727 M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (E.D.S.C.), aff’d, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 
1925).  
728 Associated Music Pubs. V. Debs Mem. Radio Fund, Inc., 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944).  
729 Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925). 
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3.5.2.2 The impact of technological advances 
New technologies, which allowed for the intermediate re-transmissions of radio and 
television broadcasts, further compounded the definitional complexities confronted by 
the courts under the 1990 Act. This meant considering the question of whether these 
re-transmissions constitute performances. Pursuant to this, in a somewhat 
controversial decision in 1931, the Supreme Court held that a hotel proprietor 
“performed” music by making the sounds of radio broadcasts audible by placing 
receivers and loudspeakers in public and private rooms in the hotel in the case of Buck 
v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.730   
However, in contrast to this decision, the Supreme Court in Twentieth Century music 
Corp, v. Aiken,731 ruled that a fast-food restaurant owner who played radio programs 
through four small speakers he had installed in the ceiling of his shop did not “perform.” 
Instead, it was ruled that he was doing little more than turning on the radio, and those 






730 283 U.S. 191 (1931) - On the precise facts, the broadcasts of the neighbouring radio station were 
themselves unauthorized, which later the Supreme Court underlined as the primary reason for the 
hotels liability in the case); Liebesman, Y.J., ‘When Does Copyright Law Require Technology 
Blindness? Aiken Meets Aero’ 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1383, 1389 [2015] at 1391. The Court took 
special note that the hotel owner installed the radio receivers for the entertainment of his guests. 
Also, entertaining others seemed to lead to the clear conclusion of a public performance; Taken 
from McGraw, T., Music Streaming: Where Interactive & Non-Interactive Services Fit Under the 
Homestyle Exemption, 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 269 (2018), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/ vol10/iss1/6; A similar decision was reached in Case C-306-
05Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  [2006] ECR I-
11519.  
731 422 U.S. 151 (1975).  
732 By similar comparison, see Case C-135/10 Societa Consortile, [2012] ECDR (16) 276 (ECJ).  
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3.5.2.3 The meaning of ‘perform’ under the 1976 Act 
Under §.101 of the 1976 act, as used in the title, the following terms and their variant 
forms mean the following: 
“...To “perform” a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either 
directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture 
or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the 
sounds accompanying it audible.”733 
To “perform” a work, under the definition in section 101, includes reading a literary 
work aloud, singing or playing music, dancing a ballet or other choreographic work, 
and acting out a dramatic work or pantomime. A performance may be accomplished: 
either directly or by means of any device or process. This includes all kinds of 
equipment for reproducing or amplifying sounds or visual images, any sort of 
transmitting apparatus, any type of electronic retrieval system, and any other 
techniques and systems not yet in use or invented.  
In the (Second Circuit) case of US v. American Society of Composers,734 Circuit Judge 
Walker held that downloads are not musical performances that are 
contemporaneously perceived by the listener. They are simply transfers of electronic 
files received by the transfer containing digital copies from an online server to a local 
hard drive. Therefore, the downloaded songs are not performed in any perceptible 
manner during the transfers; the user must take some further action to play the songs 
after they are downloaded. By implication, this implies that the electronic download 
itself involves no recitation, rendering, or playing of the musical work encoded in the 
digital transmission, whereby the download is not a performance of the work, as 
defined by §101.735  
In coming to its conclusion, it is asserted that the court reached a seemingly 
paradoxical conclusion when viewed in accordance with the 1997 World Intellectual 
 
733 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976).  
734 US v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (Applications of RealNetworks, 
Inc., Yahoo! Inc) 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010).  
735 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Treaty”) that required the Court to find 
that downloads of musical works constitute public performances.  
This is because the WIPO Treaty, under Article 8, provides that: 
“[T]he exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their 
works, by wire or by wireless means, including the making available to the 
public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these 
works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.” 
However, the US congress has nonetheless chosen to suggest that the treaty does 
not “require any change in the substance of copyright rights.”736 This conclusion was 
arrived at, in part, because the Copyright Act 1976 already permits copyright holders 
to control the ‘reproduction’ and ‘distribution’ (both discussed in chapter 4)737 of their 
musical works over the Internet. Again, regarding the extent to which a download 
implicates these rights, the conclusion seems to be that a download that does not also 
trigger the public performance right does not infringe on Article 8 of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty. The other policy arguments raised by ASCAP in the US v. American 
Society of Composers,738 related to the global harmony of doctrine, and adequate 
compensation – are better addressed to Congress, which has the power to amend the 
Copyright Act 1976.739   
In turn, Internet Companies’ [streaming] transmission also illustrate why a download 
is not a public performance. A stream is an electronic transmission that renders the 
musical work audible as it is received by the client-computers temporary memory. This 
transmission, like a television or radio broadcast, is a performance because there is a 
playing of the song that is received simultaneously with the transmission.740 Moreover, 
 
736 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at 9 (1998).  
737 The exclusive rights of ‘reproduction’ and ‘distribution’ are discussed in chapter 4 generally, in 
particular, see sections 4.7 and 4.7.1 respectively.  
738 US v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (Applications of RealNetworks, 
Inc., Yahoo! Inc) 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010).  
739 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-07 (2003).  
740 See e.g. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 158 (1975) - This case was 
decided under the 1909 Copyright Act, which was the precursor to the 1976 Copyright Act, which is 
now the applicable law.  
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in Columbia Pictures v. Prof’l Real Estate741 it was held that downloaded music works 
are transmitted at one point in time and performed at another, meaning that a 
transmittal without a performance does not constitute a “public performance.”742 
3.5.2.4 ‘Public’ performances under the 1976 act  
To perform or display a work “publicly” under §101 means –  
“(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where 
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered;  
or 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work 
to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or 
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and 
at the same time or at different times.  
To ‘transmit’ a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process 
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 
Under clause (1) of the definition of ‘publicly’ in section 101, a performance or display 
is ‘public’ if it takes place ‘at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered’ according to a US Congress House Report.743 
Significantly, a fundamental aim in the procurement of this definition was to make clear 
that, contrary to the decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Wyatt,744 was that 
performances in ‘semi-public’ places such as clubs, schools, lodges, and factories, are 
‘public performances’ and therefore subject to copyright control.  
 
741 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir. 
1989)  (holding that renting videodiscs to a hotel guest for playback in the guest’s room does not 
constitute the ‘transmission’ of a public performance).   
742 Ibid.  
743 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th., Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1976).  
744 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Wyatt, 21 C.O. Bull. 203 (D.Md. 1932).  
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In addition, clause (2) of the definition of ‘publicly’ in section 101 makes clear that the 
concepts of public performance and public display include not only performances and 
displays that occur initially in a public place, but also acts that transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance or display of the work to the public by means of any 
device or process. As such, in  Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile 
Accessories Co.,745 it was held that just because a radio performance was held in a 
place where  members of the public were not all in the same place or able to converse 
with each other, it was still nonetheless held that these listeners were capable of being 
construed as members of the audience.746 Moreover, the definition of ‘transmit’ – to 
communicate a performance or display ‘by any device or process whereby images or 
sound are received beyond the place from which they are sent’ – is broad enough to 
include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired and wireless communications 
media.747 
Essentially, this means that every method by which the images or sounds comprising 
a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission,’ and if the 
transmission reaches the public in any form, the case within the scope of causes (4) 
or (5) of §106.748 This thesis argues that this ‘all-encompassing’ legislative approach749 
is quintessentially capitalistic because to survive and further expand, capitalism had 
to shift from colonisation in the strict sense to colonisation in a more encompassing 
sense.750 This is because it is argued to have reached the limits of the exploitation of 
labour, and capital then begins to transgress them. In doing so, it starts to exploit 
 
745 Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F.2d  
411, 411–12 (6th Cir. 1925). 
746 Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 159. 
747 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).  
748 17 U.S.C. 1976.  
749 Macmillan, F., New Directions in Copyright Law (Volume 6, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007), p.4. 
750 On ‘colonisation’ see this chapter at 3.4 and 3.5.4.1 respectively; Habermas, J., Theory of 
Communicative Action, Vol. 2 (1987) pp.332-373 on colonisation. Habermas argued that the 
bureaucratic state has become dysfunctional, either because it has ‘colonized other life-worlds” or 
because it has inappropriately interfered with the functioning of other subsystems – (G. Teubner, 
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (1986). 
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intellectual, communicative, symbolic or emotional labour that is produced outside of 
the sphere of production.751 The US system moved towards protecting authors from 
‘market harm’752 as opposed to the traditional ‘for profit’ requirement.753  
The reason for this is argued to be because the former is more encompassing than 
the latter, but this may seem somewhat confusing in light of the following. This is 
because the former approach meant that “virtually no performance which is paid for 
directly or indirectly c[ould] ever be regarded as not for profit.”754 Yet, the latter now 
means that the courts look to the inability of authors to reap future rewards of their 
labour, and this is argued to be extending the reach of what may be construed as 
‘harm’ through the ‘for profit’ nature of the defendants activities.755 In turn, this is then 
 
751 Vandenberghe, F. ‘Deleuzian capitalism’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 34(8) [2008]: 877-903; 
Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, State 
and Higher Education, (John Hopkins University Press, 2010), p.4.  
752 The replaced the “for profit” criterion under the 1976 Copyright Act – HR Rep No 94-1476 (1976) 
(House Report on the Final Bill for the US Copyright Act 1976) 62-63; See also, Herbert v Stanley; 
John Church Company v Hilliard Hotel Company 242 US 591 (1917); By similar comparison, see 
the discussion in chapter 4 at 4.4.2; See also, Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in 
EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], 
Queen Mary University London; For an opposite conclusion to the CJEU, the Canadian Supreme 
Court suggested that in similar circumstances there was no reproduction of a work under copyright 
law when an image is transferred to an alternative medium, see – Galerie a’Art du Petit Champlain 
Inc v Theberge [2002] SC 34 (Supreme Court, Canada). 
753 Lydia Pallas Loren, ‘The Evolving Role of for Profit Use in Copyright Law: Lessons from the 1909 
Act’ [2009] 26 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 280.  
754 Nimmer, M.B., Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas (Mathew Bender, 1974) vol 1, § 107.32.  
755 In considering whether there is a communication to "the public", it is not irrelevant that the 
communication is of a profit-making nature: Case C-306-05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores 
de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  [2006] ECR I-11519 at – [44]; Phonographic Performance 
(Ireland) Ltd v Ireland (C-162/10) EU:C:2012:141 at – [36]; Airfield NV v Belgische Vereniging van 
Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) (C-431/09) Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA 
(C-432/09) [2012] E.C.D.R. 3 at – [80]; Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2013] E.C.D.R. 14 at [204]-[206]; Societa Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Del 
Corso (C-135/10) [2012] EU:C:2012:140 at [88]-[90].     
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justified as infringement on its relevance to ‘the public’756 and it is asserted that these 
two criterion have been construed with the copyright owners’ interests in mind757 under 
capitalism. This has created what Schumpeter calls a “creative destruction”758 which 
is the idea that every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only 
against the background of the process and within the situation created by it.759 Thus, 
the interpretation of the public performance right cannot be understood outside of its 
role in the perennial gale of creative destruction.760  
Therefore, the current approach to interpretation is suggested to be limited to 
conceptions of markets to those controlled by “incumbent disseminators or copyright 
owners” and this prevents a more “dynamic and comprehensive” approach to 
infringement.761 This is postulated to be for the purpose of ensuring that minimal matter 
escapes the regulation of the copyright system in capitalist society. Thus, under the 
present law, a performance made available by transmission to the public at large is 
‘public’ even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place.762  This is also 
the case even there is no proof that any of the potential recipients was operating his 
receiving apparatus at the time transmission.763   
 
756 E.g. On Command Video Corporation v Columbia Pictures Industries 777 F Supp 787 (ND Cal 
1991) 790, and American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, et al, v Aereo, Inc, 134 S Ct 2498 (2014) 
2508.  
757 Wendy J Gordon, ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and its Predecessors’ (1982) 82(8) Columbia Law Review 1600; See also, David M Diesen 
and Shubha Ghosh, ‘The Foundations of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimization in a World of Friction’ (2005) 47 Arizona Law Review 61.  
758 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge, 2013) pp.83-4 in 
Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp.37 and 179.  
759 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) at p.39.  
760 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge, 2013) pp.83-4; See 
also, William J Abernathy and Kim B Clark, ‘Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction’ 
(1985) 14(1) Research Policy 3, 4, 6 & 14.  
761 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.179, 180-5.  
762 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th., Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1976).  
763 §106(4), (5), 17 U.S.C. 1976. 
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This is asserted to be because interested parties like to explain the culture industry in 
technological terms. Its millions of participants, they argue, demand reproduction 
processes which inevitably lead to the use of standard products to meet the same 
needs at countless locations.764 Therefore, the technical antithesis between few 
production centres and widely dispersed reception necessitates organization and 
planning by those in control.765 So, ‘public’ even though the recipients were not 
gathered in a single place, without proof that any of the potential recipients were 
operating any receiving apparatus at the time transmission, they were still nonetheless 
held to be within the concept of ‘public’.  
This is considered to stem primarily from the fact that for some of the incumbents of 
the industrial information economy the pressure from social production was 
experienced as “pure threat.” 766 The clash between these incumbents and the new 
practices that was most widely reported in the media in the first five years of the twenty-
first century, has ‘driven’ much of the policy-making, legislation, and litigation in this 
area.767 It is argued that this was to push for the much needed proprietary-based legal-
certainty, the ‘calculable universe,’ that is essential in capitalist societies,768 and which 
has been a central reason as to why capitalism flourishes in the West and why property 
rights get spread so far.769  
Moreover, the same principles apply whenever the potential recipients of the 
transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such as the occupants of hotel 
 
764 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002) p.95;  Vandenberghe, F. ‘Deleuzian capitalism’, Philosophy & 
Social Criticism, 34(8) [2008]: 877-903.  
765 Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein, Routledge Classics 1991), p.17; 
Steiner, R., ‘The Threefold Social Order’, Anthroposophic Press, Inc. New York, (1966), chapter III.  
766 Benkler, Yochai, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Protection Transforms Markets and 
Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (2006), at 126.  
767 Ibid.  
768 Trubek, D.M., ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ Faculty Scholarship Series [1972] 
Paper 4001, p.736-39; Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4993&context=fss_papers Accessed: 
12/9/2014.  
769 De Soto, H., The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and failed everywhere 
else (Black Swan Publishing, 2001), at 67. 
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rooms or the subscribers of a cable television service.770 This is because clause (2)771 
of the definition of ‘publicly’ is applicable ‘whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.’772 
Consequently, ‘to perform’ a work is defined in the Act as, ‘in the case of a motion 
picture or other audio-visual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the 
sounds accompanying it audible.’ As the House report notes, this definition means that 
an individual is performing a work whenever he does anything by which the work is 
transmitted, repeated or made to recur.773 This also means that in Columbia Pictures 
v. Redd Horne.774  the playing of a video cassette constitutes a performance section 
101.  
3.5.2.5 The digital performance right in sound recordings and its 
limitations 
3.5.2.5.1 The digital transmission public performance right 
The US Copyright Act 1976 did not extend the public performance right to sound 
recordings. Since 1995, however, producers and performers of sound recordings have 
enjoyed public performance rights with respect to digital audio transmissions as a 
result of amendments made to the 1976 Act by the Digital Performance in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995 (hereinafter DPRA). This was enacted in response to the 
absence of a performance right for sound recordings in the Copyright Act of 1976, as 
 
770 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v Aveco, Inc. 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).   
771 17 U.S.C. 1976 §106(2) 
772 Ibid.  
773 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
5659, 5676-77.  
774 Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. (1984); H.R. Rep. No. 
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5674; see S. Rep. 
No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1975).   
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well as an underlying fear that digital technology would otherwise undermine sales of 
physical records.775  
As such, in November 1995, major amendments to §106 extended, for the first in US 
law, limited public-performance rights to owners of copyright in sound recordings. This 
meant that  §106(6)776 now added to the list of exclusive rights, which, in the case of 
sound recordings, was to perform the copyright work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission. However, the performance right for sound recordings under the 
DPRA is limited to transmissions over a digital transmission, so it is not as expansive 
as the performance right for other types of copyrighted works.777      
In addition to the new performance right in §106(6), the DPRA amendments added to 
§114 several subsections that limit the right. What this did was categorize services 
under three tiers, based on the service’s potential impact on record sales.778 
 Firstly, these relate to the notion that some digital audio transmission public 
performances are wholly exempt from the copyright owner’s right, some are subject to 
a compulsory licence, and some are fully subject to the copyright owners control. 
Nonetheless, entirely exempted from the new exclusive digital-audio-transmission 
right are, among other transmissions, traditional radio and television broadcasts, 
background music services such as Muzak, and transmissions within business 
establishments (such as restaurants, department stores, and hotels).  
However, two primary types of online music streaming services exist: noninteractive 
and interactive. A noninteractive service, such as Pandora or an Internet radio station, 
does not allow a user to choose the exact song he or she wants to hear. On the other 
hand, an interactive, on-demand service allows a user to choose a particular song or 
album in the service’s catalogue to listen to. On-demand services like Spotify have 
 
775 Martin, Rebecca, ‘The Digital Performance Right in the Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Can it 
Protect U.S. Sound Recording Copyright Owners in a Global Market?’ (1996) Cardozo Arts 
Entertainment Law Journal, 14: 733.  
776 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).  
777 Cohen, Julie, Lydia Loren, Ruth Okedji, and Maureen O,Rourke, ‘Copyright in a Global Information 
Economy’ (New York: Aspen, 2006), at 466-67. 
778 Myers, Kellen, ‘The RIAA, the DMCA, and the Forgotten Few Webcasters: A Call for Change in 
Digital Copyright Royalties’. Federal Communications Law Journal, 61: 439-40.  
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played a significant role in the recent growth of digital streaming services.779 For 
example, in 2011, paid subscriptions in the United States for these services were 
estimated at approximately 1.8 million.780 Yet, by 2014, paid subscriptions in the 
United States for on-demand services more than quadrupled, reaching approximately 
7.7 million, with paid subscription revenues growing to approximately $799 million.7 
Significantly, revenues from all streaming services (which would also include 
noninteractive services like Pandora) accounted for 27 percent of total U.S. music 
industry revenues in 2014.781 
Also, transmissions by various types of non-interactive subscription services were 
subjected to compulsory licencing in the event voluntary licences (given shelter 
against antitrust challenges) cannot be negotiated, with other transmissions are fully 
subject to the copyright owners’ §106(6) right.  
The DPRA also amended §115 of the 1976 Act. This meant that new interactive 
services compensated not only sound recording copyright owners (under §106(6) and 
114), but also, songwriters and music publishers. This compensation was for lost 
‘mechanical royalties’ that would otherwise ordinarily be forthcoming under §115 via 
amendment. There have also been further developments with regards to this area, as 
on October 11, 2018, President Donald Trump signed the Orrin G. hatch-Bob 
Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) into law.  The significance of the MMA is 
that it is intended to “modernize copyright law” as applied to songwriters, music 
publishers, digital music providers, record labels, and others involved in the creation 




services/#6> accessed:19/03/2019.  
780 Joshua P. Friedlander, ‘Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., News and Notes on 2014 RIAA Music 
Industry Shipment and Revenue Statistics’ 1 (2014), http://riaa.com/media/D1F4E3E8-D3E0-FCEE-
BB55-FD8B35BC8785.pdf accessed:11/10/2019.  
781 Ibid at 1-2.  
782 The MMA consists of three parts: Title I establishes a licensing collective to grant blanket 
mechanical licenses to digital music service providers and collect and distribute royalties to music 
composition rights owners; Title II creates a royalty structure to compensate owners of pre-1972 
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The MMA consists of three parts: Title I establishes a licensing collective to grant 
blanket mechanical licenses to digital music service providers and collect and 
distribute royalties to music composition rights owners; Title II creates a royalty 
structure to compensate owners of pre-1972 sound recordings; and Title III provides 
a statutory right for producers, mixers, and sound engineers to collect royalties for 
digital transmissions of sound recordings.783 
Secondly, Congress further amended §114 as the 1995 expansion of the sound 
recording copyright omitted a principal form of Internet exploitation: audio (streaming) 
or (webcasting) of recorded performances. These transmissions originate on the 
internet and are generally non-subscription.784 Yet, the difference is that the 
geographic factors that apply to radio stations do not apply to websites and can reach 
a worldwide audience. Consequently, under the 1995 provisions, webcasts that were 
neither subscription nor interactive were entirely exempt from the sound recording 
copyright owners right. 
However, the 1998 amendments addressed this omission by retaining the three-tier 
structure created in 1995. This was achieved by wholly exempting from the right not 
all qualifying non-subscription transmissions, but only non-subscription broadcast 
transmissions. By implication, this meant that the exemption would not cover most 
webcast transmissions. This was primarily due to the statute broadly defining a 
‘broadcast’ as one ‘made by a terrestrial broadcast station licenced as such by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under §114(j)(3).785 This then meant that 
all qualifying non-subscription transmissions were added to the class of transmissions 
that were subject to the statutory licence.786 
 
sound recordings; and Title III provides a statutory right for producers, mixers, and sound engineers 
to collect royalties for digital transmissions of sound recordings; See also,  
783 <http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/03/guest-post-one-database-to-rule-them.html> accessed: 
19/05/2020).  
784 For example, the user enters the URL for the “Internet Radio” website, much as she or he would 
otherwise access a conventional radio station – 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3).  
785 17 U.S.C.  
786 The amendments retain the ‘sound recording performance complement’ and they bar the 
transmitting entity to accommodate technological measures imposed by the sound recording 
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Thirdly, despite the 1998 amendments narrowing the scope of digital transmissions 
that would otherwise be wholly exempt from the performance right, they left the status 
of analogue transmissions unaltered. This means that an over-the-air broadcaster 
pays no royalties to sound recording copyright owners, while webcasters pay at least 
the compulsory licence fees. However, Copyright owners and the Digital Media 
Association (DMA) contended that the exemption was limited to over the air 
transmissions, and the Copyright Office endorsed this view.787 In doing so, it stated, 
amongst others things, that this was to ensure that “legitimate copies were purchased 
in the market place” to prevent a listener making a “high-quality unauthorized 
reproduction of a sound recording directly from the transmission.”788 This view was 
affirmed in the case of Bonneville International v. Peters.789  
3.5.2.6 Crossed wires or a clear connection: when is a public performance 
(not) also a reproduction (or) distribution of copies? 
As will be seen in the next chapter, digital communications will often implicate both the 
reproduction and distribution rights. For example, one reason for this is because it will 
be seen that it is materially impossible, under the law of physics, for the same material 
to be distributed and exist in two places at once at the same time.790 The implications 
of this, for purposes here, is that digital transfers, due to their technical operation,791 
consequently creates secondary copies at the point of transfer792 and this attracts 
copyright liability.   
 
copyright owner to prevent users or other third parties from scanning the transmissions for the 
purpose of selecting particular transmissions - §114 (d)(2)(c)(i)-(ix).  
787 See 65 Fed.Reg. 77, 292 (Dec. 11, 2000).  
788 Ibid.  
789 Bonneville International Corp. v. peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 2003).   
790 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 6 [4] citing London-
Sire Records, Inc v John Doe 1 542 F. Supp 2D 153 (D. Mass 2008); For more information, see 4.4. 
& 4.5, respectively.   
791 MDY Industries., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) at 935-36.  
792 See chapter at 4.4 & 4.5 respectively.  
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This happened in Capitol Records v. ReDigi inc793 where the court rejected the 
arguments regarding §109(a)794 suggesting that policy required reconsideration of the 
first-sale doctrine in light of technological advances.795 The court held that the fist-sale 
doctrine did not apply because users did not upload and transfer their own individual 
phonorecord. Instead, it was considered that they uploaded and sold a reproduction 
of the phonorecord. The consequence of this was that the first sale did not protect 
them from infringement suits as these acts were, for technical purposes, 
reproductions, and so the acts were classed as distributions of reproductions.796  
By implication, this brought a second into existence, (which was then distributed) to 
another. Thus, at those precise moments, there is both a reproduction, and 
subsequent distribution, which breached §106(3) of the US Copyright Act (1976).797 
This is argued to be because the production of goods in capitalist society will adapt to 
the wants, through the agency of associations that will spring up in all manner of 
connections and attempt to escape the chains of the state, only to be brought back in 
by it under the law.798 
However, all rights may often converge on the internet,799 whereby the latter two rights, 
(including the public performance/display), will often come into play, such as in the 
audio streaming of recorded musical compositions. In a report, the Copyright Office 
acknowledged that, formally the communication of a musical work by means of audio 
streaming could be characterized as a public performance received by the public in 
different places at different times.  It also acknowledged that the same communication 
could also be characterised under the RAM copying doctrine, which is the idea that 
when a computer program is run, or an e-book in RAM when a PDF file is accessed, 
the RAM doctrine means that uses of a digital file can qualify as infringing the 
 
793 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
794 17 U.S.C.  
795 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
796 Ibid.  
797 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 2 [5].  
798 Steiner, R., ‘The Threefold Social Order’, Anthroposophic Press, Inc. New York, (1966), chapter III. 
799 For a discussion of convergence within network theory, see S. Menon, Policy Initiative Dilemmas 
on Media Convergence: A Cross National Perspective (2006) 24 Prometheus 59, 60. 
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reproduction of the work.800 This characterisation could be procured via the fact that 
the running of a program creates a series of technically procured reproductions made 
in the computer of the audio stream recipient.801 However, the effects of the RAM copy 
doctrine have been seemingly reduced in the case of Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc.,802 where a copy of a work that existed for approximately 1.2 seconds 
did not qualify as a reproduction of the work.  
As a result, although not a conclusion per se, the Copyright Office recommended, 
amongst other things, the introduction of a ‘symmetrical’ exemption from the 
performance right when the digital communication is a download. This was in order to 
prevent the otherwise impractical scenario where there would otherwise need to be a 
purchase of two separate licences for each respective exclusive right that would 
otherwise be contravened by such acts. This is because in US law, by defining each 
right as exclusive,803 the law makes clear that should anyone else purport to exercise 
 
800 Mulligan, Christina, ‘Copyright without Copying’ Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 27 : 
Issue 2, Article 5 (2017); Litman, J., ‘The Exclusive Right to Read’ 13 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. 
L.J. 29, 31-32 (1994); Aaron Perzanowski, ‘Fixing RAM Copies’ 104 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1067, 1070-71 (2010) (arguing that the RAM doctrine has been increasingly embraced by 
an increasing number of courts); For the UK position, see s.28A CDPA 1988; The maker of cached 
copies will in any event normally have a defence under r.18 of the Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013); Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London 2016), at 21-139; Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v the 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd [2013] UKSC 18; [2013] E.C.D.R. 10; [2013] E.M.L.R. 21 at [2]; 
P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Caching and Copyright: The Right of Temporary Copyright’ [2000] EIPR 482, 483; 
Sony Computer Entertainment Inc v. Owen [2002] EMLR (34) 742, 747.  
801 MDY Industries., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) (held that 
RAM copying doctrine was actionable under 17 U.S.C. §106); Report of the Register of Copyrights 
Pursuant to §104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, U.S. Copyright Office, the Librarian of 
Congress, Aug. 29, 2001, Washington D.C. 2001 in Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg, and R. 
Anthony Reese, ‘Copyright: Cases and Materials,’ Foundation Press, University Casebook Series, 
(2017), p881. On section §106 see pp.920-21;  Litman, J., Digital Copyright, (Promethus Books 
2001) p.92.     
802 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).   
803 Malevanny, N., Online Music Distribution – How much Exclusivity is Needed?: A Study of 
International, European, German and U.S. Copyright Systems and Their Objectives, (Springer-
Verlag, 2019). 
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these rights without authorization, he or she would be behaving ‘impermissibly’ in 
capitalist society.804  
Regarding whether the downloading of a digital music file constitutes a public 
performance of the song embodied in the file, the American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers) (ASCAP) suggested that this was technically possible on a 
practical level. However, the Second Circuit (in rejecting such arguments) said that 
this was not the case in US v. ASCAP.805  
Comparatively, it is also likely that such a decision would be reached in the UK, in 
accordance with the CJEU jurisprudence regarding the communication right and the 








804 Robert Brauneis & Rogere Schechter, Copyright: A Contemporary Approach 227 (2nd ed. 2018) in 
McGraw, T., ‘Music Streaming: Where Interactive & Non-Interactive Services Fit Under the 
Homestyle Exemption’ 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 269 (2018), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/ vol10/iss1/6;  Trubek, D.M., ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise 
of Capitalism’ Faculty Scholarship Series [1972] Paper 4001, p.736; Available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4993&context=fss_papers Accessed: 
12/9/2014.  
805 U.S. v. ASCAP (Applications of RealNetworks, Inc.,), 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010).  
806 The concept was first deployed in Case C-306-05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels SL,  [2006] ECR I-11519; Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. 
Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [24]; See chapter 4 at 4.4.2; Nederlands  
Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others December 
(2019); Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 
Case C- 419/; Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] Case C-263/18. 
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3.6 Bringing the elements together: how the communication and public 
display rights laid the foundation for the streaming model discussed in 
the next chapter 
It is contended that copyright law analysis still often centres around how information 
is disseminated.807 The exclusive rights of communication in the UK (section 20),808 
and the public display right in the US (section 106),809 have been pivotal in shaping 
the law of the present day. As such, it is asserted that they have played a subsequently 
“central” role in the “shaping of the landscape of the digital market.”810  
The way they have done this is by providing what is described as a ‘cradle’ away from 
P2P file-sharing and into the current streaming model discussed in the fourth chapter. 
It is suggested that this has predominantly benefitted rightsholders, essentially 
performing what is described as a ‘bridge-gap’ function.811 However, consumers can 
also benefit from this with free music available from streaming service Spotify, 
although it is limited.812 The rationale behind this ‘bridge-gap’ submission is based on 
the fact that the communication and public performance rights were conceived as part 
of a suite of reforms under the WIPO Digital Agenda.  
These reforms set out ‘the work and objectives of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) with respect to electronic commerce, the digital economy, and 
intellectual property.’813 The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances 
 
807 Nimmer, M.B., ‘The Nature of Rights Protected by Copyright’ (1962) 10 UCLA Law Review 60, 62 
(‘As the very name “copyright suggests, the right to copy represents the most fundamental, as well 
as historically the first, right in the domain of literary property’); Foong, C., The Making Available 
Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019), p.6.  
808 Specifically section 20(2) CDPA 1988.  
809 Specifically, see 17 U.S.C §106(6). 
810 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.5.  
811 See chapter 4 at 4.6 
812 https://www.spotify.com/uk/signup/ (Accessed: 09/01/2019).  
813 World Intellectual property Organization, ‘WIPO Digital Agenda: Memorandum of the Director 
General’ (24th Session, WIPO General Assembly, WO/GA/24/11, 22 September 1999) in Foong, C., 
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and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), collectively known as the ‘Internet treaties’814 
established the broad making available right to address on-demand transmissions of 
copyright works and other subject matter through interactive systems. This meant 
coverage of not just ‘push’ technologies, but also ‘pull’ technologies.815 This was to fill 
in the gaps left by the technology-centric rights of copyright’s foundational international 
treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works816 which 
covered online communications incompletely and otherwise imperfectly.817  
However, as with the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, one can 
never go far enough in the direction of these processes – in other words, it is submitted 
that copyright hasn’t seen anything yet. It is argued that the proliferation of copyright 
legal doctrine will only continue in a digital and capitalist copyright world – as 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization can never go far enough. It is an irreversible 
process that creates artificial reterritorializations in response to the deterritorializations 
presented by digital technology.818  
 
The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the 
Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.4.  
814 Ficsor, M., The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO Treaties, Their Interpretation 
and Implementation (Oxford University press, 2002) pp.414-15. Taken from Foong, C., The Making 
Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.4. 
815 WIPO, ‘Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions 
Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic 
Conference (on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions, Geneva, 2-2- December 
1996), WIPO Doc CRNR/DC/4 (30 August 1996)’ 44, in Foong, C., The Making Available Right, 
Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019), p.4.  
816 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed 9 September 1886, 
(entered into force 5 December 1887) (‘Berne Convention’), as amended on 28 September 1979, 
WIPO Lex No TRT?BERNE?001 (entered into force 19 November 1984).  
817 Jane C, Ginsburg, ‘The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public’ in Vaver, D. and Bently, L., 
(eds), Property in the New Millennium: Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 234-37 in Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of 
Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.4.  
818 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.366.  
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This is argued to be why the advancement in online communications has proliferated 
– to the point where controlling copies represents a new paradigm, where copyright 
owners are continually seeking to control the various means of access rather than the 
copies themselves.819  It is posited that this change in the dynamic of copyright 
regulation is not just down to technological advances themselves, although they can 
be said to be part of it.820 Instead, it is asserted that this forms yet another example of 
the capitalist process of reterritorialization due to the otherwise perceived 
deterritorialization that would otherwise have stemmed from failing to control the 
access points in the digital world.  
What is meant by this is that capitalism has broken down (deterritorialized) the original 
purposes of copyright like the dissemination of information.821 It then reformed the 
system in the digital era to focus around controlling the access points (reterritorialized 
it to achieve capitalist ends of maximum profit by removing or minimising any 
opportunities to escape the coding of the copyright system).822  The result is that the 
existence of an ‘act of communication’ to the public must be considered broadly823 to 
minimise such opportunities and to ensure a high level of protection in accordance 
with, inter alia, recitals 4 and 9 of the preamble to Directive 2001/29.824  
 
819 Fitzgerald, B., ‘Copyright in the Age of Access’ in Gilchrist, J., and Fitgerald, B., (eds), Copyright, 
Property and the Social Contract: The Reconceptualisation of Copyright (Springer International, 
2018) 183 in Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s 
Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.5.  
820 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.2 generally.  
821 An act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of Such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned”- Statute of Anne 1709. See: 
(http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html) Accessed: 13/10/2014.  
822 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008); Lessig also notes that state 
governments and government agencies are have been subjected to capture from the beginning – 
(Lessig, Free Culture, (2004), p.6.). 
823 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [17]; (see, to 
that effect, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and 
Others [2011] ECR I-9083, paragraph 193.  
824 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [47], [48], [49]; 
See also, the judgments in SGAE, C-306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 36; Peek & Cloppenburg, 
EU:C:2008:232, paragraph 37; and Football Association Premier League and Others, 
EU:C:2011:631, paragraph 186); (see, by analogy, judgment in Football Association Premier 
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Thus, rather than let anything ‘escape’ coding825 or circumvent restrictions,826 the 
copyright system used the aforementioned exclusive rights to repress whatever 
escaped the axiomatics and the applications of reterritorialization in other flows. It is 
argued that this was done “irrespective” of whether users avail themselves of such 
opportunities to flout the rules,827 regardless of the method used.828 This is in order to 
keep the flows from escaping the system and maintain the application of the axiomatic 
framework of copyright in the digital age.829 This was designed to extend to an 
“indeterminate number of potential recipients...and a fairly large number of 
persons.”830 This is argued to be so that information in the digital age would not end 
up on the ‘edge of the reach of the state’831 and escape the coding (regulation) of the 
copyright system whereby profits would otherwise escape or fail to be realized. 
 
League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, paragraphs 107 to 109); Reha Training Gesellschaft fur Sport-
und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft fur musikaliche Auffurhungs-und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungrechte eV (GEMA), Case C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379, [36] (ECJ, Grand Chamber) 
(this was the subject of a broad interpretation); Referring to info. Soc. Dir, Recitals 9, 10, 23: 
Stitching Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456, [22] (ECJ) 
(high level); Verwertungsgesselenschaft Rundfunk GmbH v. Hettegger Hotel Edelweiss GmbH, 
Case C-641/15, EU:C:2016:795, [AG14] (Ag Spunzar) (a very ‘broad’ right, but less discussion in 
this case was given); The need for a ‘high level’ of protection was reiterated in SGAE v Rafael 
Hotels [2006] para 36. 
825 Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.178.  
826 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [31].  
827 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [19] (see, by 
analogy, Case C-306/05 SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519, paragraph 43).  
828 Bestwater International GmbH v. Mebes, C-348/13, EU:C:2014:2315 (ECJ).  
829 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.365.  
830 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [21] (SGAE, 
paragraphs 37 and 38, and ITV Broadcasting and Others [2013] ECR, paragraph 32); Paramount 
Home Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), 
[2014] E.C.D.R. 7, [2013] 11 WLUK 310 at [109]; Warner Music UK Ltd v Tunein Inc [2019] EWHC 
2923 (Ch) [2019] 11 WLUK 6 at [121],[125],[127],[130]-[131].   
831 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
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Moreover, it is suggested that this extension of reterritorialization has now been 
furthered through the use of digital contracts.832  
This is postulated to be because the more the capitalist machine deterritorializes, 
decodes and axiomatizes flows in order to extract surplus value from them, the more 
its ancillary apparatuses, like copyright law, do their utmost to reterritorialize. This is 
done by absorbing in the process a larger and larger share of surplus value by 
preventing the escape of flows.833 This is then facilitated by controlling the access 
points of the digital market834 where the work or subject matter has been made 
available on the internet without the permission of the rightsholder.835 This is argued 
to be behind the growth of the panopticon in ‘softer forms’ of life like the market and 
entertainment industry.836 For example, reality shows and YouTube are becoming an 
asset and a social norm (the fundamental logic behind YouTube is: the more views 
the better) which has led to terms such as “panopticommodity”837 due to the 
commodification838 of surveillance online. The reason for this stems from the fact that 
capitalism is innovative, whereby it consistently draws on the knowledge that it does 
 
832 See chapter 4 generally.  
833 See the discussion in this chapter at 3.4 and 3.5 respectively; Often the most passive/incidental 
acts are caught by the reproduction right, such as upload onto a USB – Technische Universitat 
Darnstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG, Case C-117/13, EU:C:2014:2196, [52] (ECJ); Download from peer-
to-peer systems -  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] 
[43]-[46]; and when they access an Internet stream – FAPL v. British Communications [2017] EWHC 
480 (Ch) [31] (Arnold J). 
834 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury 
Academic, 1983) pp.48-9; This same concept is discussed (but in the context of surveillance) in 
Galič, M., Timan, T. & Koops, B. Bentham, ‘Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance 
Theories from the Panopticon to Participation’. Philos. Technol. 30, [2017] 9–37. at 4.1 and 4.2.     
835 GS Media NV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al., Case C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644 (ECJ).  
836 Galič, M., Timan, T. & Koops, B. Bentham, ‘Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance 
Theories from the Panopticon to Participation’. Philos. Technol. 30, [2017] 9–37. at 4.1.  
837 On ‘commodification’ see Lyon, D. The search for surveillance theories (2006) - In D. Lyon (Ed.), 
Theorising surveillance: The panopticon and beyond (pp. 3–20). Portland: Willan Publishing. 
838 Terranova, T, ‘Free Labour: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy’ Social Text, [2000] 63 (18), 
p.35; available at: http://web.mit.edu/schock/www/docs/18.2terranova.pdf (Accessed: 9/12/2017). 
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not produce itself, but that is the result of individual and collective processes of 
communication, cooperation and learning that occur in society.839   
As a result, the essentiality of the doctrines of communication (in the UK) and public 
performance (in the US) cannot be understated in the digital environment. This is 
because the traditional reliance on distribution of multiple copies of copyright works 
for income generation is being displaced by digital technologies and the online markets 
procured by them.840 This is argued to represent a quintessential example of ‘the short-
term gratification of immediate consumption’841 – which negates the need for the 
physical distribution of tangible copies. The result of this, as noted by Westkamp, is 
that in these markets, the economic value842 now remains fundamental in ‘accessing’ 
 
839 Vandenberghe, F. ‘Deleuzian capitalism’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 34(8) [2008]: 877-903. 
840 Stevens, J., ‘The secondary sale, copyright conundrum – Why we need a secondary market for 
digital content.’ (2016) Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 26(4), pp. 179-194; See also chapter 
4 at 4.6.  
841 This was raised in the context of discussing the central question of copyright policy. Dr Gurry 
stated: How can society make cultural works available to the widest possible public at affordable 
prices, whilst at the same time, assuring a dignified economic existence to creators and performers 
and the business associates that help them navigate the economic system? It is a question that 
implies a series of balances: between availability, on the one hand, and control of the distribution of 
works as a means of extracting value, on the other hand: between consumers and producers; 
between the interests of society and those of the individual creator; and between the short-term 
gratification of immediate consumption and the long-term process of providing economic incentives 
that reward creativity and foster a dynamic culture. – Gurry, F., ‘The Future of Copyright’ (at the Blue 
Sky Conference: Future Directions in Copyright Law, Sydney, 25 February 2011); Gurry, F., 
‘Foreword: The Future of Copyright’ in Brian Fitzgerald and John Gilchrist (eds), Copyright 
Perspectives: Past, Present and Prospect (Springer, 2015) vi. Taken from Foong, C., The Making 
Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.3.   
842 Bently and Sherman notes that perhaps, more accurately, the law has turned its attention away 
from the value of the labour embodied in the protected subject matter, to the value of the object 
itself...meaning that value now tend[s] to mean the macro-economic value of the property rather 
than, as had been the case previously, the quantity of the mental labour embodied in the property in 
question -  Bently, L. and Sherman, B., The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British 
Experience, 1760-1911 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.174-195. 
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the work – that is, experiencing a transient representation of the work without 
necessarily acquiring a tangible copy.843  
Consequently, it is hypothesized that if the current approach remains in the digital 
environment, it is unlikely that the aim of perfecting copyright’s dissemination function 
can be achieved.844 This is considered to be exacerbated with the issues created by 
the licensing approach in chapter four regarding the practicality, or impracticality, 
pertaining to the dissemination of digital works in the current market for those 
attempting to access works without the prospect of legal liability.845  
Yet, as will be explained in the fifth chapter, it is submitted that the reforms proposed 
can help deal with such issues by the anticipated reduction in costs across the 
copyright spectrum as access will be more economically viable, leading to the 
potentiality of enhanced access and increased production as a result.846 Thus, the 
reforms could increase the disseminatory capacity of works by making such 
distributions cheaper.  In turn, this could indirectly encourage compliance and 
minimise what would otherwise be considered to be unauthorised distributions as 
legitimate markets could seem more appealing.847 The reforms also deal with the issue 
 
843 See Ginsberg, J.C., ‘From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access 
Right in U.S. Copyright Law’ in Hugh Hansen (ed), US Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Edward 
Elgar, 2000) 39; Westkamp, G., ‘Transient Copying and Public Communications: The Creeping 
Evolution of Use and Access Rights in European Copyright Law’ (2004) 36(5) George Washington 
international Law Review 1057 – Taken from Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the 
Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 
pp3-4.  
844 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.8. 
845 See chapter 4 generally, more specifically at 4.7 and 4.7.1.  
846 See chapter 5 at 5.5.  
847 Note that there is no empirical evidence to support this directly. However, Danaher Smith and 
Telang ‘Website Blocking Revisited’ (18 April 2016), SSRN, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795> [Accessed 30 June 2019]  did find 
that in the aftermath of the November 2014 website blocks, there was a 6% increase in 
subscriptions to legitimate sources such as Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on 
legitimate ad-revenue supported sources such as BBC and Channel 5’s streaming sites. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. 
Poort and J. Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of 
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of contracts (discussed extensively in chapter four)848 and the associated implications 
of such items when applied in the context of exclusive copyright’s, which is also dealt 
with in the final chapter.849 
This is important as such items are an essential feature of the future of copyright law 
as without efficient dissemination of copyright to the public, the benefits flowing from 
the copyright system will not be fully realised.850 This is considered to be fundamental 
as both functions are intrinsic to the foundational legislation of modern copyright law, 
the Statute of Anne, which for the first time vested copyright in authors and was 
explicitly titled ‘an Act for the encouragement of learning’.851  
However, it is asserted that the movement away from such foundational aspects is 
unsurprising. This is based on the fact that this is what the completion of the process 
of reterritorialization is, more laws,852 more regulation: a world created in the process 
of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization – not at all hope, but the 
finding of a ‘finished design’. This is to the point where copyright becomes so artificial 
that the movement of deterritorialization creates of necessity and by itself a new 
copyright, more copyrights, and heightened regulation and the curtailment of 
 
Amsterdam [2018], p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the 
communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]. 
848 Specifically, this looks at the relationships with licences and copyright and how the legal principles 
of both are used to limit what can be done with digital copyright works as there is no secondary 
markets as with tangible copies. For more information on this, see chapter 4 at 4.4, 4.5, and 4.7 
respectively.   
849 See chapter 5.  
850 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.7.  
851 The full title of the act was ‘An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of 
Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times therein mentioned’: 
Statute of Anne 1710 (London).  
852 See e.g. H.R. 1836, Fair Play Fair Pay Act, 115th Cong. (2017) (giving sound recording copyright 
owners new exclusive right to perform their sound recordings over AM and FM radio); C. Geiger, O. 
Bulayenko and G. Frosio, ‘The Introduction of a Neighbouring Right for Press Publishers at EU 
Level: The Unneeded (and Unwanted) Reform’ [2017] 39 EIPR 202. 
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access.853 Therefore, for writers like Professor Spoo, what lawmakers call ‘progress’ 
in the free market is really just a “single, ongoing catastrophe and a piling up of 
proprietary ruins, copyright after copyright.” 854  
3.7 Concluding comments 
This chapter has looked at how this evolution of copyright and the internet is an 
example of the developmental aspects of capitalism. Specifically, this involved  looking 
at the way in which capitalism consistently looks for new ways and methods in which 
to turn assets into productive agents of capital generation. This also included 
assessing the ways in which it expands pre-existing avenues for doing so under 
proprietary rights and the economic value this attracts.909  
The result is that capitalism has created a situation where copyright has maintained 
its position over content where it now remains a capitalist commodity in a digital media 
regime.911 This has created a ‘global copyright congestion’ which seems more 
‘perverse’ and’ ‘antiquated’ in the era of digital technology’ under laws bent on 
recapturing the past for private interests.914 This has been done by using legal 
doctrines like the rights of communication, and, public performance, discussed in this 
chapter. Thus, although the digital network has made possible the unprecedented 
sharing and collaboration of information, they have also been the subject of a digital 
enclosure.924  
 
853 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983), p.366-7. 
854 Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 
2013), p.274.  
909 Accord, Ginsburg, ‘The Place of the Author in Copyright’ pp.66-67; See  also e.g. J. Litman, 
‘Information Privacy/Information Property’ [2000] 52 Stan.L.Rev. 1283, 1295-301. 
911 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.52.   
914 Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 
2013), p.274. 
924 Murdock, G., ‘Political Economies as Moral Economies: Commodities, Gifts, and Public Goods’ 
[2011] in Hesmondhalgh, D., The Cultural Industries (3rd eds. SAGE Publications 2013) p.71; Also, 
James Boyle offers an interesting account of how digital technology has fallen victim to the 
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This current digital environment is based on a complex social discourse that has been 
created by economic, political, and sociological forces, where copyright is increasingly 
driven by access, and restricting that access. This is to the point where we are left with 
what seems to be an ‘ad-hoc’, and ‘fact-specific’ system that fails to instil confidence 
in contemporary copyright law.927 This is because in Western capitalist society the only 
individuals who predominantly benefit from sophisticated property systems are a tiny 
minority who can afford it.928  
Under this, is it asserted that rightsholders have proactively altered the relations of 
production and strengthened their positions in the digital age by restricting access. 
Thus, although the digital transformation has been a game-changer, the game is still 
won by the music industries who win by creating the rules.929 The result is that rights, 
as part of the free-market ideology—otherwise known as the new libertarianism of 
global intellectual property—are now essential to the modern world of global 
commerce.930 
 
“enclosure” tactics facilitated by rightsholders and enabled y copyright law in Boyle, J., The Public 
Domain (Yale University Press, 2008).  
927 Foong, C., The Making Available Right, Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination 
Function in the Digital Age (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p.2. 
928 De Soto, H., The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and failed everywhere 
else (Black Swan Publishing, 2001),  p.67. (It should be noted that although De Soto is talking about 
Western Property systems in the tangible sense, it is argued that this analysis, by virtue of the 
strong property element present in the copyright sector, that the account he offers is equally 
applicable here).   
929 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.xxi.  
930  P. Morris, ‘The contemporary ideological legitimacy of global intellectual property rights’ I.P.Q. 
(2020), 1, 44-73; See also, Schnyder and Siems, The Ordoliberal Variety of Neoliberalism in 
Konzelmann and Fovargue Davies (eds), Banking Systems in the Crisis: The Faces of 
Liberal Capitalism (Routledge, 2013), 
p.4, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142529> [Accessed 6 February 2020] – 
in Asterios Pliakos and Aikaterini Dedouli-Lazaraki, ‘Granting exclusive rights to public or privileged 
undertakings under EU competition law: article 106(1) TFEU combined with article 102 TFEU’ 
E.C.L.R. [2020], 41(4), 195-209; This is only necessary insofar as is necessary to protect and 
preserve the prerequisites of the competitive system - Not direct state intervention (Talbot, 
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This is created a confiscation and hiding of wealth like never before, demonstrating 
that capitalism has invaded physical as well as virtual space, with subjects becoming 
the objects of abstract exchanges that take place nowhere else other than in their 
virtual world.932 In part, this is perhaps because of the broader growth of capitalism 
within society, and the fact that, in the UK, the development of the system is 
predominantly around the capitalist principles of economic rights.933 
To this end, the next chapter will outline how rightsholders are utilising technology 
through contractual methods in the form of digital licences. These remove works 
outside of the remit of copyright law under what is described as a ‘two-tier’ system of 
protection.942 The significance of this is the impact on the ability of individuals to invoke 
otherwise legitimate statutory limitations on the exclusive rights granted by copyright 
law,943 that are designed to limit the exercise of such exclusive powers.944 This means 
that contracts could also detrimentally impact the enforceability of the proposed 
reforms.945 This could be done by removing otherwise copyrighted-protected items 
 
‘Ordoliberalism and Balancing Competition Goals in the Development of the European Union’ [2016] 
61 The Antitrust Bull. 267); Wernhard Möschel, Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View in 
Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), p.142.  
932 Forrester, V., ‘L’horreur economique’ (Paris: Fayard, 1996) in De Soto, H., The Mystery of Capital: 
Why capitalism triumphs in the West and failed everywhere else (Black Swan Publishing, 2001), 
p.236.  
933 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly (2016). 
942 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5.  
943 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (1976); s.18(3)(a) CDPA 1988; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 4(2), allows for exhaustion in 
cases of ‘first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community’. 
944 See chapter 4 at 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.7.1  respectively.  
945 For a comprehensive account of the reforms explained in their entirety, see chapter 5at 5.4.1(c).  
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outside of their remit946 and in some cases, extending copyright-style protection where 
it would otherwise be limited.947  
Chapter five then deals with both types of contracts by proposing the imposition of a 
legislative framework.948 This will prevent contracts being used to subvert the reform 
proposals, whilst at the same time providing a greater degree of commercial certainty. 
This will be achieved by recommending that a clear framework be established in 
accordance with current case law to ensure their fluid implementation in an attempt to 
minimise commercial and legal disruption. Importantly, these proposals embody the 
foundational underpinnings behind the creation and existence of copyright, like the 
dissemination of information, through driving down prices which is predicted to create 
a more financially accessible system which could benefit some authors.949  
 
946 In the UK, see chapter 4 at 4.4.2; See also, Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 Case C- 419/13 at [38], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], 
[48], [49] - (The significance of the decision is that the CJEU held that a transferee of software from 
an original purchaser is a ‘lawful acquirer’ (even though a licence term affecting the original 
purchaser purported to prevent such transfer); Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting 
Pictoright [2015] Case C-263/18; Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v 
Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others December (2019) (the Court determined, in a quintessentially 
Usedsoft fashion, that there is no exhaustion of online media even if incidentally bound up in a 
computer program that might be the subject of the Usedsoft decision); In the US, see chapter 4 at 
4.4.1; See also, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) at 
[655] – (the first sale defence is limited to tangible artefacts that the copyright owner can inject into 
the stream of commerce ); K. Moon, ‘Resale of Digital Content: UsedSoft v ReDigi’ [2013] 24(6) 
European Intellectual Property Review 193. 
947 See chapter 4 at 4.4 generally, and more specifically, at 4.3.2; See also,  Jacobsen v Katzer 535 
F.3d 1373 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008); Care has to be taken with this case, since the 
licence is one that provides a condition of use which might otherwise result in copyright 
infringement. The broader case which extended copyright protection to an area where it was 
previously denied was in ProCD, Inc. v ZeidenBerg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996); MDY 
Industries., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) (copyright 
violations by breaches of a license agreement because of the fact that copies of a program are 
created when it runs).  
948 See chapter 5 at 5.4.1  
949 See chapter 5 at 5.5; See also e.g. Cohen, J.E., Configuring the Networked Self (New Haven 
2012), 223-66; Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, pp. 191-215; W. 
Patry, How to Fix Copyright (Oxford Uni. Press. 2011), at 177-88; J. Silbey, The Eureka Myth: 
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Creators, Innovators and Everyday Intellectual Property (Stanford Press. 2015), 274-85; M. Van 
Houweling, "Making Copyright Work for Authors Who Write to Be Read" (2015) 38 Columbia Journal 
of Law & the Arts 381; R.A. Reese, ‘Optional Copyright Renewal: Lessons for Designing Copyright 







The role of contracts. 
  
4.1 Introduction. 
The thesis has concentrated upon how the copyright system has been influenced by 
capitalism and how this has resulted in a predominant emphasis on the economic 
interests of rightsholders in the digital music industry. To this end, the previous 
chapters emphasised how advancements in digital technology enabled the 
manifestation of a copyright infrastructure that operated to encourage maximal 
compliance. This was achieved through an environment of panoptic surveillance 
adopted by the music industry1 in response to the issue of file-sharing that was 
“bulldozing the ramshackle castles of the copyright industries.”2 This resulted in an 
extensive range of activity being held capable of liability.3 This was then argued to lay 
the foundations for the ‘streaming’ model under signal copyrights.4   
 
1 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  chapter 8; Arditi, D., ‘Disciplining the Consumer: File-Sharers under the Watchful Eye of the 
Music Industry’ (2011).  
2  Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press 
2004) pp.50-1.  
3  The notion of what constitutes an act of making available has been given a rather extensive 
meaning in cases of file sharing – Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch). In this case, 
anyone using peer-to-peer software so that others can access files will amount to making available 
in the UK (even if those who access the files are, in many cases, outside of the UK). Polydor Ltd v 
Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d and MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct 2764 (US Supreme Court, 2005); See also, R. Arnold, ‘Content Copyrights 
and Signal Copyrights: The Case for a Rational Scheme of Protection’ (2011) 1 QMJIP 272; See 
also, chapter 2 at 2.3.   
4   For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.5; On ‘streaming’ see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, 
N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2016) at 26-141.  
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The answer by the music industry was to create contractual methods of consuming 
music online. This was to safeguard5 the unauthorised distribution of music against 
the seemingly unlimited capacity to do so as a result of digital technology.6 Licensing 
has been chosen as the next method of digital exploitation due to the way that 
contracts exploit the copyright legal infrastructure via the diminished applicability of 
the ‘first sale’7 and ‘exhaustion’8 doctrines. The subsequent effect that this has on the 
statutory limitations prescribed by copyright regarding the exclusive rights of 
‘reproduction’ and ‘distribution’ is discussed below.9 This chapter will argue that digital 
 
5   Park. D. J., Conglomerate Rock: The Music Industry’s Quest to Divide Music and Conquer Wallets 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2007) at 94;  Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the 
Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  pp.136-38.   
6 See the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.2; Rheingold, H., The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier (Revised edition, Cam. MA: MIT Press 2000); Castells, M., The Rise of the 
Network Society (Volume 1 of The Information Age, 1996).    
7 The first sale doctrine is codified in the US copyright statute 17 USC Sec. 109(a) and operates as a 
narrow limitation on the exclusive distribution right of owners under Sec. 106(3). Sec. 109(a) states: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord." 
8 See the Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer programs (the "Software Directive") and the European Directive on the 
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Intellectual Property and Related Rights in the Information 
Society (2001/29/EC). The Software Directive at Art. 4(2) states: "The first sale in the [European 
Union] of a copy of a program by the rightsholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution 
right within the [European Union] of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental 
of the program or a copy thereof." In similar vein, the InfoSoc Directive Art. 4(2) states: "The 
distribution right shall not be exhausted within the [European Union] in respect of the original or 
copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the [European Union] 
of that object is made by the rightsholder or with his consent."; See also, Longdin, L. and Lim, P.H., 
‘Inexhaustible distribution rights for copyright owners and the foreclosure of secondary markets for 
used software’ IIC [2013], 44(5), 541-568 at [547].  
9 For more information, see this chapter at 4.7.  
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licences are maximising the exploitation10 and imperative control11 that rightsholders 
can exert in the digital age12 particularly over consumers.13 This is opposed to the 
predominant physical method of distribution historically.14 The chapter then considers 
how they do so by virtue of the fact that they enable the terms of the relationship to be 
dictated to a greater extent as the agreements give rise to obligations which are 
enabled15 and recognised by law.16   
The chapter considers how the imposition of contractual agreements, particularly in 
the digital sphere, has increased unilateral rightsholder control.17 It then analyses how 
this control has expanded due to the relationship of copyright with contract law in the 
context of digital technology. This also includes the practical implications this has had 
 
10  Copyright is treated as a form of personal property right that can be ‘exploited’ in a number of 
ways, most importantly by assignment or license – CDPA 1988, ss.1 and 90(1); Posner argues that 
wealth maximisation exemplifies both utility and autonomy – Posner, R., The Economics of Justice 
(Harvard Uni Press 1983) p.115.  
11 The example given by Weber here refers to a corporate group, by virtue of the fact that the 
members are subjected to the legitimate exercise of imperative control, that is to ‘authority’, and so 
are labelled as an ‘imperatively coordinated’ group. He also notes that in this case, ‘imperative 
control’ is confined to the legitimate type, but it is not possible in English to speak here of an 
‘authoritarian’ group. The citizens of any state, no matter how ‘democratic,’ are ‘imperatively 
controlled’ because they are subject to law – (Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organisation (The Free Press, 1947), pp.152-53.  
12 For more information, see this chapter at 4.6.  
13 For more information, see the discussion in this chapter generally, and in particular, parts 4.5 and 
4.6 respectively; See also, Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf 
Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs 
Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th 
Cir. 2016); Savic, M., ‘The Legality of Resale of Digital Content after UsedSoft in Subsequent 
German and CJEU Case Law’ [2015] EIPR 414-29. 
14 For more information, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  Part IV.  
15 See the discussion in this chapter at 4.5; See also, s.28(1) Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988, and 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1976).  
16 Edwin Peel, The Law of Contract (14th eds. Sweet and Maxwell 2015), p.1; See also, this chapter at 
4.5, 4.5.1, and 4.6 respectively.   
17 See this chapter at 4.5.1.  
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for users regarding the accessibility of works electronically.18 Electronic contracts are 
to be recognised as valid and enforceable under UK law. This is under the E-
Commerce Directive Art.9(1)19 (as implemented via the Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No.2013).20 Similarly, such agreements are 
recognised under US law via 17 U.S.C. §109 (1976).21  
This chapter then assesses how the current situation is the result of the digital 
dissemination of information removing the intermediaries from the distribution 
process.22 Thus, a consumer who would have bought a CD directly from a retailer can 
now be supplied with an equivalent digital version over the internet directly from the 
copyright holder. This direct contract means that the rights owner can enforce any 
rights that they may have under copyright. However, this can now also include 
additional obligations imposed as part of the agreement.23  
 
18 For more information, see 4.2.  
19 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c); For 




20The Directive was originally implemented by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 (“the 2002 Regulations”), which amongst other things implemented the Country of Origin 





21 More specifically, U.S.C. §109(d) (2012) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does 
not apply to a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as 
someone who as obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee. 
22  Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  pp.120-124. 
23  Issues of fitness for use and quality of digital content supplied by traders to consumers is regulated 
in part by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Ch.3. The European Commission, as part of the Digital 
Single Market strategy, has proposed harmonization: Proposal for a Directive on Certain Aspects 
Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, COM (2015) 634 final. The proposal 
requires the supplier of digital content to have undertaken relevant rights clearances in relation to 
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The effect of this is that under the current licensing approach, the distributor can 
enforce any rights they have in copyright against the recipient.24 Yet, they can also 
enforce any other obligations they have against them contractually.25 The concern is 
that these click-through contracts will extend copyright owners rights beyond their 
existing scope.26 However, the digital revolution has also caused the democratization 
of the production, promotion and distribution of music where small-scale organizations 
such as independent labels or self-releasing artists, have also generated commercial 
success.27  
Nonetheless, although these are relevant points, the discussion here concerns digital 
contracts due to the effect they can have on the copyright system in the music area. It 
is asserted that the increasing use of electronic resources has made the use of such 
contracts become the norm.28 The chapter demonstrates that the result is that items 
are licenced not purchased, increasing the potential for the delicate balance between 
owners and users in statutory copyright to be sacrificed in the current environment.29 
The reason for this is because items which are licenced and not sold have the 
capacity, more so in the digital context,30 to circumvent the limitations on the 
 
third party intellectual property rights, but in other respects the proposed legislation leaves 
intellectual property rights intact.  
24 See this chapter generally. In particular, see sections 4.4, 4.5. 
25 The issue of fitness for use and quality of digital content supplied by traders to consumers is 
regulated by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.  
26 Malevanny N, ‘Relevant Rights and Their Applicability to Online Music Uses. In: Online Music 
Distribution - How Much Exclusivity Is Needed?’ [2019] Munich Studies on Innovation and 
Competition, vol 12. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp.13-69, 317-339; See also, P. Johnson, ‘All 
Wrapped Up? A Review of the Enforceability of “Shrink-Wrap” and “Click-Wrap” Licenses in the 
United Kingdom and the United States’ (2003) EIPR 98.  
27 Malevanny N, ‘Relevant Rights and Their Applicability to Online Music Uses. In: Online Music 
Distribution - How Much Exclusivity Is Needed?’ [2019] Munich Studies on Innovation and 
Competition, vol 12. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp.1-5.  
28 For more information, see this chapter at 4.2. 
29 Longdin, L. and Lim, P.H., ‘Inexhaustible distribution rights for copyright owners and the foreclosure 
of secondary markets for used software’ IIC [2013], 44(5), 541-568 at [550]. 
30 This is primarily facilitated by the fact that both doctrines (first sale & exhaustion) usually only apply 
to tangible copies of works. For more information, see A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. Derclaye 
(ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright Law [2009], 237-8. See also, Case C- 
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distribution right in a particular copy of a work that would otherwise be exhausted after 
its first sale. However, it is important to note that the matter of whether an act of 
electronic transfer has been made by way of a sale is often difficult to investigate.31  
In the UK, this concerns what is known as the ‘exhaustion’32 right.33 This is the principle 
that once a copy has been issued within the European Economic Area (EEA), 
thereafter; that copy can be resold in the UK under s.18(3)(a) of the 1988 Act.34 This 
has been recognized in the context of trade between member states,35 but extended 
 
419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; M Savič, ‘The CJEU 
Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual Property 
Review 378; (reviewing the benefits of the US concept of exhaustion and pushing the notion that it 
needs to continue in the digital sphere and not be restricted).  
31 Case C-166/15 Aleksandrs Ranks v. Finansu un ekonmisko noziegumu izmeklesanas prokutura, 
Microsoft Corp., EU:C:2016:762, [43], [44] (ECJ) (in relation to exhaustion of electronic copies, 
differentiating between ‘back up’ copies made by the transferee, in relation to which there is no 
exhaustion, and copies received directly from the copyright-holder.) 
32 Note that the rules shall be subject to Intellectual Property (Exhaustion of Rights) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019/265 by virtue of section 8(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; On 
exhaustion, see R. Hilty and K. Koklu, ‘Software Agreements: Stocktaking and Outlook – Lessons 
from the Oracle v. UsedSoft Case from a Comparative Law Perspective’ [2013] 44(3) IIC 263; E. F. 
Schulze, ‘Resale of Digital Content such as Music, Films or eBooks under European Law’ [2014] 
36(1) European Intellectual Property Review 9; E. Rosati, ‘Online Exhaustion’ [2015] 10 JULP 673; 
Bill Batchelor and G. Montani, ‘Exhaustion, essential subject matter and other CJEU judicial tools to 
update copyright for an online economy’, J.I.P.L.P. [2015], 10(8), 591-600; Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion 
and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters 
International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London;  M Savič, ‘The 
CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual 
Property Review 378.  
33 This is discussed in greater detail, with the surrounding legislation and case law, in this chapter at 
4.4.  
34  CDPA 1988 s.18(3)(a) of the sets out the principle of exhaustion by stating that the subsequent 
distribution of copies of a work (such as selling on a purchased copy second-hand) will not infringe 
the rightsholder’s distribution right.; Info. Soc. Dir. Art.4(2) – defines this as ‘the first sale or other 
transfer of ownership...of that object’; The early beginning of the doctrine can be traced back to the 
case of Consten SaRL and Grundig GmbH v Commission (1966) Case 56/64; Case C-456/06 Peek 
& Cloppenburg SA v Cassina SpA, [2008] ECR I-2731 (ECJ).  
35  C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, Case [1971] ECR 487; The key reason behind this was 
primarily due to the fact that laws relating to copyright and related rights operate to produce barriers 
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by Directives into the definition of the right and thus is equally applicable to 
transactions within each state.36 This relates to each and every act of distribution, that 
is, transfer of ownership (as it is understood by the CJEU in Peek & Cloppenburg v. 
Cassina SpA).37 For purposes here, it has been widely assumed that this is only 
applicable to the distribution of tangible copies38 (as is generally assumed following 
Allposters v. Stichting Pictoright).39 This is to the point where the notion of exhaustion 
is now attached to specifically to tangibility.40   
 
to trade within the internal market – Perhaps the clearest example of this was the decision in Case 
C-341/87 EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, [1989] ECR 79 (highlighting how 
differences in calculating the term of protection for sound recordings in different member states led 
to barriers to trade).   
36  Software Dir., Art. 4(c); Database Dir., Art.5(c); Rel. Rights Dire., Art 9(2); The various directives 
define the scope of exhaustion in different terms. For example, Info. Soc. Dir. Art.4(2) – defines this 
as ‘the first sale or other transfer of ownership...of that object’.  
37  Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg SA v. Cassina SpA, [2008] ECR I-2731(ECJ).   
38 A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU 
Copyright Law (2009), 237-8. See also, Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015]. 
39  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; M Savič, ‘The CJEU 
Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual Property 
Review 378; Headdon, T., ‘The Allposters problem: reproduction, alteration and the 
misappropriation of value’ E.I.P.R. [2018], 40(8), 501-509; For more information, these matters are 
discussed extensively in this chapter at 4.4.2.   
40 S. Karapapa., Exhaustion of Rights on Digital Content Under EU Copyright: Positive and Normative 
Perspectives (November 4, 2018). Forthcoming, Aplin, T. (ed) Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Digital Technologies (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar: 2019). Available at: SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278149. 
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Yet, computer programs41 are to an extent considered exempt42 where the copy is 
destroyed by the reseller under the UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle decision.43 This case 
has generated considerable academic commentary44 and has most recently been 
described as leaving the question of ‘digital’ exhaustion as an ‘open’ matter.45 
Nonetheless, the long-awaited Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) in the Tom 
Kabinet case46 has helped in providing some legal certainty concerning the application 
 
41 To aid understanding, see L Longdin and P. H. Lim, ‘Inexhaustible Distribution Rights for Copyright 
Owners and the Foreclosure of Secondary Markets for Software’ [2013] 44(5) IIC 541 (comparing 
the position on resale of digitally distributed software in the European Union, United States, and 
New Zealand).     
42 For more information, see this chapter at 4.4.2; See also, Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the 
Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v 
Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London; See also, Savic, M., ‘The Legality 
of Resale of Digital Content after UsedSoft in Subsequent German and CJEU Case Law’ [2015] 
EIPR 414-29.  
43  Case C-128/11, EU:C:2012:407 (Grand Chamber), [47], [49], [58], and [61]; For more information, 
see this chapter at 4.4 and 4.4.2 respectively.  
44  R. Hilty and K. Koklu, ‘Software Agreements: Stocktaking and Outlook – Lessons from the Oracle 
v. UsedSoft Case from a Comparative Law Perspective’ [2013] 44(3) IIC 263; E. F. Schulze, ‘Resale 
of Digital Content such as Music, Films or eBooks under European Law’ [2014] 36(1) European 
Intellectual Property Review 9; See also, Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (C-
403/08) Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) 04 October 2011; For a succinct account of the possible implications of the primary 
objective of EU integration—single market, free flow of goods—on the principle of exhaustion (the 
EU-autonomous interpretation of the exhaustion principle), see Paul L.C. Torremans, ‘The future 
implications of the UsedSoft decision’ Create Working Paper No.2 
[2014], <http://www.create.ac.uk/publications/future-implications-usedsoft/> [Accessed May 20, 
2018]; K. Moon, ‘Resale of Digital Content: UsedSoft v ReDigi’ [2013] 24(6) European Intellectual 
Property Review 193; B. Batchelor and D. Keohane, ‘UsedSoft – Where to now for Software 
Vendors?’ [2012] ECLR 545; C. Stotgers, ‘When is Copyright Exhausted by a Software License?: 
UsedSoft v Oracle’ [2012] EIPR 787. 
45 S. Karapapa., Exhaustion of Rights on Digital Content Under EU Copyright: Positive and Normative 
Perspectives (November 4, 2018). Forthcoming, Aplin, T. (ed) Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Digital Technologies (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar: 2019). Available at: SSRN: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278149> accessed: 21/12/2019.  
46  Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019. 
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of the exhaustion principle to intangible artefacts beyond computer programs47 and is 
discussed below.48    
In the US, the equivalent doctrine is known as the first-sale doctrine,49 under 17 U.S.C 
§109(a). This is where the copyright owner’s distribution right in a particular copy of 
the work is “exhausted”50  after its first sale. The ‘first sale’ doctrine regulates the rights 
of the copyright and chattel owners by establishing that once authorized copies have 
been lawfully distributed, the property rights of the chattel owners prevail. It was first 
constitutionally codified under 17 U.S.C. §41 (1909) following its (often regarded) 
creation in the seminal US Supreme Court decision of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.52 
Yet, the humble beginnings regarding the legal principles created by this case can be 
traced back even earlier.53 
This chapter will demonstrate that these doctrines are being contractually 
circumvented in the digital age,54 enabling the procurement of both scarcity, and an 
 
47  Some regard Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] as only 
applying to tangible assets e.g. M Savič, ‘The CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital 
exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual Property Review 378, E. Rosati, ‘Online exhaustion’ 
[2015] 10 JIPLP 673. However, a case concerning entirely different facts specifically excluded any 
comment or cross-over pertaining to the matters in the case and the matter of digital exhaustion – 
C-174/15 Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v. Stitching Leenrecht, EU:C:2016:459, [AG54] (AG 
Szpunar). 
48  See this chapter at 4.4; See also, Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep 
Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019.   
49  The doctrine is often traced back to the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, discussed in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., immediately following, the doctrine’s roots in fact 
extend back to the mid-18th century, to the Lord Chancellor’s decision in Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342 
(Ch. 1741).  
50  This is discussed in greater detail, with the surrounding legislation and case law, in this chapter at 
parts 4.4 and 4.4.1 respectively; Perzanowski. A. and Schultz, J., ‘Digital Exhaustion’ 58 UCLA Law. 
Rev. 889 [2011]; O-A Rognstad, ‘Legally Flawed but Politically Sound’ [2014] Oslo Law Review 1; L 
Longdin and P. H. Lim, ‘Inexhaustible Distribution Rights for Copyright Owners and the Foreclosure 
of Secondary Markets for Software’ [2013] 44(5) IIC 541 (comparing the position on resale of 
digitally distributed software in the European Union, United States, and New Zealand).  
52 (Supreme Court, 1908).   
53 For more information, see this chapter at 4.4.  
54 Ibid.  
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increase in owner control, over their assets in capitalist society. This represents what 
is considered to be a return to the past as this contractual regulation will be argued as 
akin to the effects of the conditions created by the Licensing of the Press Act 1662.55  
The chapter then demonstrates that this prevents the application of copyright 
limitations such as those provided for under Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.56 This includes the defence of ‘fair use’ 
in the US and is codified under §.107 of the 1976 Act.57 In the UK, such limitations are 
categorized as ‘permitted acts’ which are listed under chapter III CDPA 1988.58 
However, limitations on the exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright owners are 
considerably limited due to their ‘extraordinary precision and rigidity’.59 This remains 
 
55 The Licensing of the Press Act 1662 is an Act of the Parliament of England (14 Car. II. c. 33), long 
title "An Act for preventing the frequent Abuses in printing seditious treasonable and unlicensed 
Books and Pamphlets and for regulating of Printing and Printing Presses.” – For more information, 
see this chapter at 4.7.1.   
56 This is otherwise known as the ‘Three-Step’ Test under the Berne Convention, Article 9, and this is 
discussed in chapter 5 at 5.3.2; Note, there is a requirement that these limitations do not do not 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightsholders - Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 5(5); Marrakesh Dir, Art. 
3(1) (‘applied’); Rel. Rights Dir., Art. 10 (‘applied’); Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593, Art. 6(applying Art 5(5) to proposed new mandatory 
exceptions). 
57  Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §.107; On Fair Use, see Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. 
Citizens for   Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957 (D. N.H., 1978); Italian Book Corp., v. American 
Broadcasting Co., 458 F.Supp. 65 (S.D. N.Y., 1978); These can be compared with the contrasting 
cases of BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Capitol Records Inc. v. Alaujan, 
2009 WL 5873136 (D. Mass., 7/27/09).  
58 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988; See also, Info. Soc., Dir., Art. 5; The traditional approach 
of the UK courts: Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer [2000] 4 All ER 239 (CA), 257 
(Chadwick LJ); See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20. On defences under 
European law and the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC and the public interest defence see 
chapters’ 21 and 24 respectively.    
59 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1988] FSR 43, 48; Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK 
Television Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 605; See also, Fraser Woodward v BBC [2005] EWHC 472 (Ch), 
[2005] EMLR 22.  
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the case, despite two reviews of their implementation.60 The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has also indicated a preference for a ‘narrow’ interpretation 
of copyright exceptions.61 This illustrates the high level of protection favoured in this 
area regarding the reproduction and distribution of articles.62  
Many argue that the increase in direct licensing has diminished the role of copyright 
exceptions and levies through contract.63 For instance, the Reprobel64 decision by the 
CJEU opened the potentiality of publishers and other licensees or assignees to claim 
such compensation in accordance with any contractual agreement made with the 
author (or rightsholder). This prompted a decision by the EU to insert Article 1665 into 
the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market.66 The reason for this is because 
 
60 A. Gowers, ‘Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ [2006], ch.4, 39, [3.26]; Ian Hargreaves., 
‘Digital opportunity: A review of intellectual property and growth’ [2011], 3, 8.    
61 Infopaq Int. v. Dansk Dagblades Forening, Case C-5/08 [2009] ECR I-6569 (ECJ) (‘Infopaq I’), [57]; 
Painer, Case C-145/10 [2012] ECDR (6) 89 (ECJ), [109]; AKM v Zurs.net Betriebs GmbH, Case C-
138/16, EU:C:2017:218, [27]-[38] (ECJ); VCAST v RTI SpA, Case C-265/16, EU:C:2017:913, [32].  
62 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [47], [48], [49]; See 
also, the judgments in Football Association Premier League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, 
paragraph 186); (see, by analogy, judgment in Football Association Premier League and Others, 
EU:C:2011:631, paragraphs 107 to 109); SGAE, C-306/05, EU:C:2006:764, paragraph 36; Peek & 
Cloppenburg, EU:C:2008:232, paragraph 37. 
63 Kretschmer, M., ‘Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies 
in Europe’ [2011] (22 out of the then 27 Member states hd such schemes); Karapapa, S., Private 
Copying (Routledge 2012); For background, see B, Hugenholtz, ‘The Story of the tape Recorder 
and the History of Copyright Levies’, in B. Sherman and L. Wiseman, (eds), Copyright and the 
Challenge of the New [2012], ch.7. See also, Microsoft Mobile Sales International Oy, Case C-
110/15, EU:C:2016:326, [AG23] (AG Wahl) (noting that the increase in direct licensing of consumers 
and the diminishing importance of the private copying exception and levy); See also, Austro-
Mechana Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte GmbH v 
Amazon C-572/14: [2016].  
64 Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v. Reprobel SCRL, Case C-572/13, EU:C:2015:750 (ECJ),[47], 
[48].  
65 See DSM Directive, Recital 60. 
66 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC - Originally, it was listed as Article 12 (now Article 16) which specified that (a member 
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the nature of the digital transaction takes this potential applicability of legitimate 
limitations away.67 This allows copyright owners to exert control over their assets once 
they are transferred to customers under licence. The chapter will argue that this opens 
up the potentiality for claims of contractual breach, in both the UK68 and the US.69 This 
is because the mere fact that an activity falls within one of the permitted acts does not 
mean that it does not contravene some other legal right (like contract),70 creating what 
is described as a ‘two-tier’ system of protection and exploitation for owners.71  
Yet, digital rights management (DRM) is also a method assisting copyright owners in 
controlling access to digital works and limiting potential transfers.72 It is further used 
to track and limit uses73 as did the music industry when selling songs online via 
iTunes,74 in an attempt at curbing illegal file-sharing.75 However, this will not be 
 
state may specify that a transfer of a license to a publisher confers on the latter a ‘sufficient legal 
basis’ to be entitled to a share of compensation).  
67 For more information, see this chapter at 4.4.  
68 CDPA 1988, s.28(1). 
69 17 U.S.C. §.109(d) (1976).  
70 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 9-20.  
71 For more information, see this chapter at 4.5. 
72 See McKenzie, E., Note, A Book by Any Other Name: E-books and the First Sale Doctrine, 12 Chi. 
Kent. Journal of Intellectual Property, 57, 63 in  Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The 
First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015).  
73 See Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, Am. Libr. Assoc, 
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/digitalrights [http://perma.cc/D88E-HLHD] accessed: 
21/01/2018. 
74 Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ 
Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015).  at 181. 
75 See McKenzie, E., Note, A Book by Any Other Name: E-books and the First Sale Doctrine, 12 Chi. 
Kent. Journal of Intellectual Property, at 62 in  Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The 
First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . 
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considered here as the top music companies have predominantly abandoned the use 
of DRM76 with the iTunes Store selling all music DRM-free.77  
The chapter will then consider whether the proposed reforms will be impacted by the 
functionality of contracts in the digital music age. It will argue that any proposals should 
be aimed at limiting the use of these contractual methods if they are to be effective. 
The reason for this is based on the fact that contracts could have the potential to distort 
the proposals effectiveness by enabling rightsholders to sidestep them.78 This will be 
dealt with under the legislative aspect of the proposals that are outlined briefly at the 
end of the chapter,79 and are discussed in their entirety in chapter five.  
 
 
76 In February 2007, Apple CEO Steve Jobs posted an open letter on Apple’s website, in which he 
appealed to music companies to stop selling music with DRM. See Apple CEO Steve Jobs’ Posts 
Rare Open Letter: ‘Thoughts on Music’—Calls for DRM-Free Music, Macdailynews (Feb. 6, 2007, 
2:59PM), 
<http://macdailynews.com/2007/02/06/apple_ceo_steve_jobs_posts_rare_open_letter_thoughts 
s_on_music/ [http://perma.cc/EPY7-CQ8J]>. Within a year, all of the major music companies 
abandoned the use of DRM. See Catherine Holahan, Sony BMG Plans to Drop DRM, Bloomberg 
businesss week (Jan. 4, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-01-04/sony-bmg-plans-
to-drop-drmbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice [http://perma.cc/V58V-
WTYK] accessed:21/08/2017 (“In a move that would mark the end of a digital music era, Sony BMG 
Music Entertainment is finalizing plans to sell songs without the copyright protection software that 
has long restricted the use of music downloaded from the Internet . . . . Sony BMG would become 
the last of the top four music labels to drop DRM”). Taken from  Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer 
Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . 
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, (2015); See also, 
<https://www.licensinglive.com/blog/2010/09/the-music-industry-is-dropping-drm-why-doesnt-the-
software-industry-follow/> accessed: 14/09/2018); Apple iTunes also began selling music without 
DRM restrictions as early as 2007, under iTunes Plus, for an added price – Garrity, Brian. 2007. 
“Adding up iTunes Plus” Billboard, June 23.  
77 Lettice, John, ‘Apple iTunes Store Goes ‘100% DRM-Free’ – Allegedly. [2009] Register. 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/06/macworld_itunes/ accessed: 21/02/2018.   
78 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1. 
79 See this chapter at 4.4 
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 4.2 Contract and copyright: what is the difference? 
Copyright law has an in rem application in that it provides a property right against the 
world.80 It also provides legal protection for works that might otherwise be reproduced 
without the threat of legal sanction. In contrast, under the in personam nature of 
contractual agreements, no obligations can be imposed on any person or agent, 
except the parties to it as per the UK cases of Tweddle v. Atkinson81 and Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge.82 In the same way, Judge Easterbrook in the US 
case of ProCD. Inc. v. Zeidenberg83 argued that rights created by contract were not 
‘equivalent’ to rights created by copyright. For him, copyright law created a property 
right against the world, whereas contracts are used by individuals in order to utilize 
that property against other individuals.84 In the UK, there has been no such statement 
made, but the closest equivalent is section 28(1).85 
The factor which distinguishes contract from other legal obligations is that they are 
based on the agreement of the contracting parties.86 This position generally remains 
true, even though it is subject to a number of exceptions. As a whole, the law is often 
concerned with the objective appearance87 of the agreement regarding consent for 
reasons of commercial convenience.88 Yet, there are some similarities in contract law, 
 
80 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: suggestions for the future’, European  
Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1, [2011]; For the UK see Davies, G., Garnett, K., 
Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London (2005) at 2-01 and 7-14. For the US see Barrett, 'Intellectual Property: Cases and 
Materials', (5th eds, West Academic 2011) at 2, 394. 
81 [1861] EWHC J57 (QB), (1861) 1 B&S 393 at 398. This case and  Dunlop flow from the notion that 
“consideration must move from the promise” - - Barber v Fox (1862) 2 Wms.Saund. 134, n.(e); 
Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B. 851 at 859.  
82 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] UKHL 1.  
83  ProCD. Inc. v Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996). 
84 Ibid at 1454.  
85 CDPA 1988; This is discussed below at 4.4.2.  
86 For more information, see Edwin Peel, ‘The Law of Contract’ 14th eds, (2015) at 1-001.  
87 This is argued to strengthen the terms imposed under the license agreements outlined here. For 
more information, see this chapter at 4;.3.1, 4.5, and 4.5.1 respectively.  
88 Smith v Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 QB 597 at 607; OT Africa Line Limited v Vickers Plc [1996] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 700; See also, Professor Howarth, ‘The meaning of Objectivity in Contract’, [1984] 100 L.Q.R. 
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as it often describes itself as more private than public, interpretation is more about 
objective than subjective understanding, and consideration is more about form than 
substance.89   
Contracts, however, have an in personam character. This means that they cannot be 
enforced against the world, but can be enforced against the parties to the agreement.90 
In copyright, this relationship often exists between the creator or exclusive licensee of 
a work,91 which is generally the distributor, and the recipient.92 For instance, the writer 
of a piece of literature may assign copyright to the publisher, who may then use 
contracts to govern how the work is used by the recipients. Thus, an author of an 
 
265; However, there has been disagreement with the ‘objectivity’ principle regarding the former, the 
key point to understand is that the analysis can contain elements of subjectivity even when 
analysing contractual agreements objectively – See Vorster J. ‘A Comment on the Meaning of 
Objectivity in Contract’ [1987] 103 L.Q.R. 274.  
89 Dalton, C., ‘An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ 94 Yale L.J. [1985]. Available at: 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol94/iss5/1 accessed:21/03/2017.  
90 It is important to note that (The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 does make an 
improvement to the law in that it reforms a doctrine of privity, which many parties regarded as unjust 
and commercially inconvenient (For the purpose of understanding, the doctrine of privity is the 
longstanding principle in both UK and US law that only parties to a contract can sue and be sued 
under that agreement. The result of the aforementioned legislation (in the UK) has meant that some 
third parties who did not provide adequate consideration for the agreement may still be able to have 
some rights within the agreement under English contract law) – For more information, see Chitty on 
Contracts (33rd ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2019) vol 1, pt.II ch.3; In the US, Judge Easterbrook argued 
that rights created by contract were not ‘equivalent’ to rights created by copyright. For him, copyright 
law created a property right against the world, whereas contracts are used by individuals in order to 
utilize that property against other individuals – ProCD. Inc. v Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 
1996) at 1454; For more information, see the discussion in this chapter at 4.2.1  
91  On “exclusive licensees” see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), chapter 5, Part 7, 
Section C; For the purposes of the 1988 Act, s.92(1) an “exclusive license” is a license in writing, 
signed by or on behalf of the copyright owner, authorising the licensee to the exclusion of all other 
persons, including the person granting the license, to exercise a right which would otherwise be 
exercisable exclusively by the copyright owner – CDPA 1988.  
92  K. Stechova, ‘Can an Exclusive Licensee Ever be the Owner? An Examination of the Non-
Assignability of Author’s Economic Rights in the Czech Republic’ submitted as an LL.M. thesis at 
the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London, [2010].  
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academic journal article may assign copyright to the publisher, and the publisher may 
then allow students to access it via an online service.93 However, the structural 
elements pertaining to contracts in the copyright sector is highly complex, as, in 
addition to the contractual relationship between the author and publisher, there are 
also relationships involving marketing agencies, recording artists, collecting societies, 
and overseas publishers.94  
Digital licensing has created a situation where the traditional distinction between 
copyright as a right against the world, and a contract being an agreement between 
individuals, is breaking down in the online context.95 This is because the licensing of 
copyright works is becoming increasingly common on a one-to-one basis.96 This is 
argued to represent the “societal realization of the defeat of reflection, the realization 
of subsumptive reason, [and] the unification of many under one.”97 This is due to the 
fact, as Adorno would argue, that in reality, a cycle of manipulation and retroactive 
need is unifying the system. The problem that is not mentioned is that the basis on 
which technology is gaining power over society is the power of those whose economic 
position is the strongest and is being extended through contract.98 
The reason for this is because copyright owners are able to contractually dictate the 
terms of the relationship with the users of the licensed work.99 This is enabled by the 
way in which these agreements operate in the digital landscape.100 Thus, otherwise 
 
93 The problems that contracts can create pertaining to accessibility of items online were part of 
motivation for deciding to undertake a thesis on copyright law. For more information, see discussion 
in chapter 1 at 1.3 
94 It should be noted that such a list is not exhaustive – (Fisher, W., ‘Promises to Keep’, Stanford Law 
and Politics, Stanford (2004) at 60-81). 
95  ProCD v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996).  
96  Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: suggestions for the future’, European   
Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1, [2011].  
97  Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein, Routledge Classics 1991), p.11. 
98 Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds, G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002) p.95. 
99 See this chapter at 4.4 & 4.5.  
100 An interesting account of how digital technology, like the internet, drastically altered the role of 
copyright, see, Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008); On the way in which this 
transition effected the changes in the music industry, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording 
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justifiable behaviours in the physical context, such as the transfer of a tangible item, 
can now be contractually prohibited in the digital world and create an actionable 
breach of contract.101 This is due to the uncomfortable legal position of these 
agreements that has enabled copyright limitations to be “sidestepped.”102  
In essence, the enforceability of these agreements enables what can be fairly 
described as a ‘personalised’ level of exploitation.103 This will be demonstrated to 
prevent the creation of secondary markets104 by the way that licenses prevent further 
distributions of the digital work due to the technical functionality of the artefacts they 
regulate within copyright.105 
4.3 From P2P, downloading, to streaming and licences. 
File-sharing had the potential to procure mass “disintermediation”106  (removal of the 
middle-man) in the copyright system. This threatened the normal physical means of 
 
Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015); To see how the role of property 
needs to be changed if copyright is to work in the long term, see Merges, R.P., Justifying Intellectual 
Property (Harvard University Press 2011), chapter 8.  
101 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20.; See also, this chapter at 4.5 and 4.5.1.  
102 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1.  
103 ‘2002 EU IP Contracts Study’ a study called ‘Study on the Conditions Applicable to Contracts 
Relating to Intellectual Property in the European Union’commissioned by European Commission, 
DG Internal market to IViR, Amsterdam in 2002 (Study contract No. ETD/2000/B5-3001/E/69) L. 
Guibault, P.B. Hugenholtz.  
104 Longdin, L. and Lim, P.H., ‘Inexhaustible distribution rights for copyright owners and the 
foreclosure of secondary markets for used software’ IIC [2013], 44(5), 541-568.  
105 For example, in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) at 
6 [4] citing London-Sire Records, Inc v John Doe 1 542 F. Supp 2D 153 (D. Mass 2008) – It was 
held that “ReDigi was (distributing reproductions) as it was materially impossible, under the law of 
physics, for the same material to be distributed and exist in two places at once at the same time.”; 
For more information, see this chapter at 4.5 & 4.7. 
106 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.105. 
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distribution that worked to the major labels advantage.107 The music industry then used 
the panoptic surveillance discussed in chapter two108 to procure compliance within the 
music industry, but this was not enough for the industry to procure sufficient control in 
the digital music area.109  
The next step by the music industry was to find a way to profitably distribute music 
online and the first instance of this came with online download services.110 This 
received backing from Apple iTunes which enabled the purchase of AAC files online 
by song or album, subject to licence. The other alternative offered was streaming 
services, like Spotify, that allows users to listen for free up to twenty hours,111 (or for a 
fixed fee per month, with paying users able to download), all subject to licence.  
As a result, the fundamental basis behind both subscription and download services is 
that music listeners will no longer own the music;112 rather, they will rent it.113 Thus, as 
soon as a user fails to pay the fee (or cancels the subscription), and the computer or 
device that stores the music is connected to the internet, the files then cease to work 
 
107 Garnham, N. and Ingilis, F., ‘Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economics 
and Information’ Newbury Park, [1990] CA Sage Publications; Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording 
Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  p.107, see also pp.6-20.  
108 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.3 and 2.5 generally.  
109 Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d and MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct 2764 (US Supreme Court, 2005); See also, R. Arnold, 
‘Content Copyrights and Signal Copyrights: The Case for a Rational Scheme of protection’ [2011] 1 
QMJIP 272. 
110 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  Part I, Part IV.  
111 <https://www.spotify.com/uk/signup/> accessed: 09/01/2019.  
112 See generally, Mazzone, J., Copyfraud and other abuses of intellectual property law (Stanford Law 
Books, 2011), pp118-140; Lessig, L., Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999); 
Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas (Vintage Books, 2001). 
113 In the UK, see Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 
1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; In the US, see, 
Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 F.3d 
1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v 
Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., Cal., Jan 20, 2015); Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
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because the use of that subscription is contingent on a fee.114 Moreover, if any such 
items are transferred, there is also the renewed potential that there may be either an 
infringement of the rights to reproduction and/or distribution.115 This also includes 
claims in contract as the files are subject to agreement not sold. 
4.3.1 The role of contracts in the digital copyright world 
In the digital environment contracts are used by copyright owners to control the use of 
their works online.116 Many also seek broader, stronger and longer control over 
protected works than would be available within the analogue world, or in legislation.117 
Thus, the imposition of digital agreements means rightsholders can govern beyond 
the physical context118 as they are intangible119 and are sold subject to license.120 This 
enables copyright owners to minimize any subsequent distributions that may be 
carried out by ‘users’ (by users, this means primarily the individual consumers who 
wish to utilize copyright-protected material). This is because certain acts now require 
 
114 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  pp.120124.  
115  Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
116 For more information, see this chapter at 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 respectively; See also, Lindsay, D., ‘The 
law and economics of copyright, contract and mass market licenses’ Research Paper prepared for 
the Centre for Copyright Studies Ltd, [2002], at 6, 7.   
117 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1; See also, ‘2010 SABIP Study’ a Research 
commissioned in 2010 to a group of copyright and economics academics by the Strategic Advisory 
Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP) called ‘Relationship between Copyright and Contract 
Law’.  
118 For more information, see this chapter at 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 respectively.   
119 In the UK, see Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 
1039; Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; In the US, see, 
Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 F.3d 
1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v 
Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., Cal., Jan 20, 2015); Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
120 In the UK see s.28(1) CDPA 1988; In the US, see 17 U.S.C. §109(d); For more information, see 
this chapter at 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively.  
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the consent of copyright owners, with copyright law now acting to increase the 
influence of these contractual terms.121  
For example, it is not uncommon to see digital music licensed to consumers, subject 
to terms such as “You shall be authorised to use iTunes Products only for personal, 
non-commercial use”;122 and “we grant you a limited, non-exclusive, revocable 
licence to make use of the [service], and a limited, non-exclusive, revocable licence to 
make personal, non-commercial, entertainment use of the Content (the 
“Licence”).”123 As a result, what would otherwise be the simple transfer of a physical 
CD to a friend via lending, or being sold to a charity shop etc under s.18(3)124 or 
§.109(a);125 now becomes an issue of potential contractual breach as a result of 
technological developments.  
It is postulated that this is serving to maximise the control that rightsholders can exert 
because the first state of affairs prevails only where those who strive for profit do so 
by creating a scarcity condition.126 For example, the Apple iTunes, in their user 
agreement that accompanies the music downloaded from the service they provide 
writes that: 
 
121 See this chapter at 4.5, 4.7.   
122 For more information see: iTunes Terms and Conditions: <http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/uk/terms.html> accessed: 11/1/2016 (However, Apple does allow for files to be 
shared between what they term a “family” which allows up to “six” members of the group to be given 
access to that information). 
123 See, Spotify Terms and Conditions: <https://www.spotify.com/uk/legal/end-user-agreement/> 
accessed: 11.11.18.  
124 CDPA 1988 s.18(3)(a) sets out the principle of exhaustion by stating that the subsequent 
distribution of copies of a work (such as selling on a purchased copy second-hand) will not infringe 
the rightsholder’s distribution right.; Info. Soc. Dir. Art.4(2) – defines this as ‘the first sale or other 
transfer of ownership...of that object’; The early beginning of the doctrine can be traced back to the 
case of Consten SaRL and Grundig GmbH v Commission [1966] Case 56/64; Peek & Cloppenburg 
SA v Cassina SpA, Case C-456/06 [2008] ECR I-2731 (ECJ); See also, 4.4 and 4.4.2 of this 
chapter.  
125 See also, 4.4 and 4.4.1 of this chapter.  
126 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.340; For an 
opposing view, see - H. Demsetz, ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy’ [1973]  16 J 
Law and Economics, 1-9, at 3.  
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“iTunes is the provider of the Service, which permits you to access, purchase 
or rent a licence for digital content (“iTunes Products”) for end user use only 
under the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement…You agree that the 
iTunes Products are provided to you by way of a licence only...”127  
The increasing usage of licence agreements is suggested to have resulted from the 
influences exerted by a society that is dominated by a certain type of motive, the profit-
motive.128 This has created what is described as contractual profit-making activity, 
which is activity that is orientated to opportunities for seeking new powers of control 
over goods on a single occasion. This is done repeatedly, or continuously, and is 
orientated by acquisition via peaceful methods to exploit market situations.129 For 
instance, legislation such as s.18(3)(a)130 and §.109(a)131 create an environment 
whereby contracts can be enforced at the expense of copyright limitations.132 These 
very agreements can be said to receive legislative approval by virtue of items such as 
 
127 For more information see: iTunes Terms and Conditions: <http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/uk/terms.html> accessed: 11/1/2016 (However, Apple does allow for files to be 
shared between what they term a “family” which allows up to “six” members of the group to be given 
access to that information). 
128 Dobb, M., Studies in the development of capitalism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p.6; For 
more information on the role of profit in shaping the activities of individuals in modern capitalist 
society, see chapter 2 generally.  
129  Weber, M., Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (vol 1, Uni. California. 
Press. 1978) pp.90-91.  
130 CDPA 1988; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 4(2), allows for exhaustion in cases of ‘first sale or other transfer 
of ownership in the Community’; See also this chapter at 4.4 and 4.4.2.  
131 17 U.S.C. (1976); See also this chapter at 4.4 and 4.4.1. 
132 See this chapter at 4.4.  
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the E-Commerce Directive Art.9(1),133 and also both s.28(1)134 and §109(d)135 that 
assist the enforceability of contractual terms136 in the copyright system.137 
The contractual practices that have developed in the digital music industry are 
submitted to be a deliberately intensified exploitation of an already existing market 
monopoly. This has been done to create a new investment outlet by retaining control 
over subsequent distributions via contract because property owners operating in 
capitalist societies develop environments that support their financial needs.138 Thus, it 
can be said that what is presented as progress in the culture industry, via the new 
formats it offers up, like iTunes and Spotify, remains a disguise for consistent 
sameness, simply a different way to secure music sales. It has also been suggested 
that the streaming model of Spotify is an application of digital technology that simply 
 
133 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c); For 




134 CDPA 1988; See also this chapter at 4.5.  
135 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1976) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does not apply to a 
person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as someone who as 
obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee; See also this chapter at 4.5.  
136 For more information, see this chapter at 4.7.  
137 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; See also, this chapter at 4.4, 4.5. 
138 Harvey, D. The Geopolitics of Capitalism (1985) at 150, in Gregory, D. and Urry, J. (eds.): Social 
Relations and Spatial Structures. (London), pp. 128-163; Taken from Wilmsmeier, G., Monios, J. 
[2015] The production of capitalist “smooth” space in global port operations. Journal of Transport 
Geography. 47: 59-69; Heidegger would suggest that the current system is an attempt to gain 
‘mastery’ over technology - Callister, P. D.,, ‘Law and Heidegger's Question Concerning 
Technology: A Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship’ Law Library Journal, Vol. 99, pp. 285- 
305, 2007. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=960134> accessed: 21/2/1016); On 
primitive accumulation generally, see Brewer, A., A guide to Marx’s Capital (Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), Part 8; “The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the 
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production” – Marx, K., Selected 
Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (Trans. By T.B. Bottomore, McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 
1956), p.133.  
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developed improved peer-to-peer network sharing that was labelled as a general 
platform of media distribution.139 For example, Spotify co-founder and CEO, Daniel 
Ek, claims to have built the streaming model on his love for the Napster consumer 
experience, whereby he wanted to see if it could be a viable business and create a 
similar experience for users.140 Therefore, it is submitted that “everywhere the 
changes mask a skeleton which has changed just a little as the profit motive itself 
since the time it first gained its predominance over culture.”141  
In reality, the current situation amounts to what David Harvey calls “accumulation by 
dispossession.”142 This is based on the idea that rightsholders were able to assert 
legal control over activity that was previously regulated.143 These digital assets have 
been accumulated by subjecting them to contractual regulation, essentially privatising 
them to enable their continuous commodification as a result of capitalism. This is 
because the commodification of cultural forms entails wholesale dispossessions and 
the music industry is notorious for this.144  This creates “primitive accumulation”145 
which is the idea rightsholders are pushing a violence that necessarily operates 
through the state, but which precedes the capitalist mode of production and makes 
possible the capitalist mode of production itself. However, this is not violence of a 
physical kind, or unlawful, or criminal type, it is lawful violence permitted by state-
enforced contracts where violence contributes to the creation of that which it is used 
against, contributing to the creation of that which it captures under contract.147  
 
139 Eriksson, M., Fleischer, R., Johansson, A., Snickars, P., Vonderau. P., Spotify Teardown: Inside 
the Black Box of Streaming Music (Cambridge: MIT Press 2019).  
140 <https://qz.com/1683609/how-the-music-industry-shifted-from-napster-to-spotify/> accessed: 
21/11/2019.  
141 Adorno, T.W., The Culture Industry (Edited by J. M. Bernstein, Routledge Classics 1991), p.100; 
See also, Horkheimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Verso Books 1997), 
pp.94-136.  
142 For more information, see Harvey, D., The New Imperialism (Oxford University Press 2003), 
chapter 4. 
143 Namely CDPA 1988 s.18(3)(a) (Exhaustion) and 17 U.S.C §109(a) (First Sale).  
144 Harvey, D., ‘The ‘new’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession’ The Socialist Register [2004], 
<http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5811#.WCtBTXd0e8U> accessed: 8/9/2015. 
145 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus Continuum books, (1987), p.494.  
147 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus Continuum books, (1987), p.495.  
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It is argued that rightsholders are using contracts to extend their governance of assets 
beyond copyright. This includes situations where copyright would not normally apply, 
or, to prevent copyright from applying at all by exploiting the operation of contracts in 
the digital world.148 These agreements prevent a potential transfer of the asset to any 
greater number of individuals than is otherwise explicitly stipulated within the terms of 
the particular agreement. This also ensures that ownership is only for as long as is 
permitted by the owner which has the effect of procuring artificial scarcity. The 
significance of this, in theory, is that the amount of digital versions sold will increase 
because nothing can be freely transferred after purchase. Thus, it is suggested that 
the majority of unauthorised reproductions of musical works are likely to infringe 
copyright in light of recent US,149 UK,150 (note, the EU mandatory exemption for 
temporary reproductions),151 and CJEU decisions,152 as well as the relevant legislation 
 
148 This specifically relates to how they benefit from the rules on contractual enforceability – see this 
chapter at 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, respectively.   
149 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
150 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; Often the most 
passive/incidental acts are caught by the reproduction right, such as upload onto a USB – 
Technische Universitat Darnstadt v. Eugen Ulmer KG, Case C-117/13, EU:C:2014:2196, [52] (ECJ); 
ITV Broadcasting Ltd v. TV Catchup Ltd [2011] EWHC 1874 (Pat); Download from peer-to-peer 
systems -  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] [43]-[46]; 
and when they access an Internet stream – FAPL v. British Communications [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) 
[31] (Arnold J);  this also includes the image created on a television screen being regarded as a 
copy for the purposes of what constitutes a reproduction here – FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and 
C-429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083, [159], see also, FAPL Ltd and ors v. QC Leisure and ors and Karen 
Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd, Joined Cases  C-403/08 and C429/08 [2011] ECR I-9083 
(ECJ, Grand Chamber).  
151 Art. 5(1) InfoSoc Directive mandatorily exempts from the reproduction right of Art. 2 InfoSoc 
Directive certain temporary acts of reproduction. The exception is rather complex, with its 
applicability depending on five conditions – For more information on these conditions, see 
Malevanny, N., ‘Online Music Distribution – How much Exclusivity is Needed?: A Study of 
International, European, German and U.S. Copyright Systems and Their Objectives’, Springer-
Verlag (2019), pp.33-7.  
152 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018); For more information on this decision and the implications of it for 
reproduction, and other copyright-related issues, see this chapter at 4.5.1; See also, Hopton, 
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governing reproductions (Art. 2,153 s.17,154 §106(1),155 but this is different to a mere 
transfer).156  
The Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use are suggested to create numerous instances 
for which liability can be potentially procured. For example, they state, amongst other 
items, that:  
 
“The Spotify Service and the Content are the property of Spotify or Spotify’s 
licensors. We grant you a limited, non-exclusive, revocable 
licence...remain[ing] in effect until and unless terminated by you or Spotify. 
You...are using the Content for your own personal, non-commercial, use...and 
will not redistribute or transfer the Spotify Service or the Content. The Spotify 
software applications and the Content are licensed, not sold, to you...You agree 
to abide by our User guidelines and not to use the Spotify Service, the Content, 
or any part thereof in any manner not expressly permitted by the 
Agreements...Spotify grants no right, title, or interest to you in the Spotify 
Service or Content...”157 
 
P.,‘Advantage Kraftwerk in long running copyright dispute: Pelham (C-476/17) (also known as the 
Metall auf Metall case)’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(8), 279-281. 
153 Art. 2 Information Society Directive which requires member states to confer on authors, film 
producers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters, ‘the exclusive right authorize or prohibit direct, 
or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part’. 
154 CDPA 1988; C-458/11VG Wort v. KYOCERA Document Solutions Deutschland GmbH, Joined 
Cases C-457/11, C-459/11, and 460/11, EU:C:2013:34, [AG33] (AG Sharpston, referring to 
reproduction as the ‘fundamental’ right); cf. J. Litman, Digital Copyright (2001), 180 (proposing 
instead a general right to control commercial exploitation).    
155 17 U.S.C. Under US law, ‘copies’ are material objects that are to which a work is foxed – Paha 
Pubs., Inc. v. Enmark Gas Corp,, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1076 (N.D.Tex 1992). For digital media, electronic 
files are considered to be comprehended within this definition despite the lack of physicality – 
London-Sire Records v. Does, 542 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass.2008).  
156 This same scenario is discussed below in this section within the context of unauthorised 
reproductions that were otherwise held legitimate under copyright law, despite being held contrary to 
the terms of a software license agreement – Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International 
Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039.  
157 See, Spotify Terms and Conditions: <https://www.spotify.com/uk/legal/end-user-agreement/> 
accessed: 11.11.18. 
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The licensing method for digital music is considered to be a substantial alteration in 
the recorded commodity meaning that in effect, the fees go to paying for a music 
subscription. However, upon cessation of that subscription, there is nothing to show 
for the funds paid into the system unless the subscription is continued.158 This is 
considered to be a quintessentially capitalistic approach because according to 
Reckwitz, the capitalist economy is distinguished from all forms of pre-modern 
economy by its extraordinary dynamic use of new, productivity-increasing 
technologies and by its exploitation of new means of generating surplus value.159 
Yet, it is important to note that Spotify does give ‘free’ options for both streaming and 
downloading services, but again, all functions are subject to licence.160 The reason for 
this kind of practice is because copyright owners, and record labels in particular, are 
concerned with the ownership of the copyright in the recorded content. This is because 
they are always able to exploit the means of production, which is vital in technological 
shifts such as digitalisation under the current approach.161 This means that they can 
continually exploit the copyrights they own and enable the repurposing of content to 
“calculate, amass, repackage, and transport the entertainment product across the 
borders of both new technologies and media forms.”162 This then further extends to 
various others users who are confined to the limitations of the agreement that they are 
deemed to have agreed to upon usage of the service or product.163  
 
158 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  pp.121-22. 
159 Reckwitz, A., The Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of the New, (Polity press, 
2017), 86.  
160 <https://www.spotify.com/uk/signup/> accessed: 09/01/2019.  
161 An excellent account of the practical elements of this discussion is detailed in Arditi, D., iTake-
over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  ch.2.  
162 Caldwell, J. ‘Convergence Television: Aggregating the Form and Repurposing Content in the 
Culture of Conglomeration. (2004)’ in Television after TV: Essays on a Medium in Transition, edited 
by Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
163 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015), p.26.  
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4.3.2 The decline of contractual freedom in the digital age and the role that 
this has played in the creation of the present system 
The present-day significance of contract is the result of the way digital technology 
enables one-to-one contracts on a global scale. Private law contracts are a result of 
the legal reflex of the market orientation of our society.164 As such, the contract, in the 
sense of a voluntary agreement constituting the legal relationship for the foundation of 
claims and obligations, has been widely used throughout various stages of legal 
history.165 Today, the situation is vastly different. In the digital copyright sector, the 
common form of such a legal relationship is now in the form of a ‘click wrap’ licence 
which typically takes the form of a page of text to which a user must signal agreement 
in order to use or access the content.169 
The significance of such developments is that recipients of digitalised information are 
theoretically free170 to contract. This is insofar as they can accept the obligations of 
the agreement and view the material or they can refuse to do so.171 However, the 
 
164 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.672.  
165 For a general account of the historical development of contract, including the underlying theoretical 
aspects behind the construction of contracts, like the intention to create legal relations, as well as 
the doctrines used to limit the enforceability of certain agreements, such as Estoppel, see Stephen. 
A. Smith., ‘Contract Theory’ (Clarendon Law Series, Oxford University Press, 2004).  
169 For more information, see Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A 
Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, (2008), chapter 5 at 5.2.3.2 
170 Not infrequently the weaker party to a prospective contract even agrees in advance not to retract 
his offer while the offeree reserves for himself the power to accept or refuse – see, Cole, McIntyre, 
Norfleet Co. v. Hollaway, 141 Tenn. 679, 214 S. W. 817 (1919).  
171 These agreements come in many forms, from End User License Agreements (EULA), Click-Wrap, 
Browse-Wrap, and Shrink-Wrap licenses, they all revolve around the notion that access is 
dependent upon acceptance of the terms, or sometimes, implied acceptance can be held on the 
basis of opening the box and clicking ‘I agree’ to the EULA on the computer - Griffin, J., ‘The 
interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] European Journal of 
Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1; See also, ‘Microsoft Windows XP Professional  End-User 
License Agreement' - available at <http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/eula/home.mspx>, Article 
4. 
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consequence of this is that they will be unable to access it.172 In the US software cases 
of Jacobsen v Katzer173 and MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment174 contractual 
terms175 have gained significance in copyright.176 Yet, the enforcement of a copyright 
license raises critical junctures that lie at the intersection of copyright and contract 
law.177 
In the former case, it was decided that breach of an ‘open source’ copyright licence to 
control the future distribution and modification178 was enforceable. In the UK, the same 
scenario would likely be a bare licence, not a contract, due to a lack of 
 
172 Jacobsen v Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008); Care has to be taken 
with this case, since the license is one that provides a condition of use which might otherwise result 
in copyright infringement. The broader case which extended copyright protection to an area where it 
was previously denied was in ProCD, Inc. v ZeidenBerg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996).  
173 535 F.3d 1371 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008). 
174 MDY Industries., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010); See also, 
chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c)(ii).  
175 Note, there is a distinction made between license conditions and contractual covenants according 
to US State contract law – Foad Consulting Group v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 827 (9th 
Cir. 2001); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989)) at 1120; On recovery 
for copyright infringement based on breach of a license agreement, see – Tech. Corp. v. Custom 
Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2005).    
176 A licensee can be sued for copyright infringement if they act outside of the scope of the license 
agreement – S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
177 S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989)) at 1122; However, a non-
exclusive license normally means that any right to sue licensees for copyright infringement is 
otherwise waived and may only sue for breach of contract - Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) at 1121. 
178 Jacobsen v. Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed Cir, 2008) at 1. 
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consideration.179 Essentially, the Katzer decision180 means that licenses are 
enforceable as contracts (which may also impose conditions on re-use),181 but there 
are also arguments to suggest the contrary.182  
In the latter case, MDY Industries the was held liable for contributory copyright 
infringement183 because the company (MDY Industries) sold software that 
enabled Blizzard's customers to contravene their End User License Agreement 
(EULA) and Terms of Use (TOU) contracts with Blizzard.184 This was because copies 
of the program were created when it runs185 and access often relies on prior 
 
179 There is no UK equivalent of Jacobsen, but if a UK court was to decide such a case, Solicitor Mark 
Henley (Director at Wragge & Co. LLP) suggests that “there would be every likelihood that no 
contract would be found and the Artistic License would be considered a bare licence. Breach of its 
terms might take the licensee outside the scope of the licence or alternatively might entitle the 
licensor to revoke the licence even without providing reasonable notice. Either way, interim 
injunctive relief might be available to prevent further “unauthorised” use by the licensee pending 
trial.” – (Henley. M., ‘Jacobsen v Katzer and Kamind Associates – An English Legal Perspective’ 
International Free and Open Source Software and Law Review, Volume 1, no.1, Rev.41 [2009]; 
Daniela Simone, Copyright and Collective Authorship: Locating the Authors of Collaborative Work 
(Cambridge University Press 2019), p.92. 
180 535 F.3d 1371 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008). 
181 Ibid.  
182 Henley. M., ‘Jacobsen v Katzer and Kamind Associates – An English Legal Perspective’ 
International Free and Open Source Software and Law Review, Volume 1, no.1, Rev.41 [2009]; R. 
Gomulkiewicz, ‘Conditions and Covenantsin License Contracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic 
License’ [2009] 17(3) Texas Intellectual Property LJ 335.  
183 For more information, see the discussion in chapter 5 at 5.7.3.3(a)(ii).  
184 MDY Industries., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) at 935; 
See also, Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
185 MDY Industries., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010) at 935-36;  
The running of a computer program results in a temporary copy of the program in the memory of the 
computer being created in the random access memory (RAM). It is this creation of copies that 
implicates copyright law and unlike other copyright protected items, when the items (software) is 
sold under a licence, the licencee needs permission to access his copy of the program and is 
therefore bound by the term of that agreement therein – (Etten, J.V., ‘Copyright Enforcement of non- 
copyright terms: MDY v. Blizzard and Krause v. Titleserv’ [2012], Duke University School of Law); 
For more information on the technical aspects of this process, see Jeff Tyson, How Computer 
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acceptance of the agreement terms.186 By implication, this means that over-the-
counter buyers of computer games are licensees who are bound by the individual 
terms of the EULA.188 The result of this meant that users were only licensees rather 
than owners of the game, whereby they were legally bound to operate it under 
circumstances dictated by the contractual terms of the EULA.189 Thus, the issue of 
whether, and to what extent, copyright holders should be allowed to sue under 
copyright law as a result of licence violations is likely to expand as software use and 
licensing continue to develop.190  
It is argued that the current system operates akin to the unequal relationship between 
the worker and their employer. This is because although the worker is formerly free to 
enter into any contract with his employer, the reality is that they are often constrained 
 
Memory Works, Computer memory basics, <http://computer.howstuffworks.com/computer-
memory1.htm> last accessed: 12/2/2016). 
186 For more information, see Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A 
 Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, [2008], chapter 5 at 5.2.3.2; See also, Boyle, J., The 
Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.61; The most common form of a ‘click-wrap’ license 
is when there is a license page impositioned which always has to be agreed prior to the individual 
being able to access the work. For example, a shrink-wrap license was used to enable copyright-
style protection, where copyright law itself denied such protection – (ProCD, Inc. v ZeidenBerg, 86 
F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996) at 1454). The issue with this decision is that such licenses have the 
ability, at least in the US context, to bind the majority of those who access the work; However, this is 
also a likely happening in the UK system, when taking into account section 28(1) CDPA 1988, and 
Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039.  
188 This is now often the case, particularly online - See Rifkin, J., The Age of Access (Penguin Books, 
London, 2000). 
189 Volftsun, A., ‘District Court declares purchasers of Software to be Licensees’ Harvard Journal of 
Law and Technology, July 21, [2008] http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/mdy-v-blizzard accessed: 
8/2/2015).  
190 Etten, J.V., ‘Copyright Enforcement of non-copyright terms: MDY v. Blizzard and Krause v. 
Titleserv’ [2012], Duke University School of Law, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=dltr accessed: 18/3/2017.  
 291 
to do so by circumstances.191 Thus, although such a transaction appears to be free,192 
the reality is that most workers have no alternative,193 and such agreements are far 
from free.194 Comparatively, the recipients of digitalised material online are contended 
to be subjected to all the same conditions as the worker. Those who access works 
subject to licence online are postulated to have no choice in the practical sense other 
than to be bound by the terms therein. This is because capitalist production hems 
users in so tightly that they unresistingly succumb to whatever is proffered to them.195 
Thus, it can be fairly argued that the ‘choice’ of individuals to use legitimate services 
can be seen as examples of what Posner calls “coerced transactions”196 in contract.197 
These are transactions that involve use of the legitimate market that are indirectly 
facilitated by the direct legal prohibitions pertaining to the laws on theft.198  
 
191 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), pp.729-31; Life is 
now being increasingly lived online and this has the effect of strengthening the general level of 
enforceability of these agreements - Balkin, J.M., ‘Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom 
to Play in Virtual Worlds’, 90 Virginia Law Review 2043 [2004]; Lastowka, G, & Hunter, D., ‘The 
Laws of the Virtual Worlds’ 92 California Law Review 1 [2004]; Moringiello, J.M, ‘What Virtual 
Worlds Can Do for Property Law’, 62 Florida Law Review 159 [2010].  
192 To borrow from Kessler: “The freedom of contract dogma is the real hero or villain in the drama... 
but it prefers to remain in the safety of the background if possible, leaving the actual fighting to 
consideration and to the host of other satellites-all of which is very often represent confusion to the 
audience which vaguely senses the unreality of the atmosphere” – Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’,43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 639 [1943] in Dalton, C., ‘An 
Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ 94 Yale L.J. [1985]. 
193 Mensch, ‘Freedom of Contract as Ideology’ Stanford Law Review 753-772 at 767; Smith., S.A., 
‘Contract Theory’ (Clarendon Law Series, Oxford University Press, 2004). 
194 Smith, A., ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ at 64-86 in Smith, A., 
‘Lectures on Jurisprudence 472-74 (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P. Stein eds. 1978) in Mensch, 
‘Freedom of Contract as Ideology’ Stanford Law Review 753-772.  
195 Horkhaimer, M., and T.W., Adorno., Dialectic of Enlightenment (Eds., G.S., Noerr and E., Jephcott, 
Stanford University Press 2002), p.106.  
196 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law (4th edn, 1992) pp.251-2; See also, A. T. Kronman and 
Posner, R., The Economics of Contract [1979]; See also, Mircom International Content Management 
& Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 1827 (Ch) at [59].    
197 Bigwood, R., ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ The University of 
Toronto Law Journal 46, no. 2 [1996]: 201-71. accessed June 25, 2020. 
198 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, (4th edn) Little Brown and Company (1992). 
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What this does is increase the control that rightsholders can exert over their assets 
and create new avenues of revenue because the scenario becomes one where just 
like the employer, the more powerful party, can set the terms. To offer the job, “take it 
or leave it”199  and, given the normally pressing economic need of the worker, to 
impose obligations upon him.  
However, it is recognised that recipients of cultural goods are not subject to the same 
circumstances as the employee. Yet, it is considered to be seemingly unrealistic to 
expect those accessing cultural goods online to simply forgo such access. This is 
because we live in an age where human experience as a whole is becoming more and 
more virtualized.201 Also, the majority of works on the internet are often accessed 
under licence rather than a sale of the work.202 This is to the point where you cannot 
access the work until you have clicked and accepted the terms and conditions.203 
Moreover, it is suggested that this is increasingly significant given that ‘only one or two 
in 1,000 shoppers access a product’s [license] for at least a total duration of 1 
second’.204 
Therefore, result of contractual freedom, somewhat paradoxically, is the opening of 
the opportunity to use, by the clever utilisation of property ownership in the market 
these resources without the usual copyright restraints. They have been used as a 
means for the achievement of power over others, and so the legally enforceable 
creation of contractual provisions are supportive of their very power and autonomy.205 
 
199 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.730.  
201 Balkin, J.M., ‘Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds’, 90 
Virginia Law Review 2043 [2004]; Lastowka, G, & Hunter, D., ‘The Laws of the Virtual Worlds’ 92 
California Law Review 1 [2004]; Moringiello, J.M, ‘What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law’, 62 
Florida Law Review 159 [2010]. 
202 See Rifkin, J., The Age of Access (Penguin Books, London, 2000).  
203 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.61; A similar result is also likely to 
be reached in the UK system, when taking into account section 28(1) CDPA 1988.  
204 See Yannis Bakos et al, ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-
Form Contracts’ 43 J. Leg. Stud. 1, 3 [2014]. 
205 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.729-31; To see 
how property has played a role in the digital age, particularly in relation contractual restrictions and 
the ability of individuals to access information, see Efroni, Z., ‘Access-right: The Future of Digital 
Copyright Law’ (Oxford University Press, 2011), chapter 2.  
 293 
This is because the development of a free enterprise system required a flexible legal 
institution to ensure the exchange of goods and services on the market and contract 
provides this “elasticity.”206  
This has meant the establishment of digital licences in a society that is increasingly 
being lived online207 has increased the relative coercion in the culture economy. This 
is contended to have created a new state of affairs for the music industry.208 This is 
because the imposition of contractual methods in the digital world has meant that 
users are now quintessential borrowers of the material, subject to the restrictions 
imposed by the terms of the agreement. Under this, usage can be further controlled 
due to the incapacitation of copyright limitations.209 It is to these matters we now turn.  
4.4 The beginning of the end for copyright limitations on digital 
distribution? 
There are limits on copyright owner’s rights regarding the distribution of their works. In 
the UK, this relates primarily to the exhaustion doctrine. This affirms the idea that once 
a copy has been issued within ‘the Community’, thereafter; the copy can be resold and 
this relates to each and every act of distribution, that is, transfer of ownership.210 The 
distribution right would act to curtail any attempted restriction on ‘any subsequent 
distribution’ in the UK under section 18(3)(a)211 as copyright owners cannot control the 
resale under the exhaustion principle.  
 
206 Kessler, F., ‘Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’ (1943). Faculty 
Scholarship Series. Paper 2731. 
207  Rainie, L., ‘The Rise of e-reading’ Pew Internet and American Life project, [2014], 
<http://libraries.pewinternet.org/2012/04/04/the-rise-of-e-reading/> accessed- 9/10/2014. 
208 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  chapter 7.  
209 Mazzone, J., Copyfraud and other abuses of intellectual property law (Stanford Law Books, 2011), 
pp.118-140.  
210 Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg SA v. Cassina SpA, [2008] ECR I-2731(ECJ).   
211  CDPA 1988; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 4(2), allows for exhaustion in cases of ‘first sale or other transfer 
of ownership in the Community’. 
 294 
However, as stated at the outset of this chapter, it has been widely assumed that this 
is only applicable to the distribution of tangible copies.212 This is due to the decision of 
Allposters v. Stichting Pictoright.213 Thus, consent to the download of a work cannot 
be regarded as consent to the distribution. As a result, the distribution right cannot 
have been exhausted. Therefore, the Usedsoft principle does not apply to works other 
than software because Usedsoft was itself concerned with the distribution of a tangible 
copy.214  
The consequence of this is that there can be no exhaustion where the transfer of digital 
copies is electronic to consumers.215 This is highlighted in Recital 28 of the Information 
Society Directive (2001/29/EC). This only refers to the distribution of  ‘tangible articles’, 
with Recital 29 stating that the question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of 
services and on-line services in particular.216 The only instance where this can be 
deemed exempt (and thus capable of further transfer) is in the case of computer 
programs, where the substance of the arrangement is to transfer the copy for an 
indefinite period, provided however that the original copy is destroyed.217   
The equivalent doctrine in the US, is the ‘first-sale’ doctrine. This was first 
constitutionally codified under 17 U.S.C. §41 (1909) following its (often regarded) 
 
212 A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU 
Copyright Law (2009), 237-8. See also, Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015]. 
213 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; ]; M Savič, ‘The 
CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual 
Property Review 378.  
214 Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) 
Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London.  
215 Perzanowski. A. and Schultz, J., ‘Digital Exhaustion’ 58 UCLA Law. Rev. 889 [2011]; (reviewing 
the benefits of the US concept of exhaustion and pushing the notion that it needs to continue in the 
digital sphere and not be restricted);  Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale 
Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . Northwestern University 
Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, (2015) (Reis proposes a secondary digital market place for digital 
articles in the US system to ensure that goods maintain some economic value to the transferee and 
will inevitably provide cheaper access to secondary users). 
216 Info. Soc. Directive., Recital 29.  
217 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039.  
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creation in the seminal US Supreme Court decision of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.218 
Yet, the doctrine’s historical roots extend back to the mid-18th century, to the Lord 
Chancellor’s decision in Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342 (Ch. 1741). The latter case outlined 
that unpublished letters entail two kinds of property. The first was the property in the 
paper which belonged to the recipient of the letter. The second was the property in the 
right to publish the words which remained with the writer. Moreover, the chattel rights 
of the owner in the physical property are limited to that material object, and the 
acquisition of the chattel does not bring with it the right to make copies.219  
The significance of this for modern copyright is that this arguably set the foundations 
for the distribution right (due to the separation of rights) that was underlying the 
creation of the first sale doctrine. The doctrine was an attempt to limit the rights of 
copyright owners in the public interest, playing an important role in American copyright 
law for over a century.220 This is because it can be fairly said that the doctrine turns 
on the distinction between the work and the copy. This means that chattel owners may 
dispose of their physical object, but may not make copies as this would infringe the 
incorporeal rights in the work. Thus, the first sale doctrine can be said to serve its 
purpose in the context of a sale. However, issues are created when the work is 
licenced as no chattel rights are acquired, thereby exempting the execution of this 
regulatory mechanism.    
Copyright today is now codified under 17 U.S.C §109(a) (1976) and is where the 
copyright owner’s distribution right in a particular copy of the work is ‘exhausted’ after 
its first sale under the doctrine.221 The first sale doctrine regulates the rights of the 
copyright and chattel owners by establishing that once authorized copies have been 
lawfully distributed, the property rights of the chattel owners prevail. The doctrine 
 
218 (Supreme Court, 1908).   
219 This principle was reaffirmed in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 
(1989) (commissioning party owned the sculpture but not copyright; artist permitted access to 
sculpture in order to access his copyright); Pope v Curl (1741) 2 Atk 341, 26 ER 608; Cooper v 
Stephens [1895] 1 Ch 567. 
220 Kirtaseng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) as per Justice Breyer at [1363].  
221 The principle is often traced back to the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  
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prevents the copyright owner from controlling future transfers of a particular copy of a 
copyrighted work after he has transferred its “material ownership” 222 to another. 
In United States v. Powell.,224 it was held that when a copyright owner parts with title 
to a particular copy of his copyrighted work, he thereby divests himself of his exclusive 
right to vend that particular copy.225  However, it is argued that this is only applicable 
to the distribution of tangible copies in the US. This is based on the decision by the 
United States District Court of New York in Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi Inc.226 In 
this case it was ruled that the first sale doctrine would not allow customers to resell 
their pre-owned digital music files as the first sale defence is limited to tangible 
artefacts that the copyright owner can inject into the stream of commerce.227 
It is asserted that this intensifies the exploitation that owners can exert in the digital 
world by “locking up”228 information under ‘click-wrap’ and ‘click-through’ style 
agreements.230 This is because when the transfer to the user is accompanied by terms 
dictating how the item can be used, this means that the contractual control that 
rightsholders are able to procure is increased with minimal action.231 Yet, this is 
significant as this imposition risks upsetting the ‘balance’ between owners and users 
in statutory copyright, a point which has often been emphasized in both the UK,232 and 
 
222 Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. (1984) at [159].  
224 United States v. Powell, 701 F.2d 70, 72 (8th Cir. 1983). 
225 United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1979). 
226 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
227 Ibid at 655. Also, at 656 – “The first sale doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and 
speed of data transfer could not have been imagined.” 
228  For more information, see Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008); Similar 
discussions are also outlined in: Lessig, L., Free Culture (Penguin Press, 2004); Lessig, L., The 
Future of Ideas (Vintage Books, 2001), p.177.  
230 On the enforceability of these agreements see: Johnson, P., ‘All Wrapped Up? A Review of the 
Enforceability of “Shrink-Wrap” and “Click-Wrap” Licenses in the United Kingdom and the United 
States’ [2003] EIPR 98.  
231 Weber and Parsons, Weber, M. and Parsons, T., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
(The Free Press, New York 1947), (The Free Press, New York 1947), p.161.  
232 FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429-08 [2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, Grand Chamber), Painer, 
Case C-145/10 [2012] ECDR (6) 89 (ECJ), [132], [134]; Deckmyn, Case C 201/13, EU:C:2014:458), 
[27]; England & Wales Cricket Board v. Tixdaq [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch), [73].  
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the US.233 Specifically, this relates to the fact that there is a need to ensure a ‘fair 
balance’ between the rights and interests of authors and those of users.234  
4.4.1 The US approach 
In Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus235 the US supreme court identified some 
ideological aspects within copyright law as containing principles which could not be 
overridden. As stated, the case is often touted as establishing the first sale doctrine. 
In the case, the Plaintiff-copyright owner sold his book with a printed notice 
announcing that any retailer who sold the book for less than one dollar was responsible 
for copyright infringement. The Plaintiff sought injunctive relief on these grounds. The 
Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that its exclusive distribution right applied 
only to first sales of copies of the work.  
The distribution right did not permit the Plaintiff to dictate that subsequent sales of the 
work below a particular price were infringing. More specifically, the court ruled, in the 
words of Justice Day, that:  
“the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right 
to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, 
such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at 
retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.”236 
For understanding, the privity doctrine is based on the notion that only the parties to 
the contract can assert rights under, or benefit from, the agreement. This means that 
 
233 In the US, when measuring whether an act is fair use, the court looks at four factors in particular to 
determine whether a usage is ‘fair’ in order to maintain a balance between authors and users. These 
are: The nature if the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion taken - 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); The purpose and character of the use (the 
transformative factor) - Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2008); The effect upon the potential market - Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).   
234 Article 5 of Directive 2001/29/EC specifically provides for ‘numerous exceptions’; See also, 
Padawan SL v. SGAE, Case C-467/08 [2010] ECR I-10555, [AG43]; Case C-110/15 Microsoft 
Mobile Sales International Oy v. Ministero per I beni e le attivita culturali, EU:C:2016:326, {AG20] 
(AG Wahl). 
235 Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus (Supreme Court, 1908).   
236 Bobbs-Merrill Company v Straus (Supreme Court, 1908) at 350.  
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a third party cannot acquire contract rights from a contract to which they are not a 
party if they have not provided consideration.237 The court further noted that its 
decision applied solely to the rights of a copyright owner that distributed his work 
without a licence agreement.238 The significance of this for purposes here is the 
potential effects that it could be said to have in securing the legitimation and 
enforceability of digital contracts. 
This is problematic as the strict construction of the privity rule is argued to strengthen 
the enforceability of digital licences. This is because any ‘licenced’ item will otherwise 
fall outside of the scope of the first-sale doctrine. However, the rules on privity mean 
that every time a licenced digital product is accessed or purchased, the agreement 
becomes an in personam one, between the rightsholder and the recipient. This is 
because users are ‘directly’ agreeing to terms in the digital age through usage or 
access, which appears to satisfy the requirements of privity in Bobbs Merrill.  
Consequently, in situations where there is deemed to be privity of contract, the clause 
will always take effect.239 Thus, when privity is established, there can be potential 
claims in both copyright and contract. This is because the work will generally be 
protected by copyright. Yet, access is often governed by these ‘click-wrap’240 and 
‘browse-wrap’241  agreements. As a result, users will be bound by their terms and could 
 
237 On the doctrine of privity, see UK law: Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 1 B&S 393 or 121 ER 762; For 
the US, see, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S. Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.ed. 898 (1948); 
However, rights may be acquired pursuant to the passage of the UK Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999.  
238 Ibid at 350; This notion has also been codified into US law under the Copyright Act 1976 under 
§109(a).   
239 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1. 
240 A click-wrap agreement, in contrast to a browse-wrap agreement, requires users to affirmatively 
check a box to assent to terms or click “I agree” or “Yes” icon before they can download or access 
digital content – (Seringhaus, M., ‘E-book Transactions: Amazon “kindles” the Copy Ownership 
Debate” 12 Yale Journal of Law and Technology., 147, 199, (2009) in Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital 
Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 
2015). Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, (2015) at 197.  
241 A browse-wrap agreement is a type of licencing agreement that “exists in the background and 
purports to bind a user simply by their visiting a website” - (Seringhaus, M., ‘E-book Transactions: 
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face contractual liability for a breach.242 This applies even where there is no copyright 
violation and vice-versa, creating a ‘dual-system’ of protection for copyright holders.243   
Nonetheless, several decisions after Bobbs have broadened the scope of the 
application of the doctrine to an extent.244 However, it was Capitol Records v ReDigi245 
that offered the closest the US system has got so far to a full-scale consideration of 
the application of the doctrine to digital musical content. 
In the case246 ReDigi’s operation was challenged by Capitol Records as violating 
multiple aspects of the US Copyright Act (1976. This consisted of vicarious, and 
contributory, copyright infringement, and inducement of copyright infringement.247 
ReDigi opposed the action, claiming that the US first sale doctrine supported its 
business model.248 The district court disagreed and granted summary judgement for 
Capitol Records. It held that ReDigi reproduced files on its servers and distributed 
copies to its customers. Significantly, the court found no statutory basis for a digital 
first sale doctrine, concluding that the text of the statute ‘clearly’ precluded the 
application of the doctrine to dematerialized copies.249 The distribution was held to be 
one “which plainly [fits] within the sort of transaction that §106(3) (distribution) was 
 
Amazon “kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate” 12 Yale Journal of Law and Technology., 147, 199, 
(2009) in  Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ 
Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, 
(2015) at 197.  
242 In the UK see CDPA 1988 s.28(1); In the US, see 17 U.S.C. §109(d); For more information, see 
this chapter at 4.5. 
243 For more information, see this chapter at 4.5  
244 Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 
F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v 
Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., Cal., Jan 20, 2015).   
245  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
246  Ibid. 
247  Ibid. 
248 As found under 17 U.S.C. §109(a).  
249 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also, the 
discussion in Gorman, Ginsburg, and Reese, “Copyright: Cases and Materials” (9th ed), University 
Casebook Series, Foundation Press, pp.840-844.  
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intended to reach [and is, therefore, a] ‘distribution’ of a phonorecord.”250 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that the first sale defence did not permit sales of digital music files 
on ReDigi’s website. 
As a result, although ReDigi backed by some powerful voices, it seems that the 
Second Circuit will not rule in its favour for fear of the “Pandora’s box it might open.”251 
This notion is based on what Professor Burgunder calls the amicus brief of law 
scholars. This rests on the philosophical notion that the first sale doctrine derives from 
the right — or entitlement — that owners of objects have to dispose of their property. 
The fundamental question is whether the owner’s property pertains only to the physical 
items that incidentally include the copyrighted works, or whether the ownership 
interest can ever actually extend to the copyrighted aspects as well [i.e. the intangible 
exchanges].252  
Therefore, the nature of digital technology is again considered to be pushing the 
boundaries of copyright law and digital works towards the “edge of the reach of the 
state”253 in an attempt to “free”254 itself from the confines of copyright limitations. This 
can also be suggested in some ways to be a “withering away”256 or “abolition” 
(Aufhebung)257 of the state. This is because these agreements are given legal 
 
250  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 8, His Honour 
Judge Sullivan citing London-Sire, 542 F Supp 2d. 153 at 173-74.  
251 <http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/11/digital-resale-copyrights-second-circuit-wont-
buy/id=88965/> accessed: 04/07/2018).  
252 Ibid.  
253 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
254 For more information, see Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology (Trans. William 
Lovitt, Harper Torchbooks 1977); Karl Marx Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Cambridge Uni 
Press, 1844).  
256 Jessop, B., ‘Recent Theories of the Capitalist State’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, Volume 1, 
Issue 4, December (1977), Pages 353-373, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035370 
accessed: 21/09/2016.   
257 In Hegelian philosophy: the process by which the conflict between two opposed or contrasting 
things or ideas is resolved by the emergence of a new idea, which both preserves or transcends 
them - Avineri, The Social and Political thought of Karl Marx (1968), noted the two different terms 
derive from different intellectual traditions. Engels Absterben is a “biological similie”, Marx’s 
Aufhebung is “a philosophical term with clear dialectical overtones” (p.203).   
 301 
credibility through their enforceability via the state apparatus (like the courts).258 
However, the associated inapplicability of statutory limitations in the digital context259  
and the fact that copyright owners set the terms of the contracts,260 is submitted to 
amount to an oxymoronic situation that can be said to both strengthen and wither away 
the state. 
This is because, on one hand, it can be said that rightsholders rely on the state to 
ensure that they can exploit their digital works, but this can also be seen as a form of 
submission to the state.261 Equally, however, the fact the agreements are crafted to 
suit private interests and can remain outside of state-based statutory limitations, it can 
be said that the state has lost some of its regulatory power in this respect.262 Thus, it 
is asserted that rightsholders have developed a system of information regulation to 
which they are the regulators.263 This is because access is often dependant on 
agreement with the terms they create. Thus, because continued compliance is 
essential for the duration of it.264   
Going further, it can be said that such developments have not just forced the law to 
adapt,265 but it can now be said that the law is also being used to prevent the creation 
 
258 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus (Bloomsbury Academic, 1988), Ch.13. 
259 See this chapter at 4.4.  
260 For more information, see this chapter at 4.7.1. 
261 For more information, see Foucault, M., Power (Volume 3, edited by James Faubion, 2002), pp.1-
83.  
262 Issues similar to this are discussed in Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-
1984 (Volume 3, edited by James Faubion, 2002), p.83. 
263 The logistics of this are explained in Foucault, M. 1973. ‘Truth and juridical forms. Parts II & III’ In 
Michel Foucault: Power - essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, edited by M. Faubion. 
Trans. inter alia R. Hurley, 1 – 89. London: Penguin Books, 2002. 
264 This is discussed in this chapter at 4.3.1; See also, Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry 
in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015), chapter 7.  
265 A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct 2764 (US 
Supreme Court, 2005) – These cases were the landmark decisions which determined that peer-to-
peer file-sharing and the distribution/reproduction of another’s work unauthorised was considered to 
be an infringement of copyright even if done without the expectation or receipt of financial gain.  
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of secondary markets by limiting distributions.266 This is due to the technical 
functionality of these artefacts and their position regarding the enforceability of 
statutory limitations.  
Ultimately, ReDigi is argued to support the imposition of digital licences by exempting 
non-physical works from the remit of the otherwise ‘limiting’ first sale doctrine. This 
increases the control generally that copyright owners have over their works in the US. 
It also illustrates the difficulties of applying digital works to pre-digital doctrines against 
the legal architecture that governs digital uses and distribution.    
4.4.2 The UK approach 
“Copyright protection includes the exclusive right to control the distribution of 
the work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale in the Community of 
the original of a work or copies thereof by the rightsholder or with his consent 
exhausts the right to control the resale of that object in the community”267 
The principle of exhaustion268 operates similarly that of the US first sale doctrine in the 
digital environment. The application of the principle in the digital context was first 
examined in the case of UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp269 and has since 
generated considerable discussion.270 The case concerned the principle of exhaustion 
 
266 Vernor v Autodesk, Inc., 621 F. 3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto  628 
F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351 (2013); Omega SA v 
Costco Wholesale Corp (2015) US App Lexis 830 (9th Cir., Cal., Jan 20, 2015); Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In the UK see - Case C-128/11 
UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039Art & Allposters, Case C-
419/13, EU:C:2015;27 (ECJ); See also, Rosenmeier, Szkalej, and Wolk, EU Copyright Law: 
Subsistence, Exploitation and Protection of Rights, (Wolters Kluwer 2019) at §7.02, 03; For more 
information, see this chapter 4 at 4.5.1. 
267 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 
167) 28.  
268 For a general overview, see Rosenmeier, Szkalej, and Wolk, EU Copyright Law: Subsistence, 
Exploitation and Protection of Rights, (Wolters Kluwer 2019), chapter 7.  
269  Case C-128/11 [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039.   
270 The case has created a considerable amount of commentary: R. Hilty and K. Koklu, ‘Software 
Agreements: Stocktaking and Outlook – Lessons from the Oracle v. UsedSoft Case from a 
Comparative Law Perspective’ [2013] 44(3) IIC 263; E. F. Schulze, ‘Resale of Digital Content such 
as Music, Films or eBooks under European Law’ [2014] 36(1) European Intellectual Property 
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in the context of ‘used’ software in digital form.271 In the case, it was held that the 
exhaustion doctrine applied to computer programs.272  
In arriving at the decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) also 
considered what amounts to lawful acquisition of the software, if there was a licence 
preventing its resale, and whether the copyright in lawfully acquired software was 
exhausted by the resale.273 The CJEU ruled that lawful acquisition occurs at the point 
where the software is downloaded onto the user’s computer,274 and for exhaustion to 
apply, “the original acquirer must make the copy downloaded onto his computer 
‘unusable’ at the time of its resale”275 with a later decision also ruling out back-up 
copies.276 
The CJEU also concluded that the exhaustion doctrine applied to computer programs 
made electronically where the substance of the arrangement is to transfer the copy to 
the user for an indefinite period in return for the payment of a fee, thereby constituting 
a ‘sale’ to activate the exhaustion doctrine.277 Thus, the case was seemingly settled 
on exhaustion being activated by a licence agreement which, by its indefinite nature, 
was held as constituting an agreement that had all the hallmarks of a transaction 
equivalent to a ‘sale’ (and thus functionally the same as a copy on a CD-ROM or DVD).  
The significance of the decision is that the CJEU held that a transferee of software 
from an original purchaser is a ‘lawful acquirer’ (even though a licence term affecting 
 
Review 9. K. Moon, ‘Resale of Digital Content: UsedSoft v ReDigi’ [2013] 24(6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 193.  
271 It should also be noted that the EU exhaustion principle is also separately incorporated I the EU 
Software Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe on 23 April 
2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, Articles 2 and 4.  
272 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 
273 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 at [30-34].  
274 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 at [59].  
275  Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 at [78], 
[87]. 
276 Case C-166/15 Aleksandrs Ranks v. Finansu un ekonmisko noziegumu izmeklesanas prokutura, 
Microsoft Corp., EU:C:2016:762, [43]-[44] (ECJ) (this also includes situations where recipients had 
damaged, destroyed, or lost the original material medium).  
277 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 at [38], 
[42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49].  
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the original purchaser purported to prevent such transfer).278 This shows that a 
copyright owner can no longer enforce the contractually prescribed prohibitions on the 
resale of a copy when the agreement, by its duration, has become tantamount to a 
‘sale’. This is argued to be because a key motivation behind the decision was due to 
the integrative function that the exhaustion principle adds to the single market.279  
It is asserted that the UsedSoft decision can be used to support the usage of drafting 
mechanisms to otherwise prevent exhaustion from applying. This can include reducing 
the licence terms, or again, subjecting the licensee to yearly renewals. This would 
theoretically remove the legal roadblocks experienced by the creators of UsedSoft. 
Interestingly, it is unlikely that a similar conclusion would be arrived at in the US, 
whereby it was held in Microsoft Corp. v Harmony Computers and Electronics, Inc280 
that the first-sale doctrine is inapplicable in instances where software has been 
licensed and not sold.281   
However, UsedSoft can be said to be limited to the software context282 following the 
long-awaited recent Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) in Nederlands v 
Kabinet283 in December 2019. In the case, the Court found that the supply by 
downloading, for permanent use, of an e-book, is not covered by the right of 
‘distribution to the public’ provided for by Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/29.284 
Nonetheless, it did rule that it is covered by the right of ‘communication to the public’ 
 
278 Case C-128/11 [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039 at [75], [76], [77], [78], [80], [81], [82].  
279 Morris, S., ‘Beyond Trade: Global Digital Exhaustion in International Economic Regulation’ [2014] 
36(1) Campbell Law Review 107, pp.118-20.  
280 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y 1994).  
281 846 F. Supp. at 213 – (the first-sale defence did not apply as the defendant failed to trace the 
“chain of title” and establish proof of first sale); For more information, see Nimmer, D., Copyright: 
Sacred text, Technology, and the DMCA (Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp.282-284; See also, 
the Ninth Circuit decision of Microsoft Corp v. DAK Industries Inc 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Longdin, L. and Lim, P.H., ‘Inexhaustible distribution rights for copyright owners and the foreclosure 
of secondary markets for used software’ IIC [2013], 44(5), 541-568.  
282 E. Rosati, ‘Online Exhaustion’ [2015] 10 JULP 673 
283 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others December (2019).  
284 Case C-263/18 Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others December (2019) at [36], [45].  
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provided for in Article 3(1)285 but exhaustion is explicitly excluded under paragraph 
3286 in order for authors to obtain and appropriate reward for their works.287  
Consequently, the Court determined, in what is postulated to be a quintessentially 
UsedSoft fashion, that there is no exhaustion of online media (even where it is 
incidentally bound up in a computer program).288  By implication, this means that there 
is no exhaustion of digital copies because they do not deteriorate with use and a 
secondary copy is a perfectly good substitute for a new electronic version.289 Yet, the 
UsedSoft decision was also limited to a degree, although not reversed, in Art & 
Allposters v. Stichting Pictoright290 concerning exhaustion of tangible artefacts.  
This is because the decision limits how an individual can use their licenced product in 
what appears to be a decision predominantly motivated around maximising the 
economic exploitability of protected works.291  The decision has been described as 
 
285 Directive 2001/29/EC; Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene 
Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and Others December (2019) at [35], [36], [41], [60], [62], [63], 
[66], [69], [72].   
286 (The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of communication 
to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article) – Article 3(3) Directive 
2001/29/EC.  
287 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others December (2019) at [48]; (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 November 
2015, SBS Belgium, C-325/14, EU:C:2015:764, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited). 
288 <http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2019/12/tom-kabinet-decision-no-digital.html> accessed: 
10/01/2020); Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom 
Kabinet Internet BV and Others December (2019) at [53]-[55]. 
289 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others December (2019) at [48], [58].  
290 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; For a general 
commentary on the case, see Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU 
Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May 2016, 
Queen Mary University London.  
291 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; See also, 
Football Association Premier League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, Paras 107-109; Landes W., and 
Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal Studies 325.; 
However, the economic analysis of law has come to dominate academic thinking about law, and not 
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highly significant,292 with Headdon suggesting that it has “arguably opened up the 
possibility of an additional line of argument for copyright holders to control the 
exploitation of works previously put on the market by or with their consent.”293 The 
court was asked to consider the limits to the exhaustion principle regarding the practice 
of taking lawfully marketed posters of famous works and transferring the licenced 
image onto a canvas for resale. The court held that:  
Firstly, the exhaustion doctrine did not apply in a situation where a reproduction of a 
protected work, after having been lawfully marketed in the European Union with the 
copyright holder’s consent, has undergone an alteration of its medium. This was the 
transfer of that reproduction from a paper poster onto a canvas, which was placed on 
the market again in its new form294 under a “canvas transfer”295 technique. The 
exhaustion principle applied only to the ‘object’ transferred or sold. Thus, as the 
defendant presented the claimant’s picture on a different object, he could not claim 
exhaustion to the newly marketed object.297 It was also held that this alteration of the 
copy of the protected work, which provided a result closer to the original, was sufficient 
to constitute a new reproduction of that work under Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, 
which is covered by the exclusive right of the author and requires his permission.298 
 
just the more obvious commercial areas – A. T. Kronman and Posner, R., The Economics of 
Contract (Little Brown, 1979), B. Ackerman, The Economic Foundations of Property Law (Aspen 
Publishing, 1975), F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harv. 
Uni. Press. 1991); S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Harv. Uni. Press. 1987).  
292 See references in M Savič, ‘The CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ 
[2015] European Intellectual Property Review 378, 378, n 2, in Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the 
Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v 
Stitching Pictoright’ May 2016, Queen Mary University London. 
293 Headdon, T., ‘The Allposters problem: reproduction, alteration and the misappropriation of value’ 
E.I.P.R. [2018], 40(8), 501-509. 
294  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [49] 
295 ‘Exhaustion of rights (first sale doctrine): what are the broader implications of the CJEU’s ruling in 
Art & Allposters?’ (January 30, 2015), IP Kat blog, http://ipkitten.blogspot.nl/2015/01/exhaustion-of-
rights-first-sale.html [Accessed March 29, 2015]. Taken from M Savič, ‘The CJEU Allposters case: 
beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual Property Review 378; See 
also, Yoo, C.S., ‘Copyright and Product Differentiation’, 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 212 (2004).  
297  Case C-419/13 Art & Allposters, EU:C:2015;27 (ECJ) [35], [39]. 
298 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [43]. 
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Secondly, because the economic value of the canvases significantly exceeded that of 
the posters, it was concluded that if the distribution right was exhausted upon the first 
sale of the posters, then the rightsholders would have been deprived of the appropriate 
reward for the commercial exploitation of their works. This involved looking at the 
economic value of the exploitation (sale), in comparison to a canvas transfer, which 
was held to significantly exceed that of a paper poster.299  
It is asserted that this demonstrates a deliberate minimisation of what can be done 
with the lawfully marketed work to maximise the ability of righholders to economically 
exploit their assets. However, it can also be regarded as a deliberate limitation on what 
licensees can do with works pertaining to their ability to profit from them. This is 
because part of the courts’ conclusion was justified on the basis that the copyright 
holders did not consent to the distribution of the canvas transfers, at least not 
expressly. Accordingly, by applying the rule of exhaustion of the distribution right, the 
court held that such an application would deprive those rightsholders of the possibility 
of prohibiting those objects from being distributed or, in the event of distribution, of 
requiring appropriate reward for the commercial exploitation of those same works.300 
Due to this, it can be said that is it the “actual content of contract [or lack of]...is what 
facilitates capitalism [under] the systematization of law.”301 
The court also referred to Article 4.2 of Directive 2001/29 which states that exhaustion 
applies only to the first sale of the “object.”302 Notably, it also relied on Recital 28 to 
Directive 2001/28 and Articles 6 and 7 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty303 holding the 
 
299 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; See also, 
Football Association Premier League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, Paras 107-109; Case C-263/18 
Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and 
Others December (2019) at [48].  
300 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]. 
301 Chase-Dunn, C., Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy (Update edn. Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p.350. 
302  Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [34]; See also 
paras [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40] and [46].  
303 The Treaty was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference of 20 Dec 1996, at which the Treaty itself 
was also adopted.  
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view that exhaustion of the distribution right only applies to tangible objects.304 It is 
asserted that the claimants, in this case, have benefitted by the legal order of the 
state.305 This is because they have exploited their assets in circumstances that have 
been factually guaranteed to them by the consensually accepted interpretation of a 
legal norm under copyright. This is achieved with the aid of a “coercive apparatus (the 
courts) that is backed up by a guaranty that is simply based upon the validity of their 
legal position.”306  
This has created a situation wherein so far as the judge allows the coercive guaranty 
to enter a particular case for ever so concrete reasons, he creates, at least under 
certain circumstances, the empirical validity of a general norm as law simply because 
his “maxim acquires significance beyond the particular case.”307 In sum, this is argued 
to represent what Weber would call a legal order, which exists in capitalist society 
wherever coercive means, physical or psychological, are available, i.e. wherever there 
is a group of persons ready to use them for such a purpose when certain 
circumstances arise.308  
Yet, in the US case of CM Paula Co. v. Logan309 the opposite conclusion to Allposters 
was reached, where a company that removed copyrighted images from the surface of 
greeting cards and then applied them to ceramic plaques was held as having no 
duplication in this instance, and so no reproduction. It could be suggested, albeit 
stretching the conceptual and contextual boundaries here, that the transfer of the ink 
in some way maintained some elements of physicality to satisfy the decision in order 
to maintain ‘regularity’ in the copyright system.310 
Furthermore, Allposters supports the notion that a purchaser of a digital work 
effectively owns the words or notes in a fashion divorced from the object in the digital 
 
304 Ibid at paras [34-40].  
305 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.315. 
306 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.315. 
307 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.758.  
308 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.317.  
309 CM Paula Company v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973) US District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas - 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973) March 5, 1973; In comparison, see 
Mirage Editions Inc v Albuquerque A.R.T. Co. 856 F. 2d. 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).  
310 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press, 1978), at 63ff.  
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context. This is because when seemingly similar circumstances were applied in the 
digital context, the opposite was reached, as the court in CM Paula Co. v. Logan 
allowed the company in the case of tangible articles to take the copyrighted media and 
place them on other physical objects without procuring a reproduction, but in Allposters 
the opposite conclusion was reached. 
The conclusion of Allposters is also significant because of the inherent focus the court 
gave to the potential economic detriment that would have been incurred by the 
claimant if the case had been decided in another way.311 The court highlighted this 
where it stated that applying the rule of exhaustion of the distribution right would have 
deprived those rightsholders of the possibility of prohibiting those objects from being 
distributed. Alternatively, in the event of distribution, it would prevent them from 
requiring appropriate reward for the commercial exploitation of their works. To be 
appropriate, such remuneration must be reasonable regarding the economic value of 
the exploitation of the protected work and the canvas transfers economic value 
significantly exceeded that of the posters in the case.312  
It is argued that this inherently economically-orientated ratio is considered to lend itself 
to the view that the CJEU may have adopted a “market-orientated, normative basis for 
its decision on the concept of reproduction”;313 concluding that there was a 
 
311 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; On the issue 
of exploitation, specifically in relation to phonograms, see the discussion below at 4.5.1; See also, 
the recent CJEU decision pursuant to a referral from the German Federal Court - Case C- 476/17 
Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December 
(2018).   
312 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; This can be 
contrasted with the US Supreme Court case of Herbert v Stanley; John Church Company v Hilliard 
Hotel Company 242 US 594 (1917) (emphasis added) – (in this case it was held that there was a 
need for a broad interpretation of public performance in order to prevent the defendants’ ability to 
‘compete with and even destroy the success of the monopoly the law intends the plaintiff to have’).  
313 Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) 
Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London; 
For an opposite conclusion to the CJEU, the Canadian Supreme Court suggested that in similar 
circumstances there was no reproduction of a work under copyright law when an image is 
transferred to an alternative medium, see – Galerie a’Art du Petit Champlain Inc v Theberge [2002] 
SC 34 (Supreme Court, Canada).  
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reproduction on the facts at issue in Art & Allposters because separate licensing 
markets existed for paper posters and canvas transfers and the defendant’s activities 
had deprived the rightsholders of an appropriate fee. Comparatively, this also has 
similarities to the US approach under the performance right that looks to protected 
authors from ‘market harm’.315 
Therefore, the focus of the CJEU is argued to be on “formal rationality”316  rather than 
commodity production in capitalist society. This is because formal rationality is the 
concern for the efficiency of means rather than a direct focus on ends.317  This 
assertion comes from the fact that the court in Allposters arguably focused on 
maintaining the economic interests of the rightsholder.319 This was done by interpreting 
exhaustion in a restrictive manner, and reproduction in a broad sense, to ensure that 
the economic efficiency of copyright was maximised regarding the exploitability of the 
images for the licensors.320 This was opposed to a focus on an increased number of 
commodities (the transfer of the paintings onto a canvas) that would have arguably 
otherwise been created if the case was decided differently. This is contended to be 
because the deliberate creation of lack is a function of the market economy of the 
dominant class.321  
Griffiths argues that this interpretation has meant that reproduction will also occur 
whenever an object (embodying a copy of a work) is altered in such a way as to create 
a new object. Yet, it is not entirely clear whether the identification of a “new object” in 
such circumstances is simply factual, technical enquiry or whether a more normative, 
market-related enquiry is envisaged. Ultimately, this limits the amount that can get to 
 
315 Herbert v Stanley; John Church Company v Hilliard Hotel Company 242 US 591 (1917).  
316 Chase-Dunn, C., Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy, (Rownman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998), p.350.  
317 Ibid.  
319 (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ at [26]-[28], ]40], [42]-[48].  
320 Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) 
Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London. 
321 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Bloomsbury Academic, 
1983) pp.40-1.  
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market without permission.322 Consequently, it is contended that this increases the 
influence of licences whereby the court gave a seemingly restrictive interpretation of 
the facts and the exhaustion doctrine based on ensuring a “high level of protection.”323  
The conclusive elements of this decision were supported by the “principal objective” 
of the Information Society Directive, which was to establish a high level of protection 
for authors, allowing them to obtain appropriate reward for their works.324 It also, to 
some extent, harmonized the reproduction, communication, and distribution rights, as 
well as limiting the number and scope of the exceptions (or defences) that a national 
regime can operate. Significantly, this heralded a shift from ‘vertical’325 harmonization 
to ‘horizontal’ harmonization.326  
Ultimately, Allposters is contended to increase the level of exploitation in the digital 
world generally that rightsholders can exert under contracts. The decision added, “a 
new weapon to the armoury of the copyright holder...and is akin to copyright 
moonlighting as a law against unfair competition as opposed to being about 
reproduction.”327 This is because the UsedSoft principle does not apply to online 
downloads under the Information Society Directive, nor does it apply to intangible 
artefacts other than software. Thus, the exhaustion principle is presumptively confined 
to the tangible realm.328 As a result, it can be reasonably suggested that in the current 
 
322 Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) 
Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London. 
323 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [47] 
324 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [47] (with 
reference to 306/05) SGAE v Rafael Hotels [36]; (C-456/06) Peek & Cloppenburg [37]; (C-403/08 & 
429/08) FA Premier Keague v QC Leisure [186]).  
325 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 506 (1937).  
326 As the title of the Directive makes clear, its remit was only to harmonize ‘certain aspects of 
copyright. The sloppy use of the shorthand ‘Copyright Directive’ by the Court can be traced back to 
the opinions of Advocate-General Sharpston in Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, Case C-479/04 
[2006] ECR I-8089 and SGAE v. Rafael Hotels SL, Case C-306/05 [2006] ECR I-11, 519. The Court, 
for the most part, resisted the shorthand.  
327 Headdon, T., ‘The Allposters problem: reproduction, alteration and the misappropriation of value’ 
E.I.P.R. [2018], 40(8), 501-509.  
328 Slavic, M., ‘The CJEU Allposter case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European 
Intellectual Property Review 378. 
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copyright system, both in the UK, and the US, that the ideas of economic growth and 
competition have come to have a more compelling charm for the twentieth-century 
judicial mind. This has resulted in emerging contractarian theories which purport to 
base liability on will, consent, or meeting of the minds.329 However, the current 
situation could also be said to be partially the result of what Griffin describes as a 
“legislative desire to protect owners from unauthorised reproduction of their works.”330 
This is based on the fact that although judges make the decisions, they do so on a 
legislative basis.  
4.5 The creation of a two-tier system of protection in the digital world? 
In the UK, the only statutory provision which governs the relationship between 
contracts and copyright is to be found in the Fair Dealing chapter.331 The Fair Dealing 
provisions are statutory sections which detail various ‘permitted acts’ of infringement, 
and are to be seen as an fundamental part of copyright law as opposed to a mere 
defence332 as they are not defences.333 However, according to s.28(1) of the 
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988:  
 
329 Gilmore, ‘From Tort to Contract: Industrialisation and the Law’ (Book Review) 86 Yale Law Journal 
785 (1977) at 789 in Morton Horwitz and the ‘Transformation of American Legal History’ Vol. 23, 
Issue 4 23 William & Mary Law Review 663 (1982).  
330 Griffin, J., ‘Copyright Evolution: Creation, Regulation and the Decline of Substantively Rational 
Copyright Law’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly.  
331 CDPA 1988 Chapter III; See also, R. Burrell and A. Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital 
Impact (2005), ch.9.  
332 “The fair dealing exception …is a user’s right. In order to maintain the proper balance between the 
rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively …‘User rights 
are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should therefore be given the fair and 
balanced reading that befits remedial legislation” - CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper 
Canada [2004] SCC 13 (Can. Sup. Ct): citing D. Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) 
p.171. 
333 CDPA 1988 s.97.  
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“..[the provisions] relate only to the question of infringement of copyright and do 
not affect any other right or obligation restricting the doing of any of the specified 
acts.”334 
According to this subsection, even though an act335 may be carried out without 
infringing copyright (so long as it is proven by the defendant that an exception 
applies),336 this does not prevent rights being asserted under an agreement stipulating 
the contrary and create “a breach of contract, even though there may be no 
infringement of copyright.”337 Thus, if a work supplied to a user under an agreement 
whereby no part of it is to be copied, but then such a copy is made, users will be in 
breach of contract, even if there is no contravention of copyright.   
Although this may seem obvious, research conducted after the passage of the Bill 
showed that there was considerable confusion over this issue.338 Also, this is 
considered to be exacerbated by the fact that the courts often construe such matters 
strictly against the defendant as they amount to derogations of the proprietary rights 
 
334 CDPA 1988 s.28(1); See also, Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: 
suggestions for the future’ European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1, [2011].  
335 The act must fall within one of the ‘permitted’ acts in (Chapter III CDPA 1988) which include: (the 
making of temporary copies), general (which includes the fair dealing exceptions of research and 
private study (s.29(1) and (1C); text and data analysis for non-commercial research; criticism, 
review, quotation and news reporting (s.30(1)); caricature, parody or pastiche (s.30A(1)); as well as 
incidental inclusion of copyright material), exceptions for disabled people, education, libraries and 
archives, public administration, computer programs, databases, designs, typefaces, works in 
electronic form, miscellaneous provisions relating to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, 
miscellaneous provisions relating to the lending of works, miscellaneous provisions relating to films 
and sound recordings and miscellaneous provisions relating to broadcasts (including incidental 
recording for purposes of broadcasts and recording for purposes of time-shifting).  
336 Sillitoe v Mcgraw Hill Book Co [1983] F.S.R. 545 at 558.  
337 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20.   
338  Report: ‘Hansard’ HL Vol.501, cols 227–228. The report also shows that s.28(1) has a more 
limited effect in relation to computer programs, databases and broadcasts; See also, Sims, A., 
‘Strangling Their Creation: The Courts’ Treatment of Fair Dealing in Copyright Law Since 1911’ 
[2010] IPQ  192.  
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of the copyright owner.339 Thus, the onus of proof is on the defendant to prove that 
one of the exceptions applies to the act in question.340 However, the structure of the 
Act might suggest that the permitted acts can only be relied upon in civil actions, but 
it is suggested they could also apply equally in the context of criminal offences,341 
since if the act was permitted it cannot have been an infringement or an offence.342   
In the US, 17 U.S.C. §.109(d) is considered to have a similar effect to s.28(1) in the 
UK. §109(d) enables the direct omission of licenced works statutorily from the 
regulation of the first sale doctrine. This can be said to be a direct endorsement of the 
notion that the first sale doctrine does not apply to a person who possesses a copy of 
the copyrighted work without owning it, such as a licensee.343  
By implication, both s.28(1) and §.109(d) can mean that copyright protects works in 
the case of a copyright violation, can also create further rights under contract that are 
particular to the terms of that agreement. This creates what can be fairly deemed to 
be a two-tier system of protection. To explain, in Capitol Records344 the court rejected 
the arguments regarding §109(a) which suggested that policy required reconsideration 
of the first-sale doctrine in light of technological advances.345 Instead, the court held 
that the fist-sale doctrine did not apply because users did not upload and transfer their 
phonorecord. Instead, they uploaded and sold a reproduction of the phonorecord, the 
first sale did not protect them from infringement suits as these acts were, for technical 
purposes, reproductions, and so were classed as distributions of reproductions.346  
 
339 See Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] F.S.R. 33; Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v The Times 
Newspapers Ltd [1975] Q.B. 613; The Longman Group Ltd v Canington Technical Institute Board of 
Governors [1991] 2 N.Z.L.R. 574 (High Court of NZ). 
340 Sillitoe v Mcgraw Hill Book Co [1983] F.S.R. 545 at 558.  
341 CDPA 1988 s.107; See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at Ch.23.  
342 CDPA 1988 s.107(1)(e), (2)(b), (3)(b). Also see Thames & Hudson Limited v Design and Artists 
Copyright Society Limited [1995] F.S.R. 153. 
343 17 U.S.C. §.109(d) (1976).  
344 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
345 Ibid at 655.  
346 Ibid at 655.  
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This was because ReDigi was held to be (distributing reproductions) as it was 
materially impossible, under the law of physics, for the same material to be distributed 
and exist in two places at once at the same time.347 Thus, it was held to be a 
reproduction even if the material was deleted. This was because the new file could not 
have been transferred without first being copied (and thus making a new reproduction) 
of that file. By implication, this brought a second into existence, (which was then 
distributed) to another. Consequently, at those precise moments, there was both 
reproduction and subsequent distribution, which breached §106(3) of the US 
Copyright Act (1976).348       
There are similarities in the decisions of Capitol Records349 (and) Allposters350 
regarding the perceived distribution. This because in both instances, it was held that 
the acts, although slightly different, were still nonetheless considered to be 
‘reproductions’ and this can be seen as a somewhat predictable conclusion in the 
copyright legal area. For instance, courts in the US have consistently held that the 
unauthorized duplication of digital music files over the Internet infringes a copyright 
owner’s exclusive right to reproduce;351 whilst in the UK, one factor that is common to 
all works is that infringement takes place whether the copy is permanent, transient, 
temporary, or even incidental to some other use of the work.352 
Therefore, subsequent transfers were held unlawful under their respective copyright 
laws as they were considered to breach the exclusive right of distribution. The 
significance of this is that there is nothing in these instances that would prevent a 
breach of contract claim if, for example, no breach was found in copyright as there is 
no exhaustion of the exclusive rights. Thus, contracts could still impede future 
transfers per se because there will be no distribution and this then reinforces the 
 
347 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 6 [4] citing London-
Sire Records, Inc v John Doe 1 542 F. Supp 2D 153 (D. Mass 2008).  
348 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 2 [5].  
349 Ibid.  
350 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015].  
351 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir.2001). 
352 See England & Wales Cricket Board v. Tixdaq [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch), [60]; See also, R. Arnold, 
‘Content Copyrights and Signal Copyrights: The Case for a Rational Scheme of protection’ [2011] 1 
QMJIP 272. 
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applicability of the e-contract as the terms dictate the usage here.353 This is argued to 
create a two-tier system of protection that sees copyright and contract increase the 
control copyright owners have over their works; whilst also acting as a potential safety 
net if copyright is inapplicable under this contractual fallback. This is because the 
increased use of licences on the internet and digital works will bind recipients through 
a contractual clause, whereby a legitimate reproduction could be prevented and the 
access agreement could bind all users who legitimately access the work.354  
This is procured on the basis that digital consumers are not the owners of the content 
they receive, but mere licensees with a right to read, view, or listen to the work.355 
Ownership remains with the provider, and the maintenance of access depends on the 
consumer’s compliance with the provider’s terms. This is contended to be made worse 
by the fact that the sales pages generally fail to indicate that the transaction is a licence 
and not a sale. This is because typically, the contract governing the transaction when 
someone buys digital content means there is no transfer of title. Thus, the transaction 
becomes a “permission” that is usually “revocable” to commit some act that would 
otherwise be “unlawful” due to the agreement.356 This is because the digital economy 
is a new economy based on the networking of human intelligence which functions on 
contractual control.357 
Moreover, this is considered to be exacerbated in light of the developments (or lack 
of) regarding the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA),358 
which was an attempt by the US to implement the World Intellectual property 
 
353 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others December (2019).  
354 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1.  
355 Mazzone, J., Copyfraud and other abuses of intellectual property law (Stanford Law Books, 2011), 
p.118.  
356 Black’s Law Dictionary 1059 (10th ed. 2014) (on the definition of a license). Taken from:  Reis, S., 
‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ Northwestern Law 
Review (March 1, 2015). . Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, (2015) at 183.  
357 Tapscott, D., The Digital Economy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), p.xiii. 
358 To amend title 17, United States Code, to implement the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and for other purposes. 
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Organisation treaties.359 This was a report, (Section 104), that was directed at the 
Register of Copyrights by the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information 
of the Department of Counsel. This joint report to Congress was about the relationship 
between existing and emergent technology and the operation of sections 109 and 117 
of Title 17, United States Code.360  
The report refused to expand §.109 on the basis that the issue was not deemed to be 
a “compelling” one.361 These findings were furthered by the US copyright office 
comments in the report where it highlighted that it would decline to endorse a “digital 
first sale doctrine” which would modify the US Copyright Act to exempt a digital copy 
forwarded to one recipient so as long as the original was deleted.362 The reasoning 
primarily centred around economic and practical difficulties such as the lack of 
assurance that users would delete their pre-existing copies, and that that the first sale 
doctrine’s impact on normal exploitation of the work is far greater than a physical copy 
first sale doctrine,363 a point that was reiterated in Capitol Records,364 and the recent 
CJEU Tom Kabinet case.365   
Lessig would argue that this is because we live in a technological environment that is 
“ill-suited” to fix the flow of internet innovation. The introduction of new technology 
disrupted old markets, particularly copyright owners who sold through well-established 
distribution mechanisms, and these have now been enhanced by contractual 
control.366 Thus, Griffin notes that it is the desire of the capitalist market to gain access 
to information usage. Due to this, he writes that capitalism has attempted to “obtain 
 
359 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). Available at 
<https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf> accessed: 19/11/2018.  
360 Ibid.  
361 Ibid.  
362 Ibid.  
363  Ibid.  
364 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) – the court 
highlighted that the justifications of the first sale doctrine in the physical world could not be imported 
into the digital domain.  
365 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019 (Accessed: 11/01/2020) at [48], [58].  
366 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 380 F.3d 1154 1167 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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regulation of the flows of information” through contract in the digital world and these 
have now become “reflected in the semantic and structural paradigms of the state.”367   
The reason for this is contended to stem from the fact that law is but an element – a 
crucial one – in the continuing social struggle, a socioeconomic phenomenon, its 
principles biased towards socioeconomic elites.368 Thus, the combination of increased 
usage of licences on the internet and an increasing amount of individuals choosing to 
access information this way, sometimes with no other option,369 means that more 
recipients will become subject to these copyright style contractual clauses. As such, it 
seems that “copyright industries’ ability to sidestep copyright limitations will increase 
dramatically as more and more expression becomes available primarily online”370 and 
disrupt the balance that copyright tries to achieve.371  
4.5.1 Has the scope of the terms of agreements been increased as a result 
of developments in copyright law?  
It is predicted that digital contracts will give rightsholders the ultimate say in what users 
can do with the material they access. This is because failure to operate within the 
confines of a licence or obtain express agreement in which to do a particular act is 
likely to fall contrary to copyright law itself under the current system. 
To explain, Professor Kretchmer provides an example. He writes that:  
“Suppose Mr. A, an author, has written a book to get published and marketed. 
He negotiates with publisher P for that purpose. A and P agree on a publishing 
contract, which stipulates that A will supply the work to P for the purpose of 
printing and sale, and that P will pay a specific royalty to A for each book that 
 
367 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
368 Morton Horwitz, ‘Transformation of American Legal History’, Vol. 23, Issue 4 23 William & Mary 
Law Review 663 (1982). 
369 See Rifkin, J., The Age of Access (Penguin Books, London, 2000). 
370 Netanel, N.W.,  Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.70 
371 E.g. – “We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of 
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their 
just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be 
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.” – Per Lord Mansfield in Sayre v 
Moore (1785) at 362. 
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is sold. Upon signing of the contract, A duly supplies the work to P. However, 
at the end of the day, two things emerge; (1) even though there have been 
sales of the book, P has not paid any royalties to A, and (2) it has been detected 
that a second publisher, Q, has also produced and sold copies of the same 
book. Q has no contractual relationship with either A or P. What can A do? I 
would argue that A can sue P for breach of contract, and A can sue Q for breach 
of copyright law. In principle, A cannot sue P for breach of copyright law, since 
the contract between them gives P the right to produce and market the book.”372  
It is argued that the issues surrounding ‘exhaustion’373 and ‘first sale’374 that are 
discussed above,375 have added to this scenario in the digital context due to the current 
rules regarding digitally transferred articles.376 Specifically, this suggests that in the 
same scenario (but one which is procured by way of a digital license), (A) would be 
able to sue (Q) for breach of the exclusive copyrights of reproduction in both the UK,377 
and the US,378 as well as unauthorised distribution.379  This also includes the potential 
to sue both (P) and (Q) for a breach of contract by permission being presumed by 
 
372 This was an example taken from research carried out by the Strategic Advisory Board for 
Intellectual Property Policy, but was subjected to heavy amendments for contextual purposes. For 
more information, see Professor Martin Kretchmer, Associate Professor Derclaye, E., Favale, M., 
Watt, R., ‘The Relationship Between Copyright and Contract Law’ (2010), p.18 
http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/16091/1/contractlaw-report.pdf accessed: 11/4/2018.  
373 See this chapter 4.4.2 
374 See this chapter 4.4.1  
375 See this chapter at 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.  
376 For more information, see this chapter at 4.2, 4.4, 4.5 respectively.  
377 See s.18 CDPA in the UK, Info Soc., Art. 4(2);  
378 See §106(3) of the US Copyright Act (1976); See also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (commissioning party owned the sculpture but not copyright, artist 
permitted access to the sculpture in order to access his copyright; Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi 
Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
379 Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg SA v. Cassina SpA, [2008] ECR I-2731(ECJ); Also, due to 
the lack of ‘permission’ it is likely that this could be treated as an unauthorised reproduction and 
distribution, but then the initial distribution in the physical world would suggest no, but licensed 
transfers in the digital area are likely to be judged/treated differently - Art & Allposters, Case C-
419/13, EU:C:2015;27 (ECJ); In the US, see Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 
640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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mere ‘access’ to the work that is often the subject of a ‘click-wrap’ license that has to 
be ‘agreed’ to before the material being accessed. This is considered to be the case 
as the courts generally enforce these click-wrap agreements in both the US380 and the 
UK.381 This is primarily according to the operationality of contractual privity in the digital 
world.382  
This is contended to reinforce the notion that there is now a two-tier system of 
protection and control over intangible assets, particularly in the digital music industry. 
This is argued to be further fuelled by the recent CJEU decision of Martin Hass v Ralf 
Hütter383 (referred from the German Federal Court of Justice). This considered, 
amongst other things, whether it is an infringement of a phonogram producer’s 
exclusive right under Article 2(c)384 to reproduce that phonogram if someone takes 
very short snatches from the phonogram and transfers them to another phonogram.  
For clarity, ‘sampling’ was described in the case, by AG Szpunar,385 as:  
“the process of taking, by means of electronic equipment, a portion or sample 
(hence the name of the technique) of a phonogram for the purpose of using it 
as an element in a new composition in another phonogram. When reused, 
those samples are often mixed, modified and repeated in a loop in such a way 
as to be more or less utilized in the new work…..those samples may be of 
 
380 See e.g., in the US – Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 206 F.3d 17, 22 n.4 (2d Cir 
2002). 
381 For the UK, see C-322/14 Jaouad El Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb. Deutschland GmbH [2015] (21 
May 2015) (Note that the decision in the CarsOnTheWeb case is a bit of a double-edged sword 
insofar as it confirms the enforceability of click-wrap agreements in the business to business context 
will be welcomed by many online businesses; Yet, it also implies that businesses need to be alert to 
the danger of inadvertently agreeing to unusual or onerous contractual terms when purchasing 
goods or services online).  
382 See this chapter at 4.4.1 
383 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018); Pelham GMBH v Hutter (EU:C:2018:1002): 29 July 2019; 
EU:C:2019:624; [2020] F.S.R.6.     
384 Directive 2001/29/EC.  
385 For further details of AG Szpunar’s commentary on these points see - Bryant, C. and Heeley, R., 
‘The Kraftwerk case—does a two-second sample infringe copyright?’ [2019] 30 Ent. L.R. 125-128. 
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different lengths; of a duration of between less than a second and several tens 
of seconds.”386  
Article 2(c) provides that phonogram producers have the exclusive right to utilize or 
prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in 
any form, in whole or in part of their phonogram. This question is important in 
determining what precisely is meant by ‘reproduction in part’.387  
From the outset in his Opinion, the AG was confident in his submission that:  
“It goes without saying that such an act amounts to reproduction within the 
meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2001/29, which concerns...any ‘direct or 
indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and any form, in 
whole or in part’ of subject matter. Sampling (generally) involves the direct and 
permanent reproduction, by digital means and in digital form, of a portion or 
sample of a phonogram. It therefore...[is]...quite clear that that act amounts to 
an infringement of the right of producers of the phonogram in question to 
authorise or prohibit such a reproduction made without their permission.”388  
The potentiality that sampling rights may be subject to a ‘de minimis’ (i.e. quantitative 
criteria) threshold was also considered in the case. This criterion stemmed from the 
earlier case of Infopaq International389 where the court found that the literary works at 
issue, in that case, consisted of words which, considered in isolation, were not 
protected by copyright. Only their original arrangement was protected as an 
intellectual creation of the author of the work.390 On this subject, in Martin Hass v Ralf 
Hütter, the court noted that “the author of a literary work cannot appropriate common 
 
386  Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [1].  
387 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [6]. 
388 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [26]. 
389 Judgment of 16 July 2009, Infopaq International (C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465).  
390 Judgment of 16 July 2009, Infopaq International (C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465, paragraphs 44 to 46); In 
the UK, see Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2416, citing as an 
example Kenrick & Co v Lawrence & Co (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 99, adapted to apply to the post-Infopaq 
position. 
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words or expressions, in the same way, that a composer cannot claim an exclusive 
right over the notes or a painter a right over the colours.”391 The court highlighted that 
this did not, however, introduce any de minimis threshold in copyright law, as Infopaq 
still applied to long as the work was sufficiently original to constitute the authors own 
intellectual creation.392  
Ultimately, it was ruled that that the reasoning in Infopaq did not apply to phonograms, 
thus ruling out the potentiality of any de minimis criteria being introduced here. This 
was because a phonogram was not considered to be an intellectual creation but rather 
a fixation of sounds, protected as an indivisible whole, incidentally requiring no 
“originality”393 for a phonogram. This is because it is not protected as a result of its 
creativeness, but due to the financial and organisational investment. However, it was 
true that a sound or word could not be monopolised by an author. Yet, from the 
moment they are recorded, that same sound performed by a musician would fall within 
the scope of copyright and related rights.  
The fact that the right of a phonogram producer is aimed at protecting his legitimate 
financial investment (i.e. protection of property against piracy) did not mean that the 
right did not also cover other exploitation, such as authorising or prohibiting 
sampling. It was also deemed incorrect to limit the legitimate financial interests of 
producers of phonograms to protection against the distribution or the communication 
 
391 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [29]. 
392 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [28] citing Judgment of 16 July 2009, Infopaq International (C-5/08, 
EU:C:2009:465, paragraph 39 and paragraph 1 of the operative part).  
393 For a general account of what originality is, see ‘EU legislation and case law on originality: an 
overview’ in Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), Part 4, Section A, IV; On the meaning 
of ‘originality’ in the context of Directive 2001/29/EC – see, Infopaq International A/S v Danske 
Dagblades Forening (Case C-5/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-6569; [2009] E.C.D.R. 15, noting that the same 
is true for databases and photographs. In Case C-145/10 Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH [2012] 
E.C.D.R. 6, this was expressly confirmed in respect of photographs. 
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of their phonograms as such to the public.394  As a result, it seems that “even 
approximately two seconds”395 of unlicensed sampling, from a phonogram is regarded 
as copyright infringement in absence of express authorization. 
The case has been described as “music to the ears of phonogram producers” in the 
UK and EU.396 This has created a scenario where culture is purchased by the “sip” 
rather than by the “glass.”397 Thus, licences can be said to be only accessible “to the 
owners of property and thus in effect support their very autonomy and power 
positions.”398 This is because even the smallest use of digital material must be subject 
to the express permissions of the rightsholder, as it is protected “in whole or in part”399 
despite Directive 2001/29 [having] no references to the protection of a substantial part 
of a phonogram.  
Hopton notes that another point of interest is how the English courts will choose to 
apply this judgment. Unlike  art.2(c) of the Copyright Directive which refers to "whole 
or in part", the  Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 refers to "whole or 
any substantial part."400 He suggests, on the basis, that if national law cannot embody 
 
394 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [30], [31], [32], [33]; See also, Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039Art & Allposters, Case C-419/13, EU:C:2015;27 (ECJ); 
Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others 19 December 2019, at [48], [58].  
395 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [14] and [25]; Bryant, C. and Heeley, R., ‘The Kraftwerk case - does a two-second 
sample infringe copyright?’ Ent. L.R. [2019] 30(4), 125-128; In the US, see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 200 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 
507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016); 
See also, Bartlett, C., ‘Bridgeport Music’s Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Big Chill on the Music 
Industry’, 15 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 301 (2005).  
396 <https://intellectualpropertyblog.fieldfisher.com/2018/ag-opinion-brings-music-to-the-ears-of-
phonogram-producers> accessed: 02/01/2019.  
397 Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.57 
398 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.730. 
399 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben [2018] at [38]. 
400 Hopton, P.,‘Advantage Kraftwerk in long running copyright dispute: Pelham (C-476/17) (also 
known as the Metall auf Metall case)’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(8), 279-281 at [281]; (“he question 
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new exceptions,401 then it must follow that the English courts will interpret English law 
in line with this judgment and deem that a sample recognisable to the ear is a 
"substantial part" and an unrecognisable sample is not. Yet, in a post-Brexit world, of 
course, this might not necessarily always be the case.402 
The US decision by the Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport Music v. Justin Combs Publishing,403 
which has attracted criticism,404 confirmed copyright infringement liability against Sean 
‘Diddy’ Combs and his Bad Boy record label. This was also on the basis that there 
was no de minimis exception to claims alleging copyright infringement of a sound 
recording. Significantly, the Biggie record sampled just ‘five seconds’ of horns from 
‘Singin’ In The Morning’, but Diddy nonetheless had failed to obtain a licence for its 
use. 
Following this, the song’s copyright owners Bridgeport Music and Westbound Records 
sued for infringement, with a US jury awarding $733,878 in damages to Bridgeport, 
and punitive damages of $3.5 million to Westbound. However, in allowing common 
sense to prevail, the trial judge overturned the award, ruling instead that Bridgeport 
should receive $150,000 in statutory damages, with Westbound receiving $366,939 in 
actual damages. However, despite what may be deemed a small victory in the context 
of sampling costs for creators, when broken down, the sum works out at over $100,000 
per second of music.405  
 
whether he has copied a substantial part depends much more on the quality than on the quantity of 
what he has taken.”) - Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 per 
Lord Reid at [276]; (whether the part taken is substantial must be determined by its quality rather 
than its quantity – Designers Guild v Williams [2000] 1 WLR 2426, 2426 per Lord Millet; See also, 
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 per Lord Pearce at [293]. 
401 For instance, Directive 2001/29/EC provides for numerous exceptions – Case C-467/08 Padawan 
SL v SGAE, [2010] ECR I-10555, [AG43].  
402 Hopton, P.,‘Advantage Kraftwerk in long running copyright dispute: Pelham (C-476/17) (also 
known as the Metall auf Metall case)’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(8), 279-281 at [281]. 
403 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007).  
404 Mueller, J., ‘All Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and de Minimis Digital Sampling’, 
Indiana Law Journal, (2006) 81, 435-63; Somoano, M.K., ‘Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films: 
Has Unlicensed Digital Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Recordings Come to an End?’ Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, (2006), 21, 289-309.   
405 <http://www.soundonsound.com/sound-advice/sample-clearance> accessed: 21/6/2016.  
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Yet, it is important to note that the Bridgeport decision has been altered to some extent 
by the US Ninth Circuit, in Salsoul v. Ciccone.406 Here, it was ruled that the de minimis 
exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound recordings, 
as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions. However, Judge Silverman in 
the case, dissenting, wrote that the court should follow the Sixth Circuit and hold that 
use of an identical copy of a portion of a copyrighted fixed sound recording is an 
infringement.407 There have also been no further rulings.  
It is asserted that the current legal stance creates not only the creation of a two-tier 
system, but that contracts could allow reproduction, or distribution, to be ‘personalised’ 
under the agreement with the background support of copyright as a safety net. This is 
because a lack of express permission is likely to amount to an ‘unauthorised’ 
reproduction whether it is ‘in part’ or ‘substantial’ under the current system. It is also 
This is because cases are likely to hinge on the precise wording of the agreements to 
assess permission, as it seems that reproduction occurs irrespective of whether the 
user values the work for its expressive or communicative content.408 
Moreover, there are likely to be a “great number of cases where the position is not 
clear-cut.”409 In turn, this is considered to naturally increase the issues here as it is 
likely that users will be even more reluctant to do acts that may be perceived as having 
the potential to operate beyond the confines of the agreement, or as Griffin would 
argue, the decision in Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter410 may result in contracts being used 
in a manner that “restricts” creative re-uses.411  
The consequence of legal uncertainty is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will 
either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open, and could drive the 
 
406 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016).  
407 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016).  
408 See e.g.. J. Litman, ‘Festischizing Copies’, in R. Okediji (ed.), Copyright in An Age of Limitations 
and Exceptions (2017).  
409 Hopton, P., ‘Advantage Kraftwerk in long running copyright dispute: Pelham (C-476/17) (also 
known as the Metall auf Metall case)’ Ent. L.R. [2019], 30(8), 279-281 at [281].  
410 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018).  
411 Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, Ph.D. [2010] p.166.  
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process underground.412 For purposes here, creativity is the ability of individuals to 
access works and also, their ability to use those works freely (either to create new 
works or distribute interesting pieces to others) without the prospect of legal reprisal 
when creating and producing new forms of culture that are transformative and socially 
valuable pieces.413  
This is considered to be supported by the fact that these decisions414 can be said to 
have transferability to those who licence music generally like the Spotify agreements 
above. This can increase the control rightsholders exert on a societal level, reducing 
the potential to derive maximum value from any works due to the contractual limits on 
usage and the uncertainty associated with them.415 As such, any contravention of the 
incorporated terms and conditions within the agreement could mean users procure an 
unauthorised reproduction or distribution as they do not own the property they licence.  
Ultimately, the effect of the decisions,419 notwithstanding s.28(1), and §109(d), is that 
not only do copyright owners get to limit future distributions of their works, and on their 
chosen terms when intangible works are licenced; but also, this means that an act that 
would otherwise be permitted by copyright can be restricted by contract. For example, 
if a contractual clause states that no copy of the work in question may be made, 
regardless of how much, and then a copy is made, then a breach of contract will arise 
regardless of whether or not the act constitutes a valid action within copyright. 
Consequently, if a work was only made available digitally under the current rules, then 
 
412 Lessig, Free Culture (2004), p.185 
413 Werde, B. ‘Defiant Downloads Rise From the Underground’, (New York Times, 25 February 2004) 
in Rimmer, M., Digital Copyright and the Consumer revolution: Hand of my iPod (MPG Books 2007), 
p.134. 
414 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 507 F.3d 470, 
486-90 (6th Cir. 2007). 
415 Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 799 (30 July 
2009); Bright Tunes Music v Harrisongs Music 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) – in Sharkova, K., 
‘The author, the fan and the in-between: in search of a copyright regime for the everyday creative’ 
[2018] E.I.P.R. , 40(12), 784-796. 
419 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018). 
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a copyright owners decision to “discontinue any further transmissions of the work could 
well be effective to deny all access to the work.”420 
It asserted that current case law421 serves to strengthen the terms of these digital 
agreements. This is because any usage that is considered to be outside of the 
agreement and thus lacking in the prerequisite authorization will be considered as 
likely to amount to unlicensed, and subsequently, infringing use. Moreover, although 
in an employment-type license concerning computer programs, in SAS v SAS 
[2020]422 the CJEU held that:  
“Directives 2004/48 and 2009/24 must be interpreted as meaning that a breach 
of a clause in a license agreement for a computer program relating to 
intellectual property rights of the owner of the copyright of that program falls 
within the concept of “infringement of intellectual property rights”...and that, 
therefore, that owner must be able to benefit from the guarantees provided for 
by th[ose] directive[s], regardless of the liability regime applicable under 
national law.”423    
The effect of this is submitted to create a situation where even if the activity is non-
commercial, a secondary work utilising the loosely outlined protectable expressions of 
a song may still be considered to be interfering with the capacity of the original right 
holder to commercialise and make available through their own chosen means.424 
Therefore, it can be said that the basis for this system rests on the control of 
distribution, both contractually, and ensuring that goods remain ‘undistributed’ to 
procure the benefits discussed here.425 However, the use of such a mechanism can 
 
420 Reece RA, “The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks.”, (2003), 44(2) BC L Rev 577, 
p.630.  
421 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
422 Case C-666/18 IT Development v Free Mobile SAS [2020] E.C.D.R. 7  
423 Case C-666/18 IT Development v Free Mobile SAS [2020] E.C.D.R. 7 at [49].  
424 Sharkova, K., ‘The author, the fan and the in-between: in search of a copyright regime for the 
everyday creative’ [2018] E.I.P.R. , 40(12), 784-796. 
425 For example, in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) at 
6 [4] citing London-Sire Records, Inc v John Doe 1 542 F. Supp 2D 153 (D. Mass 2008); See also, 
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discourage re-use because access can be terminated at any time (e.g. if contractual 
terms regarding re-use are broken for instance) and the only way to access it is 
through an access mechanism.426  
Many websites also contain standard terms and conditions of use which require users 
to waive rights that they would otherwise enjoy under copyright law which treat 
copyright limitations as “mere contractual default rules.”427 Thus, it is argued that this 
is not just the possession of private property, but also the direct coercion exorcised 
based on purely personal claims to authority.428 This is because once copyright is 
characterized as a form of property, allowing for the scope of its exclusive privileges 
and exclusionary right to be extended with little regard for its underlying purpose via 
these contractual methods.429  
As a result, the current imposition of digital contracts is argued to represent an 
“externalization of internality”430 by copyright owners. This is because licenses 
arguably enable the individualized exploitation of their material where the licensor can 
decide their terms. These are reinforced by the weight of the law to “facilitate”431 the 
 
Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015] at [48]; See also, 
Football Association Premier League and Others, EU:C:2011:631, Paras 107-109; Case C-263/18 
Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and 
Others December (2019) at [48]. 
426 Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, Ph.D. [2010] p.166.  
427 Netanel, N.W.,  Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.70. 
428 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.731; To see 
how copyright is enforced primarily through the courts, including the environment of control that this 
creates in capitalist society, see chapter 3 generally.    
429 Balganesh, S, ‘Debunking Blackstonian Copyright’ 118 Yale Law Journal [2009] 1126-1181, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389483?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents accessed:21/11/2015; 
Netanel also agrees that the expansion of copyright has been highly influenced by the factors 
permeated into the copyright system by the property concept, see Netanel, N.W.,  Copyright’s 
Paradox (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.6. 
430 Demsetz, H., ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 347 [1967].  
431 Durkheim gives an interesting account on how contracts facilitate “contractual solidarity” to procure 
individual action and how the importance of contract increases depending on the scale of the 
transaction and is particularly pertinent to twentieth-century development – S. Lukes and A. Scull, 
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exploitation of their property in a manner that goes beyond that which was originally 
contemplated in the Statute of Anne 1709.432 This means that there is now a more 
common factual scenario where “the use of contractual clauses has a greater impact 
because the in rem – in personam distinction is of less importance because the [digital] 
information has to be accessed on an in personam basis.”433  
Significantly, this is postulated to imply that contracts which bind those who come to 
them in such a manner make copyright style “exclusivity” relevant only when it is 
otherwise required by owners.434 For example, when someone is in breach of an 
agreement they can be found liable for copyright infringement as the material relates 
to copyright content. However, licences in the digital format can be capable of going 
beyond the copyright legal doctrine as such agreements are no longer limited by 
copyright and statutory limitations like the first sale435 and exhaustion doctrines.436   
It is postulated that this creates an inherent level of inequality that is successfully 
hidden by the belief in freedom of contract437 and opportunity in capitalist society438 
 
Durkheim and the Law (2013), chapter 8; Interestingly, Durkheim neglects the concept of the state, 
regarding it as important but refuses to analyse why it is important and what interests it serves.  
432 “An act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
 Purchasers of Such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned”- Statute of Anne 1709. See: 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html> accessed:13/10/2014. 
433 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1. 
434 Malevanny, N., ‘Online Music Distribution – How much Exclusivity is Needed?: A Study of 
International, European, German and U.S. Copyright Systems and Their Objectives’, Springer-
Verlag (2019).  
435 Quality king Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research International. Inc. 523 U.S. 135 [1998] - 
(Reaffirming Bobbs-Merril where it outlined that, “the first sale doctrine would not provide a defence 
to...any nonowner such as a bailee...[or] a licensee.” at [146-7]).   
436 M Savič, ‘The CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European 
Intellectual Property Review 378 
437 Epstein, R.A., Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the Lens of Laissez-
Faire’ Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics [2007] Working Paper No. 49.  
438 Tushnet, ‘Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the 
Seventies’ 57 Texas Law Review, 1307, 1347-1350 (1979) in Morton Horwitz, ‘Transformation of 
American Legal History’, Vol. 23, Issue 4 23 William & Mary Law Review 663 (1982). 
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where access is continually subject to the terms of their respective licence 
agreements. Considering this, it is fair to say that the predictions of Cornish have 
become prophetic in the current environment. In 2004, writing in relation to e-contracts 
and how they will be governed within wider copyright law, he predicted that:  
“the legal machinery will be required primarily to underpin the e-
contracts...[c]opyright will not even be needed to define the material in which 
there is a property right to be licenced. The contract can relate to material that 
is outside of any copyright of an author or producer...and can require payment 
even where copyright law creates an exception, such as downloading for 
browsing, detailed private study, or criticism.”439  
It has been argued that contracts are considered to have been central to the music 
industry in the digital age. It is posited that will likely remain the case as they are a key 
method in which extended control can be retained over digital works. However, such 
items can be reasonably said to procure their strength from their non-physical 
elements and how the law approaches the regulation of such items in the digital world, 
it can be said that the current issues will remain something of an intellectual struggle 
for some time. For instance, without requiring an element of physicality, this could 
open the doors for the establishment of digital music file-sharing systems based on 
lawful digital transfers, (although this seems unlikely),440 potentially resurrecting the 
sites like Napster and Grokster,441 but this time with a solid legal foundation.442  
 
439 Cornish, W., Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant (Oxford University Press 
2004), p.55; Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1998] FSR 43, 48 (Laddie J); See also, the 
more liberal interpretation of CDPA 1988, s.30(1) in Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton Television [1999] 
FSR 610, 614 (Walker LJ). 
440 Polydor Ltd v Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d and MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct 2764 (US Supreme Court, 2005); Capitol Records, LLC v. 
ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y 2013). 
441 For more information, see the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.6 generally.  
442 <http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/11/digital-resale-copyrights-second-circuit-wont-
buy/id=88965/ accessed: 03/02/2019.  
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It is hypothesised that the current approach has seen the courts interpret contract law 
to benefit “commercially sophisticated insiders”443 which has “operat[ed] to the 
detriment of consumers.”444 This is considered to provide a possible explanation as to 
why there has been such a reluctance (or opposition) to apply the first sale and 
exhaustion doctrines to the digital world, which would procure secondary markets.445 
This is because such markets would conceivably benefit consumers as they could 
partially reimburse themselves after they are finished with the product, whilst at the 
same time, a lawful acquirer will be likely to obtain it cheaper. This subject has been 
described as a “hot topic”446 and is supported by Stevens, who argues that a 
secondary economy would create reduced prices,447 and some argue that it may even 
serve to increase the legitimacy of copyright law.448  
 
443 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [28]. 
444 M.J. Horwitz, ‘The Transformation of American Law’ 1780-1860, (London: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), p.192; D. Sugarman, (1980), 7 Brit. J. Law & Society, 297; See also, W. Holt, ‘Molton 
Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal History’ William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 4, 
663-723. 
445 Stevens, J., ‘The secondary sale, copyright conundrum – Why we need a secondary market for 
digital content.’ (2016) Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 26(4), pp.179-194. 
446 Phillips, J., ‘Canvassing Opinion: a guest post on Art & Allposters’ (September 11, 2014), The 
1709 Blog,http://the1709blog.blogspot.nl/2014/09/canvassing-opinion-guest-post-on-art.html ; 
also ‘Which is the CJEU copyright case to look most forward to? Probably Art & Allposters’ (August 
12, 2014), The IP Kat Blog, http://ipkitten.blogspot.nl/2014/08/which-is-cjeu-copyright-case-to-
look.html [Both accessed June 23, 2018]. 
447 Stevens, J., ‘The secondary sale, copyright conundrum – Why we need a secondary market for 
digital content.’ (2016) Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 26(4), pp. 179-194; See also, inter 
alia Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325; Breyer, S., ‘The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs’, 84 Harvard Law Review 281 (1970); Demsetz, H., 
“Economic, Legal and Political Dimensions of Competition, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam (1982). 
448 Dootson P and Suzor N, ‘The Game of Clones and the Australian Tax: Divergent Views about 
Copyright Business Models and the Willingness of Australian Consumers to Infringe’ [2015] 38(1) 
UNSW Law Journal 206, at 208.    
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Mysoor suggests that a reasonable solution could be to use the “doctrine of implied 
licence.”449 This is to help address what she regards as the conflation of the 
complexities of exhaustion by regarding the statutory principle of exhaustion itself as 
a licence implied by a statute into a transaction because certain circumstances, i.e. 
certain policy reasons, are satisfied. In this sense, implied licence would be used to 
reframe the context within which the statutory exhaustion takes place under an 
“Implied Licence Framework for Exhaustion.”450  
Yet, the reforms451 discussed in chapter 5452 aim to help counteract these issues by 
creating the possibility of producing cheaper works to lessen the severity of such items 
which could decrease costs throughout copyright.453 This would deal with the need to 
have such an implied licence framework as the proposals could counteract this as they 
provide a framework designed to encourage creative re-uses under a legislative 
scheme that also deals with contracts.454 This is done by reducing the cost of 
production through placing a temporary limit on the price that can be charged for a 
copyrighted item, regarding both sale and re-use455 and could also facilitate the 
reduction in prices advocated by Stevens.  
 
449 The “implied license” doctrine is relatively limited in relation to intellectual property. Implied 
licenses are often what ends up being asserted where there are gaps in existing contractual 
relationships. It is a way of articulating the subjective (or even objective) intent of the parties 
involved. Sometimes “implied license” is used as a way of superseding or bypassing explicit contract 
provisions (or filling in gaps where contract language is vague or poorly framed). Simply put, an 
implied license is an unwritten license which permits a party (the licensee) to do something that 
would normally require the express permission of the owner (the licensor). Implied licenses may 
arise as a consequence of actions by the licensor that a reasonable person would believe (including 
the licensee) that they have the necessary permissions. 
450 Mysoor, P., ‘Exhaustion, non-exhaustion and implied license’, International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law [2018]. 
451 For a brief overview, see chapter 5 at 5.3.  
452 See chapter 5 at 5.5 generally.   
453 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
454 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.8 and chapter 5 at 5.4.1(c).  
455 On re-use, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b) and 5.4.1(c).  
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4.6 How the current approach saved the music industry?456 
“File-sharing tore apart the music industry business model, destroying over half 
its value in revenues; to now, it looks as though the internet may have 
resurrected the business model it almost killed with fee-based subscription 
streaming generating 100m paying subscribers worldwide.457 
The expansion458 of subscription services like Spotify459 is argued to have been 
procured by the current licensing approach. This has seen commentators like Jimmy 
Lovine, former CEO of Interscope Records, to go from remarking the music industry 
as “dead”460 to proclaiming that the only solution for the music industry is “digital 
subscription, because without it, there is no business.”461  
Yet, before this, particularly during the file-sharing days, the music industry was 
referred to as a “disaster”462 until “music streaming services, like Spotify, [took] music 
out of th[ose] dark days.”463 This is because as revenues declined and music 
companies lashed out, they began legal battles with those who illegally downloaded 
music and invested in campaigns to try to teach young people the value of intellectual 
property.464 However, the growth of licensing changed this and streaming breathed life 
 
456 <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/apr/24/weve-got-more-money-swirling-around-how-
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457 Nicolaou, A., ‘How streaming saved the music industry’ The Financial Times: January 16 2017. 
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10/05/2017).  
458 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/04/29/spotify-hits-100m-premium-subscribers-
international-expansion/> accessed: 21/01/2020); See also the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.6.  
459 <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-22164268/spotify-s-global-expansion-plans> accessed: 
23/01/2020.  
460 Fricke, D., ‘The Main with the Magic Ears’ Rolling Stone, April (2012) in Arditi, D., iTake-over: The 
Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  p.121.  
461 Ibid. 
462 <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/apr/24/weve-got-more-money-swirling-around-how-
streaming-saved-the-music-industry> accessed: 21/01/2019).  
463 Ibid.   
464 <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/prince-didnt-like-streaming-but-it-could-be-a-big-boost-to-his-
estate-anyway.html> accessed: 12/11/2018); See also, the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3, 2.4, and 
2.6.    
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back into what was perceived as a declining industry and has become the alternative 
to physical music, making up approximately one-quarter of all income for most content 
providers.465  
Griffin suggests that the proliferation of these contractual methods which have enabled 
the proliferation of streaming under licensing has been because the issue has been 
“sidestepped”466 in a capitalist system that “expands and intensif[ies] in response to 
the falling rate of profit.”467 This is based on the fact that licensing can be seen as an 
intensification of a pre-existing music market, through deliberate contractual 
governance that is designed to limit the amount of consumer freedom that would 
otherwise be previously available to tangible assets under copyright. This is because, 
in a capitalist society, property owners get over the potentiality of a crisis by both 
“forced destruction of new markets, and more thorough exploitation of old ones.”468  
The current approach minimises the amount that can be distributed (maximising 
scarcity) and this is contended to serve the purpose of intensifying the avenues of 
exploitation due to the limitations induced by contract under a relatively new business 
model. Yet, there are also concerns about whether being copyright is being used as a 
means of “censorship, a restraint on creativity, and a way of restricting the supply of 
music, and so on.”469 Notwithstanding this, it is asserted that online music has become 
an expanding market that will soon overtake conventional music sales in physical 
stores.470 This is also considered to be a reason why streaming services such as 
 
465 McDaniels, Robb, ‘Please Adjust Your Bet’ Billboard, January 25 2014 in Arditi, D., iTake-over: 
The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2015) in Arditi, D., 
iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  p.x.  
466  Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1 
467 Jones, G. and Roffe, J., Deleuze’s Philisophical Language (Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 
p.152.  
468 Marx, K., Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (Trans. By T.B. Bottomore, 
McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1956), p.143.  
469 Frith, S. and Marshall, L., Music and Copyright (2nd edn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
2004) , p.5. 
470 Wiebe, A., Right Clearance for Online Music: Legal and Practical Problems from the Perspective of 
a Content Provider and Alternative Models (Medien und Recht Publishing, 2014), p.1.  
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Spotify are overtaking downloaded music formats like iTunes which has seen a decline 
in the imitation offline shop “download-to-own”471 model.  
Instead, innovative services offer new kinds of digital experience (iTunes, Spotify, 
Deezer). Business models include downloads on a pay-per-act or pay-as-you-go basis 
(iTunes, Amazon, Nokia Music, Beatport), download on a subscription basis (Emusic), 
or streaming for free on an advertising basis and streaming on a subscription base 
(Spotify, Rhapsbody).472  In turn, this has meant that purchases of online music and 
the number of subscribers to online streaming services are rapidly increasing.473  
It is postulated that the contractual restriction in the current system creates a greater 
level of demand (and scarcity) for the protected item. This is because the instances 
where the user can act (and thus transfer via lending for example) without the prior 
consent of the copyright holder is diminished in the digital world. Correspondingly, the 
amount available generally can be said to decrease concomitantly due to limitation 
specifically provided for in the agreements, as material cannot be distributed as freely 
as in the tangible context without incurring liability.474 However, this is contended to 
be exacerbated by the lack of applicability regarding the first-sale and exhaustion 
doctrines respectively.475 This would mean that any contravention by distribution 
 
471 <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jan/05/film-and-tv-streaming-and-downloads-overtake-
dvd-sales-for-first-time-netflix-amazon-uk> accessed: 21/08/2019).  
472 Dang N. G., Dejean, S., & Moreau, F. (2012). Are streaming and other music consumption modes 
substitutes or complements? http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025071 accessed:12/08/2019); Sebastian 
Felix Schwemer,  Licensing and Access to Content in the European Union: Regulation between 
Copyright and Competition Law (Cambridge University press, 2019).   
473 Wiebe, A., Right Clearance for Online Music: Legal and Practical Problems from the Perspective of 
a Content Provider and Alternative Models (Medien und Recht Publishing, 2014), p.3; See also, 
Dang N. G., Dejean, S., & Moreau, F. (2012). Are streaming and other music consumption modes 
substitutes or complements?  
474 In the UK see s.28(1) CDPA 1988; In the US, see 17 U.S.C. §109(d); For more information, see 
this chapter at 4.5.  
475 See this chapter at 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively.  
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would generally be viewed as a breach of contract or breach of the distribution right 
under UK476  and US law.477  
This had led to calls for a secondary market for digital goods on public policy 
grounds.478 There have been further calls for a specific doctrine to accompany the 
existing legal provisions as a result of the inability to invoke the previous doctrines 
under a proposed “digital transfer” doctrine.479 This would allow consumers to do with 
electronic copies what they have long been able to do with physical ones480 which has 
been a consistent “problem” in the digital age.481 For example, if someone desires to 
resell, lend, or give away e-books or digital content to another, all that person has to 
do is hand over his Kindle full of e-books. But this action would violate the Kindle Store 
Terms of Use and is thus not a viable solution.482  
 
476 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; Case C-263/18 
Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV and 
Others [2019].     
477 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y 2013); Case C- 419/13 
Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015].    
478 Stevens, J., ‘The secondary sale, copyright conundrum – Why we need a secondary market for 
digital content.’ (2016) Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 26(4), pp. 179-194. 
479 Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ 
Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, 
(2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744447 (Accessed: 14/09/2018); (Reis 
proposes a secondary digital market place for digital articles in the US system to ensure that goods 
maintain some economic value to the transferee and will inevitably provide cheaper access to 
secondary users). 
480 Villasenor, J., ‘Rethinking a Digital First Sale Doctrine in a Post-Kirtsaeng World: The Cause for 
Caution’ Competition Policy International, May (2013).  
481 Clark. D. A., ‘Kirtsaeng and the First Sale Doctrine’s Digital Problem’, 66 Stan, L. Rev., Online 17, 
23 [2013].  
482 Reis, S., ‘Toward a Digital Transfer Doctrine?: The First Sale Doctrine in the Digital Era’ 
Northwestern Law Review (March 1, 2015). . Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, 
2015. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744447>; See, e.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, Amazon (Sept. 
6, 2012), <http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950 
[http://perma.cc/ST4U-N53K]>; Baker, N., ‘A New Page: Can the Kindle Really Improve on the 
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Therefore, contracts, although principally a way of controlling how a work is exploited, 
are suggested to have become a principal means of exploitation in the digital music 
industry. It is argued that this is because the individualistic ethos of contractarian 
legalism plays a necessarily central role in the advancement and stabilisation of a 
society based on commodities, exchange, and profit.484  
This is based on the notion that parties to a contract often regard “legal enforceability” 
by the state as either “unnecessary” or as “self-evident” in capitalist society.485 Thus, 
it is submitted that copyright owners are using contracts to enforce their private will in 
a manner that operates through the state due to the reliance on the legal system itself.  
However, this operation is also on the “edge of the reach” of the State486 because the 
rights prevent State-based copyright limitations from applying, meaning that private 
terms are enforced that exclude State regulation.487 This is argued to be the reason 
why “ubiquitous contracting is now a fact of life”488 because the capitalist economy 
requires the certainty and predictability of legal consequences provided by contracts 
for economic planning.489   
As a result, it is suggested that these agreements are designed to create higher levels 
of consumer engagement with licenced digital music to the point that there is now a 
focus on increasing control over works rather than to secure means for 
consumption.490 This is contended to be the reason why between 2009-2016, the 
music industry has witnessed a noticeable drop in ‘ownership’ of music and a 
 
Book?’ New Yorker, Aug. 3, [2009], 27 in Mazzone, J., Copyfraud and other abuses of intellectual 
property law (Stanford Law Books, 2011), p.119. 
484 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 84, 87, 170, 176, 271, 398-399, 540, 574, 583-84, 
624 (Int’l Pub. Ed. New York 1967) (1st ed. 1867) in Morton Horwitz, ‘Transformation of American 
Legal History’, Vol. 23, Issue 4 23 William & Mary Law Review 663 (1982). 
485 Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.756.  
486 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly; See 
also, chapter 2 at 2.5. 
487 For more information, see this chapter at 4.4 generally. 
488 Merges, R.P., Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011), p.262.  
489  Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977), p.81; See also, the discussion 
in chapter 3 at 3.3; See also, the discussion in this chapter at 4.3.1  
490  Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.91. 
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considerable rise in ‘paid’ (licensed) access.491 Yet, the terms imposed are often 
inconsistent with the balance that copyright law aims for, with many, but not all, 
“conflict[ing] with the limited protection copyright law is [designed] to give”492 and they 
restrict what can be done with the licenced material. As such, the predicted growth of 
the streaming industry outlined below493 can be reasonably said to be attributable to 
the restrictive nature of these agreements. Specifically, this relates to their level of 
enforceability beyond normal copyright constraints which is procured under digital 
technology and the certainty that this offers for licensors.  
4.7 How re-use has been affected in the current system: are licences a 
limitation on creativity?521   
The overall result of these developments has been the manifestation of a legal 
environment where creativity522  inadvertently suffers in the name of profit preservation 
and asset regulation for copyright holders in the digital age. For example, The Verve’s 
single “Bitter Sweet Symphony”, which used an unlicensed sample from an orchestral 
version of The Rolling Stones’ song “The Last Time” was derived from the song (not 
the performance) and was deemed to infringe copyright.  As such, The Verve were 
ordered to pay 100 per cent royalties to Mick Jagger and Keith Richards.523   
Moreover, Paul‘s Boutique, which was released in 1989, by the Beastie Boys which 
pioneered the use of dense sampling with success. However, subsequent Beastie 
 
491 <https://copyrightandtechnology.com/2017/04/12/in-music-drm-grows-while-ownership-shrinks/> 
accessed: 12/09/2018.  
492 Lessig, L., The Future of Ideas (Vintage Books, 2001), p.257. 
493 See this chapter at 4.6.1.  
521 Creativity is expressed here as the ability of individuals/recipients to use the internet and other 
copyrighted goods, without fear of legal reprisal. The basic tenet of the claim is that even though the 
majority of recipient’s activity may be perfectly legal under copyright, the argument is that the 
environment created by the current copyright system is preventing people from using cultural goods 
for fear of legal repercussions.   
522 It is important to note that this is not designed to be an exhaustive account of ‘creativity’ generally 
within copyright (as this is beyond the discussion of this thesis), but instead, to explain how the 
effects pertaining to the matters discussed within this chapter have consequentially restricted the 
ability of individuals for the reasons discussed.  
523 Gowers Review [2006] p.67.  
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Boys albums have not followed this same technique, because of high transaction costs 
necessary for a label to clear the work for release to avoid copyright infringement 
argues Griffin.528 Significantly, in an extract from the Gowers Review (2006),529 when 
questioned about how the change in the IP framework had affected their work, The 
Beastie Boys commented that:  
“We can’t just go crazy and sample everything and anything like we did on 
Paul’s Boutique. It’s limiting in the sense that if we’re going to grab a two-bar 
section of something now, we’re going to have to think about how much we 
really need it.”530  
Regarding the US, the report531 also outlined that in the case of Bridgeport Music Inc. 
v. Dimension Films,532 it was ruled that samples which rise “to a level of legally 
cognizable appropriation” have to be licensed, but that de minimis sampling was still 
to be considered fair use. This was, however, reversed in the appeal to this case, 
where the court ruled the three-note sample was not fair use and that musicians should 
“get a license or do not sample.”533  
It is suggested that these items have been caused by an overly strong property 
regime534 that is causing the underuse of resources.535 This is because questions 
about ownership that create legal disputes can serve to stagnate the creative 
 
528 Steuer, E., ‘The remix Masters’, Wired, Issue 12-11 (2004) available at 
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.11/beastie.html> accessed: 17 August 2007 in Griffin, J., 
‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, 
Ph.D. (2010). 
529 A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property [2006]. The report can be found at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf last accessed: 22/4/2015.  
530 A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property [2006], p.67. 
531 A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property [2006].  
532 Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp.2d 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
533 Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, (2005). 
534 Griffin, J., ‘Making a new copyright economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary 
exploitation in Copyright’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2013].  
535 On ‘property’ and the role this has played in creating the current system, see chapter 3 at 3.2 and 
3.3 generally. 
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development of resources.536 Thus, transaction costs, holdouts, and rent-seeking may 
prevent otherwise economically justified conversions from taking place, even if the 
property rights are “clearly defined” and contracts are subject to the “rule of law” this 
can still procure underuse.537  
However, Waelde and Schlesinger argue that while it cannot be argued that the 
payment of money per se cramps creativity, it is somewhat unlikely that all musicians 
with few resources will actively use the samples they would like in new productions.538 
Yet, the reforms propose to help eradicate this by decreasing the cost of works, 
amongst other things.539 As a result, copyright law in the digital age can now be 
deemed to reflect a system that restricts creativity in the music industry, whereby it 
has become inherently focused upon the needs of rightsholders within the modern 
copyright system under proprietary rights that are contractually enforced. This has 
created an environment where the phrase “get a hit, get an infringement suit”540 still 
remains as relevant today as it did in 2004 and can be said to be the result of laws 
that are looked upon as “commands” backed up by the state.541  
 
536 Heller, M.A. ‘The Tragedy of the Anti-commons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ 
Harv. L. Rev. 111, no. 3 (1998): 621-88; The essence of Heller’s argument is that the conversion of 
property into private rights can cause under-use, as there is no system of regulation that guarantees 
its effective usage for wider society. As such, the article also argues that the difficulties of 
overcoming a tragedy of the anti-commons suggests that policymakers should pay more attention to 
the content of property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clarity of rights.  
537 Heller, M.A. ‘The Tragedy of the Anti-commons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ 
Harvard Law Review 111, no. 3 [1998]: 621-88; Hardin, G., The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
Science 1243 [1968].  
538 Waelde, C. and Schlesinger, P., ‘Music and Dance: Beyond Copyright Text?’ (in) Scripted,  
Volume 8, Issue 3, December 2011.  
539 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5.  
540 Hull, G.P., The Recording Industry (2nd eds, Routledge Publishing, 2004), p.63.  
541 Posner, R.A., Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p.393;  For example, in 
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films Inc. 410 F.3d 792 at 801 (6th Cir. 2005) per Guy J it was stated 
that users should “get a license or do not sample”; Gowers Review (2006) p.67; For more 
information, see the discussion in this chapter generally, and in particular, parts 4.5, 4.6, 
respectively; See also, Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, 
Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December (2018); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 
507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016); 
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The economically orientated characteristics of the discourse throughout this area have 
created the tendency for analysis’ here to focus around methods of quantification,542 
where users are told to “get a license or do not sample.”543 However, it can be said 
that the law turned its attention away from the value of the labour embodied in the 
protected subject matter, to the value of the work itself. Thus, “value now tend[s] to 
mean the macro-economic value of the property...”544 In turn, this is acting to restrict 
what individuals can do with the information, due to the costs associated with re-use 
and challenging a copyright claim, but also, by the nature of the terms that have to be 
agreed to prior to accessing digital works which is restricting access to works.  
Becker and Posner also note that part of the reason for this is because the boundaries 
of fair use are ill-defined,545 and copyright owners try to narrow them as much as 
possible, insisting that even minute excerpts need a license.546 Although clearer 
defined boundaries concerning fair use may encourage more users to assert their 
rights at trial, it is equally contended that high clearance fees will continue to prevent 
the establishment of new online music services547 and is something which the reforms 
 
Savic, M., ‘The Legality of Resale of Digital Content after UsedSoft in Subsequent German and 
CJEU Case Law’ [2015] EIPR 414-29. 
542 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. 
543 Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films Inc. 410 F.3d 792 at 801 (6th Cir. 2005) per Guy J.  
544 Bently, L. and Sherman, B., The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British 
Experience, 1760-1911 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.174-195; See also, Bamgboye and 
Another v Reed and Others [2002] EWHC 2922 (QB) 2002 WL 31961976.    
545 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting fair use defence and finding copyright infringements when commercial copying 
service compiled and sold course packets to students at the University of Michigan containing large 
portions of copyrighted works); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 
1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting fair use defense and finding copyright infringement by Kinko’s in 
preparing course packets for students at New York schools), in Mazzone, J., ‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn 
Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 40; New York University Law Review, Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026..  
546 Posner, R., ‘Do patent and copyright law restrict competition and creativity excessively?’ Becker-
Posner Blog (9/3/2012) <http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-
restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html> accessed: 22/3/2017. 
547 Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7. 
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could deal with.548 Thus, by restricting, either through high duties, or outright 
prohibition, the monopoly of the market is essentially secured to the industry employed 
in producing them.549 The result of these developments is argued to suggest that 
creativity in copyright has been insufficiently considered in copyright law. This has led 
to restrictive contracts in the digital world that exempt otherwise limiting doctrines from 
being used, and where costly rights clearances for risk of infringement claims have 
increased this “permission culture.”550   
The perpetuation of this kind of environment also falls in direct contravention of the 
historic judgement handed down by Lord Mansfield, in Sayre v Moore.551 In this case, 
he dissented that: 
“We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, 
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the 
community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their 
ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of 
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.”552  
It is further asserted that the current digital environment is also operating in stark 
contrast to some of the seminal UK cases like the Da Vinci Code553 and Designers 
Guild.554 Concerning this, Griffin notes that the courts otherwise attempted to achieve 
a balanced level of protection against the ability of recipients to re-use element of the 
 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233065> accessed: 12/5/2015; Heins. M, & Beckles, T., ‘Will Fair Use 
Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control’ (New York University Brendan Centre for 
Justice 2005) (“Threatening ‘cease and desist’ letters cause many people to give up their fair use 
rights”).  
548 The reforms could help lessen the impact of such high fees by driving down costs – see the 
discussion in chapter 5 at 5.5.3(a).  
549 Smith, A., ‘The Invisible Hand’ (Penguin Books, 2008), p.54.  
550 Lessig, L., Free Culture (2004), pp.xiv-8.  
551 Sayre v Moore (1785) the report of which is available within Cary v Longman 1 East 357 (1801) at 
358 
552 Sayre v Moore ibid., at 362.  
553 Baigent v The Random House Group [2007] FSR 579. 
554 Designers Guild v Williams [2001] 1 WLR 2416. 
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work.555 However, it is suggested that such attempts are still nonetheless restricted to 
those situations outside of the contractual scenarios and there will continue to be a 
presumption that all unauthorised uses are going to be the subject of infringement 
proceedings.556   
This is because multimedia digital formats and online communication challenge the 
current practice and this has resulted in an assumption that all copyrighted materials 
must be used only with “permission.”557 Thus, creativity has been displaced as an 
overriding concern in modern copyright law558 and the courts have become too 
influenced by the immediate arguments of the parties to a case.559 The consequence 
of this has meant that there are now “strained” relations between creativity and 
commercial life.560 
This is because we have entered a transition, a moment during which there is a shift 
from traditional forms of economic regulation to that of information regulation in 
capitalist society. Griffin also suggests that this transformation is occurring because of 
the infrastructure of the digital information age and the way in which it influences our 
 
555 Griffin, J., ‘The interface between copyright and contract: Suggestions for the future’ [2011] 
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.1.  
556 Mazzone, J., ‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 40; New York University 
Law Review, Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=787244> accessed: 22/5/2015; 
Griffin, J. and Nair, A., ‘Making Threats of Copyright Infringement’ [2013] International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology; See also, chapter 2 at 2.3.  
557 Aufderheide, P., Milosevic, T., and Bello, B., ‘The impact of copyright permissions on the US visual 
arts community: The consequences of fear of fair use’ SAGE Publications, [2015]; Whalen M, 
‘What’s wrong with this picture? An examination of art historians attitudes about electronic 
publishing opportunities and the consequences of their continuing love affair with print’ Art 
Documentation: Bulletin of the Art Libraries Society of North America [2009] 28(2): 13–22; Bielstein 
SM, Permissions, a Survival Guide: Blunt Talk about Art as Intellectual Property (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 
558 Bently and Sherman, The making of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p.43.  
559  Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, Ph.D. [2010].   
560 A. Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (University of Chicago 
Press 2009), p.7.  
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means of capitalist interaction by maintaining a degree of imbalance between 
rightsholders and recipients.561 This change is argued to be the result of 
socioeconomic compulsion, where the source of legal change in the copyright system 
comes from society and the economy itself.562  
It is postulated that this implies the existence of a “living law”563 underlying the formal 
rules of the copyright system and it is the task of judge to integrate these two types of 
law, as the centre of legal gravity lies in society itself.564 As a result, the law was 
developed so that the conditions for the existence of the music industry were 
maintained in the digital age, to the point where digital production “enhanced” rather 
than “undermined” the commercial positions of copyright owners.565  
4.7.1 A repeat of the past? 
It is postulated that the copyright industry is seeing a privatised return to the past, 
which is the idea that rightsholders are indirectly employing, on behalf of the state, 
their own method of regulation that is akin to the effects of the English Licensing of the 
Press Act 1662.566 This was an act for preventing the “frequent abuses in printing 
seditious treasonable and unlicensed books and pamphlets and for regulating of 
 
561 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016] 
562 Regarding the capitalist influences that are operative within society and the way these have 
influenced the development of the current system, see chapter 3 generally; For an interesting 
account of the role that capitalism has played in the developmental aspects of society and the 
implications of this for the future, see Harari, Y.H., Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow 
(Penguin Random House, 2015), chapters 6 and 7. 
563 L. Brandeis, ‘The Living Law’ [1916] 10 Illinois Law Review 461; E. Ehrlich, Fundamental 
Principles of the Sociology of Law (Transaction Publishers, 1936). 
564 Ehrlich, E. ‘The Structure of the Legal Proposition’ in Fundamental Principles in the Sociology of  
Law, by Eugen Ehrlich, translated by Walter Lewis Moll, pp.198-203, 501-503, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 1936) – Taken from M.D.A. Freeman, Introduction to Jurisprudence 
(Sweet and Maxwell, 8th Edition 2008), p.847; D. Nelken, ‘Law in action or living law?’ [1984] 4 legal 
studies 157, who argues that Ehrlich’s approach, though underestimating the importance of, and 
need for, legislative intervention, is a better focus for empirical research, being more firmly related to 
sociological theory.   
565 Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 
2015),  p.xiii.  
566 Licencing Act of the Press Act 1662, 14 car.II.  
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printing and printing presses.”567 The significance of introducing this is because it 
required all intended publications to be registered with the government-approved 
Stationers’ Company, giving the Stationers the ultimate say in what got printed and 
what did not.568  
In the US, this can be compared with the ‘courtesy of the trade’ provisions that were 
prevalent prior to the enactment of formal copyright legislation. These granted an 
informal exclusive right of publication to the first American publisher to announce plans 
to issue an un-copyrighted foreign book domestically. It was not, however, a legal 
obligation, but instead, a gentleman’s agreement (a framework of informal rules and 
punishments in absence of legal protections). This meant that participating publishing 
houses recognised such a right and refrained from what they called “printing on” the 
announcing firm (those who printed the foreign work first on American soil).569 As such, 
the publisher Isaac K. Funk, who was frequently charged with rank piracy, attacked 
courtesy as a “law” that had not been “framed” and described it as a mere “right of 
possession” based primarily on the principle of “first grab.”570  
 
567 See Licencing Act of the Press Act 1662, 14 car.II, c.33; Deazley, Ronan. 2008a. “Commentary on 
the Licensing Act, 1662.” In Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900), ed. Bently. L, and 
Kretschmer. M., Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law <http:// 
www.copyrighthistory.org.> Taken from: Nipps, K., ‘Cum Privilegio: Licensing of the Press Act of 




568  Nipps, K., ‘Cum Privilegio: Licensing of the Press Act of 1662’ [2014] The Library Quarterly: 
Information, Community, Policy 84 (4) (October): 494–500. doi:10.1086/677787.   
569 Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp.30-64.  
570  Pound to Price, 3/14/1927, in Alpert, B.S., “Ezra Pound, John Price, and The Exile,” Paideuma: 
Modern and Contemporary Poetry and Poetics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1973), 439-40; Groves, J.D., 
Courtesy of the Trade in Books 1550-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) in Casper et al., 
Industrial Book: 1840-1880 (University of North Carolina Press, 2007) at 147-48; For a similar 
analysis, see Garvey, E.G., ‘Ambivalent Advertising: Books, Prestige, and the Circulation of 
Publicity’ 170-89 in Keastle and Radway, Print in Motion (Vol.IV, University of North Carolina Press, 
2009) at 175. 
 346 
The contractual agreements discussed in this chapter are contended to provide 
evidence of the dispensability of legal coercion, that is dispensed only with the 
coercive legal power of the state.571 This is because these historical  methods are 
argued to be akin to that which rightsholders have manifested for themselves through 
digital contracts that can be fairly described as a quintessential right of possession.  
This is because digital licences are enabling rightsholders to circumvent copyright by 
‘contracting’ themselves out of what would otherwise be contextually applicable legal 
limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners created by the State. Thus, 
these contracts are performing what can be fairly argued as a “facilitative” function as 
facilitative laws and contractual instruments are agencies of State policy through which 
private individuals may expand or contract their autonomy to subvert official State 
policy.572  
Ultimately, consumers who commit contravening acts under the agreement which 
governs the articles they access, although potentially justified under copyright, can 
now be pursued for redress under what now becomes a violation of owners private 
contractual rights. Thus, such activity can be fairly regarded as enabling rightsholders 
to establish their own code of conduct in the same way as the stationers who were 
regarded by many as establishing their “own code of conduct, independent of the state 
itself.”573 
Therefore, because the 1662 legislation gave the stationers the ultimate say in what 
got printed and what did not, and the fact that contracts can be used to circumvent 
copyright and create a cause of action in law against those who breach the agreement 
is highlighted to not only extend copyright protection; but it arguably overrides it, to the 
point where rightsholders are now able to control what is distributed, and what is not.574  
 
571  Weber, M., Economy and Society (University of California Press Version, 1978), p.756. 
572 G. R. Rubin and Sugarman, D., Law, Economy and Society: Essays in Legal History English Law 
1750-1914 (Professional Books, 1984) p.10-11; See also, D. Sugarman, Company Law and the 
Rise of Capitalism, (Unpublished, 1982).  
573 Johns, A., Piracy: The intellectual property wars from Guttenberg to Gates (University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), p.18. 
574 For a brief account of how the stationers register played a vital role in upholding order in London’s 
commerce of print in the mid-seventeenth century, see Johns, A., Piracy: The intellectual property 
wars from Guttenberg to Gates (University of Chicago Press, 2009), chapters 2 and 3.  
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It can also be argued that a motive for the orchestration of this kind of environment is 
because capitalists require predictable legal consequences575 to govern the 
interrelationship between law and technology. This is because the use and copy of 
digital works are notoriously interwoven at many stages in the digital world576 where 
contracts become “supportive” of the ‘streaming’ distribution model, as opposed to 
being “unsupportive.”577 Thus, the nature of digital works, and the way they are 
primarily accessed, means that contractual enforceability is strengthened due to things 
like privity. This is due to the in personam factor having in rem application almost every 
time as the nature of the transaction becomes ‘direct’ in the digital world. This 
seemingly enhances the enforceability of these agreements, whilst at the same time, 
limiting the distributive capacities of recipients, in both the UK,578 and the US.579  
In turn, these items are then further backed up by the regulatory functionality of 
copyright law on technology when viewed in light of the fact that mere distribution is 
always going to create another copy.580 This is because as soon as society figures out 
new ways to share ideas that advance the common good, private interests advance 
 
575 Trubek, D.M., ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ Faculty Scholarship Series [1972] 
Paper 4001, Available at: 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4993&context=fss_papers> 
accessed: 12/9/2014. 
576 Perzanowski. A. and Schultz, J., ‘Digital Exhaustion’ 58 UCLA Law. Rev. 889 [2011] at 902. 
577 Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, Ph.D. [2010], p.175.  
578 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; See also, M Savič, 
‘The CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual 
Property Review 378.  
579 The reproduction right, under US law, (§.106(1)), cannot be a digital first sale defence because a 
digital transfer requires reproduction of the content in addition to distribution, and the reproduction is 
a distinct exclusive right of copyright holders granted by §.109(a); For more information, see Capitol 
Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y 2013).   
580 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y 2013) 2 [5]; This creates 
what can be fairly argued as an almost strict liability scenario - Costanza, N., ‘Digital Music Garage 
Sale: An Analysis of Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. and a Proposal for Legislative Reform in 
Copyright Enabling a Secondary Market for Digital Music’ Hastings Communication Law Journal, Vol 
37, Issue 1, [2015]. 
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to prevent this from happening, to maintain the old systems that benefit the “elite” in 
capitalist society.582    
However, despite the law appearing to favour the entrenchment of contractual 
agreements and the diminished (if not made impossible) the enforceability of limiting 
copyright doctrines in the digital sphere, there is no need for this to remain so. Since 
the Statute of Anne 1710, many of the details of copyright law have changed, and 
since the creation of the first sale and exhaustion doctrines are somewhat ill-suited to 
regulating items that were otherwise not in the contemplation at the time of their 
respective creations. This was arguably recognised by the court in ReDigi, where it 
outlined that it “could not, of its own accord condone the wholesale application of the 
first sale defence to the digital sphere, particularly when congress has declined to take 
that step.”583 Recognising this, it is suggested that if such matters are not dealt with, 
then the reforms could be undermined in a similar manner by contracts. It is to these 
matters we now turn.584 
4.8 Proposal for reform. 
So far, the chapter has outlined the issues surrounding the imposition of contracts in 
terms of how they interact with copyright law. In doing so, it assessed the capacity of:  
 
- (a) those contracts that remove legitimate copyright limitations on the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners (like the distribution right)585 by virtue of 
their digital format;  
and  
- (b) those which go beyond the remit of copyright itself to prevent otherwise 
legitimate acts from being held justifiable under copyright law due to provisions 
such as s.28(1), and §109(d).  
 
582 Mason, M., ‘The Pirate’s Dilemma: How Youth Culture is Reinventing Capitalism’ (Free Press, 
2008), pp.141-142.  
583 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 655 (S.D.N.Y 2013) at [660].  
584 How the reforms seek to prevent contracts from undermining them are discussed more extensively 
in chapter 5 at 5.4.  
585 See §106(3) in the US, and s.18 CDPA in the UK, Info Soc., Art. 4(2).  
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To this end, the chapter has focused on how the current copyright system has been 
effected by the use of contracts. This included the way the courts have seemingly 
assisted rightsholders in safeguarding their ability to maximally exploit their assets by 
assessing copyright infringement predominantly in light of the potential effects that 
such infringement can be said to have on the existing financial interests of 
rightsholders.  
The chapter has focused on assessing the way such contracts are enforced to ensure 
that any reform exercise is not undermined by the strategic use of contracts to sidestep 
the proposals. In support, Hargreaves, in his 2011 government review on intellectual 
property,586 also stated that the government should legislate to ensure that other 
copyright exceptions are protected from override by contract.587    
It is suggested that both (a) and (b) of contract should be the focus of any reform in 
the copyright system. This stems from the challenge that they are contended to 
represent regarding the successful imposition of the proposed reforms, in that they 
may restrict the re-use of copyright works,588 as well as providing a way to ‘contract 
out’ of them. 
Chapter five deals with both types of contracts by proposing the imposition of a 
legislative framework.589 This is to ensure that it is not possible to contract out of the 
reforms and will be assessed under current case law to facilitate their fluid 
implementation in an attempt to minimise commercial and legal disruption.  
 
586 Hargreaves, I., ‘Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth’ (2011), p.8 
(Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-
finalreport.pdf) accessed: 21/11/2014.  
587 Hargreaves, I., ‘Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth’ (2011), 
Recommendation 5, and 51, [5.40] (explaining that permitting contractual variation ‘replaces 
clarity...with uncertainty’). For more information, see this same review at chapter 9, p.229.   
588 The re-use right is namely that there cannot be a reproduction of the work that is subject to 
copyright protection without the permission of the rightsholder- (Remember that copyright protects 
the form in which ideas are expressed, not the ideas themselves- see, inter alia, Designers Guild 
[2000] 1 W.L.R. 2416 at 2423; Jefferys v Boosey (1854) 10 AII E.R. 681 PC (UK); Donoghue v 
Allied Newspapers Ltd [1938] Ch. 106 Ch D; This is dealt with in chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b) and 5.4.1(c).  
589 See chapter 5 at 5.4 generally.   
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Two situations were discussed in this chapter in which contracts will have an impact. 
These were the way they affect: 
 
- (a) What users can do with the material they purchase or access;  
and  
- (b) The extent to which contracts can either extend copyright law or remove 
the ability of individuals to rely on copyright to produce what could otherwise be 
a legitimate reproduction and/or distribution depending on the wider 
circumstances of each scenario.  
It is suggested that some regulation of these situations is necessary in order to ensure 
that the proposed reforms are not undermined. Consequently, the thesis will set out in 
chapter five a ‘capping’ system590 which introduces two main principles.  
First of all, no contract within the general subject matter
 
of copyright should be used 
in a way that serves to either circumvent the proposals or prevent a reliance upon 
copyright law. This will apply to situations where copyright-based limitations or 
defences would otherwise be available if it were not for the restrictions imposed by the 
agreement. Thus, the scheme outlined in chapter five is structured in a way so as to 
prevent owners from limiting the re-use of works by raising prices to make up for any 
profits they feel have been lost under the reforms.591  
Secondly, it is asserted that any reformed system should also provide a stronger 
bargaining position to those who wish to re-use existing works, all of which are 
considered in accordance with the Berne Convention.592 Ultimately, the overriding aim 
of the scheme is to make the accessibility of copyright works easier and cheaper. The 
reforms propose to do so by lowering the overall cost that can be charged for both 
sale and re-use. 
 
590 For a brief account of exactly what these are, see chapter 5 at 5.3 generally.  
591 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.4.1(b).  
592 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised in 
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S, Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [The 1979 amended 
version does not appear on UNTS or ILM, but the 1971 Paris version is available at 1161 UNTS 30 
(1971)].  
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The reforms proposed explicitly consider the issue of rightsholders restricting re-uses 
for the purposes of encouraging creativity by driving down costs across the culture 
sector. This could help alleviate high clearance fees, as well as limit the prices that 
can be charged for re-uses by copyright owners for a limited number of times. In turn, 
this could encourage the creative re-use of works via a more financially accessible 
system.593 
The proposed system will also give equal consideration to how rightsholders have 
been influenced by external factors, like capitalism.594 The purpose of this is to work 
with the aspects that have influenced the development of the current system that does 
not operate in isolation of a capitalist system to which there is no alternative.595 It is 
suggested that such an approach is fundamental to create workable change in a 
society where capitalism that has come to dominate economic life.596 Therefore, it is 
submitted that if one wants to work in the direction called for by the forces of human 
evolution, one must not be deluded into considering the idea that the management of 
social systems could be anywhere else other than within the confines of capitalism.597 
4.9 Concluding comments 
The previous chapters have looked at how the old regime of intellectual property, 
operating as a form of industrial competition policy has been replaced. Now, 
intellectual property is on the desktop and is implicated in routine creative, 
communicative, and just plain consumptive acts that each of us performs every day.598 
 
593 For more information, see chapter 5 at 5.5.3.  
594 For more information, see chapter 3 generally.  
595 Harari, Y.H., Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (Penguin Random House, 2015); For an 
opposing view, see Streeck, W., How will capitalism end? (Verso Books, 2016) - (Wolfgang Streeck 
argues that we are witnessing a long and painful period of cumulative decay: of intensifying frictions, 
of fragility and uncertainty, and of a steady succession of normal accidents); Alternatives to 
capitalism have also been offered - Mason, P., Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin 
Publishing 2016); Bregman, R., Utopia for Realists: And How We Can Get There (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2017).   
596 Weber, M., The Protestant ethic and Spirit of Capitalism (London: Unwin University Books, 1971, 
11th impression) p.55.  
597 Steiner, R., The Threefold Social Order (Anthroposophic Press, 1966), chapter III.  
598  Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ).  
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The result is that the triggers of copyright – reproduction, distribution – can be 
activated by individual “footsteps.”599 This chapter and the discussion within the 
previous chapters have demonstrated that copyright has become a system that has 
been influenced by capitalism, becoming focused around the economic interests of 
rightsholders. The manifestation of this environment has been built on a foundation of 
proprietary rights and is procured through an environment of legally-based control in 
the digital age.  
The thesis has postulated that this has been the result of a capitalist “transition” within 
copyright,600 where rightsholders are attempting to perfect the control that they have 
over their assets by contractual methods in the music industry. The chapter has 
suggested that this situation has been exacerbated by what has been regarded as an 
increasing level of information that is now accessed electronically as a result of 
advancements in technology. This has created a scenario where users have little 
choice other than to agree to the terms of digital contracts which are mandatorily 
imposed by rightsholders as a precondition of access. The courts are considered to 
have played an assistive role in procuring the current environment to ensure that the 
economic interests of rightsholders have remained paramount. This is considered to 
have added implicit legal weight to the ‘terms’ of these agreements for risk of 
unauthorised usage and the perceived legal consequences that flow as a result.601  
The findings in this chapter also raise the question of whether digital downloads will 
ever be exhausted.602 Thus, it becomes reasonable to conclude that rightsholders will 
 
599  Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), pp.50-52. 
600 For more information, see Arditi, D., iTake-over: The Recording Industry in the Digital Era 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 2015),  chapter 1; Also, see generally chapter 3.  
601 For more information, see the discussion in this chapter generally, and in particular, parts 4.5, 4.6 
respectively; See also, Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, 
Florian Schneider-Esleben, 12 December [2018]; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing, 
507 F.3d 470, 486-90 (6th Cir. 2007); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. 13-57104 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Savic, M., ‘The Legality of Resale of Digital Content after UsedSoft in Subsequent German and 
CJEU Case Law’ [2015] EIPR 414-29. 
602 See references in M Savič, ‘The CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ 
[2015] European Intellectual Property Review 378, 378, n 2, in Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the 
Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) Art & Allposters International BV v 
Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London. 
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conceivably be able to manifest increased control in the future as the ability of 
individuals to use contracts to circumvent copyright law is likely to continue under the 
current rules and this could also affect the reforms if this is not sufficiently dealt with. 
As a result, two situations were distinguished by this thesis as being situations in which 
contracts will have an impact on the ability of individuals to freely use their accessed 
article.  
- These were those which seek to govern what users can do with the material 
they purchase or access.  
and  
- Those which either extend copyright law or remove the ability of individuals to 
rely on copyright to produce what would otherwise be a legitimate reproduction 
and/or distribution.  
The result of this, is that, products that once were the property of the consumer in the 
sense that they had the ability to transfer their purchased item to an unlimited number 
of people by lend or sale, is now devoid of any proprietary transfer as it is ‘licenced’. 
This is significant because in the current digital environment the imposition of contracts 
within the music industry has created a complete network of contractual relationships, 
each of which originates in a “deliberately planned process of power acquisition, 
control, and disposal.”603  
Consequently, for now, at least, it appears that not only do the handcuffs of network 
effects are indeed “golden.”604 This is because the doctrine of contract brings the 
whole weight of the social fabric upon the man who has bound himself by a promise. 
His freedom to consists in being able to make or abstain from making a binding 
promise. Yet, when he has made it, the State uses its whole despotic power to compel 
 
603 Weber and Parsons, Weber, M. and Parsons, T., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
(The Free Press, New York 1947), (The Free Press, 1947), p.163; See also, this thesis at chapter 3.   
604 It should be noted that in this instance, Boyle is talking about the nature of the Free and Open 
Source software system, and how these are affected by the digital environment, but it is argued that 
this is equally applicable here – Boyle, J., The Public Domain (Yale University Press, 2008), p.191. 
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or prevent his free action.”605 The sanctions of law become drivers of the performance 
of contractual obligations606 where contracts now operate as “institutional licenses for 
sectional interests.”607 
The next chapter will outline reform proposals which embody the foundational 
underpinnings behind the creation and existence of copyright. like the dissemination 
of information. This could be achieved through driving down prices which is predicted 
to create a more financially accessible system. The proposals will also recommend 
the outlawing of agreements which prevent the application, or otherwise obscure the 
enforcement, of legitimate copyright limitations. This will be done to the effect that the 
reforms are still applicable under the agreement. However, this does not affect 
individual contractual enforceability, except where the terms of the agreement act to 
otherwise prevent the enforceability of the reforms.608  
It is, however, acknowledged that there are provisions in the 1988 Act609  that can be 
said to go beyond EU requirements and, in a number of other situations, applies to 
contractual provisions that seek to override exceptions.610 These exceptions are 
applied using two different techniques, which are sometimes that the contractual 
provisions are declared ‘void’,611 or they are declared otherwise ‘unenforceable’612 
 
605 T.H. Farrer, ‘Freedom of Contract’ Fortnightly Review, XXIX [N.S.] (1881);- G. R. Rubin and 
Sugarman, D., Law, Economy and Society: Essays in Legal History English Law 1750-1914 
(Professional Books, 1984) p.192. 
606 G. R. Rubin and Sugarman, D., Law, Economy and Society: Essays in Legal History English Law 
1750-1914 (Professional Books, 1984) p.193.  
607 Avineri, S., Social and Political Thought of Marx (Cambridge University Press, 1968) p.23.  
608 See chapter 5 at 5.4 generally.  
609 CDPA 1988 s.28(1).  
610 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011) at 8.  
611 CDPA 1988, ss.36(4), 50A, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c), and 296B. 
612 CDPA 1988, 29(4B) (research and private study), 29A(5) (data analytics), 30(4) (quotation), 30a(2) 
(parody etc), 32(3) (teaching), 31F(8) (disability), 32(3) (instruction), 41(5) (library copying for other 
libraries), 42(7) (library copying to replace missing parts), and 42A(6) (library copying of published 
works for user research). Cf. CDPA 1988, ss. 40B (use on-site in cultural institutions), 43(3)(b) 
(prohibited copying of unpublished works), which are capable of being overridden by contract.  
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insofar as they attempt to prevent the applicability of a certain exception under 
proprietary rights.613  
As a result, the reforms recognise the underlying principle that copyright is 
fundamentally a property right.614 This is based on the fact that proprietary rights have 
been a foundational aspect of copyright since the inception of this legal area under the 
Statute of Anne in 1710.615 Moreover, the notion of private property is the outcome of 
the social creativeness that is associated with individual human ability that provides 
for the free and independent use of the means of production.616  
The aim is to lessen the overt focus upon economic exploitation and enhance the 
transferability of digital assets by freeing up some of the constraints through creating 
more financially accessible works617 and limiting the impact of contracts.618 This is to 
push copyright towards “the more interdependent social, political and economic 
processes that it is meant to serve.”619 This is because in the public interest, the 
Statute of Anne limited the term of protection. Thus, in adapting the copyright law to 
the needs of the twenty-first century, the challenge is to respect the fundamentals of 
that law and to meet the needs of both creators and the public interest alike.620  
 
613 For more information see chapter 5 5.4.1(a)(i), 5.4.1(a)(ii).  
614 See chapter 3 at 3.2  
615 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors 
or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times therein mentioned 1710 (8 Ann. C. 19); Copyright 
is a property right under s.1(1) Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, and protects against 
exploitation of the copyright work by others under s.16 CDPA 1988.  
616 Steiner, R., The Threefold Social Order (Anthroposophic Press, Inc. New York, 1966), chapter III.  
617 See chapter 5 at 5.5.3.  
618 See chapter 5 at 5.4.  
619 Balganesh, S, ‘Debunking Blackstonian Copyright’ 118 Yale Law Journal [2009]  1126-1181 at 
1181, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389483?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents> accessed: 
21/11/2015; On the benefits of the reforms, see chapter 5 at 5.5.   
620 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; See also, On the future of copyright, see: 
E. Derclaye (ed), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2009); B. Fitzgerald, ‘Copyright 2010: The Future of Copyright’ E.I.P.R. [2008], 30(2), 
43; C. Geiger, ‘The future of copyright in Europe: striking a fair balance between protection and 
access to information’ I.P.Q. [2010], 1. R. Deazley, Rethinking Copyright—History, Theory, 
Language (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006); B. Atkinson and B. Fitzgerald (eds), 
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Therefore, it is argued that reducing prices and increasing overall accessibility could 
help achieve this. This is because an accessible system of culture is not one without 
property, or where artists do not get paid, as this may remove the incentive to 
progress621 and to use resources efficiently.622 A culture without property, or in which 
creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not what is advanced here, 


















Copyright Law: Vol III: Copyright in the 21st Century (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Z. Efoni, Access-
right: the future of digital copyright law (New York: OUP, 2011). 
621 H. Demsetz, ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy’ [1973]  16 J Law and 
Economics, 1-9 at 3.  
622 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law (1973) p.10.  







Implementation of the proposed framework in the UK and the US music 
industry. 
5.1 Introduction. 
The thesis has so far contended two complementary points in relation to the evolution 
of copyright law and its current functionality.  
Firstly, that capitalism has played a fundamental role in the creation of the current 
copyright system. As a result the system now focuses predominantly upon the existing 
interests of rightsholders, whereby it has become centred around exclusivity, and 
economic exploitation. This has been perpetuated by an environment of panoptic 
control1 where users activities are being monitored,2 or held as a contractual breach,3 
in an attempt to enforce compliance and minimise infringing activity. The purpose of 
this was to generate maximal profits to ensure the continued extension of capitalist 
commodification in the digital age under copyright law.4  
Secondly, this has served to discourage creativity (and what can be done with 
copyright works)5 for fear of being summoned before the courts,6 or, risk being in 
breach of copyright or contract (under a ‘two-tier’ system of protection).7 This has 
strengthened existing threats provisions (under a ‘decentralized’ system),8 which 
included using the court process to eliminate commercial competitors.9 This was 
argued to have been exacerbated by the costs associated with simply contesting an 
 
1 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.3.  
2 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.3.1.1(b). 
3 See chapter 4 generally, and at 4.5. 
4 Devos, K., Tax Compliance Theory and the Literature (Springer Publishing 2014); See also, part 5.5 
in this chapter generally, and specifically, 5.5.3(a).  
5 See chapter 4 at 4.7.  
6 See chapter 2 generally.  
7 See chapter 4 at 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.7 respectively.  
8 See chapter 2 at 2.5.  
9 See chapter 2 at 2.6.  
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infringement allegation10 because even a £2,000 claim for copyright infringement can 
run up costs of around £20-£30,000.11  
To this end, chapter two argued that the changes brought in by the advancement of 
digital technology represented a challenge to the music industry.12 The existing music 
industry right holders (publishers) sought to resolve the challenge to existing markets 
by the utilisation of the law and technology.13 The chapter then considered the 
consequences, analysing how this created a self-serving system of panoptic 
surveillance.14 That system saw threats of legal sanction move away from judicial 
scrutiny to the point where, infringement allegations became a predominantly 
uncontested affair.15 The chapter then looked at how there has been a gradual 
extension of legal liability for copyright infringement online, where information service 
providers have become policers of content in an attempt to avoid being sued.16 It also 
assessed how a lack of specific defences to copyright-related claims led to copyright 
law becoming a “self-defining, [self-serving] autopoietic prophecy”17 in a decentralized 
system.18 
 
10 See the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3, 2.5; Gibson, J., ‘Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in 
Intellectual Property Law’ 116 Yale Law Journal 882, 887-906 [2007]; Aufderheide, P. and Jaszi, P., 
Reclaiming fair use (University of Chicago Press, 2011), ch.1.  
11 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011), p.83.  
12 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.2.1 
13 Callister, P. D., ‘Law and Heidegger's Question Concerning Technology: A Prolegomenon to Future 
Law Librarianship’ Law Library Journal, Vol. 99, pp. 285-305, [2007]. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=960134 accessed: 21/2/1016.  
14  See chapter 2 at 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.  
15  For more information, see chapter 3 at 2.3 and 2.5 generally.  
16  For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.3.1.1(a), 2.3.1.1(b) and chapter 3 at 3.5.1.4 respectively; 
O’Sullivan, K.T., ‘Copyright and internet service provider "liability": the emerging realpolitik of 
intermediary obligations’ IIC [2019], 50(5), 527-558; Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the 
development of the communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577; See also, M. 
Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third parties: The case of website blocking’ (2013) JIPITEC.   
17 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of ‘information justice’ Intellectual Property Quarterly [2016]; See 
also, Luhmann, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems in (Sociocybernetic Paradoxes 1986), pp.172-
192; Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law [1985], Teubner and Febbraio, State Law, and 
Economy as Autopoietic Systems [1992].  
18  For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.5.  
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Chapter three, then critically analysed how capitalism manifests an attitude of 
accumulation among individuals that is perpetuated through the notion of property.19 
This assessed the role that property has played in the commodification of culture 
against the backdrop of digital technological advances under capitalism. This was 
argued as an attempt by both rightsholders, and the State, to create environments that 
are conducive to profit-making.20 This revealed that individuals are acting 
subconsciously, “unwittingly”, and “in concert”,21 to facilitate the development of 
capitalism within the culture sector.22 This resulted in the withering away of copyright 
limitations,23 that are more about exploitation than creation. It then considered the role 
of the exclusive rights of communication (in the UK),24 and, the public performance 
right (in the US)25 in the creation of the current ‘streaming’ business model discussed 
in chapter 4.26  
Chapter four then analysed imposition of digitalised contracts in the current copyright 
system.  The chapter demonstrated that this resulted in an increase in rightsholder 
control through the use of digital licenses. This was then contended to have been 
exacerbated by digital technology due to its relationship with contract law and the 
practical implications this has had for users regarding the accessibility of works 
electronically.27 This included the fact that ‘electronic contracts’ are to be recognised 
as valid and enforceable under UK law by virtue of the E-Commerce Directive 
Art.9(1)28 (as implemented via the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
 
19  See this chapter at 3.2.  
20  May argues that the inherent tendency for the capitalism is to continually search for areas of new 
investment – (May, C., A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, (Abingdon: 
Routledge 2000); See also, chapter 3 at 3.4.  
21  Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations   (Book IV, 1776) in Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information 
justice’ Intellectual Law Quarterly, [2016]. 
22 See chapter 3 at 3.4.  
23 Rel. Rights Dir., Art. 10(1); See chapter 3 at 3.4 and 3.5 generally.  
24 See chapter 3 at 3.5.1.  
25  See this chapter at 3.5.2.  
26  See chapter 3 at 3.5.  
27 For more information, see 4.2.  
28 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c); For 
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2002 (SI 2002 No.2013), and under US law via 17 U.S.C. §109.29 The end result was 
that two situations were discussed where contracts will have an impact. These were 
the way they affect: 
(a) what users can do with the material they purchase or access,  
and  
(b) the extent to which contracts can either extend copyright law or remove the 
ability of individuals to rely on copyright to produce what could otherwise be a 
legitimate reproduction and/or distribution depending on the wider 
circumstances of each scenario.  
It is suggested that some regulation of these situations is necessary in order to ensure 
that the proposed reforms are not undermined. 
This chapter seeks to flesh out the items discussed within the thesis by taking into 
consideration the aspects from the previous chapters and incorporating them into the 
supplementary proposals. These are designed to work alongside the current system 
of legal protection. These reforms are not intended to repeal any of the existing laws 
in the UK, or the US. Instead, the capping system proposed is aimed at regulating 
works as opposed to reducing protection. The aim of the proposals is to provide a 
framework that will have effect beyond their enforcement, but in a way that works with 
capitalism and the current regulatory bodies:30 “in an economy where intangible assets 
are more valuable than ever, IP is more important than ever.”31  
 




29 More specifically, U.S.C. §109(d) (2012) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does 
not apply to a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as 
someone who as obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee. 
30 For more information, see this chapter at 5.7.3.3(c) generally.    
31  Merges, R.P., Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011), p.291.  
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The reason for this is to create a reform strategy that works with the ideological 
aspects of the capitalist system32 that have perpetuated the current environment,33 
with the aim of increasing creativity by driving down production and re-use34 costs 
across the culture sector. It is suggested that this comprehensive drive-down in fees 
generally within copyright is likely to facilitate a correlative proliferation in the amount 
of information that is disseminated, as the cost of production, purchase, and re-use, 
will fall for reasons that are not strictly related to the reforms per se.35  
The proposed system aims to establish ways in which there could be a greater degree 
of focus upon the creative re-use of works36 with little effect on the quality of works 
produced.37 Content recipients, and their re-use of works, will be the central theme 
behind the proposed system. This also includes ensuring that the impartiality of the 
proposals and their associated regulatory procedures remain paramount.38 It will do 
so by setting out ways in which costs could be reduced in the copyright system. This 
is to aid and encourage creative re-uses of works, as well as ensuring that 
enforcement is dealt with beyond a single body.39 It will be suggested that there is a 
need to consider both rightsholders and recipients in any reformed system, if there is 
to be a system that is viable for the long-term.40  
The proposals to the UK and US copyright system are based around two fundamental 
issues. Firstly, there is a need to consider the current economic environment in which 
 
32 On capitalism, see chapter 3 generally.  
33 See chapter 2 at 2.3 generally.  
34 The re-use right is namely that there cannot be a reproduction of the work that is subject to 
copyright protection without the permission of the rightsholder- (Remember that copyright protects 
the form in which ideas are expressed, not the ideas themselves- see, inter alia, Designers Guild 
[2000] 1 W.L.R. 2416 at 2423; Jefferys v Boosey (1854) 10 AII E.R. 681 PC (UK); Donoghue v 
Allied Newspapers Ltd [1938] Ch. 106 Ch D. 
35 See this chapter at 5.5.3(a). 
36 See this chapter at 5.5.3(a), 5.4..1(b), 5.4.1(c) respectively. 
37 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5.2. 
38 See this chapter at 5.7.3.1; On the need for independent regulatory authorities, see  Walters and 
Haahr, Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration (Routledge, 2005), 
p.52. 
39 See this chapter at 5.7, 5.7.1 and 5.7.2.    
40 See this chapter at 5.5.3(a).  
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copyright has developed in order to produce reform that operates in conjunction with 
it. This also includes looking at potential limitations to the operation of the proposals, 
like contracts,41 as well as looking at both the current UK42 and US43 legal 
infrastructures. This is to explore methods to assist in the efficient implementation and 
enforceability of the reforms.44 Secondly, there is a need to consider how to ensure 
the proposed system will encourage creative re-use through driving down prices.45 
With this, a set of criteria are outlined,46 which also includes considering the most 
appropriate method for administering the proposed system.47 The reason for the focus 
on price is based on the notion that price is the fundamental coordinator that brings 
together all parties in the copyright system and markets generally.48  
5.2 The importance of recognising the current environment in 
approaching reform. 
As technology has developed content recipients are able to manipulate existing works 
in an increasing number of ways49 due to the “emancipatory effect” of digital 
technology.50 However, a combination of high costs, and a legal framework based on 
proprietary rights that is predominantly focused on economic exploitation, has 
diminished such potential.51 
In previous chapters, it was suggested that copyright places too much emphasis on 
preserving the existing financial interests of rightsholders as a result of capitalism. This 
 
41 See this chapter at 5.4.  
42 See this chapter at 5.7.1  
43 See this chapter at 5.7.2 
44 See this chapter at 5.7.  
45 See this chapter at 5.5.3(a)  
46 See this chapter at 5.3   
47 See this chapter at 5.7.3.3(c)(i),and (ii).   
48 (e.g. Posner notes that there is no coordinator – except price) - Posner, R.A., Hayek, Law, & 
Cognition, NYU Journal of Law and Liberty 147 [2005] at 149.  
49 Schneiderman, B., Software Psychology: Human Factors in Computers and Information Systems 
(Little, Brown Pub. 1980); See also, Lanier, J., You are not a Gadget (Penguin Books, 2010). 
50 Jenkins H., Convergence Culture (New York University Press 2006); See also, chapter 2 at 2.3.   
51 See generally, chapters 2, 3, 4.  
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is because copyrights provide right holders with rights,53
 
which Griffin notes include 
“inter alia the exclusive rights of reproduction, and distribution, in the UK adaptation 
and, in the US, derivation.”54
 
This has created a “permission culture”55
 
that has been 
argued to be damaging to creativity because of the clearing fees that have to be paid,56 
as well as the costs associated with defending a copyright claim.57 This also includes 
the amount of damages awarded.58 
The proposals aim to counteract the effects that have been inflicted upon the current 
system, in that it provides a framework designed to encourage creative re-uses. This 
 
53 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 1-31. 
54 For more information, see Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A 
Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, (2008) chapter 6 at 6.2.; For the rights in the UK, see 
CDPA 1988 s.16, and for rights in the US, see 17 United States Copyright Act 1976 § 106. (Both 
relate to the justifiable limitations on the exclusive rights of owners under what is known as “fair-
use”). 
55 Lessig, L., “Free Culture”, (New York, 2004), pp.192-93.  
56  See chapter 4 at 4.7 and 4.7.1; Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp.2d 830, 841 
(M.D. Tenn. 2002); Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, (2005) (a three-note 
sample was not considered to be fair use and users were told to “get a license or do not sample”); 
Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018) at [14] and [25] – (“even approximately two seconds” of unlicensed 
sampling, from a phonogram (i.e. a sound recording) is regarded as copyright infringement in 
absence of express authorization).   
57  Balganesh, S., ‘Copyright Infringement Markets’ (February 13, 2013). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
113, 2013; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 13-7; 
Gibson, J., ‘Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law’ 116 Yale Law Journal 
882, 887-906 [2007]; Aufderheide, P. and Jaszi, P., Reclaiming fair use (University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), ch.1. 
58  Reformation Publishing Company Limited v Cruiseco Limited and anor [2018] EWHC 2761 (Ch) – 
(a large part of the judgment looked at what type of damages would be appropriate and the recent 
cases of One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris - Garnier [2018] UKSC 20, and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd v Stinger Compania de Inversion SA [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1308 and concluded the term “Wrotham Park damages” to cover all the types of remedy should 
no longer be used; See also the discussion in this chapter at 5.5.3(a).  
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is achieved by reducing the cost of production through placing a temporary limit59 on 
the price that can be charged for a copyrighted item, pertaining to both sale and re-
use.60 By changing the prices (lowering them), it is argued that this would help alleviate 
the operationality of the current system. This is because the proposals could indirectly 
enable access to works due to the possible reduction in costs overall across the 
copyright spectrum. This could also incidentally increase compliance with copyright 
due to the reduced prices and lessen piracy as a corollary effect.61 Although it is 
impossible to eradicate piracy, in the absence of more affordable and accessible 
options, there will always be illegal pirate streams.62  
However, it could be suggested that a simple solution would be to shut down all non-
permitted data streams, although this may create further issues. For example, Minitel 
(which was a computer terminal that connected to remote services via uplink63), and 
 
59  Tirole, J., The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), Para 9.4, 36 
7ff.  
60  In terms of what items would be covered by the law, this is covered by the existing scheme of legal 
protection i.e. whatever items are capable of being protected by copyright are also capable of being 
protected under the current scheme. However, ‘Artistic’ works are not included under the reforms, 
for more information, see this chapter at 5.6.   
61 Devos, K., Tax Compliance Theory and the Literature (Springer Publishing 2014); See also, part 
5.5 in this chapter generally, and specifically, 5.5.3(a).  
62 BBC, "Premier League: Third of fans say they watch illegal streams of matches – survey", (4 July 
2017), <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/40483486>; The Guardian, "Premier League launches 
major fightback against illegal streaming" (29 March 
2017), <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/mar/29/premier-league-illegal-streaming-tv-
audiences> [Both accessed 30 June 2019] – Taken from: Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the 
development of the communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [576]; 
(Illegal Streaming Mobile Piracy Surged in France 2017) - 
<https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/illegal-streaming-mobile-piracy-france-2017-1202833883/> 
accessed 21/06/2020.  
63 (An uplink is a port found on network hubs, switches, and routers that allows a connection between 
computers or other network devices. For example, a home network may have a router connected to 
a broadband connection through the uplink port, so an Internet connection can be shared with all 
computers on the network.) - <https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/u/uplink.htm> accessed: 
09/03/18.  
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which operated comparatively like a modern Google Chromebook.64 Importantly, 
Minitel operated as an open network and was a huge success65 but was 
decommissioned in 2012 after 30 years of service due to the networks ability to move 
with the advances of the internet. Fundamentally, the success of Minitel was, in part, 
due to the fact that it was subject to government regulation and was an open network.  
Minitel blended state intervention (build and maintain the marketplace) with market-
impartiality (giving all parties the capacity to sell legal products and services) These 
factors were the catalyst for the boom of Minitel.66 Therefore, to help combat illegal 
streams, the reforms could facilitate cheaper, and subsequently, more accessible 
options, and this could create incentives for people to channel their transactions 
through the legitimate market.68 However, empirical evidence to support this assertion 
is potentially lacking.69 
This is important as the current copyright system does not adequately consider the 
wider issue of creativity. Access to works is being discouraged by a combination of 
 
64 With a Minitel, one could read the news, take part in multi-player interactive gaming, grocery shop 
for same-day delivery, reserve theatre tickets in Paris, purchase said tickets using a credit card, 
remotely control thermostats and other home appliances, manage a bank account, chat, and date. 
65 With free terminals at home or work, people in France could connect to more than 25,000 online 
services long before the world wide web had even been invented - 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/minitel/530646/> accessed: 08/04/2019.  
66 Ibid.  
68 Posner. R, Economic Analysis of Law, (4th edn, 1992), pp.251-2. 
69  Note that there is no empirical evidence to support this directly. However, Danaher Smith and 
Telang ‘Website Blocking Revisited’ (18 April 2016), SSRN, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795> [Accessed 30 June 2019]  did find 
that in the aftermath of the November 2014 website blocks, there was a 6% increase in 
subscriptions to legitimate sources such as Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on 
legitimate ad-revenue supported sources such as BBC and Channel 5’s streaming sites. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. 
Poort and J. Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of 
Amsterdam [2018], p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the 
communication to the public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]. 
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legal threats,70 controlling access points,71 contractual methods,72 and high costs (to 
the point where infringement is being ‘monetized’),73 that are made possible by 
copyright laws in capitalist society.74  
Chapters two and three focused on how the capitalist ideology has influenced the 
development of the current legal environment. They then analysed how, and why, this 
has been enforced through copyright within a panoptic-style system of surveillance. 
The chapters revealed inadequacies within the current system which have also 
resulted in the formulation of restrictive legal doctrines that are more about exploitation 
than creation in the name of profit. This was then argued to have been facilitated by 
the exclusive rights of communication (in the UK),75 and, the public performance right76 
(in the US),77 including how the ‘streaming’ business model discussed in chapter 4 
was built on these rights.   
Chapter four considered why there is a need to counteract the problem of contracts 
that have served to increase the amount of control that rightsholders have over their 
protected assets. This also included the how contracts prevent the applicability of 
legitimate copyright limitations on the exclusive rights granted by law. This is procured 
through the contractual mechanics of license agreements in the digital age under a 
‘two-tier’ system of protection.78 The purpose of doing so was postulated to be for the 
purpose of ensuring that the reforms remain effective in the face of such items. This 
was to prevent righthoders from simply contracting out of the reformed system, 
otherwise rendering them partially effective at best.   
 
70 See chapter 2, more specifically, see 2.3 and 2.5 respectively. 
71 For more information, see chapter 3 at 3.7 generally, more specifically, see section 8.10.  
72 For more information, see chapter 4 generally.  
73 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.3, and 2.3.1.2(a) respectively.  
74 See chapter 3 at 3.3 and 3.4.   
75  See this chapter at 3.5.1 generally.  
76  Note, there is a UK right of (‘public performance’) – which is a right on the copyright owner to 
perform the work in public (s.19 CDPA); See also, FAPL, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 
[2011] ECR I-9083 (ECJ, Grand Chamber), [200]-[203]; Kitchin J. also confirmed that s.19 
represents an overlap between (s.20 CDPA ‘communication to the public’) – FAPL v. QC Leisure 
[2012] EWHC 108 (Ch), [63].   
77  See this chapter at 3.5.2.  
78 See chapter 4 at 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.7 respectively.  
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The thesis has focused on the factors that have contributed to the shaping of the law 
by identifying the external developments that have created the current system that is 
predominantly focused on economic exploitation. The proposals aim to learn from 
these same items to encourage access to existing content and facilitate creative re-
uses by reducing the cost of producing and accessing content. In support of this cost-
reducing approach, Landes and Posner in economic terms79
 
suggest that if legal 
copyright protection reaches a certain level, for instance, in the costs of rights clearing, 
this will reduce the number of works being created. In turn, this will limit the amount of 
stimuli for future works thereby limiting future creativity.80  
It is posited that there is a need to consider reforms which directly tackle the issue of 
rising costs, not necessarily to the point where an author is ‘free’ to ‘borrow’ material 
from an earlier one81 but instead, to reduce the cost of borrowing that material overall. 
This could result in cheaper works being produced for consumers and future authors 
that could correlatively increase the dissemination of works. This is because "the costs 
of developing a new idea are likely to be low in most cases relative to the potential 
reward from licensing the idea to others, and so there would be a mad rush to develop 
and copyright ideas. Resources would be sucked into developing ideas with minimal 
expression, and the ideas thus developed would be banked in the hope that a later 
author would pay for their use. Although the development of new ideas would be 
accelerated, the dissemination of ideas might not be."82  
The reforms could counteract this, by providing a ‘stimuli’ that works in tandem with 
the capitalist ideology, by ensuring that the measures are only temporary. This could 
prevent the withholding of works as both sale and re-use would be covered. Thus, to 
withhold works in the hope that a later author would pay for their use would make little 
 
79 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. at 326 and 332.  
80 For more information, see Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A 
Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, (2008) chapter 6 at 6.2; Also, see this chapter at 5.5 
81  Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. at 333. 
82 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law" (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 
325, 350. 
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economic sense under the proposed system as this would prevent owners charging 
their chosen price.  
It is suggested that any approach to reform should operate in accordance with the 
principles governing the capitalist system, because although it may not last forever,83 
it is the current economic system of both the UK and the USA and so it is contended 
that any reforms must necessarily work in conjunction with it.84 This is because instead 
of collapsing under crisis, capitalism generally adapts and mutates as although 
swathes of capital can be destroyed, business models can be scrapped, empires can 
be liquidated in global wars – the system survives, albeit it in a different form.87 The 
thesis will then consider what bodies would be the most appropriate in administering 
the proposed system,88 including how it will be enforced.89  
5.3 The capping system: A basic overview. 
The basic tenet of the capping system offered by this thesis operates on the basis that:  
 
83 Mason, P., Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing, 2016), chapter 8. 
84 Harari, Y.H., Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (Penguin Random House, 2015). 
87 Mason, P., Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing, 2016), pp.31-48.  
88 See this chapter at 5.7 generally.  
89 See this chapter at 5.7.3.3(c)(i), (ii), (iiii).   
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(The size of the work)90 = (The maximum price91 it can be market for until (x) 
number of copies/amount are/is sold in accordance with the figure imposed by 
the capping system)92 
Rightsholders and distributors will have to declare the accuracy of their own numbers 
under a formal system of registration.93 Then, once the qualifying 
(number/amount/duration) of (works) have been sold/licensed in accordance with the 
rules imposed by the guidelines provided: the work can be sold/licensed at a rate 
chosen by the owner.  
For simplicity, the analysis focuses on copyright protection for (items) and other written 
works, but it should be noted that the proposals are applicable, “mutatis mutandis, to 
other forms of expression as well.”94 
In essence, the capping aspect of the proposals works by applying what are known as 
‘price controls’ to the current copyright system, which is the ability to set maximum and 
minimum prices.95 The reforms would set a ‘maximum price’ that could be charged in 
 
90 ‘Size’ is not defined explicitly here because it is considered to be a quantitative matter that should 
be outlined by the statutory proposals which should be considered within the wider context of the 
culture economy. In addition, such an analysis is deemed to be a matter for governmental 
consideration based on the fact that to provide a comprehensive analysis of potential prices and 
sizes is argued to be beyond the scope of this thesis, as this is designed to provide a framework for 
more detailed reform within the copyright sector to be developed. 
91 For purposes here, no specific number of items (or) duration is provided, neither are specific prices 
because the framework provided is intended to offer a basic outline without any specific numbers. 
Instead, it is designed to provide a model in which accurate numbers can be inserted into, and 
implemented into law by way of a fully-fledged extensive economic analysis. In addition, it is 
suggested that such an analysis is deemed to be beyond the scope of this thesis and so to provide 
specifics pertaining to numbers beyond the scope of this piece.     
92 The proposals are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to other forms of expression – Landes W., and 
Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal Studies 325 
93 For more information, see this chapter at 5.7.3.3(a). 
94 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
95 <https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/621/economics/price-controls-advantages-and-
disadvantages/> accessed: 19/02/2019.  
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relation to works sold and re-used, and the price of works cannot go above a certain 
level until a certain amount have been sold/re-used.96 The aim overall, is to reduce 
prices below the market equilibrium price, and this could reduce prices overall across 
the copyright system even after the ‘capped’ phase.97  
Advantages of this approach include: 
1. Could lead to lower prices for consumers.98 This may be important if the 
supplier has monopoly power to exploit customers. For example, a copyright 
owner who owns all the rights in a work in a specific area can charge excessive 
prices. Maximum prices are a method to bring prices closer to a ‘fair’ and 
‘competitive equilibrium to the copyright system post-reform.99 
2. Maximum prices are usually reserved for socially important goods and 
purposes,100 but it is also suggested that they can be used to help alleviate 
rising prices in the copyright area for the multiple reasons.101 
Disadvantages of this approach are: 
3. That it will lead to lower supply. If owners get a lower price, there may be less 
incentive to supply the good, and the number or quality of goods on the market 
could decline. The reforms aim to counteract this potential drawback under the 
following basis. The quality of the work will directly impact on an author’s ability 
to charge their chosen price based on the fact they need to surpass the number 
of works required to be sold before they can attain pricing freedom (the ability 
to no longer be limited by the pricing limits imposed by the cap). This is 
suggested to help combat any concerns about reduced quality and/or supply.102 
 
96 There is a reason why ‘quantity’ here is used over a ‘time’ based approach – for more information, 
see this chapter at 5.3.1. 
97 See also, part 5.5 in this chapter generally, and specifically, 5.5.3(a). 
98 See this chapter at 5.5.3 and 5.5.3(a) respectively.  
99 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5.3(a).  
100 Amazon.com, Case C-521/11 EU:C:2013:515, [49] – The CJEU in this case ruled that 
compensatory funds could be used for social and cultural establishments.  
101 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5 generally.  
102 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5.2.  
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4. A maximum price will also lead to a shortage – where demand will exceed 
supply – The reforms could deal with this under the time-based approach 
used,103 and also, the fact that the capping limitations could capitalise on the 
principles of competition in capitalist society could reduce costs further.104     
To illustrate how maximum prices work, the graph below shows what happens when 
maximum price is applied under market conditions. The equilibrium price is Pe. A 
maximum price leads to demand of Q2, but a fall in supply to Q1.105 
106 
 
To avoid any unnecessary or otherwise repetitive explanation regarding how the 
reforms will procure the above advantages, and, deal with the associated 
 
103 This is discussed further in this chapter at 5.3.1  
104 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5, and 5.5.3(a) respectively.   
105 <https://www.economicshelp.org/concepts/maximum-prices/> accessed: 19/05/2018).  
106 Ibid.  
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disadvantages,  it is important to note in this section that the above points are dealt 
with later in this chapter.107 
5.3.1 Why is there an emphasis on the quantity sold as opposed to a 
specified time limit under the proposed reforms?  
The importance of a quantity-sold approach, as opposed to a time-based method, is 
based on the hypothesis. Simply, that if rightsholders were given an allocated time-
frame in which to charge a particular fee, it is argued that they would artificially restrict 
the amount available until the designated period expires in capitalist society via the 
capitalist practice of ‘hoarding’108 (the withholding of goods in an attempt to induce 
scarcity to raise prices).  
It is asserted that rightsholders would adopt such practices to minimise the effects of 
a temporary reduction in price, as owners would essentially be able to modify their 
output. This is to curtail any potential losses perceived by them under a time-based 
method and this would be problematic in attempting to reduce prices. This is 
considered to be particularly important given the fact that the function of ‘hoarding’ 
goods is ‘simply ignored in the capitalist economy. It is ignored to the point where the 
hoarding of goods is the same as the withdrawal of goods but with a characteristic 
price increase as a consequence.”109 Tangentially, it is postulated that the envisaged 
hoarding by capitalists under a time-based approach to reform is a reasonable 
prediction. This is because rightsholders could be reasonably said to adopt such 
practices for the purpose of reducing what may be perceived as a form of financial 
‘loss’ due to the temporarily lowered prices under the proposals during the initial 
stages of the caps.  
Specifically, under a time-based approach, it is submitted that rightsholders would 
adopt the practice of hoarding not necessarily to induce an artificial rise in prices, but 
instead, to reduce the damage caused by a time-based restriction via minimising the 
 
   
108 Ibid.  
109 Backhaus, J., Joseph Alois Schumpter: Entrepreneurship, Style and Vision (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003), Ch.3, pp.93-94; On the way in which capitalists hoard money and disrupt the 
normal function of capital as a tool of exchange rather than accumulation, see Fornas, J., 
Capitalism: A companion to Marx’s Economy Critique (Routledge Publishing, 2013), pp.47-8.    
 374 
amount released. By adopting the quantity-based approach outlined, as opposed to, 
a time-based method, it is suggested that works could potentially remain of sufficient 
quality110 despite the initial limitations. Yet, their price, including those for creation and 
re-use, could be significantly lower by virtue of what will be demonstrated below111 as 
an increased degree of economic efficiency112 throughout the system because of the 
anticipated effects of the reforms.  
This is predicted to encourage owners to make a concerted effort to bypass the 
restrictive price limitations in place by using a numbers approach. This is simply to 
ensure they could make the most of the pricing freedom available after the required 
amount has been satisfied under the proposed system. This is based on the notion 
that in capitalist society, man is under the perception that ‘time is money’ and a man 
who can earn ten shillings a day by his labour, [but] sits idle, [essentially] throw[s] 
away, five shillings.113  
The same analysis can be applied to the proposed reforms. It could be suggested that 
for every time a rightsholder keeps their works within the boundaries of the caps, they 
are, in essence, throwing away extra shillings that they perceive could be made under 
their own independently chosen price. This method could be useful as rightsholders 
are influenced by the inherent need to make profit within capitalist society,114 and 
because for a new work to be created, the expected return — typically, [shall be] 
assume[d] exclusively, from the sale of copies—must exceed the expected cost.115  
 
110 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5.2.  
111 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5, and 5.7, generally; On price reduction, see this 
chapter at 5.5.3(a).   
112 R. J. Van den Bergh and P. D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 29–30; See also, Posner R. Economic 
Analysis of Law (1973); H. Demsetz, ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy’ [1973]  16 
J Law and Economics, 1-9.  
113 Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism (Trans, Stephen Kalberg, Roxbury 
Publishing, 2002), p.14.  
114 Weber, M., The Protestant ethic and Spirit of Capitalism (London: Unwin University Books, 1971, 
11th impression); See also, chapters 2 and 4 generally.  
115 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
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Therefore, it is for these reasons that a time-based approach is argued to be an 
ineffective way in which to efficiently implement the proposals. Also, the benefits of a 
quantitative approach are suggested to be substantiated by Landes and Posner. They 
maintain the assumption that there is a ‘downward-slumping demand curve’ in relation 
to copyrighted works.116 As such, it is hypothesised that these factors are likely to 
create a greater desire among rightsholders to bypass the limitations proposed on the 
sale of protected articles. This is in order to benefit from the early popularity of the 
asset and to retain their pricing freedom for the reasons mentioned herein.  
In any event, it is recognised that more popular works will sell more, and therefore, 
have a better chance of benefitting from the current proposals than less popular works. 
Nonetheless, it is contended that such items are likely to occur regardless of the 
approach taken as “if there is no market interest in a work, even an extended copyright 
[or absence of a ‘capped’ phase] will not save it.”117 It is also contended that due to 
the reduced rates envisaged, both consumers and potential creators will have to pay 
less money to access works. This could facilitate a subsequent rise in creativity, and 
thus, the objective of the reforms, as more popular works will inevitably have a better 
chance of market success regardless of what system is proposed.118 
However, it is also recognised that this analysis could equally suggest that prices could 
rise after the works are no longer subjected to the proposed capping phase. Although 
this is a potentiality, it is nonetheless argued that the consequential elements produced 
by the reforms,119 could actually see a reduction in both the prices associated with 
sale, and re-use, post-reform. This is based on the premise that production costs will 
be reduced. This implies that the cost of expression will fall (as well as during the 
capped stage). In turn, this could transcend to a lower price charged for the finished 
 
116 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. at n.5. 
117 Dallon, C.,  ‘The problem with congress and copyright law: Forgetting the past and ignoring the 
public interest’ 44 Santa Clara Law Review 365 (2004).   
118 Geiger, C., ‘The future of copyright in Europe: striking a fair balance between protection and 
access to information’ I.P.Q. [2010], 1. R.; Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of 
copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal Studies 325 
119Namely that prices will be reduced across the copyright area as individual publishers bargain for 
the best deal and compete for custom to maximise revenue in capitalist society. 
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item and lower sale costs overall, with the potential for increased dissemination of 
works.120  
Correspondingly, to deal with re-use is considered to be especially important. This is 
because licensing and other transaction costs to obtain permission to copy such works 
often raises the cost of creating new works – and this can lower the number of works 
created.121 Landes and Posner highlight that copyright holders might, therefore, find it 
in their self-interest, ex ante, to limit copyright protection.122 Instead, it is hypothesised 
that rather than limit copyright protection, similar results can be achieved by limiting 
the cost that can be charged for a work (which also applies to re-use), due to the 
predicted reduction in production costs that could be induced by the proposals.123  
5.3.2 Impact on associated laws and potential barriers to implementation. 
It has already been outlined that the proposed changes do not seek to alter any of the 
current laws per se, in that there is no permanent limitation on the legal rights of 
owners. However, the fact the reforms indirectly hinder the ability of rightsholders to 
exploit their works through the caps imposed must be considered. It is suggested that 
this could be problematic in terms of compliance with the Berne Convention124 and 
 
120 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325.; For more information, see the discussion in this chapter at 5.5 generally, and, 
specifically at 5.5.3(a).  
121 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. at 332; A parallel analysis (independent of Landes and Posner’s) of the novelty 
requirement in patent law is found in Scotchmer. S, & Green, J., ‘Novelty and Disclosure in Patent 
Law’ (Berkeley and Harvard, unpublished manuscript, May 12, 1988). The authors point out that the 
more stringent the requirement, making it harder to get a patent, the greater the gains from 
patenting but the less information useful to other inventors will be disclosed (patent applicants must 
disclose their inventions in the application).  
122 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. at 333.  
123 For more information, see the discussion in this chapter at 5.5.3(a).  
124 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised in 
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S, Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [The 1979 amended 
version does not appear on UNTS or ILM, but the 1971 Paris version is available at 1161 UNTS 30 
(1971)]; On the Berne Convention generally, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, 
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TRIPS,125 as well as other international provisions.126 The Berne Convention127 states, 
in relation to the reproduction right, under Article 9(2) that: 
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”128 
These three requirements, namely that such permission may be granted (a) in certain 
special cases, where the reproduction; (b) does not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work; and (c) does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author; are known as the Berne “three-step” test. These criteria apply 
cumulatively, and the meaning and significance of the three-step test129 has been 
considered extensively.130 Article 9(2) of Berne is considered by UK law pursuant to 
Art.5(5) of Directive 2001/29/EC. However, it is important to note that the three-step 
 
(eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 
23-04.  
125 Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, 15th December 1993, 33 ILM 81 (1994).  
126 Malevanny, N., ‘Online Music Distribution – How much Exclusivity is Needed?: A Study of 
International, European, German and U.S. Copyright Systems and Their Objectives’, Springer-
Verlag (2019), chapter 3.  
127 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) 1886 
(Berne, September 9, 1886).  
128 Article 9(2). Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.  
129 Unlike the three-step test in international copyright law, it is uncertain whether the three-step test in 
the InfoSoc Directive is addressed to national courts as well as the legislatures of the Member 
States - Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has provided 
guidance in this respect. Although the Court has held that Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive is not 
intended to affect the substantive content of the exceptions contained in Article 5(1), (2) and (3) 
thereof...it appears from the CJEU’s jurisprudence that the three-step test in the InfoSoc Directive is 
addressed at national legislators and courts alike – Richard Arnold and Eleonora Rosati, ‘Are 
National Courts the Addressees of the InfoSoc Three-Step Test?’ (2015) 10(10) Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 741-749.   
130 For more information, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 23-33, 23-138.  
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test has never been incorporated into UK copyright legislation,131 but was recently 
described as “relevant”133  by the UK High Court.  
The proposals, despite limiting the ability of an owner to exploit their works, are 
nonetheless held to comply with article 9(2) due to their temporary nature, as well as 
being compliant with Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty,134 which states: 
“(1) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations 
of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works 
under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author; 
(2) Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any 
limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain special cases 
that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” 
An alternative line of argument could be that the reforms aim to provide a system of 
remuneration for rightsholders that does not conflict with the normal exploitation of a 
work as the restrictions apply for a limited period. Moreover, the potential for owners 
to earn higher levels of remuneration for their works can be influenced by their ability 
to obtain cheaper methods of production under the current system.135  
 
131 For more information, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 9-02.  
133 Warner Music UK Ltd Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd (for themselves and as representative 
Claimants on behalf of the members of their respective corporate groups) v Tunein Inc [2019] 
EWHC 2923 (Ch) [2019] 11 WLUK 6 at [184].  
134 WIPO Copyright Treaty (Adopted in Geneva, 20 December 1996) Article 10. 
135 ‘2016 Print Remuneration Study’ a study called “Commission study on remuneration of authors of 
books and scientific journals, translators, journalists and visual artists for the use of their works” 
prepared in 2016 for the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology / DG Internal Market by Europe Economics and IViR (Study internal contact No. 
MARKT/2014/088/D1/ST/OP); ‘2015 EU Remuneration Study’ a study called “Remuneration of 
authors and performers for the use of their works and fixations of their performances” prepared in 
2015 for the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology / DG 
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The temporary nature of the system is unlikely to unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author because the limitations are not permanent, and member states 
may enact exceptions which have a minimally prejudicial effect on the rightsholder.136 
Also, art.2(b) and art.3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as not precluding 
national legislation which establishes, as regards the exploitation of audio-visual 
archives by a body set up for that purpose, a rebuttable presumption that the performer 
has authorised the fixation and exploitation of his performances, where that performer 
is involved in the recording of an audiovisual work so that it may be broadcast.137  
Thus, it is asserted that because there is no reduction in the legal rights of the author 
other than their ability to exploit their works for a limited time, it is likely that the 
measures will comply with article 9(2) and could be deemed a ‘special case’. This is 
due to the fact that the proposals could increase access to works and because writers 
such as Senftleben argue that “special cases”138 have been added for specific policy 
reasons.139 In support, Christophe et al., state that the “open-ended” wording of the 
three-step test supports “flexible approaches” that seek to strike an appropriate 
“balance”140 “in copyright law…[and] it may thus be better to see the test as an 
important link between continental European and Anglo-American copyright systems 
than as a prohibition of domestic open-ended exceptions.”141  
 
Internal Market by Europe Economics and IViR as part of the Digital Single market Strategy 
preparation (Study internal contract No. MARKT/2013/080/D); See also, this chapter at 5.5.3(a).   
136 Warner Music UK Ltd Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd (for themselves and as representative 
Claimants on behalf of the members of their respective corporate groups) v Tunein Inc [2019] 
EWHC 2923 (Ch) [2019] 11 WLUK 6 at [184]-[186] (see also, recital 35 Directive 2001/29/EC and 
Case C-463/12 Copydan). 
137 Société de perception et de distribution des droits des artistes-interprètes de la musique et de la 
danse (Spedidam) v Institut national de l’audiovisuel [2020] E.C.D.R. 4 at H6.  
138 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck [2019] E.C.D.R 24 at [37]. 
139 Senftleben, M., ‘Copyright Limitations and the three step test’, Kluwer, The Hague (2004) at 156.  
140 Current copyright statutes such as the  CDPA , and judicial interpretation of them, are a means by 
which the general public may begin their investment in the rationalisation of copyright. The current 
statutes are invariably described as a “balance” between stakeholders -  Gowers Review (2006), 
p.1. 
141 Geiger, Christophe; Gervais, Daniel; and Senftleben, Martin, ‘The Three-Step Test Revisited: How 
to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law.’ [2013]. PIJIP Research Paper no. 2013-04.  
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It is suggested that a wide application of ‘special cases’ can be used to justify the 
current approach because of the level of restriction that is apparent within the current 
copyright system. In turn, the reforms can be considered as a special case to help 
facilitate a more cost-effective system for potential creators and users. An application 
of this nature is contended to be supported by the preamble of the 1996 World 
Copyright Treaty (WCT),142 whereby it stresses the necessity “…to maintain a balance 
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, 
research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention.”143 This is 
considered to be of heightened importance in the US, for example, where the 
constitution emphasises the interests of authors. It states that the purpose of 
protection is, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”144  
Consequently, it is posited that the proposed system could comply with the provisions 
outlined in the three-step test. This is because it enables rightsholders to obtain 
financial reward for their works, as well as for re-use, but subject to a temporary 
restriction that once bypassed, will allow for the otherwise unhindered exploitation of 
their works. This is important as the World Trade Organisation Panel (WTOP), (a 
quasi-judicial body in charge of adjudicating disputes between Members in the first 
 
142 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) - 
<https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_226.pdf> accessed: 16/02/2019.  
143 NR/DC/4, § 12.09. Moreover, it was raised in the course of the deliberations of Main Committee I. 
See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, 72 and 74. Cf. as to the reference to the Berne Convention (‘as 
reflected in the Berne Convention’), A. Françon, ‘La conférence diplomatique sur certaines 
questions de droit d’auteur et de droits voisins’, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 1997, p. 3 
(9); S. Ricketson, ‘The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper E&Ls: International Conventions and 
Cohen Jehoram, ‘Some Principles of Exceptions to Copyright’, in: P. Ganea/C. Heath/G. Schricker 
(eds.), Urheberrecht Gestern – Heute – Morgen, Festschrift für Adolf Dietz zum 65. Geburtstag, 
München: C.H. Beck 2001, p. 382; Taken from Geiger, Christophe; Gervais, Daniel; and Senftleben, 
Martin. ‘The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law.’ 
(2013). PIJIP Research Paper no. 2013-04.  
144 The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8.  
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instance),145 commented in relation to the ‘normal exploitation of the work’ part of the 
test. It considered that a “...conflict arises when the exception or limitation enters into 
economic competition with the ways that rightsholders normally extract economic 
value from that right to the work (copyrighted material) and thereby deprives them of 
significant or tangible commercial gain.”146 Regarding whether an exception or 
limitation must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder, 
the panel found that there is unreasonable prejudice where an exception or limitation 
causes, or has the potential to cause, an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright 
holder.147 It is suggested that the reforms would be supported by this for the reasons 
discussed herein.148 Moreover, a short-term restriction on price competition effected 
by the proposals is generally not considered anti-competitive,149 especially when 
 
145 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s3p1_e.htm> accessed: 
21/04/2019.  
146 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle (eds), “Copinger and Skone James on Copyright”, 17th edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, (2016) at 23-139; Panel Report WT/DS160/R of June 15, 2000: United 
States—s.110(5) of the Copyright Act at  para 6.183.   
147 Concerning the Panel Report, see J.C. Ginsburg, “Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The 
WTO Panel Decision and the ‘Three-StepTest’ for Copyright Exceptions”, (2001) 187 RIDA 3; K.J. 
Koelman, “Fixing the Three-Step Test” [2006] E.I.P.R 28(8), 407-412 in Davies, G., Garnett, K., 
Harbottle (eds), “Copinger and Skone James on Copyright”, 17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, (2016) at 23-139. Y. Gaubic, “Les exceptions au droit d’auteur: un nouvel avenir”, [2001] 
Communication Commerce éléctronique, no.6, 12; M. Ficsor, “How much of What? The ‘Three-
StepTest’ and its application in two recent WTO dispute settlement cases”, (2002) 192 RIDA 110; 
D.J. Brennan, “The Three-Step Test Frenzy—Why the TRIPs Panel Decision might be considered 
Per Incuriam”, [2002] IPQ 2, 212; ; B.C. Goldmann, “Victory for Songwriters in WTO Music Royalties 
Dispute between U.S. and E.U.—Background of the Conflict Over the Extension of Homestyle 
Exemption”, (2001) 32 IIC 412; and J. Bornkamm, “Copyright and the Public Interest—The Three-
Step Test in International Copyright”, paper delivered at the Fordham University School of Law 10th 
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, New York, April 4-5, 2002.   
148 See also, this chapter at 5.3.3, 5.5, and 5.5.3(a).  
149 Landes/Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, p. 374; Drexl, in: Drexl (ed.), 
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 27, 45–46; See also, Kolstad, in: 
Drexl (ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 3, 6–10; 
Landes/Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, p. 374; Yow, 34 World 
Competition L. & Econ. Rev. 287, 288; for further references see Hilty, in: Rosén (ed.), Individualism 
and Collectiveness in Intellectual Property Law, 3, 5, footnote 7; Taken from Malevanny N, ‘Relevant 
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taking into account the long-term perspective of the reforms and their associated 
benefits.  
5.3.3 A ‘temporary’ advantage: why the capping system can be used as a 
‘source of inspiration’ for national lawmakers 
The temporary nature of the reforms can use the three-step test as a source of 
inspiration for legislators seeking to institute flexible exceptions and limitations at the 
domestic level in the digital environment.150 It is, however, acknowledged that UK has 
chosen not to transpose the test, [but] it is already within the relevant copyright 
exceptions.151 The Court of Justice of the European Union has yet to confront the 
obvious tension between the ‘three-step test’ and the idea that exceptions are to fairly 
balance the fundamental rights and interests of owners and users.152 This is 
 
Rights and Their Applicability to Online Music Uses. In: Online Music Distribution - How Much 
Exclusivity Is Needed?’ [2019] Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 12. Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg, pp.317-330.  
150 Geiger, Christophe; Gervais, Daniel; and Senftleben, Martin. ‘The Three-Step Test Revisited: How 
to Use the Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law.’ [2013]. PIJIP Research Paper no. 2013-04.  
151 Arnold & Rosati, ‘Are national courts the addressees of the InfoSoc three-step test?’ [2015] 10(10) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice at 743; DTI, Consultation paper on implementation 
(August 2002), 11-12, as reported in Cornish and Others, Intellectual property, cit, §12.37. See also 
M Hart – S Holmes, ‘Implementation of the Copyright Directive in the United Kingdom’ [2004] 26(6) 
EIPR 254, 255.  
152 J. Griffiths, ‘Fair Dealing after Deckmyn’, in M. Richardson and S. Ricketson (eds), Research 
Handbook on IP in Media and Entertainment [2017], ch. 3, 96-100; See also, Case C-201/13 
Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds v. Vandersteen, EU:C:2014:458, [AG29] (AG Cruz Villallon).  
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uncertain153 because the test has never officially been interpreted by the CJEU154 and 
remains an “unanswered” question officially155 in what has been described as a “total 
failure”156  of harmonization. However, this can be used to support the proposals in 
accordance with the three-step test. This is because even in those Member States 
that have “not transposed the language of the three-step test into their own legal 
systems, courts must determine not only whether the acts of the defendant in question 
are eligible for the application of a certain exception or limitation, but also whether they 
comply with the cumulative conditions set in the InfoSoc three-step test.”158  
Under the current approach, this could be something that could become a feasible 
option and would enable some boundaries to be set pertaining to the aforementioned 
challenges. Moreover, this supported by the comments of the US delegation in the 
1996 Diplomatic Conference which adopted the World Intellectual Property 
 
153 Despite several precedents – among other things – at the EU level, the wording of Article 5(5) 
(which incorporates the three-step test into the InfoSoc Directive) of the InfoSoc Directive does not 
clarify with sufficient certainty who the addressees of this provision are – For more information, see 
L Guibault – G Westkamp – T Rieber-Mohn, ‘Study on the implementation and effect in Member 
States’ laws of Directive 2001/297EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the Information Society [2012], Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No 2012-
28, 57; Case C-527/15 Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems, EU:C:2017:300 (ECJ); C-435/12 
ACI Adam BV v. Stichting de Thuiskopie, EU:C:2014:254 (ECJ). 
154 Arnold & Rosati, ‘Are national courts the addressees of the InfoSoc three-step test?’ (2015) 10 (10) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 741-749; See also, Garnett, kevin, Gillian Davies 
and Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 17th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2016) 9-68, 9-70; Richardson, M. & Ricketson, S. Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property in Media and Entertainment, (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp.96-101.   
155 Griffiths, J., ‘The “three-step test” in European copyright law – problems and solutions’ [2009] 
2009/4 IPQ 428, 431.  
156 MC Janssens ‘The issue of exceptions: reshaping the keys to the gates in the territory of literary, 
musical and artistic creation’, in E Derclaye (ed) Research handbook on the future of EU 
copyright (Edward Elgar, 2009), p.332 – Taken from Rosati, Eleonora, ‘Non-commercial quotation 
and freedom of panorama: useful and lawful?’ (2017) Journal of Intellectual Property Information 
Technology and E-Commerce Law, 8 (4), 311-321. 
158 Arnold, R., and Rosati, E., ‘Are National Courts the Addressees of the InfoSoc Three-Step Test?’ 
(2015) 10(10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 741-749. 
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Organisation (WIPO) ‘Internet’ treaties.160 The delegation stressed that the three-step 
test “should be understood to permit contracting parties to carry forward, and 
appropriately extend into the digital environment, limitations and exceptions in their 
national laws which were considered acceptable under the Berne Convention.”161 
Consequently, under the proposed system the normal exploitation of works will not be 
undermined, nor will it deprive authors of significant financial gain. This is because 
exploitation will be achieved through a combination of purchasing the original work at 
a ‘capped’ rate by content recipients who, after the expiration of the designated period, 
will then be able to charge their chosen rates. Thus, it is contended that the proposed 
system represents a valid exception to the exclusive rights of copyright owners under 
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.  It is asserted that the proposals do not conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rights holder because they do not tax them.162 This includes the fact 
 
160 The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) - 
(known together as the "Internet Treaties"), set down international norms aimed at preventing 
unauthorized access to and use of creative works on the Internet or other digital networks. Among 
other things, both the WCT and the WPPT address the challenges posed by today's digital 
technologies, in particular the dissemination of protected material over digital networks such as the 
Internet. For this reason, they are often referred to as the "Internet treaties."; See also, Recitals 15, 
25, 26, 30 and 32 of Directive 2001/29 EC in Société de perception et de distribution des droits des 
artistes-interprètes de la musique et de la danse (Spedidam) v Institut national de l’audiovisuel 
[2020] E.C.D.R. 4 (Opinion of AG Hogan at II.A.6) 
161 See Minutes of Main Committee I, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, 70 in Geiger, Christophe; Gervais, 
Daniel; and Senftleben, Martin. ‘The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in 
National Copyright Law.’ [2013]. Arnold and Rosati put forward a similar notion, namely that both 
national courts and legislatures should apply the test when considering copyright matters, 
specifically those situations where there is a need to consider the balance between authors and 
users rights - R. Arnold and E. Rosati, ‘Are National courts the Addressees of the Info Soc Three-
Step Test? [2015] 10 (10) JIPLP 741-9; PIJIP Research Paper no. 2013-04; See also, WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996) Article 25 The reproduction right, as 
set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in 
the digital environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the 
storage of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within 
the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.   
162 See this chapter at 5.5 
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that they are only temporary, and also have economic benefits for potential authors 
that could see the overall cost of production fall.163  
This reduction could mean that rightsholders experience an increased economic value 
for their works. This is based on the fact that the revenue generated by their works is 
likely to increase because less money could potentially be spent on production under 
the proposed system. Tangentially, this is also asserted to help support the fact that 
the reforms are not to be viewed as to “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author”164 regarding the ability of the author to extract economic value from the 
work.  
5.4 The issue of contracts. 
In chapter four, it was demonstrated that there is a need to counteract the use of 
contractual methods that increase the control rightsholders have over their protected 
assets. This included the capacity of contracts to deny legitimate copyright limitations 
on the exclusive rights granted by the law, through the contractual mechanics of 
license agreements in the digital age. 
Contracts are deemed to be an essential point of consideration in the formulation of 
any reform proposal. This is to ensure that they are effective as contracts could be 
used to diminish the operationality of the proposals. There should be a legislative 
provision whereby any attempt to procure a situation where the reforms are otherwise 
contracted out of will be ‘triggered’ by such items. This will not necessarily render the 
contract void, but will render any limitations on the reforms as an invalid part of the 
agreement. The remainder of the agreement will remain otherwise valid.  
The decision to specifically deal with contracts165 when attempting to regulate any 
aspects of the copyright system is considered to be fundamental if the reforms are 
going to be successful and to prevent confusion.166 Professor Ian Hargreaves would 
 
163 For more information, see this chapter at 5.5.3(a).  
164 Article 9(2). Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 
165 For more information on the effect of contracts on the current system, see chapter 4 generally.  
166 Hargreaves Review, Recommendation 5, and 51, [5.40] (explaining that permitting contractual 
variation ‘replaces clarity...with uncertainty’). For more information, see this same review at chapter 
9, p.229.   
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seemingly agree, where he proposed a recommendation in his 2011 review, when 
talking about limits to copyright. He recommended that “the Government should 
legislate to ensure that...copyright exceptions are protected from override by 
contract.”167 
5.4.1(a) How  to decide when an agreement is invalid under the proposals, 
and what about the intention of the parties: are they relevant or not? 
5.4.1(a)(i) The UK approach 
In terms of how to assess which agreements would otherwise fall within the ‘but for’ 
test, in the UK, the standard for establishing ‘causation’ in negligence could be used. 
Tortious liability has been referred to in copyright on numerous occasions168 and the 
but for test is considered to provide a viable method of ascertaining the objective 
meaning of specific contractual terms.169 
Under this, the courts could assess whether or not a contract has been used to 
undermine the enforceability of the reforms and but for such items, the reforms would 
otherwise apply.170   
 
167 For more information, see Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and 
growth (2011) at p.8; See also, the discussion in this chapter at 5.4; See also chapter 4 at 4.8. 
168 R. Arnold, ‘Website-blocking Injunctions: The Question of Legislative Basis’ [2015] E.I.P.R. 623–
630; Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J); Hetcher, S., ‘The 
Immorality of Strict Liability’ in Copyright, 17 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 [2013]; Goold, Patrick 
Russell, ‘Unbundling the 'Tort' of Copyright Infringement’ (September 14, 2016). Virginia Law 
Review, Vol. 102, 2016.   
169 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 1101 at [60]; c.f. The Aktor 
[2008] EWHC 1330 (Comm); [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246 at [38]; Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd v 
Erinaceous Insurance Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 354; [2009] Lloyds Rep. I.R. 464 at [66]. 
Earlier authorities had seemed to endorse a subjective approach: see, e.g. IRC v Raphael [1935] 
A.C. 96, 143 (“real intention”); The Nai Genova [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 353 at 359; Munt v Beasley 
[2006] EWCA Civ 370 at [36]; Nicholson Air Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 706 A.2d 124, 
132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).  
170 The test and its surrounding discussion in this chapter is by no means any attempt at providing an 
exhaustive or otherwise comprehensive account of the law in this area, or legal causation as a 
whole for that matter, but simply, to show that the mechanics of it can be used to create a viable 
approach in which to assist in the successful implementation of the current proposals; Note, it can 
also be said that IP is, in fact, also a tort - Garg, Richa, Tort in Intellectual Property (September 5, 
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The but for test was established in Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington HMC [1969],171 
where it was ruled that that the question to be asked is: ‘but for’ the defendant’s 
actions, would the claimant have suffered the loss? If yes, the defendant is not liable. 
If no, the defendant is liable.172 Thus, it is suggested that a simple application of 
the ‘but for’ test will suffice in assessing whether or not a contract has been used to 
undermine the enforceability of the reforms, and, would otherwise have successfully 
done so if the court did not intervene. 
So, the question would operate similarly to the above, namely: ‘but for’ the contractual 
agreement, would the article have been otherwise exempt from the regulation of the 
capping system? If yes, the contract remains and nothing is changed. If no, the 
contract is changed to otherwise give effect to the agreement in a manner that is as 
close as is reasonably practicable to the parties objective intentions, or, if the contract 
was for the explicit purpose of removing the work outside of the remit of the reforms, 
it will be declared void if no other purpose can be found.173   
The but for test is considered to provide a ‘simplistic’ and ‘straightforward’ approach, 
which is adaptable in most circumstances: as in the majority of cases, courts 
determine causation on the basis of ‘common sense’.174 The test, therefore, looks not 
at the bare acts or omissions, but instead, for the preclusive elements caused by the 
specifics of the agreement.175 Such a view, would be considered to be a singularist 
 
2010). Available at 
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1672183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1672183> accessed: 
3/05/2018.  
171 1 QB 428.    
172 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington HMC [1969] 1 QB 428; Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927.  
173 These same principles will also apply in the US – see this chapter at 5.4(a)(ii).   
174 Steel, S. ‘Proof of Causation in Tort Law’ Law Quarterly Review [2017] 133 (Jul), 516-520.   
175 The decision in the Court of Appeal in Robbins v Bexley LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1233 is 
inconsistent with this principle and looks wrong. Fundamentally, the Court of Appeal held the 
defendant council liable for damage done to the claimants’ house. The Court of Appeal held the 
defendant council liable for the damage caused by their breaching the duty of care that they owed 
the claimants, but rather a case of holding the defendants liable for the damage caused by their 
failing to try to comply with the duty of care that they owed the claimants; See also, Stapleton, S., 
‘Choosing What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law,’ 73 MO. L. REV. 433–480 (2008).   
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one by Moore,176 a well-known writer on causation issues. His central argument in 
Causation and Responsibility is to substantiate the core notion of causation. Moore 
denies that token causal relations are ‘grounded in laws of nature, counterfactuals, or 
any other general features of the world;’177 and simply that, albeit somewhat 
uncomprehensive pertaining to his entire account,178 is that this would suggest that 
‘omissions...are literally no things at all.’179  
Ultimately, it is hypothesised that the but for test is a beneficial method in which to 
assess contracts within the context of the reforms. This due to the inherently objective 
nature of causation when it comes to deciding whether contracts (or specific terms) 
operate to otherwise undermine the enforceability of the capping system.180 This is 
because deciding the meaning of specific contractual terms is considered to be an 
inherently objective test (as established in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes 
Ltd).181  In the case, the court was concerned to identify the intention of the parties by 
reference to “what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the 
language in the contract to mean.”182 The court looks, therefore, at the contract as a 
 
176 Moore, M., Causation and Responsibility (Oxford Uni Press, 2009), chapter 20 in Schaffer, J., 
Disconnection and Responsibility’ Legal Theory, 18, [2012] at 399-435; Schaffer, J., ‘The 
Metaphysics of Causation’ [2007] Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. <plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics.Google> Scholar accessed: 
21/09/2018.  
177 Ibid.  
178 Moore, M., Causation and Responsibility (Oxford Uni Press, 2009). 
179 Moore, M., Causation and Responsibility (Oxford Uni Press, 2009), P.129. 
180 Ibid at 77.  
181 [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 1101 at [60]; c.f. The Aktor [2008] EWHC 1330 (Comm); [2008] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 246 at [38]; Dunlop Haywards (DHL) Ltd v Erinaceous Insurance Services Ltd [2009] 
EWCA Civ 354; [2009] Lloyds Rep. I.R. 464 at [66]. Earlier authorities had seemed to endorse a 
subjective approach: see, e.g. IRC v Raphael [1935] A.C. 96, 143 (“real intention”); The Nai Genova 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 353 at 359; Munt v Beasley [2006] EWCA Civ 370 at [36].  
182 Lord Hoffman in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, para 14.  
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whole and considers not only the words of the relevant clauses, but also the 
“documentary, factual and commercial context.”183  
Therefore, the but for test, is postulated to be a suitable approach because 
ascertaining the effect of contractual terms is likely to be one that is decided on its 
objective facts in the UK system.184 The reason for this submission is that any analysis 
would conceivably involve looking at the outcome produced by the contract itself on 
an objective factual basis, as it is likely that the outcome produced by the contract is 
what will determine the result (i.e. does it operate to effectuate the ‘contracting out’ of 
the reforms). This is because the written instrument will often require an objective 
approach in ascertaining the realities of the situation. This is due to the fact that it is 
the effect of the contractual agreement that is being looked at, within the context of 
copyright, namely whether or not it operates to remove the work outside of the 
proposed reforms.  
5.4.1(a)(ii) The US approach 
It is argued that a similar method could be followed in the US because the traditional 
approach to factual causation seeks to determine whether the outcome would have 
happened even if the defendant had taken care. This is also known as the but-for test: 
Causation can be established if the injury would not have happened but for the 
defendant’s negligence.185 In essence, the factual cause means the whole set of 
 
183 Arnold -v- Britton [2015] UKSC 36, (Arnold), Lord Neuberger, para 15; BCCI -v- Ali (No.1) [2002] 1 
AC 251; "This is not necessarily the dictionary meaning of the word, but that which is generally 
understood". But the court will not "attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not 
have had" and will not rewrite the contract (The Antaios Compania Naviera SA -v- Salen Rederierna 
AB [1985] 1 AC 191 and Co-Operative Wholesale Society Limited -v- National Westminster Bank 
PLC [1995] 1 EGLR 97). 
184 Davies, P.S., JC Smith’s: The Law of Contract (Oxford University press, 2016), chapter 2.  
185 Hylton, K., Tort Law: a modern perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.195, see also, 
chapter 12 generally;  In more complex cases, the courts use a different approach, known as the 
substantial factor test that has been developed as an alternative specifically for cases in which there 
are intervening factors (including, for example, other negligent actors) that could easily account for 
the plaintiff’s injury – New York Central Railroad Co. v. Grimstad 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920); Stubbs 
v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 1919); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 390 
conditions preceding the result and necessary to produce it, in the sense that the 
absence of one of them would have given a different result.186 The but-for test is a test 
commonly used in both US tort law, and, criminal law, to determine factual causation, 
and is the most widely accepted test for determining this.187  The test asks, “but for the 
existence of X, would Y have occurred?”  If the answer is yes, then factor X is an actual 
cause of result Y.188  
This again is extremely similar to the UK system, in that the question to be asked 
revolves around the same quintessential factors, namely: ‘but for’ the defendant’s 
actions, would the claimant have suffered the loss? If yes, the defendant is not liable. 
If no, the defendant is liable. However, the but-for test has been criticised for its usage 
of both “hypothetical and counterfactual analysis.”’189 That is, the but-for test assumes 
a state of affairs that does not exist and asks what would have happened under 
imagined circumstances.190 Moreover, when the language of the contract is clear, the 
court will presume that the parties intended what they expressed objectively. This is 
even where the expression differs from the parties’ intentions at the time they created 
the contract,191 whereby the parties’ intentions are subordinated to the intrinsic 
meaning of the words.192 
 
186 Williams, G., ‘Causation and the Law’ The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Apr., 1961), at 
63-64.  
187 Ibid at 62-63; Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Railway, 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885); Fischer, D.A., 
‘Causation in Fact in Omission Cases’, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 1335 (1992).  
188 It is therefore necessary not only to determine the plaintiff’s position after the tort but also to 
assess what the “original position” would have been. It is the difference between these positions, the 
“original position” and the “injured position”, which is the plaintiff’s loss – Athey v. Leonati (1996), 
140 D.L.R. (4th) 235 at para. 32, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, [1997] 1 W.W.R. 97 (original emphasis).  
189 Grady, M.F.,  Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 363, 392 (1984).  
190 Fischer, D.A., Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 1335 (1992).  
191 Nicholson Air Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 706 A.2d 124, 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1998); see Restatement of Contracts §230 illus. 1 (1932) – Taken from Perillo, J.M., ‘The Origins of 
the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation’, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427 (2000).  
192 For one of many such statements, see Rickman v.Carstairs, 5 B. & Ad. 650, 662-63 (K.B. 1833) 
("Unfortunately, however, they have used words which will not, we think, effectuate that intention. 
The question in this and other cases of construction of written instruments is, not what was the 
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Consequently, it is also submitted that a similar application of the ‘but for’ test will 
suffice in the US specifically concerning whether or not a contract has been used to 
undermine the enforceability of the reforms, and, would otherwise have successfully 
done so if the court did not intervene using a similar analysis. 
This would also achieve the results put forward by one US commentator, who 
thereupon proposed a different solution to the problems generated by contracts in 
copyright – invoking contract law principles to bar the enforceability of terms unless 
clearly brought to the user’s attention, though devices such as enhanced notice, 
(except without the requirement to demonstrate the latter as the reforms would deal 
with the effects of the terms themselves).193   
5.4.1(b) The need to deal with re-use  
The issue of re-use must also be dealt with effectively by the proposed reforms. It is 
argued that rightsholders will use this to mitigate against any loss they feel they have 
incurred under the temporary restriction on prices. This is because this is a practice 
which has been shown to have the correlative effect of raising the overall cost of 
producing future works.194 This has also discouraged creativity via contract195 and 
otherwise negating the potential benefits envisaged under the reforms.196 This is the 
 
intention of the parties, but what is the meaning of the words they have used."). But one finds an 
occasional enlightened case holding that words of art can be overcome by other language found in 
a written instrument. See, e.g., Sherman's Lessee v. Dill, 4 Yeates 295 (Pa. 1806) - Perillo, J.M., 
‘The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation’, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 
427 (2000).  
193 See BJ Ard, ‘Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licencing’, 80 Mo. L. Rev. 313, 369-76 (2015). In 
this manner, “the contractualization of copyright should not [be construed as] offering unfettered 
power to licencors.’ at 359.  
194 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325.  
195 See chapter 4 at 4.4, 4.5, and 4.7.  
196 See inter alia Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’18 [1989] 
Journal of Legal Studies 325; Breyer, S., ‘The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs’, 84 Harvard Law Review281 (1970); Demsetz, H., 
“Economic, Legal and Political Dimensions of Competition, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam (1982); ‘2002 EU IP Contracts Study’ a study called ‘Study on the Conditions Applicable 
to Contracts Relating to Intellectual Property in the European Union’ commissioned by European 
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notion that individuals and potential authors are unwilling to re-use works to produce 
new ones for fear of legal action and the high costs associated with both litigation and 
re-use discussed within the thesis, and, this could create the presumption that all 
unauthorised uses will be the subject of an infringement claim.197 
It is essential to consider these issues when formulating reforms as opposed to merely 
laying down a system that could encourage creative re-use. This is to ensure the 
successful implementation of the proposed system so it cannot be overridden by 
contract in the context of re-use.198 Making re-use financially accessible is also 
considered to be of heightened importance. This is because of the increased literacy 
of populations, rising levels of education and in particular the widespread availability 
of technology meant an increase in the ability of content recipients to re-use works.199  
Consequently, it is argued that if re-use is not considered in the reforms, then the 
proposals will be diminished by higher fees being charged for re-use if left unregulated.  
5.4.1(c) A legislative solution operating in conjunction with the reforms.  
 
It has been argued that there be a specific legislative provision created to help solve 
the issue of rightsholders ‘contracting’ out of copyright law. I will now consider the use 
of contracts to negate the enforceability of legitimate legal limitations on the exclusivity 
 
Commission, DG Internal market to IViR, Amsterdam in 2002 (Study contract No. ETD/2000/B5-
3001/E/69) L. Guibault, P.B. Hugenholtz; See also, chapter 4 at 4.7 and 4.7.1 respectively.  
197 See chapter 2 at 2.3 generally; See also chapter 4 at 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively; Mazzone, J., 
‘Copyfraud’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 40; New York University Law Review, 
Vol. 81, [2006] at 1026.; See also Bhattacharjee, S., Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. 
‘Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal 
Actions’ [2006] Journal of Law and Economics, 49, 91-114.  
198 In the UK see CDPA 1988 s.28(1); In the US, see 17 U.S.C. §109(d); For more information, see 
chapter 4 at 4.5. 
199 Chartier, R., ‘The practical impact of writing’, in Finkelstein, D., and McCleery, A., The book history 
reader (Routledge, London 2002) at 118-142.  
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afforded by copyright, like fair dealing (in the UK),200 and fair use (in the US).201  In the 
US, ‘fair use’ is codified under §.107 of the 1976 Act.202  
5.4.1(c)(i) The situation in the UK 
In the UK, they are categorised as ‘permitted acts’ which are listed under chapter III of 
Part 1 of the 1988 Act.203 The reason for dealing with contracts is because they have 
the capacity to diminish the enforceability of the proposed system, much in the same 
way as the increase in direct licencing has diminished the role of copyright exceptions 
and levies.204 
The fundamental purpose of creating a specific legislative provision is designed to 
prevent the effectuation and subsequent enforceability of any form of contractual 
 
200 See chapter III of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
201 See 17 U.S.C. §107; For an interesting account to the necessity of fair use and some general 
background information, see H.H. Rep. No. 94-1476. 94th Cong., Sess. 65-66 (1976); On the 
application of the doctrine to the creation of new works see, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 
U.S. 569, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994).  
202 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §.107; On Fair Use, see Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. 
Citizens for   Gallen Comm., 457 F.Supp. 957 (D. N.H., 1978); Italian Book Corp., v. American 
Broadcasting Co., 458 F.Supp. 65 (S.D. N.Y., 1978); These can be compared with the contrasting 
cases of BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Capitol Records Inc. v. Alaujan, 
2009 WL 5873136 (D. Mass., 7/27/09).  
203 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988; See also, Info. Soc., Dir., Art. 5; The traditional approach 
of the UK courts: Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer [2000] 4 All ER 239 (CA), 257 
(Chadwick LJ); See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20. On defences under 
European law and the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC and the public interest defence see 
chapters’ 21 and 24 respectively.    
204 Kretschmer, M., ‘Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies 
in Europe’ [2011] (22 out of the then 27 Member states adopted these schemes); Karapapa, S., 
Private Copying (Routledge 2012); For background, see B. Hugenholtz, The Story of the tape 
Recorder and the History of Copyright Levies’, in B. Sherman and L. Wiseman, (eds), Copyright and 
the Challenge of the New (2012), ch.7. See also, Microsoft Mobile Sales International Oy, Case C-
110/15, EU:C:2016:326, [AG23] (AG Wahl) (noting that the increase in direct licensing of consumers 
and the diminishing importance of the private copyring exception and levy); See also, Austro-
Mechana Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte GmbH v 
Amazon C-572/14: [2016].  
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agreement that has the consequence of removing an otherwise copyright protected 
item out of the proposals. This is considered to be made increasingly necessary by 
the fact that these very agreements can be said to receive legislative approval under 
laws such as the E-Commerce Directive Art.9(1)205 (as implemented via the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No.2013),206 and also, both 
s.28(1),207 and §109(d).208 The is due to the fact that these provisions arguably assist 
in the enforceability of individualistic contractual terms209 in the copyright system.210 
Again, this is considered to be of heightened importance in the UK, as s.28(1) is the 
only statutory provision under UK law which governs the relationship between 
contracts and copyright and is contained in the Fair Dealing chapter.211 It states that: 
 
205 E-Commerce Dir., Art.9(1); There are certain exceptions that cannot be overridden by contract 
under the following subsections: CDPA 1988, ss50, 50B, 296A(1)(a), 296A(1)(b), 296A(1)(c); For 




206 The Directive was originally implemented by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 (“the 2002 Regulations”), which amongst other things implemented the Country of Origin 





207 CDPA 1988; See also this chapter at 4.5 respectively.  
208 17 U.S.C. §109(d) (1976) as this section specifies that the first sale doctrine does not apply to a 
person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as someone who as 
obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee; See also chapter 4 at 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively.  
209 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.7.1  
210 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; See also, this chapter at 4.4 and 4.5 
respectively. 
211 See ss.29 and 30 of the CDPA (1988) respectively.  
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“..[the provisions] relate only to the question of infringement of copyright and do 
not affect any other right or obligation restricting the doing of any of the specified 
acts.”212 
This means that just because an activity falls within one of the permitted acts, it  does 
not mean that it does not contravene some other legal right, whereby an act that would 
otherwise be justified by copyright can be restricted by contract. By implication, this 
means that such items could equally prevent the proposed system from applying in a 
similar way.213 Therefore, the fact that an act may be done without infringing copyright 
does not, however, mean that such an act will not be a breach of some other right or 
obligation, such as an express contractual term, restricting the doing of any of the 
specified acts.214 This is reinforced by the fact that the Act provides that the permitted 
acts are to be construed independently of each other, so that just because an act does 
not fall within one provision does not mean that it is not covered by another.215 
Sharing such concerns, although somewhat prophetically in light of the modern day 
copyright system, is Griffin. He highlighted in 2011 that because of s.28(1), it is likely 
that there will be an increased use of licenses on the internet and digital works will 
bind recipients through a copyright style contractual clause.216 An otherwise legal 
reproduction could be prevented; the access agreement could bind all users who 
legally (contractually) access the work or prevent reliance on otherwise legitimate 
copyright limitations, or procure copyright violations by contractual breaches.217 This 
 
212 CDPA 1988 s.28.  
213 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20.   
214 CDPA 1988, s.28(1); See also, Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20.   
215  CDPA 1988, s.28(4).  
216 Jacobsen v Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008); Care has to be taken 
with this case, since the license is one that provides a condition of use which might otherwise result 
in copyright infringement. The broader case which extended copyright protection to an area where it 
was previously denied was in ProCD, Inc. v ZeidenBerg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Circuit, 1996); Compare 
with Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp [2012] 3 CMLR (44) 1039. 
217 Jacobsen v Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008); MDY Industries., LLC 
v. Blizzard Entertainment., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010);  Griffin, J., ‘The interface 
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process is manifested by the fact that digital consumers are not the owners of the 
content they receive, but mere licensees with a right to read, view, or listen to the 
work.218 Ownership remains with the provider, and the maintenance of access 
depends on the consumers compliance with the provider’s terms that come with that 
intangible item.219  
Therefore, it is essential to deal with the issue of contracts to maximise legal certainty 
for the long-term enforceability of the reforms. In this connection, it is suggested, that 
this approach would be supported by the principles iterated in recitals 1, 6 and 7 in the 
preamble to Directive 2001/29 as the objectives of the directive are, inter alia, to 
remedy the legislative differences and legal uncertainty that exist in relation to 
copyright protection.220 
5.4.1(c)(ii) The situation in the US 
In the US, §109(d)221 specifies that the first sale doctrine does not apply to a person 
who possesses a copy of the copyrighted work without owning it, such as someone 
who as obtained it subject to contract, like a licensee.222  
By comparison, in the UK, any such distribution would act to curtail any attempted 
restriction on ‘any subsequent distribution’ in the UK under section 18(3)(a) CDPA 
 
between copyright and contract: suggestions for the future’, European Journal of Law and 
Technology, Vol. 2, No.1, (2011).  
218 For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5 and 4.9 respectively. 
219 Mazzone, J., Copyfraud and other abuses of intellectual property law (Stanford Law Books, 2011), 
p.118; For more information on this, see 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively; In the UK see Jaouad El 
Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb. Deutschland GmbH [2015] (C-322/14) (21 May 2015, see also, Davies, 
G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 9-20; In the US, see Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (treatise quoted); Fantsastic Flakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 
1981) (Treatise cited). See County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1966). 
220 Case C-466/12  Svensson and ors v. Retriever Sverige AB, EU:C:2014:76 (ECJ), at [34]; Warner 
Music UK Ltd v Tunein Inc [2019] EWHC 2923 (Ch); [2020] E.C.D.R. 8. 
221 17 U.S.C. (1976).  
222 See also chapter 4 at 4.5 and 4.5.1 respectively. 
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1988,223 as copyright owners cannot control the resale under the exhaustion principle. 
For purposes here, it has however, been widely assumed that this is only applicable 
to the distribution of tangible copies224 (as is generally assumed following Allposters 
v. Stichting Pictoright).225 As such, consent to the download of a work cannot be 
regarded as consent to distribution and, as a result, the distribution right cannot have 
been exhausted...and the Usedsoft principle does not apply to works other than 
software...because Usedsoft was itself concerned with the distribution of a tangible 
copy.226 This is considered to be increasingly the case following the recent CJEU 
decisions of Nederlands v Kabinet227 and Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter228 as discussed in 
the fourth chapter.229  
If these items are not dealt with by a legislative scheme, it is argued that copyright 
owners will get to limit future distributions of their works, and on their chosen terms 
when intangible works are licensed. This also means that an act that would otherwise 
be permitted by copyright can be restricted by contract, which includes the applicability 
of the reforms.  
This means that if a work was only made available digitally, then “a copyright owners 
decision to discontinue any further transmissions of the work could well be effective to 
 
223  CDPA 1988; Info. Soc. Dir., Art. 4(2), allows for exhaustion in cases of ‘first sale or other transfer 
of ownership in the Community’.  
224 A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in E. Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU 
Copyright Law (2009), 237-8. See also, Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. 
Stichting Pictoright [2015]. 
225 Case C- 419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright [2015]; ]; M Savič, ‘The 
CJEU Allposters case: beginning of the end of digital exhaustion?’ [2015] European Intellectual 
Property Review 378.  
226 Griffiths, J., ‘Exhaustion and the Alteration of Copyright Works in EU Copyright Law – (C-419/13) 
Art & Allposters International BV v Stitching Pictoright’ May [2016], Queen Mary University London.  
227 Case C-263/18 Nederlands  Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet 
Internet BV and Others December (2019).  
228 Case C- 476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Hass v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-
Esleben, 12 December (2018).  
229 For more information, see chapter 4 generally.  
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deny all access to the work.”230 Moreover, the issue of dealing with contractual 
circumvention methods is considered to be of further importance in the US (albeit in 
the context of computer programs) as a result of the US Ninth Circuit decision in MDY 
Industries v Blizzard Entertainment.231  In this case, it was ruled that a licensee’s 
violation of a contract (numerous Terms of Use and an End User License 
Agreement)232 could constitute copyright infringement,233 [but] there must be a nexus 
between the condition and the licensors exclusive rights of copyright.234    
This is due to the fact that legislation often falls behind the advancement of 
technology,235 and digital technology is considered to be pushing the boundaries of 
copyright law and digital works towards the “edge of the reach of the state.”236 
Consequently, because a legal system has an impetus of its own, a professional 
tradition which may operate for good or ill and it is submitted that the reforms can 
provide legal certainty in relation to contract. This is not necessarily the exclusive task 
 
230 Reece R.A., “The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks.”, (2003), 44(2) BC L Rev 577, 
p.630; For more information, see chapter 4 at 4.5.1.  
231 MDY Indus, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010); Jacobsen v 
Katzer 535 F.3d 1373 (Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 2008); See also, Chapter 4 at 4.3.2.  
232 MDY Indus, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010) at 938. 
233 Jacobsen v Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (treatise quoted); Fantsastic Flakes, Inc. 
v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1981) (Treatise cited). See County of Ventura v. 
Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1966).   
234 A footnote in the court’s opinion nonetheless preserved the possibility of a contrary ruling in the 
event of failure to remit payment, even though earning royalties does not nominally fall among the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights. In other words, the ernstwhile nonpaying licencsee might 
become a copyright infringer for those purposes - MDY Indus, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 
629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010) at 941 (“we view payment as sui generis”); See also, Nimmer on 
Copyright, Vol 1, §10.15[A][5] (issue 102-7/2017 Pub.465); This may also conflict with The 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
235 <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a2fc93d5-d055-41ad-9963-f29600f943b4> 
(Accessed: 21/03/2019); <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-
pace-with-technology/> (Accessed: 21/03/2019); <https://research.asu.edu/smart-tech-sprints-
forward-law-lags-behind> (Accessed: 21/03/2019).  
236 Griffin, J., ‘A call for a doctrine of information justice’ [2016] Intellectual Property Quarterly See 
also the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.4.2, chapter 3 at 3.4.  
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of the legislator as the task of lawyers and judges is to understand the social 
foundations of legal rules and thereby develop them for the good of society.237  
However, with the move away from download-to-own towards more flexible business 
models (such as subscriptions), it seems unlikely that this will be seen as a policy 
priority, and so the current proposals could help alleviate the need for a fully-fledged 
legislative overhaul as they would operate only in the instances discussed herein.238  
5.4.2 How the reforms could work with compulsory licencing and create a 
more cost-effective system239  
The existence of compulsory licenses in both the US and the UK, are supported by 
two provisions of the Berne Convention that explicitly permit national legislatures to 
grant such licenses,240 with collective licensing in the online music industry being the 
most developed as a matter of law and practice.241 Article 13 of the convention 
empowers each country to limit the rights of the authors of musical works and 
accompanying lyrics who have already authorised the making of a sound recording of 
their works to a right to equitable remuneration in respect of the making of future such 
recordings.242 Similarly, art.11bis(2) allows the author’s exclusive right to authorise the 
 
237 E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of Sociology of Law (1936). For a sympathetic critique and 
detailed discussion of Ehlrich’s thought see Littlefield (1967) 19 Maine L. Rev. 1.; See also, R. 
Pound, Philosophy of Law (revised ed. 1954) pp.42-47.   
238 See also this chapter at 5.5  
239 For more information, see this section at 5.4.2.3 
240 For a useful analysis of Berne in the context of the US jukebox license, see Martin, ‘The Berne 
Convention and the US Compulsory License for Jukeboxes: Why the Song Could not Remain the 
Same’ J Copyright Socy USA [1990] 262 at 296-307 in Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. 
Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2016) at 28-06. 
241 Quintais, J.P., ‘The new copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: a critical look’ E.I.P.R. 
[2020], 42(1), 28-41 at [39]; Article 17 has been suggested to have a liability regime for OCSSPs 
with the explicit objective of imposing a licensing obligation for the content they make accessible - 
Making a similar point, see Samuelson, P., "Legally Speaking: Europe’s Controversial Digital 
Copyright Directive Finalized" (2018) 61 Communications of the ACM 20 (on file with the author). 
242 “Each country of the Union may impose for itself reservations and conditions on the exclusive right 
granted to the author of a musical work and to the author of any words, the recording of which 
together with the musical work has already been authorised by the latter, to authorise the sound 
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communication to the public of the work,243 by broadcasting or related means, to be 
restricted to a right of equitable remuneration.244 
5.4.2.1 Compulsory licencing in the UK 245 
Although copyright is a property right, in certain limited circumstances the law permits 
uses of works without the consent of the copyright owner if the user complies with 
specified conditions. This includes the payment of a fee,246 compelling the copyright 
owner to license the particular use of the work under a “compulsory license” or “license 
of right.”247 Also, under Article 5(2)(b) of the Infosoc Directive248 member states can 
offer exceptions that permit the making of ‘reproductions on any medium by a natural 
 
recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any.” See Ricketson and Ginsburg, 
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (2006), paras 13.59 et seq. Art.14 makes it explicit 
that this does not apply to cinematographic reproductions. For the full text of the Berne Convention 
(Paris Act 1971), see Vol.2 F1. 
243 Warner Music UK Ltd v Tunein Inc [2019] EWHC 2923 (Ch), 2019 WL 05684849 at [36]-[37].  
244 “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under 
which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but those conditions … 
shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to 
obtain equitable remuneration.” Note that arts 13 and 11bis state that the right to equitable 
remuneration shall “in the absence of agreement be fixed by competent authority [emphasis 
added]”. A literal reading of these provisions would suggest that countries of the Union are only 
entitled to grant compulsory licenses, and are not free to introduce a statutory license (see para.28-
02, above). This is not, however, how the effect of this provision has historically been understood. 
For the full text of the Berne Convention (Paris Act 1971), see Vol.2 at F1. 
245 For more information, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at chapter 28.  
246 Thus, in jurisprudential terms, the grant of a compulsory license converts a property rule into a 
liability rule. See further, Kaplow and Sharell, ‘Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis’ (1996) 109 Harv. L.Rev. 713. Ayres and Talley, ‘Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to facilitate Coasean Trade’ (1995) 104 Yale LJ. 1027; For consideration in the context 
of intellectual property; Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at chapter 28, Part 2, section 
Merges, A., ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations’ (1996) 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293.   
247 Compare Patents Act 1977 (c.37) ss.46-54. 
248  Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC.  
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person for private use and for ends that are directly or indirectly commercial’ with many 
EU member states having broad private copying exceptions.249   
Apart from the existing provisions, the UK has historically recognised four situations 
where non-voluntary licenses were made available. The first compulsory license was 
introduced into the UK by the Literary Copyright Act 1842.250 A second non-voluntary 
license was available after 1847. This was to permit the importation of reprints of works 
into the colonies, on payment of a customs duty which was to be redistributed to 
author,251 but was abandoned in 1911.252 A third such license was introduced by the 
proviso to s.3 of the 1911 Act. This gave a statutory license to reproduce for sale any 
work after the expiration of 25 (or, in the case of pre-1911 works, 30) years from the 
date of death of the author, with the rate being calculated at 10 per cent on the price 
at which the work was published.253 The fourth license—the statutory recording 
license—was introduced in 1911 and was maintained in the 1956 Act.254 Under this 
license manufacturers were entitled to make records of musical works which had 
previously been recorded with the consent of the copyright owner, provided the 
manufacturer gave the copyright owner notice of his intention to do so and paid a 
 
249 Karapapa, S., Private Copying (Routledge 2012).  
250 Literary Copyright Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c.45) s.5. It might be noted, however, that the Statute of 
Anne 1709 (8 Anne c.19) contained a provision which allowed for a maximum price to be set on the 
sale of particular books, a provision which has been described as “analogous” to a compulsory 
license. See Latman, Gorman and Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties, 3rd edn (New York: 
Matthew Bender, 1989) p.4. 
251 Colonial Copyright Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c.95). This was introduced primarily at the behest of the 
Canadians, who subsequently charged a duty of 12.5 per cent. However, very little was collected: 
Report of the Commission on Copyright 1878 (C-2036) paras 182-197. 
252 Copyright Act 1911, s.37, sch. 2.  
253 Concern existed as to whether such a provision conflicted with the requirements of the Berne 
Convention, and the provision was not re-enacted in the 1956 Act – Again, repeal occurred in the 
light of the recommendations of the Gregory Committee: Report of the Copyright Committee, 1952 
(Cmnd.8662), para.23. However, it should be noted that although the 1956 Act repealed s.3 of the 
1911 Act it maintained the effect of the proviso as a defence after 1956 in relation to reproductions 
of pre-1957 works in respect of which the requisite notice had been given. 
254 Copyright Act 1956 s.8; Copyright Act 1911 s.19. For a detailed discussion of the provisions, see 
Copinger, 12th edn, paras 827 et seq. See also Discount Inter-Shopping Co Ltd v Micrometre Ltd 
[1984] Ch. 369; [1984] R.P.C. 198. 
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royalty. Further provision was made so that words previously associated with such a 
recording might also be reproduced.255 
In the current copyright system, a further useful distinction can be drawn between 
statutory licenses and compulsory licenses properly so called. In the case of a 
statutory license the rate is fixed by law, whereas in the case of a compulsory license 
the rate is left to be negotiated, but in neither case can use be refused or prevented, 
but either can be referred to as non-voluntary licenses.256 They are available in nine 
distinct circumstances,257 and where the copyright owner has violated art.102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or the Competition Act 1998 
by abusing  dominant position.258 There are extensive financial penalties for failing to 
comply with a Commission order to issue a license.259  
5.4.2.2 Compulsory licencing in the US 
The concept of the compulsory license was introduced into US law in 1909. The 
Supreme Court had already decided in White-Smith Publishing Co. v Apollo Co.,260 
that piano rolls (and by analogy phonograph records and the like) did not embody a 
system of notation that could be read and hence were not “copies” of the musical 
composition within the meaning of the law, but constituted merely parts of the devices 
for mechanically performing the music.261 
 
255 Copyright Act 1956, s.8(5).  
256 Historically, the UK has adopted a mixture of statutory and compulsory licenses, although since 
1989 the preference has clearly been for compulsory licenses. 
257 For more information, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 28-03.  
258 I. Govaere, The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, 1996), 135-50; 
RTE and Independent Television Publications v. Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 18. 
259 A fine of €899 million: European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission imposes €899 million Penalty 
in Microsoft for Non-compliance with March 2004 Decision’ (27 February 2008) Press Release 
IP/08/318.  
260 209 U.S. 1 (1908).  
261 The exclusive right of the copyright owner to public performance already existed under the 1987 
act, and this undoubtedly included such performance by mechanical instruments. It was the right to 
make such devices that was lacking, so Congress undertook to grant such a right, but without 
intending to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical devices themselves – H.R. Rep. No. 
2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909); On the music industry’s adaptation to this, see generally, 
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 In the US, copyright protection is not absolute and in some instances, the Copyright 
Act removes certain reproductions, performances, and displays from the copyright 
owners exclusive control and substitutes a “compulsory licencing” scheme. These 
compromise provisions permit certain uses of the copyright work without the copyright 
owners consent, but requires the user to adhere to statutory formalities, and to pay 
specified fees to the copyright owner.  
Specifically, in relation to phonorecords, under §115,262 apparently bases compulsory 
licensing on the making or licensing of the first recording, even if no authorized records 
are distributed to the public, but it is not a catch-all mechanism.263 Thus, in ABKCO v. 
Stellar Records264 the court clarified the scope of the §115 compulsory license as well 
as the meaning of “phonorecord” under the 1976 Act.265 It ruled that compulsory 
licenses do not give it the right to publish the compositions lyrics on a screen as they 
enjoy independent copyright protection as “literary works”266 protected under §106(1). 
Thus, compulsory licenses did permit the recording of a cover version of a song, but it 
did not extend such coverage to include a copy of the lyrics running on the screen as 
this would require additional permission from the copyright holder.267 
 
Rosenlund, ‘Compulsory Licencing of Musical Compositions for Phonorecords Under the Copyright 
Act of 1976’, 30 Hastings L.J. 683 [1979].   
262 17 U.S.C.  
263 Under the current clause, a compulsory license would be available to anyone as soon as 
“phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the public in the United 
States under the authority of the copyright owner.” – H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
107-09 (1976). 
264 ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1996); See also the technically 
contrasting decisions of Accord, Leadsinger Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 
2008); EMI Entertainment World v. Priddis Music, 505 F.Suppd.2d 1217 (D.Utah 2007).  
265 The US also has other compulsory licensing systems – for example, the digital home recording 
royalty (Audio Home Recording Act 1992), as well as the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings License under §114, including the cable television compulsory license contained within 
§111. For more information, see Botein, M., ‘Compulsory licensing vs private negotiations in peer- 
to-peer file sharing’ 11(6) Journal of Internet Law 15 [2008] at 16 .  
266 1 Nimmer §205[B]. 
267 This is similar to the UK position, whereby most licenses do not permit you to reuse the work -  For 
more information, see http://copyrightuser.org/using-and-reusing/ (Last accessed: 15/2/2017); See 
also, ‘2014 Creators’ Contracts Study’ a study called ‘Contractual Arrangements Applicable to 
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5.4.2.3 Why the reforms could achieve more than compulsory licenses: a 
long-term approach 
In the UK, few non-voluntary licenses exist because international standards to which 
the UK has committed itself are generally antipathetic to such provisions,268 and the 
exploitation of rights are generally the copyright owners prerogative.269 In the US, a 
consistent difficulty arises from the relatively restrained scope of the licenses. For 
example, former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters lamented that §115 is not up 
to the task of meeting the licencing needs of the 21st Century and simply places 
continual artificial limits on the free marketplace.270   
Moreover, so-called extended collective license systems (ECL systems) are primarily 
aimed at including the rights from non-represented right holders (so-called 
“outsiders”), in order to create a complete repertoire for the user. By doing that ECL 
systems improve the collective rights management (CRM). Yet, as a form of “blanket 
paying mechanism” the CRM and, in particular, ECL systems have worked quite well 
in the past.271  
Whether such instruments could work effectively under new conditions like fast-
changing online markets is debatable according to Trumpke.272 This also includes 
potential issues regarding the ECL compatibility with European and International 
Law.273 Specifically, this refers to the previously discussed Berne Convention “three-
 
Creators: Law and Practice of Selected Member States’ commissioned by the European Parliament, 
DG for Internal Policies in 2014 to a group of copyright and economics academics led by S. 
Dusollier. 
268 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 28-06.  
269 Cas C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, [1998] ECR I-7791, 7811 [AG-56].  
270 Statement on Music Licencing Reform of Marybeth Peters before the Subcommittee on Intellectual 
property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 12th, 
2005.  
271 Kung-Chung Liu, Reto M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of 
New Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) , p.86, and 4.4.2.  
272 Ibid.  
273 Kung-Chung Liu, Reto M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of 
New Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) at 5.2. 
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step test”274 which applies to all “limitations and exceptions.”275 Also, at the European 
level, there is an increasingly closed catalogue of limits that Member States can 
operate to restrict the exclusive rights of copyright owners under national law.276  
Licenses are further considered to be inappropriate here. This is because they are 
often viewed as a “suspect device” in copyright law generally,277 as well as being 
administratively cumbersome.278 This also includes being perceived as contrary to 
copyright’s overall free market philosophy”279 amongst others things.280 It is argued 
that the reforms will help get around such issues because they are not permanent. 
Thus, any issues pertaining to how they are perceived will only be for a limited time.  
It is contended that this minimises any potential interruption of the free market as they 
are temporary and can have lasting effects on the cost of works overall in the copyright 
sector. This not only limits any intrusion on the exploitability of copyright holders 
monopolies,281 but this could also create a cheaper, more efficient, and subsequently, 
more accessible market.282 Moreover, this approach is likely to be further supported 
 
274 See the discussion in this chapter at 5.3.2. 
275 Article 13, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); Article 8, 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT); There is debate as to whether the ECL model would be a limitation 
or an exemption - Trumpke, F., ‘The Extended Collective License – A Matter of Exclusivity?’ [2012], 
NIR 2012, 264-294.   
276 Article 5 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.  
277 Ginsburg, ‘Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information’ [1990] 
90 Col. L.Rev. 1865 at 1872. 
278 See further, Scrutton, The Law of Copyright (1883), at 14. 
279 Ginsburg, ‘Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information’ [1990] 
90 Col. L.Rev. 1865 at 1924. 
280 Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016) at 28-08.  
281 For more information on how these reforms will comply with the various international conventions 
and obligations of both the US and the UK, see this chapter at 5.3.2.  
282 For more information on the benefits that the reforms could have on the copyright market, see this 
chapter at 5.5 
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by the 2019 UK High Court decision of Warner Music UK Ltd v Tunein Inc.283 In this 
case, it was held that neither Art 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, nor the Directive itself, 
as a whole, prevents any member state from enacting a narrower exception as long 
as the narrower exception satisfies the Berne three step test provided for in Art.5(5).284 
Finally, it is suggested that the greater emphasis on direct licencing amongst 
consumers that has diminished the importance of things such as the private copying 
exception,285 especially in light of Reprobel,286 and Article 16 of the Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market,287 further supports the decision to move away 
from licencing as a reform strategy. Also, the legal use of works outside of a country 
on the basis of a national ECL model is not possible due to the principle of 
territoriality.288 This is particularly relevant as creative content is increasingly 
distributed in non-physical formats across national borders through different networks 
 
283 Warner Music UK Ltd Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd (for themselves and as representative 
Claimants on behalf of the members of their respective corporate groups) v Tunein Inc [2019] 
EWHC 2923 (Ch) [2019] 11 WLUK 6.  
284 Ibid at [186]; (Art.5(5) Directive 2001/29/EC – The exceptions and limitations provided for in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the rightsholder.) 
285 Case C-110/15 Microsoft Mobile Sales International Oy, EU:C:2016:326, [AG23] (AG Wahl) 
(noting the increase in direct licencing of consumers is diminishing the importance of the private 
copying exception. 
286 Case C-572/13 Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v. Reprobel SCRL, EU:C:2015:750 (ECJ),[48] 
(Presumably, publishers and other licensees or assignees can claim such compensation in 
accordance with any contractual agreement made with the author (or right holder).  
287 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC - Originally, it was listed as Article 12 (now Article 16) which specified that (a member 
state may specify that a transfer of a license to a publisher confers on the latter a ‘sufficient legal 
basis’ to be entitled to a share of compensation); See also the discussion in chapter 2 at 2.3.   
288 On ‘territoriality’ see Polčák R., ‘Territoriality of Copyright Law’ (2020) - in: Szczepanik P., 
Zahrádka P., Macek J., Stepan P. (eds) Digital Peripheries. Springer Series in Media Industries. 
Springer, Cham. 
 407 
and devices, whereby it is questionable whether the national models of ECL systems 
may have a future at all.289  
In essence, it seems increasingly likely that licencing, specifically methods such as 
the ECL approach, will be unsuitable in online markets. However, such a system could 
operate within a territorial-based framework that is combined with reciprocal 
agreements between national CMOs; or by introducing a country of origin or 
transmission rule,290 whereby ECL systems may work on a national basis.291   
5.5 A temporary approach for lasting results: the overall changes 
envisaged under these reforms. 
5.5.1 Why not use taxation? 
In terms of how to administer such a system, Fisher argues that it is desirable to fund 
it by way of direct taxation, but this is not the preferred approach here.292 This is 
because the proposed capping method is based on the idea that it is not as direct as 
taxation, as taxing rightsholders could be unappealing according to Smith. 293 He 
writes that taxation could diminish the individual incentive to work, save, and invest, 
 
289 As far as Europe is concerned this development has also been identified by the European 
Commission, which clearly strives to facilitate cross-border use of works by promoting transnational 
or pan-European licensing; European Commission (2015), A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe, COM - Kung-Chung Liu, Reto M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory 
Challenges of New Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) , pp.97-8.  
290  Under a “country of transmission rule” a user would only have to obtain a license from the country 
where the copyrighted work was made available, since the relevant act would be interpreted as 
occurring in the country of origin regarding transmission. A familiar rule was created for satellite 
distribution in Europe (Article 1 Paragraph 2(b) Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 
on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to 
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission) - M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: 
Regulatory Challenges of New Business Models (Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017) , p.98.  
291 M. Hilty, Remuneration of Copyright Owners: Regulatory Challenges of New Business Models 
(Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, 2017), p.98.  
292 Fisher is a strong proponent of direct taxation to fund and facilitate copyright reforms – William 
Fisher, ‘Promises to Keep’ Stanford Law and Politics, Stanford (2004) chapter 6.   
293 Smith, A., His Life, Thought, and Legacy (Eds. Ryan Patrick Hanley, Princeton University Press 
2016).  
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and otherwise comply with the proposals.294 This is based on the notion that any direct 
removal of funds may create an environment where potential authors and existing 
owners feel that they are being deprived of their efforts. Also, taxation has been 
regarded as having minimal effects on allotment295 and to the incentive which 
otherwise results from particular tax policies that are endorsed and administered 
directly by the State.296 For instance, Posner posits that taxation can have 
disincentivising effects, procure increase inequality, and create excessive 
expenditures for accountants and tax advisors.297 
It is contended that this is partly because taxes are increasingly susceptible to the 
amount individuals perceive is being taken from them, because as “taxpayers’ 
incomes increase, the level of evasion also increase[s]”298 based on their permanent 
and reductionist nature. The proposals are considered to be a better approach here 
as they are less intrusive than taxes because they are not a permanent limitation. They 
also do not take funds directly out of their pockets because every tax “ought to be so 
contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as 
possible.”299 
This approach would likely attract support from Hargreaves in his 2011 review, where 
he suggested that “government[s] should firmly resist over regulation of activities 
which do prejudice the central objective of copyright, namely the provision of 
incentives to creators.”300 As such, a non-taxing approach is deemed to be of 
enhanced importance in ensuring compliance with any proposals in the capitalist 
 
294 Smith, A., His Life, Thought, and Legacy (Eds. Ryan Patrick Hanley, Princeton University Press 
2016), pp.240-41.  
295 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, 77 (1973) at 222-30.  
296 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, 77 (1973) at 238-42. 
297 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, 77 (1973) at 239-41, 245-50; See also, Blum & Kalven, 
‘The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation’ 19 U. Chicago Law Review 417 (1952) (holding the 
view that progressive taxation can be supported by little more that intuitive arguments and that there 
is little support for the success of such frameworks as a whole).   
298 Devos, K., Tax Compliance Theory and the Literature (Springer Publishing 2014), p.16. 
299 Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations (1776), Book IV, ii.b.6 in m Smith, A., His Life, Thought, and 
Legacy (Eds. Ryan Patrick Hanley, Princeton University Press 2016), p.240.  
300 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011) at p.8.  
 409 
system. This is because individuals and corporations could view taxation distastefully. 
This is due to the sense of loss and evasion becomes a worthwhile consequence if 
the financial rewards outweigh the costs associated with compliance (and this could 
improve the ease of enforceability of the proposals).301  
Moreover, the current approach is also considered to be especially important as even 
temporary taxation could still, under the above line of argument, create a sense of loss 
that is likely to be carried into the market in the form of higher prices by rightsholders 
who feel that they have lost money under taxes. This is also considered to be a better 
approach as in EGEDA v Adminicon del Estado,302  it was held that any scheme raised 
through taxation must not charge those, e.g. corporations, who are not engaged in 
things like private copying and the current system could bypass such issues as costs 
would only occur in the event of a breach of the system.  
5.5.2 How the reforms could increase the quality of copyright works 
The temporary nature of the reforms could push ‘quality’303 to the top of rightsholders 
agendas. This is because profit is contended to be their main motivation in a society 
that operates like a “workshop” which is “organised for the production of wealth” under 
capitalism.304 To explain further, it is submitted that the quality of the work will directly 
 
301 Alingham and Sandmo, “Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis” Journal of Public Economics, 
1972, vol. 1, issue 3-4, pages 323-338; Sibichen, K. Mathew, “Making people pay: The economic 
sociology of taxation” Penguin Books, (2013); Compliance is also argued to be encouraged by the 
penalty system proposed, where financial gains made my way of deliberate contraventions of the 
systems will be subject to a ‘doubling’ of the fee – For more information, see 5.7.3.3(a) generally.     
302 Case C-470/14, EU:C:2016: 418 (ECJ), [26]; See also, Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v. 
Reprobel SCRL, Case C-572/13, EU:C:2015:750 (ECJ), [48] (on reprographic levy under Art 5(2)(a), 
noting that pricniples applicable should parallel those for private copying compensation schemes 
under Art 5(2)(b)).   
303 For the purpose of understanding, the term ‘quality’ refers to ‘good-quality’ works, which is works 
of a high/superior standard in comparison to other pieces of a similar nature -  he standard of 
something as measured against other things of a similar kind; the degree of excellence of 
something. 
304 Marx, K., Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, (Trans. By T.B. Bottomore, 
McGraw-Hill Paperbacks, 1956), p.91.    
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impact on an author’s ability to charge their own rates. This is based on the fact they 
need to surpass the number of works required to be sold/licensed before they can 
attain pricing freedom (the ability to no longer be limited by the pricing limits imposed 
by the cap).  
This provides what is predicted to be an indirect ‘incentivising’ mechanism that 
capitalises on the profit-making mentality perpetuated by capitalism.305 In theory, the 
longer a work stays within the confines of the caps, the longer it will take for an owner 
to charge their own rates. As such, this could create a scenario where rightsholders 
will attempt to focus on the quality of the works in order to bypass the pricing 
limitations. This is contended to cause creators to focus on the quality of the works 
produced under the limited prices they can charge for this same reason. This is in 
order to bypass these limits and the best way to do this is to create high quality works 
with a corresponding level of demand that will enable them to do so in the quickest 
timeframe.   
As a result, the temporary nature of these reforms remains a central element to their 
proposed success because owners could look to bypass the limits imposed. Thus, the 
production of high-quality works is contended to likely be the most tenable way 
possible in the contemplation of those creating works. Ultimately, it is hypothesised 
that this will ensure that quality works remain a forefront consideration for those 
subject to the capping proposals.  
5.5.3 How the reforms can drive-down overall prices in the copyright 
industry 
It is argued that in order for owners to maximise the profits made, even during the 
capping phase, because individuals are rational maximisers of their satisfactions 
where legal rules are used in a process of utility calculation,306 that is, individuals would 
look to maximise their own profits under the current system under this idea.307 Based 
 
305 For more information, see chapter 3 generally.  
306 McAdams, R.H., ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ Michigan Law Review 96 
(November): (1997), 338-427; FRIEDMAN, M., AND L. J. SAVAGE, ‘The Utility Analysis of Choices 
Involving Risk’ Journal of Political Economy 56 (August 1948), 279-304.   
307 Jolls, Christine, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Law and 
Economics’ Stanford Law Review 50 (May): (1998), 1471-1550; Posner, Eric Law and Social 
 411 
on this notion, it is likely that they are going to look for cheaper methods of 
production,308 but this is not always the case.309 This idea is based on the notion that 
“for a new work to be created, the expected return – typically, and…exclusively, from 
the sale of copies – must exceed the expected cost.”310 Consequently, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that during the ‘capped’ phase, (whereby rightsholders are 
restricted in the price that can be charged for the protected works until the number of 
copies sold/re-used has been satisfied) the overall cost of production could come 
down. This is important for writers like Professor Merges, who states that new 
schemes need to accommodate the needs of consumers and users by facilitating and 
encouraging cheap and easy IP permission.311  
In addition, it was submitted that there is a need to deal with the issue of re-use, in 
reform.312 This was to ensure that the benefits envisaged under the proposals are not 
counteracted by higher prices pertaining to re-use. This is in an attempt by 
rightsholders to recoup what may be deemed lost profits due to the pricing limitations 
imposed by the proposals. However, recognising re-use is also important as there are 
further benefits beyond limiting the potentiality of high prices being charged. This 
relates to the fact that the restriction on the prices that can be charged for re-use in 
the reforms could also serve to add to this ‘reduction-effect’. This is based on the fact 
that less has to be paid by creators to ‘sample’ or ‘clear’ works for commercial 
reproduction which is a prominent issue in the current system that is discouraging 
creativity.313 
 
Norms, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000); Duxbury, Neil, Patterns of American 
Jurisprudence, (Oxford University Press 1995); Duxbury, Neil, ‘Signalling and Social Norms’ Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 21 (Winter) [2001] 719-36.  
308 Landes, W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325-63. In addition, see also the ‘invisible hand’ of capitalism – (Smith, A., The Wealth of 
Nations (1776), Book IV, chapter II).    
309 Posner, Richard A. Frontiers of Legal Theory, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2001).  
310  Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325 
311  Merges, R.P., Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011), p.290.  
312 See chapter 4 at 4.7 and 4.8, and also, the discussion in this chapter at 5.4.1(b) respectively.  
313 See chapter 4 at 4.7.  
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David Ricardo, one of the most influential economists of the early nineteenth century, 
established that the labour-theory was as firmly in the public mind as supply and 
demand is now.314 He suggested that if you can use less labour in making something, 
it should be cheaper and more profitable.315 If you cut the amount of labour needed to 
produce hats, “their price will ultimately fall to their new natural price, although demand 
should be doubled, trebled or quadrupled.”316 This is argued to be applicable to the 
operation of the proposed system, particularly pertaining to its effects. For example, 
in the same way as machines could make manufacturing fees fall due less labour 
being needed during their creation, thereby reducing the overall natural price; it is 
argued that the same theory can be applied under the reforms.  
Based on the predicted rivalry amongst publishers competing for business, it is likely 
that rightsholders will look for the most cost-effective methods in which to publish their 
works. The way this would work is that publishers operating under the reforms can be 
reasonably said to ask the following question, namely that:  
Is the value of offering a lesser fee to an author in the short term greater than 
the value to be gained by securing a better deal long term in revenues from 
sales?317  
In answering this question, publishers may decide to drop their own rates (and 
potentially give better deals to authors) in an attempt to remain competitive.318 It is 
argued that this will further result in an incidental reduction in the cost of works overall 
due to the potential increase in rational exchanges which are made only when there 
is advantage to be gained by both parties. In this case, this would be the publishers 
 
314 Ricardo, D., ‘Towards the Free Machine’ (http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricPri.html) in 
Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016), p.148.  
315 Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016), at p.148. 
316 Mason, P.,, Post-capitalism: A guide to our future (Penguin Publishing 2016), pp.148-9; Landes 
W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal Studies 325. 
317 Stigler, G.J., The Theory of Price, (4th edn, Macmillan Publishers, 1987); R. H. Coase, ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’, Chicago Journal of Law and Economics, (1960), Volume 3, chapter 1.     
318 Besen, S., Kirby, S. and Salop, S. ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives’, [1992] Va. L. 
Rev. 78: 383–411; Besen, S. and Raskind L.J. ‘An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
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and the authors who will both have to negotiate in order to obtain a deal that represents 
a beneficial transaction for them based on cost.  
For instance, the ‘cost’ of any productive service in producing A is the maximum 
amount it could produce elsewhere.319 Thus, it is fair to suggest that publisher A may 
decide to reduce the costs associated with publication (or give a better deal) to the 
author, if, in his view, the work could produce more value elsewhere. In addition, there 
is the potential that rival publisher B may also recognise this fact, which is considered 
to be facilitated by the fact that both publishers will be acting in their self-interest.320 
This is posited to ensure that the natural rules of competition produce a better result 
for authors and the copyright system generally.321  
This same theoretical analysis can mean that a wider range of potential authors may 
be encouraged to produce works because of the lowered prices predicted under the 
proposals. This is based on the notion that the increased financial accessibility in the 
copyright system may create higher levels of opportunity by making works more 
accessible. This could mean that the investment made in creating a work (time and 
money) may transcend to an increase in the maximum amount it could produce 
elsewhere under this analysis because the cost of getting a work to market, in theory, 
will be cheaper.322  
Yet, such determinations are not always directly correlative to the capacity of new 
market entrants to succeed,323 although Posner suggests that State intervention to 
create new market entrants is sometimes preferable.324 Nonetheless, it is asserted that 
 
319 Stigler, G.J., The Theory of Price, (4th edn, Macmillan Publishers, 1987); R. H. Coase, The 
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320 See this chapter at 5.5.3.   
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Price, (4th edn, Macmillan Publishers, 1987), pp.165-77.       
323 Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ [1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925. 
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it is not the role of the reforms325 to ensure the market success or failure of individuals 
authors, but instead, to increase the level of creativity in copyright by providing a 
framework in which to do so.326 This is based on the fact that the initial reductions are 
suggested to create not just an increased amount of engagement and creativity in the 
creation and usage of copyright works in the digital world, but also, demand will likely 
increase as a result based on the notion that works,327 even after the ‘capped’ stage 
will be cheaper for the reasons stated herein.328  
It is important to note that items like e-books are also capable of being subjected to 
these reforms. This means that print-based formats will not be too disadvantaged 
(although kindle books are nonetheless cheaper to produce).329 This can minimise the 
impact on high street retailers of physical copies. This is because the quantity of every 
commodity which human industry can either produce or purchase regulates itself in 
every country according to the effectual demand; or according to the demand of those 
who are willing to pay the whole rent, labour, and profits which must be paid in order 
to get to the market.330 Thus, “for a new work to be created, the expected return—
typically, [shall be] assume[d] exclusively, from the sale of copies—must exceed the 
expected cost.”331  
In essence, it is argued that due to these factors, both groups (rightsholders and 
publishers) will be acting in concert, unwittingly almost, as it may seem, to produce 
greater economic efficiency across the copyright system through their pursuit of profit, 
 
325 R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ Chicago Journal of Law and Economics, [1960], 
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331 Landes W., and Posner, R., ‘An economic analysis of copyright law’ 18 [1989] Journal of Legal 
Studies 325. 
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inadvertently pushed by the “invisible hand.”332 The invisible hand argument asserts 
that self-interest has the unintended consequence of serving the public good, for as 
we seek to benefit ourselves by serving the market more efficiently and effectively, we 
serve others.333  
This is because in the process of production, humans tend to produce only by working 
jointly in a specific way and by reciprocally trading definite connections with each 
other.334 To aid understanding of this concept, Smith uses the example of greyhounds 
running on a track, who are not bound by any formal agreement, but still nonetheless 
create the appearance of moving together on a mutual basis for the attainment of a 
common goal, namely chasing after the same hare.335  
It is postulated that it is only within these types of social connections and relations 
does the production of copyright goods take place. This is because the creation of the 
current system in response to the changes in digital technology was the result of 
rightsholders and the State working together. This was to create an environment that 
ensured that copyright remained a profitable business model in the digital age.336 Also, 
the very creation of copyrighted works can be fairly said to stem from previous authors 
exchanging (whether fairly or not)337 their works (usually for a fee). This is so that 
others can produce something new that will have a definite connection to the previous 
work, through the exchange carried out via humans working together in a specific 
 
332 Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations   (Book IV, 1776), Ch.II.  
333 Berry, Paganelli, & Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
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337 For example, see Spoo, R., Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp.3-4; On courtesy, see Spoo’s book at pp.30-64.  
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manner and a reciprocal fashion to benefit themselves. This is due to a “certain 
propensity within human nature” to create the “division of labour, from which so many 
advantages are derived” with regards to “truck, barter, and the exchange [of] one thing 
for another.”338 By implication, this could reduce the cost of publication services339 as 
rightsholders and potential authors in capitalist society will purchase “whatever part of 
the produce or utilise whatever area of expertise that he has occasion for…by the 
general disposition of truck, barter or exchange.”340  
In the same way, the entire evolution of the copyright system pursuant to advances in 
digital technology are contended to be driven by the self-interested motives of 
copyright owners. This was to preserve their own profit-making infrastructures (their 
business model) against the emergence of peer-to-peer and related decentralized 
content storage and distribution technologies [that] disrupted the traditional functioning 
of many content industry business platforms.341 
This saw them push for a whole set of distinct demands for higher legal “fencing.”342 
This is because “to a large extent, in present-day economic life, men are providing for 
themselves”343 through the assignment of value to intellectual labour in relation to the 
individual human being and what we now call law.344  
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5.5.3(a) Post-reform: how costs could remain lower in the long-term after 
the capping-phase expires 
A further effect of this reduction in production costs is a potential increase in the 
amount of information that is disseminated. This is because the drive-down in prices 
pertaining to creation, and re-use, which could also see costs reduced at the point of 
sale post-reform due to the reduction in production costs for rightsholders. This also 
includes limiting the effects of Article 17.345 This is because neoclassical economic 
theory suggests that competition produces the best outcomes for society as “in 
competitive markets prices are kept down, and other benefits, such as quality, choice, 
and innovation, flow to consumers…”346 However, this theoretical stance is open to 
criticism,347 because while it is motivated by empirical observation, the analysis is 
based on theoretical models, often with restrictive premises far removed from reality. 
Nonetheless, in spite of this, it is important to note for purposes here that the cost of 
expression to authors of copyrighted works increases as copyright protection 
increases, meaning that there is less material an author can borrow from other 
copyright holders without infringing their copyrights, whereby the cost of creating his 
work will be greater.348  
If a later author is free to borrow material from an earlier one, the later author’s cost of 
expression is reduced; and, from an ex-ante viewpoint, every author is both an earlier 
author349 from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the later author 
himself. In the former role, he desires maximum copyright protection for works he 
 
345 Directive 2019/790; For more information, see the discussion in chapter 3 at 3.5.1.4.  
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creates; in the latter, he prefers minimum protection for works created earlier by 
others.350 This suggests that copyright law raises the cost of expression. 
How this analysis relates to the reforms comes from the notion that rather than limit 
copyright protection, it is contended that by simply limiting the cost that can be charged 
for a work (which also applies to re-use); the following could be achieved, but without 
reducing copyright protection. This is due to the predicted reduction in production costs 
that could be induced by the proposals because “natural prices are determined by the 
cost of production, independent of demand.”351  
This is based on the idea that creators under this system will have lower rates to 
recoup when considering the market price of works.352 This is because of the reduction 
in both licenses and production costs that are anticipated under the reforms. It is 
predicted that this could induce socially efficient incentives to create new works that 
result from the above self-interested bargaining, and also, the tendency of capitalists 
to consistently look for new ways to accumulate profit under the notion of self-
interest.353 However, such arguments are predictive in this economic system, but it is 
asserted that there is little alternative to such items because it is so easy for the 
economy to be thus and thus...[and] the economy of the entire earth which we can call 
“world economy” – cannot be absolutely determined, but only relatively so.354  
It is argued that the reforms could encourage increased compliance from two mutually 
opposed, but interested groups, rightsholders and recipients, for the self-interested 
reasons outlined above. This is due to the fact that law is not simply a set of spoken, 
written or formalised rules that people blindly follow, but instead, law represents the 
formalisation of behavioural rules, about which a high percentage of people agree. It 
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reflects behavioural propensities that offer benefits to those who follow them and when 
people do not recognise or believe in these potential benefits, laws are often 
disregarded or disobeyed.355  
Notwithstanding the submissions herein, the reforms could create cheaper works, and 
processes, overall, across the copyright spectrum as competition is seen as a 
behavioural process. 356 Thus, easier accessibility could lessen the restrictive aspects 
of the current system as lower prices could mean less unlicensed or infringing activities 
based on the fact that compliance would be more financially accessible.357 It is 
asserted that Hargreaves would support this, stipulating that it is important to ensure 
that measures are not designed or implemented in a way that alienates consumers 
and undermines work in education and extending the appeal of legitimate markets.358 
Moreover, the issue of costs in the UK is considered to be particularly important, 
whereby it was established in Reformation Publishing v Cruiseco359  a general starting 
point for a reasonable license fee for 1 year for 2 songs is £155,000.360   
 
355 Gruter, M., Law and the Mind (Londone: Sage, 1991), p.62 in De Soto, H., ‘The Mystery of Capital: 
Why capitalism triumphs in the West and failed everywhere else’ (Black Swan Publishing, 2001), 
pp.185-6; See also, Litman, J., Digital Copyright (2001). 
356  McNulty, P., ‘A Note on the History of Perfect Competition’ [1967] 75 J Political Economy 395, 
who mentions the influence of other writers in the seventeenth century; McNulty, P., ‘Economic 
Theory and the Meaning of Competition’ [1968] 82 Quarterly J Economics 639. 
357 It is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. Poort and J. 
Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam [2018], 
p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the communication to the 
public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577]; See also, this chapter at 5.2.  
358 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011), at 8.45.  
359 Reformation Publishing Company Limited v Cruiseco Limited and anor [2018] EWHC 2761 (Ch) – 
(a large part of the judgment looked at what type of damages would be appropriate and the recent 
cases of One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris - Garnier [2018] UKSC 20, and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd v Stinger Compania de Inversion SA [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1308 and concluded the term “Wrotham Park damages” to cover all the types of remedy should 
no longer be used. 
360 A large part of the judgment looked at what type of damages would be appropriate and the recent 
cases of One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris - Garnier [2018] UKSC 20, and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Eaton Mansions (Westminster) Ltd v Stinger Compania de Inversion SA [2013] EWCA 
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5.6 Why artistic works are not included in the reformed system.361 
One of the assumptions within copyright, which is occasionally challenged but not 
comprehensively so, is the notion that copyright exists primarily for providing monetary 
reward/incentive in exchange for the exploitation of a copyrighted work.362 The result 
of this is that economy, particularly monetary economy, led to the increased perception 
of artistic works as commercial instruments.”363  
This is because as the market conditions for capitalism developed, the market 
transformed art364 into a commodity, which it had never before been and price has 
become the foremost factor.365 This is based on the fact that price, often has an 
 
Civ 1308 and concluded the term “Wrotham Park damages” to cover all the types of remedy should 
no longer be used. 
361 For what is deemed to constitute an ‘artistic’ work for the sake of clarity, see sections 4(1)(a), 
(b),(c),(2)(a),(b) of the CDPA 1988. This is because the majority of the law used here to facilitate the 
enforcement of the proposals is UK law as these reforms are aimed primarily at UK enforcement, 
and the purpose of this section is to discuss when certain items will be covered by the reforms and 
when they will not. Also, the aim here is not to give a comprehensive account of what ‘art’ is, or what 
would qualify as art, as not only is this considered as irrelevant to the central basis of the discussion 
here, but also, such a discussion is likely to be beyond the scope of this thesis.    
362 Millar v Taylor (1769) 98 E.R. 201 at 220 (explicitly); Donaldson v Beckett (1774) 1 E.R. 837 at 845 
–To see how the reproduction of art has been influenced by both technology and capitalism, to the 
point where “mechanical reproduction” has “emancipated the work of art from its parasitical 
dependence on ritual” into an item to be “reproducible” for the consumer see Walter Benjamin, The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (Trans. J.A. Underwood, Penguin Publishing, 
2008); For a shortened version, see Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (eds. Hannah Arendt, Trans. 
Harry Zorn, Random House, 2015), pp.211-44.     
363 Bueys, What is Money? (2010), pp.16-17; Regarding a more diversified cultural debate, see M. 
Adorno and T. W. Horkenheimer, Dialectic of Entitlement (trans. J. Cumming, 1972), p.xv in Griffin, 
J., ‘Making a new Copyright Economy: A new system parallel to the notion of proprietary exploitation 
in Copyright’ [2013] Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
364 For purposes here, ‘art’ is considered the expression or application of human creative skill and 
imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting or sculpture, producing works to be 
appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional power that are catagorised by their aesthetic 
appeal and elements of artistic craftsmanship.  
365 Marx, K. and Engels, F., On literature and art: a selection of writings (edited by Lee Baxandall and 
Stefan Morawski, International general publishing New York, 1974), p.19; Richard A. Posner & 
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interconnectedness that shows how the interplay of subjective social relationships 
results in the objective expression of a particular price-formation that constitutes the 
overall sale price; i.e., to the extent that it rests on a true judgement of objective 
processes.366  
Thus, in the same way, it is suggested that although subjective influences like the 
desire to obtain capital have conceivably caused art to become a commodity367 with 
price as the foremost factor, the subjective aesthetic qualities of art are hypothesised 
to be fundamentally problematic pertaining to any objective quantification of such 
items.368 This is because they are viewed primarily in terms of their “artistic 
craftsmanship” qualities in cases like Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth,369 and are suggested 
to be practically incapable of a quantification-based analysis as a result of what Steiner 
regards as the interconnectedness between the subjective valuation of an artwork and 
the objective price listed.370  
 
William M. Landes, ‘The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the Ownership of Works of Art and 
Other Collectibles’ Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 40, [1996]. 
366 Steiner, R., ‘World Economy: The formation of a science of world economics’ (Rudolf Steiner 
Press 1977), pp.149-161. 
367  Marx, K. and Engels, F., On literature and art: a selection of writings (edited by Lee Baxandall and 
Stefan Morawski, International general publishing New York, 1974), pp.1-20.  
368 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 419-
482; Bell, D., The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, (New York: Basic Books, 1976).    
369 Lucasfilm Ltd and others v Ainsworth and another [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208 (SC) 228D; 
For a detailed account of the case, see Clark, S., ‘Star Wars: New Hope or Lost Cause? [2010] 
Copyright World (This does talk about the 2009 case, but the decision remained the same on 
appeal) (Last accessed: 22/5/2015) (Available at: 
<http://www.blplaw.com/media/pdfs/publications/copyright_world_star_wars.pdf)>; March and Clark, 
‘Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth: The Force of Copyright Protection for Three-Dimensional Designs as 
Sculptures or Works of Artistic Craftsmanship’ [2009] European Intellectual Property Review, Issue 
7.  
370 Steiner, R., World Economy: The formation of a science of world economics (Rudolf Steiner Press 
1977), pp.11-23.  
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This is because you “cannot quantify art”371 and any attempt to apply the reforms to 
items that are often judged on aesthetic qualities,372 artistic craftsmanship373 and 
artistic ‘merit’ and ‘purpose’374 is considered to be difficult in light of these factors. This 
view is supported by Australia’s Highest Court as in Burge v. Swarbrick.375 This is 
because whilst refusing to provide ‘any exhaustive and fully predictive identification of 
what can and cannot amount to a “work of craftsmanship”, the court concluded that 
they key factor that separates protected works of artistic craftsmanship from mere 
industrial designs is the significance of ‘functional constraints’ and the degree of 
‘freedom of design choice’ which are often prohibited in functional articles for industrial 
usage. This is due to the need to apply principles of mathematics, physics, and 
engineering in their construction, rather than making something visually or 
aesthetically appealing as this is increasingly difficult to define objectively.376 
 
371 <https://bolesblogs.com/2008/11/21/the-role-of-the-artist-in-society/> (Last accessed: 19/3/2017).   
372 Lucasfilm Ltd and others v Ainsworth and another [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208 (SC) 228D; 
For a general account as to how artistic craftsmanship is assessed, including the controversies 
surrounding the application of this test, see Patrick Masiyakurima, ‘Copyright in Works of Artistic 
Craftsmanship: An Analysis’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2016), pp. 505-534. 
Also, in Lucasfilm Ltd and others v Ainsworth and another [2009] F.S.R. 9 (Ch) 103, 153, Mann J 
agreed that ‘artistic purpose’ was key – at [118]; Evans-Lombe J referred approvingly to the view of 
the New Zealand High Court that the question of whether a work of artistic craftsmanship could not 
depend purely on the intention of the creator; the finished work must have some artistic quality, in 
the sense of being produced by someone with creative ability and having aesthetic appeal – Bonz 
Group v. Cooke [1994] 3 NZLR 26.   
373 Hensher v Restawile [1975] R.P.C. 31 – See Lord Reid at [54], Lord Kilbrandon at [72] both look at 
intent to create a work of art, whilst Lord Morris and Lord Viscount called for a detached judgement 
regarding the intent of the author and more specifically of the artistic aesthetic elements of the work 
at [57], [62-63]; For a concentrated analysis of the examination pertaining to this area from the 
Australian High Court, see Burge v Swarbuck [2007] F.S.R. 27; However, regarding the analysis 
given in the Hensher, there was no display of uniformity by the Lords in their approach.   
374 Lucasfilm Ltd and others v Ainsworth and another [2009] F.S.R. (2) 103, 154, at [121] per Mann J; 
There was also emphasis on the functionality of the article pertaining to its usage in delegated role 
play – 154 at [123].  
375 Burge v. Swarbrick [2007] HCA 17, (2007) 234 ALR 204, 81 ALJR 950 at [82]-[84].      
376 Ibid at [82]-[84].      
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5.7 Change for the future: how the reforms add to the copyright legal 
infrastructure.  
In chapters two and three, it was outlined how the structure of the copyright legal 
system has influenced the current approach that focuses predominantly on economic 
exploitation. This also involved looking at how this has resulted in the manifestation of 
an environment of panoptic control that restricts the re-use of copyright content. 
Chapter four suggested that this economically-orientated focus has been exacerbated 
by the usage of contracts in the digital sphere, whereby rightsholders have been able 
to increase the amount of control that they exert over their assets beyond what would 
otherwise be available under copyright, limiting re-use in multiple ways.377 In the same 
way, the Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance said that collecting societies have 
“been reluctant or perhaps their members have been reluctant to allow digital licensing 
because they are nervous [and] scared of what the consequences are.”378  
Therefore, the proposed reforms suggest that a greater emphasis on re-use may be 
achieved by statute requiring:  
- That a limit be placed on what can be charged for a work for both sale 
and re-use 
- That contractual agreements which seek to remove an item outside of 
the scope of the proposals be declared void 
It is suggested that because there will be a degree of restriction for what can be 
charged for a copyrighted work for a limited period, including the validity of certain 
contractual agreements, there is a need for a legal body to be able to enforce and 
assess these restrictions on a case-by-case basis. This is to help facilitate legal 
certainty by considering such matters in light of current case law and the new 
legislation. This could safeguard against any technological developments changing 
the assumed balance of copyright law as has occurred with the development of digital 
technology in order to maximise the efficiency of the law.379 This could strengthen the 
 
377 For more information see chapter 4 at sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and, 4.7 respectively.  
378 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal, TSO, London, (2008), pp.10-11.  
379 Posner, R.A., Economic Analysis of Law 26 (6th ed. 2003).  
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practical enforceability of the proposals against contracts discussed in chapter 4. It is 
suggested that in the UK, a Tribunal could fulfil this role, and in the US, a body similar 
to the Copyright Royalty Board could be used to implement the capping scheme. Yet, 
due to the original nature of the proposals, there is no pre-existing knowledge per se 
as to how the reforms outlined by the thesis could be administered and overseen by 
an outside organisation. As such, the thesis will now discuss how this could be 
achieved in the UK and the US.  
5.7.1 Enforcement in the UK. 
The proposed system could be overseen by the UK's Copyright Tribunal380 which 
would be responsible for the administration and monitoring of the capping system,381 
as the current role of the Copyright Tribunal is also to administer and monitor licensing 
bodies and grant/negotiate copyright licenses,382 as well as determine royalty rates in 
absence of a relevant agreement under sections 182D(4) and 191H.383
 
However, it is 
acknowledged that in a report by the House of Commons Innovation, Universities, 
Science and Skills Committee, it was pointed out that cases heard by the Tribunal are 
often substantial in size and lengthy, involving a large number of parties and 




380 The Copyright Tribunal’s primary purpose is to resolve commercial licensing disputes between 
copyright owners or their agents (collecting societies) and people who use copyrighted material in 
their business – <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/copyright-tribunal/about>  
accessed: 22/4/2016.   
381 It should be noted however that the Copyright Tribunal is an independent body, but it lacks its own 
administrative support. This is provided by the UK Intellectual Property Office (the operating name of 
the Patent Office since April 2007).   
382 CDPA 1988, s.116(2) For details see Freegard, M., ‘40 years on: An appraisal of the UK Copyright 
Tribunal, 1957-1996’ 177 Revue Internationale du Droit d’autuer 2 (1998) in Griffin, J., ‘The 
Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University of Bristol, Ph.D. 
(2010) chapter 6 at 6.10.1 
383 CDPA 1988.  
384 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ̳The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal‘, TSO, London, (2008) p.5.  
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5.7.2 Enforcement in the US. 
Regarding the US, the Copyright Royalty Board is part of the U.S. Library of Congress 
and it consists of three Copyright Royalty Board judges who determine royalty rates 
for statutory licenses as provided by the U.S. Copyright Royalty and Reform Act of 
2004.385 The duties of this organisation involve the determination of both the rates 
and terms of the copyright statutory licenses, which also includes determinations 
regarding the distribution of statutory license royalties collected by the Copyright 
Office.386 Thus, in the same way as the UK Tribunal, the US Royalty Board could 
oversee the running of the proposed system regarding administration, and 
enforcement, of duties. 
5.7.3 How the proposals can work with current US and UK bodies to 
reduce costs and streamline enforcement 
It is asserted that the proposals would need to coincide with the current existing 
enforcement bodies in both the UK and US on a collaborative basis in order to save 
money and streamline enforcement. For example, the system could operate in a 
manner similar to the methods proposed in a 2007 review of the UK Copyright Tribunal 
by the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO), which recommended that the staff of the 
Copyright Tribunal should share offices with the IPO in an attempt to provide cost-
effective accommodation.387  
 
 
385 The Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 (CRDRA), was signed into law by 
President Bush on November 30, 2004. The law makes extensive changes to the procedural 
framework for adjudicating royalty rates for compulsory licenses under the Copyright Act. The law 
repeals and re-enacts chapter 8 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code, 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-805. The previous 
ad hoc three-member Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel is replaced by standing Copyright Royalty 
Judges appointed for six-year terms – CRS Report for Congress, ‘The Copyright Royalty and 
Distribution Reform Act of 2004’ (Order Code RS2152) – 
<https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20041216_RS21512_61f2a8fdbeaeda23d4de7558299b204c
91f96a9d.pdf> accessed: 21/08/2019.  
386 <https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/> accessed:16/3/2017.  
387 UK-IPO, ̳Review of the Copyright Tribunal, DTI, Newport (2007) at 39 (Available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/501038/Disc_log_att
achment_to_460.pdf)> accessed: 22/5/2017.  
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To create more efficient and impartial enforcement, the reformed body could have 
individuals who are appointed to explicitly consider the interests of creative re-users, 
whilst at the same time, these groups can also operate within the pre-existing bodies 
particular to each jurisdiction to avoid excessive costs. The members could consist of 
authors, publishers and creative re-users in a tripartite structure.388  
Due to the fact that the system is specifically designed to reduce costs within copyright, 
it is further suggested that the members appointed be regulated by a Non-
Departmental Public Body (NDPB)389 that could oversee the day-to-day workings of 
those selected to ensure that they are acting in the best interests of both rightsholders 
and recipients. 
5.7.3.1 The UK approach 
Building on the above, this approach is considered to be particularly important since, 
for instance, in the UK, the impartiality of the Tribunal could be called into question 
regarding its members, which consists of:  
“...a Chairman, two deputies and a pool of up to eight lay members. The 
Chairman and deputies are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, in consultation 
with Scottish ministers. The Lord Chancellor is also responsible for issuing the 
Tribunal’s Rules, which set out its scope and operational parameters. The lay 
members are appointed by the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities, 
and Skills.”390  
The chairing of the UK group, and appointment of members could be authorised under 
the discretion of the Secretary of State and these selections could be independently 
assessed by the NDPB to maximise the impartiality of the system. This is particularly 
important since the independence of the Tribunal has been called into question in a 
 
388 Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, Ph.D. (2010) chapter 6 at 6.10.3 
389 NDPBs are not an integral part of any government department and carry out their work at arm's 
length from ministers, although ministers are ultimately responsible to parliament for the activities of 
bodies sponsored by their department.  
390 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ‘The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal’, TSO, London, (2008) p.5.  
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government report.391  Thus, it is deemed of paramount importance to have an 
independent appeals service that will listen to appeals and decide whether the 
decisions of the reformed body have been issued correctly. This is to ensure 
impartiality and equal treatment of all parties concerned to enhance user confidence 
in the system.  
This is considered to be of heightened importance as there have been criticisms that 
the current UK Tribunal does not treat all parties fairly.392  Moreover, this could also 
help to deal with the criticisms of the current rules in the UK system, which only allows 
for appeals from the Copyright Tribunal on points of law to the High Court,393 but again, 
the normal deference is given to a specialist tribunal like the Copyright Tribunal.394 
5.7.3.2 The US approach 
Regarding the US, it is suggested that the judges of the Copyright Royalty Board could 
oversee this role. However, writers like Griffin suggest that the appointment of 
representatives of creative re-users could prove increasingly difficult in both the US, 
and the UK. He postulates that the selection process would stem from “the 
appointment of authors who have been on record as having previously obtained a 




391 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ̳The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal‘, TSO, London, (2008) p.30.   
392 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ‘The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal’, TSO, London, (2008), pp.12-13.  
393 CDPA 1988, s.152.  
394 See ITV Network Limited v. Performing Right Society Ltd [2017] EWHC 234 (Ch), [18].  
395 Griffin, J., ‘The Copyright Balancing Exercise in the Digital Era: A Proposal for Reform’ University 
of Bristol, Ph.D. (2010) chapter 6 at 6.10.3 
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5.7.3.3 The overall operation of the proposed systems and how they will 
be enforced in both the UK and the US.396 
The legal functionality of the reformed bodies would operate akin to, and within, the 
UK‘s Copyright Tribunal or the US Copyright Royalty Board, in that the judgements 
handed down by each respective organisation could be subjected to a domestic 
appeal. This would then be subject to a review by the NDPB first, and if this procedure 
is exhausted, then the parties can have a right to appeal. This facility would be run by 
a series of trained assessors who would have various backgrounds with many years 
of dispute resolution experience, which could be lay members chosen on the basis of 
specific expertise as was recommended by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Association.397  
The proposed systems will be enforced alongside the current systems of protection, 
but it will be up to rightsholders and distributors to declare the accuracy of their own 
numbers under a formal system of registration.398 Contraventions will be assessed as 
either ‘accidental’ contraventions, whereby the penalty will be equivalent to all of the 
additional funds generated from all sales that were beyond the limits imposed by the 
capping scheme, or funds will be increased in the case of ‘deliberate’ or ‘repeated’ 
contraventions.399   
 
396 The majority of the law used here to facilitate the enforcement of the proposals is UK law as these 
reforms are aimed primarily at UK enforcement. However, the US system is considered equally to 
the UK system pertaining to enforcement agencies, but legal liability could arguably be modelled 
similarly in the US under the UK principles outlined within this section by direct legislative extension, 
as well as using the existing enforcement agencies discussed here.   
397 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ‘The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal’, TSO, London, (2008) p.4. 
<(https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdius/637/637.pdf)> accessed: 
3/6/2016).  
398 This will operate in the same way as the old system of registration in the days of the Stationers 
Company whereby to obtain protection, the items in question had to be formally registered by the 
stationer’s company. However, rather than to obtain protection, the system can ensure compliance 
and reduce costs associated with gathering information if it becomes a statutory requirement for 
rightsholders to prove that they have acted in compliance with the current regulations.  
399 See this chapter at 5.7.3.3(a).  
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In cases where the contravention is a genuine mistake by the rightsholder, the fine 
imposed will be all of the additional money generated from all sales that are outside 
the limits imposed by the capping scheme. So, righthlders will have their funds 
reimbursed as if they had complied with the reforms, minus additional funds. This is 
similar to what has been labelled an ‘incremental approach’, where it has been 
suggested that, to determine the profits payable, the courts should compare the profit 
that the defendant made with that which they have made had they not used the 
infringing material or process, the ‘increment’ being the profits attributable to the 
infringement.400 However, this approach seems to have received little judicial support, 
being rejected on a number of occasions in favour of a less refined approach, under 
which the courts simply apportion the total net profits,401 but this could be a benefit 
here for sake of simplicity. 
Such information could be procured by a process similar to that of an ‘account of 
profits’ under UK law402 which is an equitable remedy that deprives the defendant of 
any profits made as a result of their infringement under s.96(2).403 The significance of 
this is that although such an approach is often considered a “laborious and expensive 
procedure that is infrequently resorted to,”404 it can still nonetheless afford a sight of 
 
400 Siddell v. Vickers (1888) 5 RPC 416; My Kinda Town v. Soll [1983] RPC 15.  
401 Potton v. Yorkclose [1990] FSR 11 (incremental approach is suitable only where the infringement 
was in the process of producing the work).  
402 For the history, see L. Bently and C. Mitchell, ‘Combining Money Awards for Patent Infringement: 
Spring Form Inc. v. Toy Brokers Ltd’ [2003] Restitution L Rev 79; See also, T. Moody-Stuart, 
‘Quantum in Accounts: The Acid Test’ [1999] EIPR 147. 
403 CDPA 1988; This is not a notional computation as with damages, but an investigation of actual 
accounts. It has been used as a personal remedy against unjust enrichment: see esp. Attorney-
General v Observer [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at 262, 265-67, 288, 293-94; See also, My Kinda Town v. Soll 
[1982] FSR 147 (passing off); Peter Pan v. Corsetes Silhouette [1963] 3 All ER 402 (breach of 
confidence); Attorney-General v. Blake [2000] 3 WLR 625, 641 (Lord Nicholls) (contractual breach 
of confidence).  
404 Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, and trade Marks and Allied 
Rights (7th eds.) Sweet and Maxwell Publishing, (2010), p. 85.  
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customers’ names and other information about the defendant that would be 
conceivably conducive to investigatory and enforcement procedure.405  
The court can refuse this remedy as it is equitable (and therefore discretionary)406 but 
it will not be refused where the defendant had knowledge of the infringing conduct.407 
The profits sought would be those actually made by the defendant through the 
infringement,408 or if there are multiple defendants, the profit each and every one of 
them has made,409 and there is no defence of innocence.410 This could be a 
reasonable method in which to make a defendant who contravenes the system 
account for profits and otherwise prevent their unjust enrichment,411 so that only net 
profits made via the contravention, deducting profits attributable to the defendant’s 
own efforts will be the measure.412   
In the US, it is suggested that this could be achieved by an extension of 17 USC 
§504(1)(b)413 whereby the state could be entitled to recover the actual damages 
 
405 There is a discretion to order the discovery concerning infringing acts in relation to damages as 
well as an account: Smith Kline & French v Doncaster Pharmaceuticals [1989] F.S.R. 401; and see 
Minnesota Mining v Jefferies [1993] F.S.R. 189 FC (Aust.).  
406 Hollister Inc. v Medik Ostmy Supplies [2013] FSR (24) 502, [55] (Kitchin LJ). 
407 Bodo Sperlein Ltd v Sabichi Ltd [2015] EWHC 1242 (IPEC).  
408 CDPA 1988, s.96(2).  
409 Hotel Cipriani SRL v. Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) [2010] EWHC 628 (Ch), [7].  
410 Copyright is a proprietary right and is infringed by invasion of the right, except to the extent that the 
statute provides otherwise. Innocence is therefore not a defence to a claim for primary infringement 
of copyright - Wienerworld Ltd v. Vision Video Ltd [1998] FSR 832;  See, e.g. Mansell v Valley 
Printing Company [1908] 2 Ch. 441; Lee v Simpson 136 E.R. 349, (1847) 3 C.B. 871; Hoffman v 
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (UK) Ltd [2012] EWPCC 2, at [17], [18]. See, further, Davies, G., 
Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), at 7–37. 
411 Colburn v Simms (1843) 2 Hare 543.  
412 Delfe v Delamonte (1857) 3 K. & J. 581; Polton Ltd v Yorkclose Ltd [1990] F.S.R. 11. A different 
view has been taken in Germany, Re Treatment of Overheads in Profit Calculation [2002] E.C.D.R. 
289.  
413 17 U.S.C. §504(1)(b).  
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suffered as a result of the infringement, and where it is ‘deliberate’, this could be 
covered by 17 USC §504(c)(2)414 which deals with wilful infringements.415  
5.7.3.3(a) Punishing contraventions and how to assess costs 
It is suggested that costs should be doubled if a contravention is proven to be 
‘deliberate.’416 This could operate to persuade the user to comply and the reason for 
the ‘doubling’ is based on the ideas advocated by Posner, who notes that the 
consequence needs to be greater than mere compensation in order to provide the 
necessary incentive to refrain from contravening activity.417 It is argued that such an 
approach is correct, as if the price of deliberate non-compliance is simply the cost of 
getting ‘caught’ (i.e. simply the money gained, so the defendant would in effect, break-
even), then there is no real deterrent. The basis for such an assertion can be said to 
be substantiated by the then, House of Lords decision in the context of exemplary 
damages418 in the case of Rookes v Barnard [1964]419 where Lord Devlin ruled that:  
‘…those [circumstances] in which the defendant’s conduct has been calculated 
by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation 
payable to the plaintiff...Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for a 
plaintiff's rights has calculated that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing 
will probably exceed the damages at risk, it is necessary for the law to show 
that it cannot be broken with impunity…’420 
 
414 17 U.S.C. 
415 This is discussed in this chapter at 5.7.3.3(a)  
416 Whether or not a contravention is decided to be ‘deliberate’ could be analysed in a manner similar 
to secondary liability for copyright infringement in the UK, that is only committed when the defendant 
knew or had reason to believe a defined state of affairs relating to infringement – (CDPA 1988 s.22).  
417 Posner R. Economic Analysis of Law (4th edn, 1992).  
418 Also known as exemplary damages, retributory damages or vindictive damages. Damages 
awarded in excess of the claimants loss. They are intended to punish the defendant rather than 
compensate the claimant and are only available in precise and limited circumstances such as where 
the defendant is guilty of oppressive or unconstitutional action or has calculated that the money to 
be made from his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages payable (see Rookes v Barnard 
[1964] AC 1129 and Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] UKHL 29). 
419 AC 1129; See also, Lord Reid's view in Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027 at 1098.  
420 Ibid at [1226].  
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Therefore, in the decision recent decision of AXA Insurance UK plc v Financial Claims 
Solutions Ltd and others421 the UK Court of Appeal ruled that there was a need to 
deter others from engaging  in such activities. The Court of Appeal was therefore of 
the view that this was in fact a paradigm case for the award of exemplary damages 
and each respondent was accordingly ordered to pay Axa a further £20,000.422 As a 
result, it is argued that the current approach would prevent the need for judicial 
determination of such matters, although this is not necessarily prevented, which could 
prevent the calculative behaviours of those attempting to contravene the proposed 
system in the same way as the defendants did in the Axa case. It is suggested this 
approach is of further importance due to the fact that individuals tend to favour a 
“status quo bias, that is, the psychological tendency of people to maintain current 
arrangements” rather than departing from them.423 
In terms of deliberate contraventions, factors that are indicative of such behaviour will 
include items such as repeated offences and the extent to which the non-compliant 
individual went to avoid legal detection. The compensation should be paid by those 
who take advantage of the exception (and thus cause the harm).424 It is asserted that 
compensation can be provided in a manner similar to that envisaged by the CJEU in 
the Amazon case,425 where the funds could be used to pay for social and cultural 
establishments.  
This does not rule out the potentiality that the money acquired could also be used to 
secure compensation for authors indirectly, through the setting up of establishments 
designed to assist those in need of financial assistance under this approach.426 This 
approach is argued to be supported by the Chicago School (or the behaviouralist 
 
421 [2018] EWCA Civ 1330.  
422 <https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/blog/dispute-resolution/court-of-appeal-affirms-basis-for-awarding-
exemplary-damages-axa-insurance-uk-plc-v-financial-claims-solutions-ltd> accessed: 21/12/2019)).  
423 Rizzo, Mario J. and Whitman, D.G., ‘The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism’ Brigham Young 
University Law Review [2009]: 905–968 at 915 in Thomas J. Miceli, The Oxford Handbook of Law 
and Economics: Methodology and Concepts, (Vol 1, Oxford University Press, 2017), at 4.2.2.  
424 Padawan, SL v SGAE, [2010] Case C-467/08 ECR I-10555, [45]; Case C-462/09 Thuiskopie 
[2011] ECR I-5331, [26].   
425 Case C-521/11 Amazon.com, EU:C:2013:515, [49].  
426 Case C-462/09 Thuiskopie, [2011] ECR I-5331, [29], [39].   
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movement)427 that advocates the view that authorities should limit their intervention to 
the detection of collusive behaviours (which show no efficiency) and, where 
necessary, to punish them when they appear.428  
5.7.3.3(a)(i) How deliberate contraventions could be assessed in the UK 
Whether or not a contravention is considered to be ‘deliberate’ could be analysed in a 
manner similar to secondary liability429 for copyright infringement in the UK.430 This is 
only committed when the defendant knew or had reason to believe a defined state of 
 
427  A.I. Gavil, W.E. Kovacic, and J.B. Baker, Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and 
Problems in Competition Policy, American Casebook Series (St Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2002), at 
67–8; The founders of this movement were Aaron Director, Robert Bork, Demsetz, H., Posner, R., 
and George Stigler. The Chicago School differed from the Harvard structuralists both 
methodologically and ideologically - See Posner, R., ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ 
[1979] 127 U Penn L Rev 925, at 944 who establishes the issue of economic concentration and 
deconcentration policies as the fundamental difference between the Chicago School and the 
Harvard School; See also, See R.J. van den Bergh and P.D. Camesasca, European Competition 
Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective(Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia/Hart Publishing, 
2001), at 16, who emphasize the great divergences among economic schools since classical theory. 
However, competition economics has been nourished by these interactions between movements, 
schools, and doctrines so that today it is relatively stable and reliable, at least in those applications 
with a longer history. 
428 This doctrine is echoed in Germany, where Professor Hoppmann criticized the 
structure/performance link and came out in favour of a competition policy targeting behaviour – see 
R.J. van den Bergh and P.D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective(Antwerp/Oxford: Intersentia/Hart Publishing, 2001), at 40 and 45; See 
also, Posner, R.A., A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of 08’ and the descent into Depression 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).   
429 Secondary liability differs by Member State – See C Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability 
in Copyright: A Tort-Based Analysis (Kluwer Law International BV, 2017).  
430 S.23 CDPA 1988; For more information, on ‘secondary liability’ see, Davies, G., Garnett, K., 
Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 2016), chapter 8.  
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affairs relating to infringement,431 as opposed to primary liability which occurs without 
regard to the defendants state of mind.432  
Any ‘knowledge’433 or act by the infringer, or associated infringers,434 must stem from 
the idea that they ‘know’ or have ‘reason to believe’ that they were committing the act 
in relation to an infringing article that does not comply with the reformed system, and 
should be restricted to secondary liability at the domestic level.435 Also, the concept of 
‘authorization’436 which is a copyright owners right to authorise others to do any of the 
restricted acts,437 can be used here. This would cover situations where grants (or 
purports to grant) to a third person the right to do an act in contravention of the 
 
431 CDPA 1988 s.22. (The entirety of secondary infringement in relation to the specific acts is 
contained in ss.23-26, as well as ss296-299 which deals with unlawful decryption of decrypted 
signals and subverting copyright-protection measures).   
432 Thus, making the deliberateness or otherwise of the defendant’s conduct not relevant to the 
assessment of infringement: Laddie J., Electronic Techniques v Critchley Components [1997] F.S.R. 
401 at 410; Sony Music Entertainment v Easyinternetcafe [2003] E.W.H.C. 62.  
433 On ‘knowledge’ see LA Gear Inc v Hi-Tec Sports PLC [1992] FSR 121 at [129], [131]; Pensher 
Security Door Co Ltd v Sunderland City Council [2000] RPC 249 at [284]; Hutchison Personal 
Communications v Hook Advertising [1995] FSR 365 at [383]-[384]; ZYX Music GmbH v King [1997] 
E.M.L.R. 319 at [343]. 
434 An act, depending on the facts of each case, could be both an act of primary liability and give rise 
to accessory liability for the acts of others by way of ‘inducement’: Twentieth Century Fox Film v 
Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J); (a defendant may procure an infringement by 
inducement, incitement or persuasion) – CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc & 
Another [1988] 2 A11 ER 484 at [496]; In the US, this is known as “inducing infringement”, and has 
been used to find similar defendants liable in subsequent litigation, notably in the 2010 District Court 
decision involving P2P service LimeWire - Arista Records LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 
(KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) - B. Sisario, ‘Major Record Labels Settle Suit With LimeWire’, 
New York Times, May 12, 2011). 
435 For example, see laws on accessory liability in the UK; By comparison, see störerhaftung in 
Germany under section 1004 of the German Civil Code. 
436 The leading case on authorisation in the UK is Twentieth Century Fox v. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 
608 (Ch). A similar result was reached in the US via the route of tortious liability under the notion of 
‘inducement’: see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 US 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 
(2005).  
437 CDPA 1988, s.16(2).  
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reforms.438 This can include scenarios where third parties are used or involved.439 It 
can also cover situations where websites are used to distribute copies in contravention 
of the proposals,440 as well as those who facilitate441 the supply, or manufacture, of 
equipment to do so.442 
Moreover, a difficulty here may be with ascertaining liability as the question of ‘actual’ 
knowledge has been described as a heavy one443 and is an objective test.444 
Essentially, the defendant must have been in a position from which they are able to 
evaluate the information given to them,.445 This also includes having a reasonable time 
in which to consider whether or not they were breaching the capping system.446  
 
438 Falcon v. Famous Players [1926] 2 KB 474, 491.  
439 PPL v. GGK Trading [2016] EWHC 2642 (Ch), [60] (Master Clark) – nightclub manager was held 
liable for authorisation of the infringements of a DJ despite having no direct connection to the songs 
chosen.  
440 Twentieth Century Fox v. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, 545 US 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
441 Dramatico Entertainment v. British Sky Broadcasting [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [73]-[81]; EMI 
Records v. British Sky Broadcasting [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [52]-[70];  
442 CBS Songs v. Amstrad [1988] AC 1013.  
443 Infabrics Ltd v Jaytex Shirt Co. Ltd [1978] F.S.R. 451(at first instance); Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book 
Co. [1983] F.S.R. 545. 
444 Vermaat v. Boncrest (No.2) [2002] FSR (21) 331, [30].  
445 LA Gear v. Hi-Tec Sports [1992] FSR 121, 129.  
446 The normal period is often 14 days. Cf. Monsoon v. Indian Advertising [1995] FSR 365; Metix UK 
v. Maughan [1997] FSR 718.  
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5.7.3.3(a)(ii) How deliberate contraventions could be assessed in the US 
The assessment of contraventions could be analysed under vicarious447 and 
contributory448 liability449 under US law.450 Unlike contributory infringement, knowledge 
is not an element of vicarious liability.451 
To establish vicarious copyright liability,452 it must be demonstrated that there has 
been a direct infringement,453 and (1) that the infringer has sufficient control454 and 
 
447 The landmark case for vicarious copyright liability – Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 
316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).  
448 One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer – Gershwin Publ’g  Corp. 
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d. Cir. 1971); see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. 
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).  
449 For a review of the development of vicarious and contributory liability in US law and how it has 
been developed in response to technological developments, see Kathryn D. Holt, Grokster and 
Beyond: Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement During Live Musical Performances, 19 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 173 (2011). 
450 Napster could be held liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, affirming the 
District Court holding in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (No. C 99-5183 MHP No. C 00-0074 
MHP), United States District Court for the Northern District of California - in A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913 (2005). 
451 Nimmer on Copyright §12.04[A][1] at 12-70.  
452 A well-established principle of copyright law is that a person who violates any of the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner is an infringer, including persons who can be considered related or 
vicarious infringers...The Committee has decided that no justification exists for changing existing 
law, and causing a significant erosion of the public performance right - H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, § 
501, at 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.  
453 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Secondary 
liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a third 
party."). 
454 Major Bob Music, v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475, 480 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (holding defendant bar-owner 
vicariously liable because she had "the right and ability to control the activities at her 
establishment").  
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ability455 to supervise the infringement,456 which includes any premises457 or activity 
used to infringe,458 and, (2) has obtained direct financial benefit459 as a result.460  
However, lesser requirements have been satisfactory, such as those promulgated 
under the “draw theory”461 based around indirect financial benefit which was 
developed by the Ninth Circuit. The two prongs of this offence should be analysed 
together using the “totality of relationship”463 approach. This looks at all aspects of the 
relationship between the infringer and the vicariously liable party particular to the direct 
infringement.464  
 
455 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478, 483 (N.D. Ohio 1984) - (stating active 
supervision is not required as long as the defendant has "the 'right and ability' to supervise the 
infringing activities".  
456 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1160 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 
1918); See also, Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control Reading Vicarious Liability for 
Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,75 Wash. L. Rev. 1005, 
1012 (2000).   
457 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 930, 937 (C.D. Ill. 2010).  
458 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc., v. 
Shapiro, Berstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); See also, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, § 501, at 
159-60.  
459 The leading case requires an “obvious and direct financial benefit” - Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 
H.L. Green, Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963);  see also  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (one "infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it");  
460 Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
461 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cit. 1996). 
463 6 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 21:66 (2010) in Holt, K.D., ‘Grokster and Beyond: 
Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement During Live Musical Performances’, 19 J. Intell. Prop. 
L. 173 (2011). 
464 Ibid.  
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To establish contributory copyright infringement, the defendant must (1) have 
knowledge465 of the direct infringement466 and (2) must have materially contributed to 
the infringement.467 This is often known as “inducing infringement”468 and has been 
used to find defendants liable in litigation, notably in the 2010 District Court decision 
involving P2P service LimeWire in the case of  Arista Records LLC v Lime Group 
LLC.469   
Essentially, the infringer must “know or have reason to know”470 of activity that is in 
contravention of the proposals. Thus, there is a requirement to establish that the 
 
465 Courts have found liability based upon actual knowledge of specific acts of copyright infringement - 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) - (However, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to hold Napster liable for contributory copyright infringement merely because its 
product was not capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Despite the court failing to impose 
liability for the contributory infringement, the court did find that Napster met the requisite knowledge 
requirement because it had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and had the 
capacity thereof to block such infringing articles) – at [1021-22].  
466 The requirement of ‘constructive’ knowledge resulted from the Supreme Court ruling in  Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. at 419-20; ‘Constructive knowledge’ in this 
case was held on the basis that Sony had “sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact 
tha their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorised copies of copyrighted material)- 
at [439]; See also, Aimster Copyright Litigation 334 F.3d 643, 644 (7th Cir. 2003) at 650-1.   
467 Gershwin Publ’g  Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d. Cir. 1971) at 
1162; See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) 
("One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement."); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining contributory copyright 
infringement according to the Gershwin standard); Kathryn D. Holt, ‘Grokster and Beyond: 
Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement During Live Musical Performances’, 19 J. Intell. Prop. 
L. 173 (2011) at II.   
468 Sisario, B., ‘Major Record Labels Settle Suit With LimeWire’, New York Times, May 12, 2011). 
469 No.06 CV 5936 (KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010).  
470 Gershwin Publ’g  Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d. Cir. 1971); See 
also Mathew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998)  (this case found 
contributory liability where either "(i) personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement; 
and (ii) provision of machinery or goods that facilitate the infringement" exists).  
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Distributors had “specific knowledge of infringement at a time which they contribute[d] 
to the infringement, and, they fail[ed] to act upon that information.”471  
The requirement of material contribution, is simply, that the defendant must have 
materially contributed to the direct act of infringement. In assessing this, the court 
looks at the role played by the defendant in the infringing activity which must be “more 
than ‘mere[ly] quantitative’ to the primary infringement....Participation must be 
substantial.”472 There are two ways that this can be established. The first is  through 
active causation, also known as, inducement,473 which requires proof that a person 
induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringing conduct of another.474 The 
second way is through providing the means of infringement.475 
Ultimately, these approaches could help to procure liability where sales have been 
conducted in breach of the proposed system,476 and in situations where individuals 
who have sufficient control of premises.477 This will also help deal with bodies in the 
online world that operate in contravention of the proposals,478 giving the reforms 
maximum coverage. 
 
471 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. (2003) at 
[1036] (citing A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. 
Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 & 846 (11th Cir. 1990). 
472 Livnat v. Lavi, No. 96 CIV. 4967 (RWS), 1998 WL 43221, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1993).  
473  6 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 21:48 (2010).  
474 Jalbert v. Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 72 (D. Mass. 2008).  
475 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cit. 1996). 
476 Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); See also, Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).  
477 In some cases, the so called ‘dance-hall-cases’ the operator of an entertainment venue was held 
liable for infringing performances when the operator (1) could control the premises and (2) obtained 
a direct financial benefit from the audience, who paid to enjoy the infringing performance. See, e.g. 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc, v. 
Shapiro, Bernstein & co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929).   
478 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. (2003) at 
[1036] (citing A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 
F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Cal. 2000); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc 239 F.3d 1004 (Court of 
Appeals, 9th Circuit 2001).  
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5.7.3.3(a)(iii) Why use these approaches? 
The reason for these approaches is because it is likely that the contravention of this 
system will relate directly to dealings in copies where multiple actors could all be, 
separately and distinctly, be regarded as legally responsible.479 In the US, there could 
be assistance by way of vicarious copyright infringement for sales of items procured 
in contravention of the reforms.480 Particularly, this can apply to instances where the 
operator could control the premises/store/location of contravention,481 including those 
online.482 This is not intended to affect the existing law on primary and secondary 
infringement in the UK, or the US.  
Simply, the principles used in assessing secondary infringement are deemed the most 
appropriate here as the majority of the offences, due to the nature of the reformed 
system, are likely to include dealing in copies. This can include, but is not necessarily 
limited to, selling works in contravention,483 offering or exposing for sale,484 and also, 
 
479 Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Kitchin J); Stichting Brein v. Ziggo 
BV Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:456 (ECJ, Second Chamber) at [36]; Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and 
XS4All Internet BV, Case C-610/15, EU:C:2017:99, [AG53].  
480 Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). On the issue of ‘lack of 
knowledge’ of the infringing acts – Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d. Cir. 1938); cf. Fromount v. 
Aeolian Co. 254 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y) 1918).  
481 In some cases, the so called ‘dance-hall-cases’ the operator of an entertainment venue was held 
liable for infringing performances when the operator (1) could control the premises and (2) obtained 
a direct financial benefit from the audience, who paid to enjoy the infringing performance. See, e.g. 
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc, v. 
Shapiro, Bernstein & co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929).   
482 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. (2003) at 
[1036] (citing A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 
F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Cal. 2000); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc 239 F.3d 1004 (Court of 
Appeals, 9th Circuit 2001).  
483 In Phillips v Holmes [1988] R.P.C. 613; Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 
304 (2d Cir. 1963); See also, Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
484 CDPA 1988. s.107(1)(a), (c), (d).  
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knowingly providing the apparatus or premises485 to facilitate486 the sale of an item in 
a manner that is not in compliance with the reforms. This could also include online 
marketplaces, payment service providers, and advertisers that may enable 
contravening activity.487  
5.7.3.3(b) How to calculate the profits made under a contravention: an 
apportionment approach 
In terms of how to calculate profits under the remedy of account, the approach of the 
court could be to determine what profits have been created, in a legal sense, by those 
contraventions.488 Regarding what these figures may amount to, it can be reasonably 
said that ‘a proper combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses (such as 
mathematical averages to approximate the harm caused) in order to draw inferences’ 
of minimal harm; could reasonably be used to establish the ‘specific legal question’ 
that could arise. Namely, as to whether the harm caused by breaches of the capping 
system was so extensive as to render the harm minimal or non-existent.489 
Member states of the European Union would have a ‘wide discretion’ when deciding 
who must discharge the responsibility to provide compensation.490 This is not an 
isolated numerical approximation, but one of ‘judicial estimation’ that takes into 
account the aforementioned factors.491 In doing so, an ‘apportionment approach’ can 
be used to ascertain the profits made by the defendant from the activity in question.492 
 
485 See, e.g. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball Room, 
Inc, v. Shapiro, Bernstein & co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929).   
486 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cit. 1996). 
487 In the UK, see CDPA 1988 ss.22-26; Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 
(Ch) (Kitchin J); A similar result was reached in the US via the route of tortious liability under the 
notion of ‘inducement’: see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 US 913, 125 S. Ct. 
2764 (2005). 
488 Calanese v. BP [1999] rpc 203; Union Carbide v. BP [1998] FSR 1, 6. 
489 R (on the application of British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors) v. Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation & Skills [2015] EWHC 2041 (Admin), [2015] RPC (26) 703.  
490 Thuiskopie, Case C-462/09, [2011] ECR I-5331, [23]; Amazon.com, Case C-521/11 
EU:C:2013:515, [20]. 
491 Universities UK v. Copyright Licensing Agency [2002] RPC (36) 693, 726, [177].  
492 Potton v. Yorkclose [1990] FSR 11, 18.  
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This could be used to define the portion of the profits that are attributable to the 
contravention and this is not a mathematical exercise,493 but one of reasonable 
approximation.494 
This may also relate to bank accounts and other financial assets495 and can also 
include the forced disclosure of the names of the consignors or consignees 
responsible. However, this will be possible only if this is necessary to dispose fairly of 
a claim or to save costs, as contained in r.31.17 of the Civil Procedure Rules.496 
5.7.3.3(b)(i) The role of the courts in gathering and securing evidence 
The so-called ‘Norwich Pharmacal Order’497 can be used as a “fully-fledged”498 remedy 
in the process of gathering evidence against larger scale infringers. This is because it 
is an application for final relief, not an interim remedy.500 Specifically, in cases where 
 
493 Design & Display Ltd v. Ooo Abbott and anor [2016] EWCA Civ 95, [53] (mathematic precision is 
impossible when using account of profits).  
494 My Kinda Town v. Soll [1993] RPC 15.  
495 In order to ensure such efficacy, the court may allow cross-examination on affidavits in defence: 
House of Spring Gardens v Waite [1985] F.S.R. 173 CA.  
496 CHC Software v Hopkins F.S.R. 241; Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN [2003] F.S.R. 311, 
disapproving Sedley L.J., Interbrew v Financial Times [2002] E.M.L.R. 24.  
497 Norwich Pharmacal Company & Ors v Customs And Excise [1973] UKHL 6, [1974] AC 133 (26 
June 1973); These orders were not available in Scottish law. Accordingly, provision was made by 
the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc) Regulation 2006 (SI 2006/1028), reg. 4.  
498 Husovec. M, Accountable, not liable: injunctions against intermediaries. TILEC discussion paper 
no. 2016-012:1-76, p.40 - https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773768; In the context of online copyright 
enforcement, the industry has broadly used this relief to pursue attempts to force individuals into 
settlement for alleged online infringement. Historical figures bear out the point, e.g. in Germany in 
2013, 446 right holders pursued 108,975 letters for settlement totalling 90m. See summary of 
German interest group IGGDAW findings of 2013 at https://torrentfreak.com/lawyers-sent-109000-
piracy-threats-in-germany-during-2013-140304/ - O’Sullivan, K.T., ‘Copyright and internet service 
provider "liability": the emerging realpolitik of intermediary obligations’ IIC [2019], 50(5), 527-558. 
500 Ab Bank v Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC [2017] 1 WLR 810 at [10] (Teare J); See also, 
Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 1827 
(Ch) at [12].   
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there are individuals acting for those higher up in a more leading role, but this may be 
seen as “disproportionate.”501  
The UK body can also use freezing orders502 to prevent the transfer of assets or 
monies, where the organisation can show that they are entitled to money from a 
 
501 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723(Ch) (26 March 
2012) at [36]. However, in respect to the order in question, it should be noted that if the information 
can be obtained another way, then a “Norwich Pharmacal” order is unlikely to be issued, and would 
be seen as “disproportionate” – See (Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Service 
[2012] UKSC 55; Blocking injunctions can also be used against ISP’s whereby they can be ordered 
to block customer access to websites, such as Newzbin and the Pirate Bay, containing or giving 
access to copyright material without the permission of the relevant rights holder – Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2011] RPC 855; M. 
Husovec, ‘Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The case of Website Blocking’ [2013] JIPITEC 
(arguing that these remedies signify a transformation in the nature of remedies from tortious to in 
rem); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications Plc (No.2) [2011] EWHC 
2174 (Ch); Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (No.2) [2012] EWHC 1152 
(Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR (15) 360; Paramount Home Entertainment International v. British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch), [2014] ECDR (7) 101; Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v. 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [2012] 3 CMLR (14) 328; Football Association 
Premier League v. British Telecommunications [2017] ECDR (17) 346; The blocking injunction was 
also used in relation to websites selling counterfeit goods - Cartier International AG v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 658; Arista Records LLC v Lime Group LLC, No.06 CV 5936 
(KMW) (US S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) - In granting summary judgment for the plaintiff record 
companies, the court found that several LimeWire-related defendants: were aware of the substantial 
infringement being committed by LimeWire users; purposefully marketed LimeWire to individuals 
who were known to use file-sharing programs to share copyrighted recordings or who expressed an 
interest in doing so; assisted users in committing infringement; experienced business growth that 
depended greatly on LimeWire users’ ability to commit infringement; and did not implement in a 
meaningful way any technological barriers or design choices to diminish infringement. On October 
26, 2010, the court entered a permanent injunction against the LimeWire defendants and ordered 
most of the service’s functions to be disabled. In May 2011, the defendants settled the litigation with 
the record-industry plaintiffs for a reported US $105 million) - (source: B. Sisario, ‘Major Record 
Labels Settle Suit With LimeWire’, New York Times, May 12, 2011).  
502 On ‘freezing orders’ see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), Part VI, chapter 21, Part 7, 
Section B; Enforcement Directive art.9(3) provides that the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to require the applicant to provide any reasonably available evidence in order to satisfy 
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defendant (who has breached the terms of the capping system). They will also have 
to show that there is a real risk that the defendant will remove assets from the 
jurisdiction, or deal with them so as to render them unavailable or untraceable. The 
court may grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from removing them from the 
jurisdiction, or from dealing with the assets (whether located within the jurisdiction or 
not).503  
However, this approach may be doubtful in the US, as the Supreme Court ruled 
against the usage of such orders.504 However, a similar result could be reached using 
a Temporary Restraining Order,505 but this still nonetheless has a more limited 
application506 in comparison to the former and this could weaken enforcement powers 
in the US. 
There are a number of factors to be weighed up when deciding to grant such an order 
in the UK,507 but fundamentally, these concern the necessity to protect property rights 
under Article 17(2) of the European Charter of Rights and Freedoms (ECRF),508 which 
 
themselves with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant is the rightsholder and that the 
applicant’s rights are being infringed, or that such infringement is imminent. There is no express 
provision in the CPR to this effect, but it is implicit in the rules of practice as to the strength of the 
case required before interim relief will be granted; The freezing injunction is granted under Practice 
Direction 25A—Interim Injunctions. 
503 This remedy was created by way of a judicial intervention in the case of Mareva Compania Naviera 
SA v International Bulk Carriers SA (The Mareva) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Report 509; [1980] 1 All ER 213; 
For more information on freezing order, see “Freezing Injunctions: A Nuclear Weapon for the 
Commercial Litigator” Presented by Hefin Rees, Delivered to Carter-Ruck Solicitors, London, on the 
8th December 2009; This can also provide an assistive function in the delivery up of goods under 
s.99 CDPA 1988 where there is suspected actionable infringement under s.96 of the same act.    
504 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999): A similar 
approach was reached in the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Credit Agricole Indosuez v. 
Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank, 94 N.Y.2d 541 (N.Y.2000). 
505 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure §65 
506 Tamaruya Masayuki, ‘The Anglo-American Perspective on Freezing Injunctions’ Civil Justice 
Quarterly. 29 (3): 250-369.  
507 See Rugby Football Union v. Viagogo Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 333, [44]-[45] (Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore 
JSC); Golden Eye (International) Ltd and anor v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] RPC 28, at [117].  
508 ECHR, First Protocol, Art. 1; Charter, Art. 17(2).  
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is not absolute, but declares that ‘intellectual property shall be protected’.509 This also 
includes the right to property under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the (ECRF).510 Therefore, 
any such orders must be proportionately511 and individually512 balanced in terms of 
protecting authors and allowing for access,513 as this is necessary to balance the 
interests and rights of rightsholders and recipients.514 There is also a need to preserve 
the identification of those involved under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)515 in accordance with the margin of appreciation.516  
These are essential considerations as the principles of ‘proportionality’ and ‘certainty’ 
are derived from general principles of EU law,517 and these are basic, unwritten ideas 
 
509 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364; S. Peers. T. Hervey, J. 
Kenner, and A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (2014); The 
precise coverage of the term ‘intellectual property’ has been given a broad interpretation – WIPO 
Convention (1967), Art.2(viii), EC Statement 2005/95/EC on the Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC.  
510 Golden Eye (International) Ltd and anor v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] RPC 28, [116]-[147]; This 
approach was endorsed by the UK Supreme Court in Rugby Football Union v. Consolidated 
Information Services Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 333, [44]-[45].   
511 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch) at [15-17]; See also, Golden Eye (International) Ltd and anor v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] 
RPC 28 at [18].  
512 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2019] EWHC 
1827 (Ch) at [17].  
513 Koo, J., The Right of Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 2019) 
Part 3, II, A.  
514 When granting an injunction it is necessary to consider the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to balance the interests and rights which would include Article 8 (privacy).   
515 ECHR, Art. 8(1); Charter, Art.7.   
516 The ‘margin of appreciation’ refers to the space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are 
willing to grant national authorities, in fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR; On the way this has 
been applied in the context of Article 8, and its purported limitations, see Professor Westkamp, G., 
‘Private life and the margin of appreciation, introductory note to the European Court of Human 
Rights: Alex Springer AG v. Germany and Von Hannover (No.2), International Legal Materials Vol. 
51, No. 4 (2012), at 631-684.  
517 The general principles of EU law include: proportionality, legal certainty, equality, subsidiarity and 
fundamental rights. 
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that underlie the functionality of the EU legal system.518 They have been labelled as 
‘controversial’519 ‘gap-fillers’520 and means of ‘derogation’521 but this in no way is an 
attempt to play down their influence in copyright law.522  
The CJEU has often used the concept of proportionality to mitigate against the rigor 
of the applications of legal doctrines and to ensure that the suitability of court orders 
and civil remedies523 are sufficient when the law is applied.524 Moreover, art.17 of the 
 
518 The general principles of the EU are often inferred from the decisions of the CJEU. For example, 
the proportionality principle was developed in Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH 
v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECLI:EU:C:1970:114 and Case C-
331/88 The Queen v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, 
ex parte Fedesa et al [1990] ECLI:EU:C:1990:391. 
519 C Semmelmann, ‘General Principles of EU Law: The Ghost in the Platonic Heaven in Need of 
Conceptual Clarification’ [2013] 2 Pittsburgh Papers on the European Union 1, 4–5. Also 
see P Morvan, ‘What’s a Principle?’ [2012] 20(2) European Review of Private Law 313, 322, who 
states that there is no one size fit all approach in regards to principles. Thus, different aspects of law 
may have different conceptions about principles and their roles in Koo, J., The Right of 
Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 2019) at 8-9.  
520 Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2006) and N de 
Boer, LDijkman and Kampen, S.V., ‘The Changing Role of Principles in the European Multilayered 
Legal Order: Conference Report of the Symposium “Principles and the Law”’, Utrecht University, 25 
May 2011’ [2012] 20(2) European Review of Private Law 425, 428–29 in Koo, J., The Right of 
Communication to the Public in EU Copyright Law (Hart Publishing, 2019)p.9.  
521 C Sieburgh, ‘Principles in Private Law: From Luxury to Necessity – Multi-Layered Legal Systems 
and the Generative Force of Principles’ [2012] 20(2) European Review of Private Law 295, 301. 
522 Morvan suggests that principles exist to set aside concrete legal provisions that have inopportune 
effects in a specific case – Morvan, P., ‘What’s a Principle?’ [2012] 20(2) European Review of 
Private Law 313 at 319.  
523 On civil remedies, see Davies, G., Garnett, K., Harbottle, N. Caddick, (eds), Copinger and Skone 
James on Copyright (17th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2016), Part VI.  
524 Case C-275/06 Prodctores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España 
SAU [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, paras 68 and 70, Scarlet Extended v SABAM [2011] para 48, Case 
C-461/10 Bonnier Audio AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:219, 
para 59 and UPC Telekabel [2014] para 46. Also see Case C-355/12 Nintendo Co Ltd and others v 
PC Box Srl and another [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:25, para 30. 
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Berne convention could also be used in a similar regard, and has been suggested as 
a way to justify compulsory licensing,525 in that it specifically provides that: 
“…the provisions of this Convention cannot in any way affect the right of the 
Government of each country of the Union to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by 
legislation or regulation, the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work 
or production [emphasis added].”526 
Ultimately, all of these rights will be individual to each particular case. This is because 
neither right automatically has precedence over the other and to solve the conflict 
involves an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being 
claimed in the individual case and the justifications for interfering with or restricting 
each right. Most decisions, however, when assessing proportionality are simply 
decided on the balance of convenience.527 
5.7.3.3(c) Practical enforcement by UK and US regulatory bodies 
5.7.3.3(c)(i) How this could be enforced in the UK 
The HMRC, which is the UK customs authority responsible for national policy 
governing IP rights enforcement at the UK external border, could be drafted in as a 
secondary mechanism. This is because, in certain circumstances, HMRC (and Border 
Force, the law enforcement command within the Home Office responsible for carrying 
out the frontier interventions that implement this policy) are empowered to detain 
goods that may infringe intellectual property rights such as copyright.528  
The effectiveness of the HMRC can be assisted by Trading Standards officers in the 
UK, who are also under a statutory duty to enforce copyright and have the powers, 
 
525 For more information, see Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights (2006), paras 13.91-13.92. 
526 Berne Convention (Paris Act 1971) art.17; Vol.2 F1. 
527 Warner Lambert v. Sandoz [2016] EWHC 3317 (pat), at [75] (Arnold J). 
528 The international Comparative Legal Guide to Copyright to: Copyright 2017, (3rd Edition), 
Published by Global Legal Group, in association with Bird & Bird LLP. 
<https://www.twobirds.com/~/media/copyright-chapter-iclg-bird--bird-2016.pdf?la=en> accessed: 
22/3/2017.    
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among others, to make test purchases of infringing goods,529 to enter premises and to 
inspect and seize goods and documents which infringe,530 and can be done without 
obtaining a court order as long as it is done by, or with the permission of, the copyright 
owner.531  
The Anton Pillar order could also be of assistance here. In EMI Ltd v Pandit,532 it was 
held that in exceptional circumstances the court would make an order on an ex parte 
application authorising the claimant to search the defendant’s premises and to seize 
evidence of infringement, including infringing copies. This was affirmed in Anton Pillar 
KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd,533 but confined it to narrow circumstances with 
specific conditions required.534  
However, the draconian nature of the order has criticised, and where it is granted, but 
the claimant has failed to disclose material facts likely to influence the initial decision, 
this can in exceptional circumstances lead to the order being set aside.535 The 
principles developed by the courts were given statutory force by the Civil Procedure 
 
529 S.107A CDPA 1988; This is also known as a “Trap Order”. 
530 The international Comparative Legal Guide to Copyright to: Copyright 2017, (3rd Edition), 
Published by Global Legal Group, in association with Bird & Bird LLP. 
<https://www.twobirds.com/~/media/copyright-chapter-iclg-bird--bird-2016.pdf?la=en> accessed: 
22/3/2017.    
531 CDPA 1988, ss.100, 196.  
532 [1975] 1 A11 E.R. 418.  
533 [1976] Ch. 55.  
534 (a) a strong prima facie case of infringement must be shown (b) there must be a real and serious 
possibility of damage to the claimant flowing from the defendant’s alleged activities (c) there must be 
clear evidence of a real possibility that the defendant would have destroyed or otherwise disposed 
of evidence of infringement had the claimant sought inspection following an order inter partes 
proceedings; and (d) the claimant must give a cross-undertaking in damages to the defendant, 
providing an indemnity in the event that the claimant’s case proves to be unfounded.  
535 Brinks Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1350; Dormeuil Freres SA v Nocilian International 
(Textiles) Ltd [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1362; Bebehani v Salim [1989] 2 A11 E.R. 143; Tate Access Floors v 
Boswell [1990] 3 A11 E.R. 303; Lagenes Ltd v It’s At (U.K.) Ltd v Chemiculture Ltd [1993] F.S.R. 
270; Intergraph Corporation v Solid Systems CAD Services Ltd [1993] F.S.R. 617; Elvee Ltd v 
Taylor [2002] F.S.R. 738.    
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Act 1997, s.7(2) and the order would be available under Practice Direction Pt 25 of the 
Civil Procedure Rules and may be conditional.536    
These procedures could be strengthened by extending the powers granted to 
rightsholders under the various provisions contained in s.100537 to also cover articles 
sold contrary to the limitations specified by the reforms. These could be treated as 
“prohibited goods”538 sold in non-compliance of the reforms, including those imported 
in contravention of the proposals. The mere act of importation could also attract 
criminal liability as the act of importation itself could be a criminal offence.540 
This can help strengthen the role of enforcement bodies like the HMRC because it 
enables owners to seize infringing copies and other articles of a work which are found 
exposed or otherwise immediately available for sale or hire, and in respect of which 
the copyright owner would be entitled to apply for an order under s.99.541 These goods 
may then be seized and detained by him or a person authorised by him.542  
5.7.3.3(c)(ii) How this could be enforced in the US 
In the US, the enforcement of the proposals could be strengthened by being run in 
accordance with the strategy that was announced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
in January 2016 that involves working with businesses in an effort to combat 
intellectual property based crimes.543 Thus, like the proposed role of the HMRC, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), which is the domestic intelligence and security 
service of the United States, could work with its investigative partners at the National 
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (NIPRCC). They could play an 
 
536 Civil Procedure Act 1997, s.7(6); On conditions, see Universal Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben [1992] 
F.S.R. 361 – (this case had 7 guidelines to be observed in the execution of such orders that were 
clarified by a Practice Direction issued in 1994, which then was replaced by the CPR Practice 
Direction 25 which sets out guidelines for orders and includes as an annex a Standard Form Order.   
537 CDPA 1988. 
538 CDPA 1988 S.111(1),(2), (3).  
540 CDPA 1988 s.107(1)(b). 
541 CDPA 1988.  
542 S.100(1) CDPA 1988 
543 <https://www.dsac.gov/news/countering-the-growing-intellectual-property-theft-threat> accessed: 
24/2/2017. 
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integral part in this strategy to enhance compliance with the reforms by assisting with 
any investigatory and enforcement practices.544 
5.7.3.3(c)(iii) How enforcement could be enhanced by conducting random 
surveillance under existing statutory powers 
The enforcement bodies could be used to ensure that the reforms are upheld more 
effectively, that is, compliance with them could be increased if searches are conducted 
in a random fashion. The new system would operate in a manner similar to the effect 
of the panoptic system discussed in chapter two.545 This is due to the random nature 
of the searches which could be facilitated by the use of Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources (CHIS) in the UK.546  
For the purpose of understanding, a CHIS is defined in s.28(8) of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 as “a person who establishes or maintains a 
relationship with another person for the covert purpose of obtaining information or 
providing access to information to another person, or covertly disclosing information 
obtained by use of such a relationship, or as a consequence  of the existence of such 
a relationship.”547  
A similar approach in the US could be adopted because, under US law, government 
agents acting in a similar way to a CHIS will be covered by the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act 1982,548 which prevents the disclosure of covert agents.549  
 
544 <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/piracy-ip-theft> accessed: 22/4/2017).  
545 See chapter 2 at 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.  
546 The use of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS's), has been regulated by the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), specifically Part II, since its inception into United Kingdom 
law on the 2nd October 2000.  
547 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s.28(8); For more information on the nature of this 
form of surveillance, including the manner and methods in which it can and is used, see Home 
Office, ‘Covert Surveillance and Property Interference: Code of Practice’ December 2014 Pursuant 
to section 71(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 Available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/384975/Covert_Surv
eillance_Property_Interrefernce_web__2_.pdf> accessed: 3/11/2016.   
548 Title 50 of the United States Code §§421-426.  
549 Intelligence Identities Protection Act 1982 §421(c)  
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5.7.3.3(c)(iv) The proposed effects of deploying this approach 
The proposed approach would involve an undercover-type operation in the form of 
covert surveillance. It is hypothesised that in accordance with the randomised nature 
of the proposed searches, this could mean that agencies like the HMRC, and FBI, 
would become enforcers. They would place those who fail to comply with the reforms 
under the observation of a permanent petty tribunal that is constituted by the relevant 
regulatory body.550 The effect of this could see a reduction in the overall cost of 
investigative and enforcement procedures due to the potential pre-emptive 
compliance that could be generated by this approach, increasing the ‘power’ of 
enforcement agencies under this panoptic-style approach.551 This is because power 
is something which circulates, or as something which only functions in the form of a 
chain. As such, power under this approach would be employed through a net-like 
organisation where individuals are the vehicles of power, not the point of application.552 
Moreover, such individuals may often feel empowered under this approach in the 
online context where they feel a sense of responsibility to be part of policing the 
system.553  
Consequently, enforcement mechanisms like this, even at their most constraining, are 
oppressive measures which can be productive and could give rise to new forms of 
compliant behaviour. This is opposed to simply closing down or censoring certain 
forms of activity, whereby individuals become active subjects rather than passive 
 
550 Foucault, M., Power: The essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (Volume 3, edited by James 
Faubion, 2002), p.83.  
551 For more information, see chapter 2 at 2.3 and 2.4 respectively; See also, Bhattacharjee, S., 
Lertwachara, K., Gopal R. D., & Marsden, J. R. Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing 
Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions. [2006] Journal of Law and Economics, 49, 91-
114, and in particular, Tables 10, 11;  Piet, B., ‘File-sharing – fight, ignore or compete: paid 
download services vs. P2P networks’ Telematics and Informatics, 22 (1-2): 41-55: 
<d_Services_vs_P2P-Networks>  accessed: 19/5/2015.   
552 Foucault, M., Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (eds. Colin 
Gordon, Prometheus Books 1980), p.98.  
553 Albrechtslund, A. Online social networking as participatory surveillance. First Monday, 13(3), 3. 
<http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2142/1949> accessed 24 July 
2019.  
 452 
ones.554 This method is designed to induce potentially non-compliant individuals to a 
state of conscious and permanent visibility.  
This will facilitate compliance with the reforms, as the actions conducted by 
enforcement bodies subject the individual to a set of procedures. This is based on the 
notion, as discussed by Frank, that the psychological impact of threats provisions on 
the individual, the potentiality of a threat being carried out can have greater influential 
effects than if the act were to be carried out itself.555 I will now consider how the 
proposed administrative bodies and current system of enforcement could be funded. 
5.8 How to fund the current approach: maximising value by minimising 
the differentiation in the roles of regulatory bodies 
In terms of providing funding for running this system, this could be administered 
directly by the State, which could investigate the optimal manner in which to fund such 
a system over time. This is to decide the optimal level of funding that is needed overall. 
This approach is considered to be understandable in the digital age because at this 
moment, given our state of knowledge, Hargreaves notes that “no-one in the UK could 
make an informed assessment of what is the right level of resource for online and 
offline enforcement in the UK. We can only guess and get on with it, using rigorous 
evaluation to develop the kind of cost-benefit framework described by the WIPO.”556  
However, it is asserted that the nature of this funding would potentially impair the 
impartiality of this system to a degree. This is because there may be some element of 
‘political’ influence if governmental funds are used. Yet, due to the checks and 
balances that are also administered within the proposed system, it is likely that in any 
event, such a factor will remain minimally, if at all, influential in the day-to-day 
 
554 Foucault, M., The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction by Michael Foucault (Trans. R. 
Hurley, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978).  
555 Frank, J., Law and the Modern Mind, (New York: Tudor Publishing 1949), Ch.1. (Law and the 
Modern Mind is a 1930 book by Jerome Frank which argued that judicial decisions were more 
influenced by psychological factors than by objective legal premises); The book has also been the 
subject of criticism, see  Lon Luvois Fuller, Thomas W. Bechtler, Law in a Social Context: Liber 
Amicorum Honouring Professor Lon L. Fuller (Kluwer, 1978), p.17. 
556 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011), at 8.48.  
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functioning of the system. Nonetheless, it is recognised that if the recommendations 
are accepted, then this will increase the amount of administrative work required by the 
Tribunal which will inevitably increase running costs.  
To help combat this, albeit from outside of the Tribunal itself, it is hypothesised that 
because the relevant roles of bodies such as the HMRC and the Trading Standards 
officers are not significantly different from their original duties, it is asserted that these 
roles will incur minimal costs. This is important when considering the fact that the UK 
Copyright Tribunal has been regarded as lacking financial resources to the point where 
its funding has been regarded as “inadequate.”557  
The fact that the reforms will operate within the pre-existing bodies particular to each 
jurisdiction to avoid excessive costs could mean that running fees and set-up costs 
are minimised. It is likely that this could ensure that the imposition and subsequent 
running of the procedure will be more fluid due to its similarity with pre-existing 
practices and legislation. Thus, any overzealous practices could be easier to spot.558 
This is particularly important because the main issue regarding the imposition of the 
reforms is suggested to likely lie in the costs associated with investigative practices. 
This includes the need to introduce new enforcement policies if the system was 
drastically different in this regard, which this system does not for these reasons and 
so there will be less resources used if the system was entirely different to current 
procedures. This is because “enforcement needs to be carefully tracked and its 
impacts correctly understood. If this is not done, resources will be wasted and further 
harm may be done to the interests of everyone concerned.”559  
 
 
557 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ‘The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal’, TSO, London, (2008) p.14; See also, UK-IPO, ̳Review of the 
Copyright Tribunal, DTI, Newport (2007) at 18 available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/501038/Disc_log_att
achment_to_460.pdf)> last accessed: 22/5/2017). 
558 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ‘The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal’, TSO, London, (2008), part 3.  
559 Hargreaves, I., Digital Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and growth (2011), at 8.44. 
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Thus, the system is based on operating as efficiently as possible by minimally altering 
the pre-existing roles for the reasons stipulated herein. Most of the running costs would 
involve setting rates and administering disputes; it is worth noting that the current UK 
Copyright Tribunal, and the US Copyright Royalty Board, both do this. 
A potential drawback is that a House of Commons report suggested that funding for 
the Tribunal does need to be improved upon,560 although its current costs are 
marginal. 561 Considering this, the existing duties of the regulatory bodies of the 
proposed UK and US bodies are not a considerable step beyond their respective 
current roles under the proposals.  
As a result, it is asserted that any additional funding would be used to deal with the 
possibility of a greater case load when determining disputes in the first instance or 
appeals. These additional funds could comprise of either pre-existing funding with 
some ‘pragmatic’ allocative action by the state should it be needed.562 Alternatively, 
money could also be used under the current penalties system proposed because “to 
be pragmatic is to be instrumental, forward looking, empirical, sceptical, and 
antidogmatic.”563    





560 House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ̳The work and 
operation of the Copyright Tribunal‘ ibid., See also; UK-IPO, ̳Review of the Copyright Tribunal‘, DTI, 
Newport (2007) at 18.  
561 Universities UK Ltd v Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, Design and Artists Copyright Society Ltd 
intervening, [2002] RPC 693 (Copyright Tribunal) at [14]; See also House of Commons Innovation, 
Universities, Science and Skills Committee, ̳The work and operation of the Copyright Tribunal‘, TSO, 
London, (2008) at 30; House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, 
'The work and operation of the Copyright Tribunal: Government response to the Committee's 
second report of session 2007-08', 5th special report of session 2007-08, TSO (2008) at 14. 
562 C.G. Veljanovski in A. Ogus and C.G. Veljanovski, Readings in the Economics of Law and 
Regulation, (Oxford Uni. Press. 1984), p.22.  
563 Posner, R., Overcoming Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1995), p.11.   
 455 
5.9 Concluding comments 
The proposed system would reduce costs across copyright in relation to sale and re-
use for a limited period. This could transcend to reduced production fees and a further 
reduction in the overall cost of works generally for the reasons discussed. 
This could increase both the amount of information disseminated and creative activity 
in relation to works by providing considerably greater certainty for the purchasers and 
re-users of copyright content. This includes a possible reduction in both infringements, 
and threats of, infringement proceedings, as a whole by the extension of legitimate 
markets through increased financial accessibility. This is based on the predicted cost 
reductions in relation to the price of works, and those for re-uses, which may increase 
the willingness to use legitimate sources.564  
The reforms also include preventing the ability of digital contracts, as discussed in 
chapter 4,565 to otherwise restrict the current system. Licencing disputes for 
‘unlicensed’ works used could be less prevalent as the works will be more financially 
accessible under the current proposals. This may result in an increased willingness to 
license and could help alleviate issues like those experienced by the Beastie Boys in 
the Gowers Review (2006),566 where Gowers commented that the current system is 
“limiting in the sense that if we’re going to grab a two-bar section of something now, 





564 It is arguable that an increase in affordable legitimate content may reduce piracy: J. Poort and J. 
Quintais, ‘Global Online Piracy Study’ Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam [2018], 
p.27; Taken from Koo, J., ‘The influence of football on the development of the communication to the 
public right’ E.I.P.R. [2019], 41(9), 571-577 at [577].  
565 See chapter 4 generally, and more specifically, see sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.8 respectively.   
566 A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property [2006]. The report can be found at: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf> accessed: 22/4/2015.  
567 A. Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property [2006], p.67.  
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With this, the goals of the proposals specifically are: 
- That a limit be placed on what can be charged for an item dependent on 
its size568 at the point of sale and re-use until the restrictions have been 
satisfied.   
- That contractual agreements and/or clauses which serve to remove 
items outside of the scope of the proposals be declared void. 
- That cheaper works will be provided under the proposals that could 
increase the overall level of creativity due to the reduced costs envisaged 
pertaining to production and consumption. 
 
These goals will be achieved by: 
- A formal system of registration that requires rightsholders and distributors to 
declare, and objectively prove, that they have acted in compliance with the 
proposed system. Failure to do so, whether accidentally or deliberate, will result 
in the confiscation of funds generated pursuant to accidental and deliberate 
breaches. This however can be challenged, with the option of having the matter 
reviewed by a further external body.  
- An extension of the current roles carried out by the UK Copyright Tribunal, or 
the US Copyright Royalty Board. This also includes extensions of the roles of 
both HMRC and Trading Standard officers in the UK (or in the US, the FBI and 
the NIPRCC). This is done by applying the existing powers of these bodies to 
strengthen the enforceability of the reforms and to minimise costs. This will be 
done by detaining goods that are being sold in excess of the caps through test 
purchases and entering potential premises that are suspected of infringing. 
They can then seize goods and documentation that will help to support 
 
568 ‘Size’ is not defined explicitly here because it is considered to be a quantitative matter that should 
be outlined by the statutory proposals which should be considered within the wider context of the 
culture economy. In addition, such an analysis is deemed to be a matter for governmental 
consideration based on the fact that to provide a comprehensive analysis of potential prices and 
sizes is argued to be beyond the scope of this thesis, as this is designed to provide a framework for 
more detailed reform within the copyright sector to be developed. 
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prosecutions against non-compliant groups and individuals. This will be carried 
out at random intervals.569   
 The system will be funded by: 
- Pre-existing funding with some pragmatic allocative action by the State 
- Money obtained from the proposed penalty procedure570 
The proposals are argued to sufficiently consider rightsholders and recipients by 
facilitating cost-effective re-uses, whilst also attempting to maintain an incentive to 
create in a society dominated by capitalism for which there is no alternative other than 
to work within its confines.571 With this, it is asserted that the demands of the market 
will necessarily recreate authorial incentives from somewhere, even if it is hard to 
specify where right now.572 Considering this, it is hypothesised that it is in the interests 
of the proposed system to work with, and learn from, the ideological aspects of the 
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